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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation redefines the rhetorical canon of delivery by drawing on 
interdisciplinary theories of technology and materiality, including hardware and software 
studies, assemblage theory, and actor-network theory. Rhetorical theorists and 
composition scholars have correctly equated the technological medium with delivery, but 
also have focused exclusively on the circulation of symbolic forces rather than the 
persuasive agency of technology itself, thus eliding the affordances and constraints posed 
by technological actors at the non-symbolic levels of hardware, software, protocol, and 
algorithms. The first section of this dissertation (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) traces the 
historiographical development of rhetorical materialism through a genealogy of major 
theoretical developments (epistemic, anti-realist, poststructuralist, postmodern, and 
posthuman) in twentieth-century American rhetorical studies. In consideration of this 
history, I suggest that the elision of nonhuman actors within delivery scholarship parallels 
a larger linguistic, social, and cultural constructivist paradigm within rhetorical studies as 
a whole. This paradigm is particularly evident within contemporary digital and visual 
rhetorical scholarship. Scholars focus largely on the elements of delivery that the user 
perceives and interacts with and not on the complex nonsymbolic factors that co-
constitute the activity of delivery.  
In my second section (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), I seek to fully realize the claim that 
delivery is the medium by establishing a historical precedent in classical theorists such as 
Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintilian. This precedent illuminates these theorists’ 
recognition of delivery as both central to rhetoric and engaged with embodied, ecological, 
 iii 
and material nonhuman actors. With this classical framework in mind, I argue that 
assemblage theory, actor-network theory, and hardware and software studies enable 
digital rhetoric scholars to realize a similar view of delivery in the present moment that 
has otherwise been overlooked. These contemporary theories of materiality and agency 
share a rejection of a “modern” (Cf. Latour) view of an active human subject using a 
passive object to achieve a communicative aim. By contrast, I offer a “nonmodern” 
vision of technological agency where rhetorical agency and delivery are equally 
distributed across human and nonhuman actors and assemblages. I specifically reclaim 
“realism” in relationship to materiality in order to suggest a nonmodern rhetorical realism 
grounded in delivery as ontological hypokrisis. 
A nonmodern realist theory of delivery enables rhetorical scholars to study how 
material artifacts and writing technologies circulate, transform, and affect rhetorical 
consequences as they enter into various assemblages and networks to shape emergent 
political publics. By examining how delivery occurs through a complex ecological and 
material milieu, I define a more nuanced theoretical framework that allows rhetoricians 
and composition theorists to address the various non-symbolic aspects of digital rhetoric 
and nonhuman agency that increasingly serve as a condition of possibility for the ways in 
which we communicate today. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 MATTER WITHOUT SUBSTANCE: ANTI-REALISM IN THE RHETORICAL 
TRADITION 
 
Trees Have Nothing to Teach Me; Only people in the city can do that 
Socrates 
 
Man is the natural owner and proprietor of nature 
Descartes 
 
The Brain—is wider than the Sky— 
For—put them side by side— 
The one the other will contain 
With ease—and You—beside— 
Emily Dickinson 
 
Anti-Realism in the Rhetorical Tradition 
I have a relatively simple presupposition for this dissertation project: the vast 
majority of twentieth-century theories of rhetoric labor under an unacknowledged anti-
realist paradigm and, furthermore, this paradigm unites a wide array theoretical positions 
that most of us would consider to be distinct. Such a generalization claim will surely be 
greeted with suspicion as very few in our field would immediately self-identify as an 
anti-realist. Yet, if we raise the question of realism or a mind-independent reality that is 
knowable by science or philosophy, my point becomes immediately clear. If discussions 
of anti-realism enjoy little critical valence among contemporary trends in rhetorical 
studies, then realism is what Kenneth Burke would identify as a “devil term”: an ultimate 
term of repulsion. The philosopher of science Manuel DeLanda humorously, yet 
accurately, expresses realism’s status across most intellectual disciplines, ‘‘for decades 
admitting that one was a realist was equivalent to acknowledging [that] one was a child 
	   2 
molester” (Intensive Science 4). By contrast, rhetoric’s “god terms” are all manners and 
variants of linguistic, epistemic, semiotic, social, or cultural constructivisms.  
The bogey man of realism is by no means reducible to a unified set of positions. 
Some rhetorical theorists who oppose realism are reacting to the general thesis that a 
world exists independent from our perception and knowledge (e.g., a mind-independent 
reality). For others, realism simply rests in opposition to idealism. By extension, realism 
is often related to the claim that our representations of reality correspond to the ways in 
which reality actually exists independent of our beliefs (e.g., correspondence theories of 
truth). Regardless of the specific understanding of realism, rhetorical theory has 
traditionally held a deep-seated suspicion of any form of realism and any related variants 
such as “direct realism,” “naïve realism,” or “common sense” realism. Plato famously 
dismissed rhetoric as cookery and anointed philosophy as the mode of inquiry that could 
reveal intelligible forms of reality beyond the realm of appearance. Similarly, Aristotle 
allowed rhetoric to address matters of contingency or probable proof, but nevertheless 
maintained that only science or philosophy could produce knowledge of eternally 
invariable objects. Scientific proofs (pisteis) were for those who were inartistic (atechnê) 
because they required no techniques of persuasion intrinsic to the art (technê) of rhetoric 
to demonstrate their validity. Stated schematically, if rhetoric’s diminishment has often 
occurred at the hands of what remains extrinsic to rhetoric, then rhetoric is 
understandably argued as a technê—a status Plato denied it—on par with philosophy and 
science in direct proportion to the degrees of contingency that can be said to exist in our 
knowledge of reality. Charles Bazerman affirms such a generalization for twentieth-
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century rhetorical theory: “Science, especially physics, is the archetypical ‘hard case’ for 
rhetoric: if one can show rhetorical forces at work in this so-called hard discipline then a 
fortiori such forces must be at work elsewhere throughout knowledge discourse” (4). 
In rhetorical history, a rigorous debate over the relationship between rhetoric and 
realism followed the 1967 publication of Robert Scott’s “On Viewing Rhetoric as 
Epistemic.” This debate pitted constructivism against variants of scientific or 
philosophical realism. Scholars such as Edward Schiappa, Barry Brummett, and James 
Berlin defended a neo-Kantian epistemic position that all of our experience of the world 
was mediated by language, rendering the question of a mind-independent reality a 
fruitless metaphysical speculation (see Royer). By contrast, rhetorical realists such as 
James Hickens, Earl Croasmun, Richard A. Cherwitz, Sean Sayers, and Kenneth Zagacki 
posited the necessity of some manner of realism to avoid epistemic relativism. In his 
entry on “Realism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alexander Miller 
observes, “Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it 
is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various 
topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of 
macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral 
value” (para. 2). Miller’s description is fairly accurate for rhetorical history as well 
because rhetorical realists invariably preserved the space of culture (“aesthetic and moral 
value”) as the province of rhetorical interaction while articulating a “selective” realism 
for scientific representation or objectivity in general. In one such example, Trevor Melia 
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and J.E. McGuire’s “minimal realism” granted science discourse immunity from rhetoric 
in that empiricism could describe the reality of natural phenomena. 
This debate between relativists and rhetorical realists was not definitively settled. 
Yet, even a cursory glance at rhetorical scholarship over the years following Scott’s essay 
demonstrates that a prevailing epistemic approach to rhetoric has become the de facto 
norm that undergirds much in rhetorical theory and pedagogical practice.1 Articles and 
book-length manuscripts directly devoted to the subject of realism are far and few 
between with Daniel J. Royer’s “New Challenges for Epistemic Rhetoric” (1991) serving 
as one of the last essays to fully make a case for rhetorical realism. As a likely 
consequence of the elision of realism, the term “anti-realism” carried little intellectual 
currency seeing as though it would only make sense to identify oneself as an anti-realist 
if one were planning to acknowledge realism. 
When seen from the vantage point of anti-realism, disparate theoretical and 
disciplinary movements within rhetoric theory such as epistemic rhetoric and 
poststructuralism can be seen to share a common ontological underpinning; namely, that 
is it an active cognitive subject alone who constructs reality. Let me offer a well-known 
example from two different theoretical revisions of Lloyd Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. On 
the one hand, Richard Vatz offered an epistemic revision that was predicated upon a fully 
intentional and agentive rhetor who constructed rhetorical reality through the mind alone. 
On the other hand, Barbara A. Biesecker’s poststructuralist revision held that rhetorical 
agency was perpetually displaced by the slippage of signs and signifiers. She specifically 
refutes Vatz’s point of view that rhetorical outcomes are entirely the work of mental 
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processes within the rhetor’s conscious grasp. While Vatz’s and Biesecker’s respective 
views on agency and their assumptions about language differ, both share the anti-realist 
position that language mediates all experience of reality and that no unmediated 
knowledge of reality is possible.  
Anti-realism’s authorization of constructivism has also resulted in a 
marginalization of the role that material actors and materiality play in the constitution of 
rhetoric. On the one hand, James Berlin admits that rhetorical theory overwhelmingly 
privileges linguistic access to reality: “This is not to deny the force of the material in 
human affairs: people do need to provide for physiological needs, to arrange refuge from 
the elements, and to deal with eventual physical extinction. However, all of these material 
experiences are mediated through signifying practices. Only through language do we 
know and act upon the conditions of our experience” (“Poststructuralism and Cultural 
Studies” 21). Berlin’s point of view is a dominant paradigm among twentieth-century 
rhetorical theory. Granted this anti-realist warrant, a specific consideration of realism is 
rendered unnecessary.2 The human mind creates and shapes rhetorical reality 
independent of the world of natural forces.3 Culture, symbols, language, and nomos 
(culture, convention) are immune from physis (nature). In a discussion of reality in a 
book aptly named Rhetoric and Reality, Berlin writes,  
Language never acts as a simple referent to an external, extralinguistically 
verifiable thing-in-itself. It instead serves as a terministic screen, to use 
Burke’s phrase, that forms and shapes experience. . . . Thus, language 
practices engender a set of ideological prescriptions regarding the nature of 
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“reality”: economic “realities” and the distribution of wealth; social and 
political “realities” regarding class, race, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
and gender and their relations to power; and cultural “realities” regarding 
the nature of representation and symbolic form in art, play, and other 
cultural experiences. (92-93) 
Berlin’s stylistic gesture is common among rhetorical theorists who place scare quotes 
around the word “reality” to performatively emphasize its constructed vision. Berlin’s 
title Rhetoric and Reality could just as easily have been titled, “Rhetoric and Anti-
realism.”  
On the other hand, Edward Schippa’s 2003 manuscript Defining Reality fails to 
even acknowledge that there might be an outside to language. While it is a common 
syntactical habit to place “reality” in quotes to signify the constructed nature of reality in 
Berlin’s sense, Schiappa did not even acknowledge the possibility of any mind 
independent reality. For Schiappa, rhetorical reality is what humans create in an 
autonomous and isolated sphere of language without regard for how representation 
mirrors reality. His elision of realities beyond the mind or the actual material presence of 
nonhuman actors in the world is a widely held warrant that goes largely unchallenged 
within recent decades of rhetorical theory. 
Four Symptoms of Anti-Realism 
As I will demonstrate in this dissertation, rhetorical theory’s unwillingness to 
develop a more complex understanding of rhetoric vis-à-vis realism has several practical 
and ultimately negative consequences for rhetorical theory. Simply put, the tacit 
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acceptance of an anti-realist paradigm poses problems when rhetorical theory attempts to 
deal with the embodied, ecological, material, and medial aspects of communication. To 
date, realism in rhetorical theory largely remains an impoverished version of Alan G. 
Gross’s commonsense realism, leaving language free to float free of the body and the 
world save for a few rhetorical realists who claim a special status for scientific 
representation. The denial of realism has slipped into the lack of theoretical attention to 
the specific ways in which communication is a materializable phenomenon. Anti-realism, 
I will argue, makes assessing the material and physical influence of nonhuman entities in 
relationship the rhetorical situation a truly difficult task. Schiappa writes of an actual 
interchange between Larry Rosenfield and Richard McKeon at an academic conference 
in the 1970’s. In a debate over the value of so-called “Big rhetoric”—the argument that 
rhetoric has extended from a narrow concern with oral persuasion to a generalized 
discursive epistemology that constituted knowledge in any discipline—Rosenfield 
complained that rhetorical phenomena “includes everything but tidal waves” (“Critiques 
of Big Rhetoric” 269). Richard McKeon shot back, “Why not tidal waves?” indicating his 
conviction that rhetoric should account for even inanimate entities. Schiappa takes the 
fact that this semi-humorous anecdote had not come true in thirty years—no rhetorical 
scholar has written about the rhetoric of tidal waves—as proof of Rosenfield’s 
overstatement, and as a reaffirmation that rhetorical epistemology and social 
constructivism remain the foundation for rhetorical theories. Ironically, even when we are 
tempted to write about tidal waves, it would invariably be the discourse about tidal waves. 
Its status as a real entity that “persuades” humans to built homes on stilts on the north 
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shore of Oahu, Hawaii, where I visited my grandmother when I was younger, would be 
secondary to genre analysis of policy statements attempting to mine the use of 
asymptotes in City Council deliberations about the proper housing code for said stilts.  
My purpose, then, in this dissertation is to suggest a new and reconceived version 
of rhetorical realism that can in fact account for objects such as tidal waves as real, vital, 
actual, present, and affective forces in the world. Indeed, I will locate rhetoric’s anti-
realist problem with nonhuman actors and materiality within a “modern” ontological 
division between active human subjects and passive objects inherited from a Cartesian-
Newtonian ontology. In its place, I will articulate the need for a nonmodern rhetorical 
realism grounded in Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (“realistic realism”), 
assemblage theory in Jane Bennett and Manuel DeLanda (“material realism”) as well as 
Matthew Fuller’s Deleuzian media ecology, and “agential realism” in Karen Barad. 
These theories hold a “nonmodern” ontology—Latour’s concept—where humans and 
nonhumans share the same space of entanglement, prompting us to revise anti-realist 
rhetorics to conceive of the relationship between materialism and realism.  
Anti-realism leaves us with what Latour identifies as the modern Constitution 
(described below): an ontological separation between the active human subject and the 
passive, inert, and static object. While it is true that I could just as easily argue for a new 
form of nonmodern rhetorical materialism, I have strategic reasons for retaining the term 
realism. Of those affiliated with the nonhuman turn, the speculative realist branch have 
indeed made the ontological claim that reality exists independent of the mind—claims 
that I will address in detail in Chapter 4. At the present, I want to acknowledge that for 
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Latour, Barad, DeLanda, and Fuller, the invocation of the term realism does not 
necessarily mean a return to naïve realism or hypotheses of a mind-independent reality. 
Rather, realism’s devil term status means that the term can be usefully recontextualized to 
signify the return to the qualified assessments of the concrete, scientific, and quasi-
empirical material effects and affects that epistemic accounts of rhetoric have tended to 
ignore. Similarly, I seek to employ the anti-realist mechanisms by which rhetoric elided 
realism as a way to illustrate why rhetoric has a much larger problem with the sorts of 
vitalist materialism, ecologies, alien phenomenologies, and hyperobjects that nonmodern 
thinkers define as reality sans quotation marks in a world of human and nonhuman actors.  
While I will articulate this nonmodern rhetorical realism in detail in the remaining 
chapters, I want to clearly indicate the exigency for such a revision in the present chapter. 
This chapter functions simultaneously as an Introduction and as a chapter that will 
advance my argument throughout the dissertation as a whole. In other words, I want to 
conclusively demonstrate why anti-realism poses unproductive limitations for rhetorical 
theory’s relationship to matter and nonhuman actors. The major consequence of anti-
realism’s focus on the subject’s active construction authorizes the typical process-
movement to writing and rhetoric. As a consequence, the canons of invention, style, and 
(an invention-heavy) arrangement have been the sole focus of rhetorical theorists for 
much of the twentieth-century. Canons such as memory and delivery that addressed the 
nonsymbolic aspects of rhetoric fell into obscurity. Thus, the recovery of these canons 
will prove to be a core part of realizing a nonmodern rhetorical realism. In particular, I 
will suggest that delivery’s marginalization at the hands of epistemic rhetorics holds a 
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crucial component wherein delivery could be seen as the first canon of rhetoric. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: I offer four primary and by no means 
comprehensive symptoms of anti-realism that I in turn employ as points of contrast 
through which to re-think the relationship between rhetoric and realism for the 
dissertation as a whole. The first symptom examines anti-realism within the context of 
rhetorical materialism, focusing primarily on the writing of Dana Cloud. Cloud’s 
example is telling because she conflates a neo-Marxist materialism with realism, reducing 
reality to lived human experience and symbolic action. In assessing Cloud’s rhetorical 
materialism from the standpoint of anti-realism, I also draw parallels between anti-
realism and Richard Lanham’s “strong defense” of rhetoric as a knowledge-creating 
technê. The rejection of the reality of nonhuman actors and matter-in-itself will become a 
major way in which rhetoric rises to prominence in the twentieth-century; however, this 
anti-realist warrant simultaneously complicates attempts to talk about the world of 
physical objects, gravity, nail polish, GPS units, and plaid shirts in ways that do not 
automatically reduce them to human representation and instrumentality.  
My second symptom lies in the failure of rhetorical theorists to interrogate the 
ontological assumptions that epistemic and constructivist rhetorics are predicated on. 
Although rhetoric is widely held to be epistemic, such a claim is premised upon a 
distilled and unacknowledged form of neo-Kantianism and Cartesian mind/body dualism. 
An impoverished reading of Kant’s a priori cogito provided the explicit exigence for 
early twentieth-century figures such as Ernst Cassirer to simply propose that there was no 
need for rhetorical theorists to even consider the noumena—the mind-independent nature 
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of reality. Furthermore, I suggest that anti-realism in this context is no mere theoretical 
construct or idle philosophical speculation. A brief pedagogical analysis of writing 
pedagogy related to rhetorical invention in C.H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon’s 
scholarship demonstrates a clear link between common topoi of writing’s invention-
heavy focus and neo-Kantian anti-realism. 
The third symptom relates to rhetoric and composition pedagogy. I will make an 
initial case for the rise of invention and the diminishment of delivery. The fourth and, for 
my dissertation’s purpose, most important symptom lies in the problems that an anti-
realist paradigm holds for rhetorical treatments of technology. Anti-realism plays out in 
technology scholarship as a form of covert humanism. Technology only matters when 
humans directly instrumentalize it for symbolic aims. An active cognitive subject 
employs a passive object. As a result, rhetorical theorists are ill-equipped address how 
technology creates constraints and affordances in material and medial ecologies that 
obtain at nonsymbolic registers such as hardware, software, algorithms, and protocol. I 
intend to apply the insights of a nonmodern rhetorical realism to digital rhetoric, visual 
rhetoric, and matters of delivery and circulation. Therefore, an initial diagnosis of the 
modern Constitution within technology studies will pave the way for the content in future 
chapters. 
Given my treatment of these four symptoms, I suggest that anti-realism leaves 
rhetorical theory in a position where matter has no substance, a claim that I epitomize 
through Jacques Derrida’s anti-realist attempt to theorize a “materialism without 
substance.” To move beyond a view of rhetoric as “matter without substance,” I propose 
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a new understanding of rhetorical realism that is not predicated on anti-realism and 
dualism but on a flat ontology where human and nonhuman actors share the same space 
of entanglement. I turn to Karl Marx’s early writings to describe his exploration of a 
vitalist materialism where objects and nonhuman actors possessed a conative and 
affective influence on human activity. Marx, like many post-enlightenment thinkers, 
subsequently rejected this early treatment of objects, but I use his example as a way to 
introduce the possibility of a rhetorical materialism where nonhuman actors are real, 
substantial entities in the world who serve as a condition of possibility for rhetorical 
interaction. Furthermore, Marx served as a frequent point of departure for rhetorical 
materialists including Cloud, William Colvin McGee, and, more recently, Ronald Green. 
Re-thinking which parts of Marx are invoked for rhetorical materialism offers an 
important precedent for a revitalized rhetorical materialism. In order to develop this point 
of view, I identify anti-realism’s Cartesian-Kantian ontology through Bruno Latour’s 
thinking of the modern Constitution in We Have Never Been Modern. Through Latour’s 
actor-network theory and other related theoretical positions that seek to take the reality of 
nonhuman actors as a scholarly concern, I propose a “nonmodern rhetorical realism.” The 
remainder of the dissertation will develop a nonmodern rhetoric in detail by turning away 
from the epistemic and subject-centered canon of invention and toward the ontological 
and object-codependent canon of delivery. 
Symptom 1: Rhetorical Materialism’s Problem with Matter 
One major consequence of anti-realism lies in scholarly conversations around the 
materiality of rhetoric. Materiality for rhetorical theorists generally means “discourse” 
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and the linguistic mediation of materiality. It does not mean matter as such, matter-in-
itself, or the mind-independent existence of nonhuman actors. In past and recent 
conversations regarding “rhetorical materialism,” we can clearly see the ambivalence 
over realism and the privileging of constructivism. At best, much of contemporary 
rhetoric and politics in rhetorical materialism remains undertheorized as Jack Selzer 
wrote in the “Introduction” to the edited collection Rhetorical Bodies, one of the first 
substantial collections designed to addressed rhetorical materialism, “Even though 
rhetoric has long been concerned with the situatedness of literate acts and the real effects 
of discourse rather than with ideal possibilities, the relationship of rhetorical events to the 
material world that sustains and produces them has not often enough been fully 
elaborated or clearly articulated.” (9). Selzer’s point, written in the late 1990’s remains 
largely true today, and, in this section, I would like to use contemporary thinking about 
rhetorical materialism as a way of illustrating the problems with anti-realist rhetorics and 
matter. Throughout the dissertation, I will make gestures toward more general trends 
within rhetorical materialism as well as offshoots such as ecological and vitalist rhetorics. 
For the present, I will focus on the writing of a prominent rhetorical materialist, Dana 
Cloud—a decision made principally on the numerous citations that she enjoys within 
scholarship that attempts to connect rhetoric and materiality. 
For Cloud as well as for a variety of prominent rhetorical materialists such as 
Ronald Greene, materiality does not mean the world of atoms, LED-lights, shoelaces, 
academic job wikis, writing teachers, and pinecones as they exist as material or physical 
forces in the world. While ecological and vitalist offshoots of rhetorical materialism 
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(Hawk; Dobrin; Gries; Cooper) have turned to Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, Alfred 
North Whitehead, Spinoza, Diderot, and other philosophers who were very interested in 
questions of material ontology, rhetorical materialists continually pair materialism with 
“class consciousness” in the Marxist sense. This trend is in keeping with William Colvin 
McGee’s neo-Marxist definition of rhetorical materialism in essay, “A Materialist 
Conception of Rhetoric” In their introduction to Rhetoric, Materiality, Politics, John 
Louis Lacaites and Biesecker credit McGee’s essay as the first scholar in the rhetorical 
tradition to theorize a proper materialist rhetoric. Alternatively, rhetorical or cultural 
materialism has been associated with Althusserian or Foucaultian awareness of 
institutionally legitimated sites of power, identity formation, and control.4  
In order to demonstrate the connection between rhetorical materialism as 
discourse or class consciousness and the anti-realist legacy within rhetoric, I first need to 
define Marx vis-à-vis realism and anti-realism. Furthermore, this analysis will provide 
me with a context later on in this chapter to use a forgotten (vitalist) aspect of Marx’s 
early work to begin to reconceive of rhetorical materialism. Indeed, as I will demonstrate 
below, an alternative reading of Marx will actually enable me to theorize an alternative 
conception of rhetorical materialism that is not predicated on anti-realism. Furthermore, 
considering Cloud’s arguments in detail allows me to establish connections to broader 
anti-realist trends such as ideological criticism (Crowley) and various forms of linguistic 
constructivism. 
Orthodox Marxist materialism is predicated upon a view where every rhetorical 
activity either reinforces or erodes the superstructure. For Marx, symbolic structures are 
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engaged in legitimating (reflecting) or challenging the prevailing modes of production 
that authorize non-egalitarian balances between labor and capital relationships in social 
space. Material reality— albeit it one utterly and totally determined by capitalist modes 
of production—is what produces the conditions under which we practice rhetoric. In 
Reality and Reason, Sean Sayers notes that Marx did not spend much time with 
epistemology because of its idealist connotations in Kant (see also Cheah Specters). 
Although Marx did not elaborate on this point, Marxist materialisms are often predicated 
upon a variant of realism that Sayers calls the “reflection theory of language.” The theory 
goes that, Sayers writes, “The objective world can be known to consciousness . . . only 
because consciousness is a reflection of reality. This idea, in some form or other, is basic 
to all versions of realism and materialism in epistemology” (7). 
 Thus, if reality is contingent, socially constructed, and not a reflection of Plato’s 
invariable metaphysical nature, then reality as a reflection of consciousness can be 
changed exclusively by shifting signifiers and challenging acts of negation. Orthodox 
Marxist materialism was unattractive precisely because it was too deterministic. Not 
every linguistic entity is engaged in a relationship with every other entity, and this 
comment applies to all scales of human and nonhuman entities—not just symbols. Such a 
narrow definition of reality leads us to what the philosopher Todd May calls “strategic 
politics” in The Political Philosophy of Postructuralist Anarchism. Stated a bit 
reductively, strategic political philosophy limits political intervention to action targeting 
the one (economic) base that organizes all relations. If we do not target this base as the 
locus of our political and rhetorical efforts, then we are merely enacting Don Quixote’s 
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jousts with windmills or trapped inside Marx’s non-Platonic cave by concerting our 
efforts on social ephemera that maintain the base rather than identify and fix the “real 
problem.”  
Many rhetorical theorists subsequently rejected an orthodox Marxist materialism. 
It is not hard to see why. In perhaps the most famous distancing of rhetoric from 
orthodox materialism, Kenneth Burke, as Frank Lentricchia has well documented, was 
rejected from the American Writers Conference—a communist-socialist collective. Why? 
Because Burke noted that regardless of the Hegelian-infused historical dialectic that 
centered on the laborer as the empirical analysis, symbols, Burke argued, could create 
their own realities independent of any telos grounded in the economy. Thus, using the 
term “worker” as a Marxist “God term” of transnational identification carried symbolic 
resonances with an American audience that would actually create realities that were 
counter-productive to the desired ideal form of class identification. In this similar way, 
rhetoric has always been concerned not with the relationship to the truth, but with how 
language performs different functions in different social contexts and rhetorical 
situations—the anti-realist essence of Schiappa’s Defining Reality. 
 Marx’s narrow version of materialism served as a point of contrast for subsequent 
rhetorical materialisms. Following from McGee’s precedent, rhetorical materialism 
largely became a way of helping citizens and students to identify these widely distributed 
institutional ideologies and to debunk them. Thus, rhetorical theorists who wanted to 
retain Marx’s materialist class consciousness while talking about rhetorical creativity and 
labor’s materiality are often trapped, in the rhetorical materialist Dana Cloud’s words, 
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“between the Scylla of idealism and the Charybdis of ‘vulgar’ economism or 
simpleminded orthodoxies” (“The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron” 141). In 
attempting to restore “materiality” to rhetoric, Cloud notes “critical scholars are trying to 
navigate safe passage by way of a particular theoretical hypothesis: the materiality of 
discourse, or the idea that discourse itself is influential in or even constitutive of social 
and material reality (including the lived) experience of work, pleasure, pain, and hunger)” 
(“142). What is “real” is the fact humans create linguistic meaning independent of 
concrete referents in the world.  
 Cloud’s rhetorical materialism is unique because she is very well aware of the 
anti-realist position that informs her rhetorical materialism while nevertheless retaining a 
version of realism to support her materialism. This retention is not a contradiction. In a 
comment that reflects Miller’s sentiments above, the philosopher Levi Bryant argues, “all 
materialists are invariably realists at some level” (n.pag). The reverse position, however, 
“all realists are materialists” is not true as Plato believed that material reality was 
ultimately derivable from a transcendental realm of intelligible forms. Cloud’s position is 
thus not realism in the ontological sense, but a form of epistemic anti-realism where the 
human mind alone shapes reality. She argues this point in her comment elsewhere 
“Although there is no permanent, essential, or universally experienced reality, the 
category of reality is necessary to political judgment even as it finds intelligibility, 
conscious meaning, and strategic import in discourse” (“The Matrix” 331).  
Yet, as the same time, Cloud recognizes this tension with a mind-independent 
(ontological) realism, citing Hickins’s comment “Historical materialism is one version of 
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realism, or a philosophy that insists that there is a truth independent of the individual 
knower or perceiver of reality” (“Materiality of Discourse” 145).5 Yet, Cloud ultimately 
recognizes that the need for rhetoric to remain a creative linguistic force and to avoid 
strategic politics necessitates a rejection of a mind-independent realism. She offers a 
definition of reality as such: “This article defines reality as the site of lived experience, 
the place where the embodied experience of labor generates contradictions with regard to 
knowledge and consciousness” (146). Here, we see an attempt to combine a distilled 
Marxist “class awareness” that is tied not to a mind-independent realism or even to the 
ecological or material affect and influence of buildings, trees, cars, woodland creatures or 
other entities, but to critique and de-mystification of labor relations that “nonsense” 
words cover up. For Cloud, the “real” is of interest for the purposes of ideological 
demystification—an epistemic problem but not a perspective that sheds light upon the 
actual materiality of language. The “materiality” of language is simply that it can cause 
effects for humans independent of biological or physical determinism.  
For Cloud, rhetorical materialism increasingly just means the awareness of when 
symbolic statements do not accord to “actual” events such as when Apple claims to be a 
socially responsible company while exploiting and enabling deplorable worker conditions 
in Chinese factories. Neo-Marxist materialism and “realism” become almost 
interchangeable. In a different essay, Cloud specifically theorizes rhetorical materialism 
through appealing to Alcoff’s “imminent realism.” Imminent realism insists that “truths 
are perspectival and that we should privilege the truths of subordinate groups in society” 
(e.g., the factory workers) (qtd. in Cloud 146). The excluded remainder becomes a “truth” 
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in relationship to dominant metanarratives that legitimate the neoliberal order and social 
hierarchies, leading Alcoff to declare that some version of (constructivist) realism is 
necessary to political judgment and action. Ironically, this mind-dependent understanding 
of imminent realism is the exact opposite of a mind-independent realism. Alcoff’s variant 
does not argue over the ontological status of matter as it informs our attempts to bring 
Nature to Culture, but instead that ideology and hegemony cause us to value the 
arguments and grounds for argumentation (and entry points) that exclude points of view 
that would challenge these. Cloud concludes via Alcoff, “An unmitigated rhetorical 
relativism is at odds with both materialist and idealist realisms because in principle, 
relativism affords the critic no privileged perspectives by which to judge economic or 
political realities” (153). Despite her efforts to promote a rhetorical materialism, Cloud’s 
cannot avoid anti-realism. Matter does not mean matter-in-itself, but the discourse about 
labor, bodies, and the environment. Cloud’s essay well identifies the political and ethical 
stakes in maintaining an anti-realist argument, writing “On the other hand, social 
constructionism usefully challenges the idea that a given economic or political reality is 
natural, permanent, and transparent and argues that representations of that reality are 
persuasive constructs that obscure the real interests at stake and the possibilities of 
change” (149-50).  
Let us leave Cloud for the moment and look more broadly at the topography of 
rhetorical theory in the context of her claim. The canonical figures of the cultural studies 
terrain who are drawn on by rhetorical theorists is littered with anti-realists who hold 
similar positions.6 Robert Wess has documented how rhetorical approaches to the cultural 
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studies trinity of race, class, and gender are almost identical when seen from the 
viewpoint of anti-realist constructivism. In the example of racism, constructivism 
challenges the assumption of a naturalized hierarchy of white skin over non-white skin 
through biological essentialism or foundationalism (see also Rorty, Contingency). Thus, 
anti-realism or anti-foundationalism allows us to argue that race is not an essence but a 
product of nomos, convention, history, and particularist interpretations. The political and 
ethical argument is subsequently to throw out realism and nature (physis) and to maintain 
that humans are incapable of transparently or neutrally representing represent a biological 
or natural reality (physis). Here, the basic impulse seen in the anti-realist tendencies 
within rhetorical materialism becomes symptomatic within humanities approaches that 
extend far beyond rhetorical theory. Donna Haraway has well documented that the physis 
and nomos distinction inevitably universalized nature and culture, elevating the discourse 
of “natural scientists and philosophers” over rhetorical theorists. Furthermore, such issues 
connect with the historically Western obsession “with racial purity, categories authorized 
by nature, and the well-defined self” (60). 
By positing that humans have no knowledge of essences, constructivism allows 
rhetorical theorists to construct new (non)racial identities, politics, and representations by 
privileging the effects and dissemination of the social construction of symbols rather than 
an individual’s immanent reasoning capacity—a faculty historically limited to propertied 
white males—or biological self that generate them. Despite her express desire earlier in 
the essay to at least acknowledge a concern with realism, Cloud specifically invokes 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s unapologetic anti-realism that is tied to political 
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intervention and agency. Laclau and Mouffe write, “Human beings socially construct 
their world, and it is through this construction-always precarious and incomplete—that 
they give to a thing its being” (89). Laclau and Mouffe define their project as “anti-realist” 
rather than anti-materialist (86-87), an intentional move (perhaps) to separate their 
epistemic view of language from vulgar Marxist materialism while nevertheless 
reinforcing anti-realism. Yet, by Cloud’s standards, Laclau and Mouffee are materialists 
at the level of discourse producing effects in the world. Cloud affirms that Mouffee and 
Laclau reject the “usefulness of the notion of ontological, pre-discursive reality, not the 
imbrication of discourse with power. . . . They reject the idea that the world falls into line 
according to some set of a priori idealized forms or concepts” (152). Simply put, we 
cannot declare what is real and invariably for all time given that, following from Burke, 
all orientations are necessarily partial and that any claim of objectivity would only reflect 
the interests of the institutionally privileged group who could benefit from having their 
version of reality naturalized.7  
It is not only rhetorical materialists and those interested in politics who cling to an 
anti-realist worldview, and this observation will tie directly back to my previous 
observations about rhetoric’s historical dislike of realism. Anti-realism as an unspoken 
warrant that legitimates what Richard Lanham called a “strong defense of rhetoric” in 
“The Q Question.” The “weak defense” is given by Plato wherein rhetoric is cookery and 
amoral manipulation if performed by a non-virtuous man and, at best, stylistic adornment 
if employed by an elite moral individual. In no small coincidence, the strong defense of 
rhetoric—rhetoric as a knowledge producing technê—occurs when the linguistic and 
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epistemic turns blurs the lines between what science can and cannot know. The more that 
reality is argued to be a matter of historical convention, individual or social contingency, 
and does not mirror an invariable metaphysical order of things, the more that all matters 
of knowledge can be said to possess some degree of rhetoricality. The strong defense 
lurks behind Bazerman’s statement about physics and rhetoric above. Countless times at 
national rhetoric and writing conventions can one hear unchallenged assumptions that all 
knowledge is rhetorical because all knowledge is mediated by language. Epistemological 
uncertainty has been collapsed into a de facto anti-realist ontology. In other words, 
rhetorical theorists seemingly have everything to gain and nothing to lose by maintaining 
a strong anti-realism defense of rhetoric. I should note here that this thesis does not mean 
that language is necessary freed from materiality. It is more the point that what is 
considered to be essential and rhetorical about language is only its symbolic character. 
Burke defines rhetoric as “an essential function of language itself. . . the use of language 
as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” 
(Rhetoric of Motives 53). A common reading of Burke is that anything nonsymbolic lies 
in the realm of what he calls “mere motion”—that is, physical and biological causation.8  
Symptom 2: The Rise of Anti-Realism in the Rhetorical Tradition 
My previous discussion of rhetorical materialism should make it clear that actual 
considerations of mind-independent reality, scientific discourse, the ontology of matter, 
or nature per se is not at stake in any consideration of a rhetorical materialism. For the 
vast majority of rhetorical theorists, it is the discourse about bodies or the discourses that 
privilege white but not non-white bodies that is of interest for rhetorical theorists.9 How 
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did rhetorical theory get to a point where matter in itself does not matter for the vast 
majority of scholarly practice? The locus of critical attention has been on the subject 
while the reality or status of the object has been ignored, bracketed, or reduced to 
signification. Diana Poole and Samantha Frost in the introduction to the edited collection 
New Materialisms writes: “It is true that over the past three decades or so, theorists have 
radicalized the way they understand subjectivity, discovering its efficacy in constructing 
even the most apparently natural phenomena while insisting upon its embededness in 
dense networks of power that outrun its control and constitute its willfulness. Yet it is on 
subjectivity that their gaze has focused” (2). According to Thomas Rickert in Ambient 
Rhetoric, rhetorical theory tends to elide a common fact; namely, “every theory of 
rhetoric implicitly or explicitly organizes and invokes a theory of materiality and the 
human relation to it” (n/a). Berlin as well acknowledges to argue for a theory of rhetoric 
(and writing) is to argue for a version of reality and thus was confident in his exclusion of 
matter as such and the world of nonhumans from his understanding of the rhetorical 
situation.  
The second symptom of anti-realism is that of the fixity of matter: the Cartesian-
Kantian paradigm and the Newtonian worldview of static objects. In this section I want to 
explore the ontological foundations of anti-realism. Although many rhetorical histories 
begin with the Greeks and Romans, mine begins by arguing for the centrality of an 
enlightenment philosopher seldom discussed outside of philosophy and rhetoric 
scholarship who had a ironically negative view of rhetoric: Immanuel Kant. In 
“Transgressive Realism,” Lee Braver notes three ontological steps to anti-realism: Kant’s 
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“active mind,” Hegel’s “objective idealism,” and Kierkegaard’s “transgressive realism”; 
however, Kant, in my opinion, ends up being the most significant figure for rhetorical 
theorists to focus on. Prior to Kant, Braver notes that Cartesian dualism sowed the seeds 
for modern divisions between perceiving and knowing subjects and passive objects. 
Poole and Frost make a similar claim. 
Many our ideas about materiality in fact remain indebted to Descartes, 
who defined matter in the seventeenth century as corporeal substance 
constituted of length, breadth, and thickness; as extended, uniform, and 
inert. This provided the basis for modern ideas of nature as quantifiable 
and measurable and hence for Euclidian geometry and Newtonian 
physics. According to this model, material objects are identifiably 
discrete; they move only upon an encounter with an external force or 
agent, and they do so according to a linear logic of cause and effect. (7) 
This view also has the convenience of coinciding with our common sense view of reality, 
missing, as Jane Bennett notes in Vibrant Matter, the slow grammatological rewriting of 
techtonic plates and other things that occur either too fast or too slow for humans to 
perceive. Descartes identified the cogito as ontologically other than matter. Locke and the 
empiricists would similarly shift the location of substance from things-in-themselves to 
the impressions of the human senses. Simply put, prior to Kant’s a priori synthetic 
judgment, a dualist foundation was established that would respect the thing-in-itself by 
allowing that we could only really be sure of impressions produced by our mental 
patterns to inform our partial experience of objects. 
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According to a general narrative established by speculative realists such as 
Quentin Meillassoux, Bryant, Latour, and Graham Harman, Kant is largely responsible 
for two thrusts in the twentieth-century. First, building upon empiricism’s observation 
that we only encounter substances as they exist for us and not as they exist in themselves, 
Kant argued for the active construction of knowledge: 
But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow 
that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our 
empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions 
and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving 
merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. (Critique 275) 
According to Braver in A History of Continental Anti-Realism, Kant united Cartesian 
dualism with an empirical skepticism in “the epoch-making claim that the mind actively 
processes or organizes experience in the construction of knowledge, rather than passively 
reflecting an independent reality” (3). Latour facetiously describes Descartes’ 
contribution: “Only a mind put in the strangest position, looking at the form from the 
inside out and linked to the outside by nothing by the tenuous connection of the gaze, will 
throb in constant fear of losing reality” (Pandora’s Hope 4). 
Secondly, Kant is alleged to have perpetuated Cartesian duality in the form of a 
separation of mind and matter or, in his terms, noumenal and phenomenal: 
Since the oldest days of philosophy, inquirers into pure reason have 
thought that, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), 
which make up the sensible world, there were certain beings of the 
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understanding (noumena), which should constitute an intelligible 
world. . . . And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere 
appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, 
though we know not this thing as it is in itself but only know its 
appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this 
unknown something. (798) 
Kant would build upon dualism and British empiricism, noting that substances are, as 
Braver describes, “particulars that endure in time and space, which we use (through 
impressions and senses) to give unity to our sense of place in the world. We use things 
and our ability to differentiate things as a way to locate ourselves in the world (Irwin, it 
should be noted, notes that Aristotle wanted this too)” (11).10 Despite the existence of 
noumenal forms, Kant is still very much in the mind.11 Unlike empiricists, and this 
insight is key for understanding the connection between rhetoric and anti-realism, Kant 
argued that the mind actively constituted reality in order to determine necessity for causal 
relations. Sensation thus required supplementation by the mind as no relations were 
directly given in impression. Since the mind therefore imposes the limits of knowledge, 
humans required then to distinguish not between the thing-in-itself and its localized 
manifestation, but between judgments of intersubjectivity or social consensus. Some 
positions and claims could be universalized (e.g., a cup of hot coffee is warm)—scientific 
and objective—and some could not (e.g., “I think this cup of hot coffee is delicious”)—
nonscientific and subjective. Consensus, be it of a Habermansian or social-epistemic 
variety in Berlin, is identified—much as Aristotle situated rhetoric to deal with matters of 
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probability and science to deal with an invariable nature—not against a consideration of a 
mind-independent reality (the thing-in-itself), but of epistemic construction. Like Locke, 
he believes that we have no access or good reason to believe in a mind-independent 
reality as an explanation for qualities that we experience.12  
In the speculative realist narrative of post-enlightenment thought, Kant 
inaugurated a paradigm that Meillassoux identifies as “correlationism”: “By 
‘correlationism,’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from 
the other” (5). Meillassoux describes a gradual philosophical shift in how questions of 
ontology—considerations the nature of all beings, of substance —were replaced by 
questions of epistemology—questions of human access to knowledge. Bryant et al. 
confirm Meillassoux and Braver’s observation: “The origins of the correlationist turn lie 
in Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy. . . . [I]n Kant’s famous Copernican revolution, it 
is no longer the mind that conforms to objects, but rather objects that conform to the 
mind” (4). Kant himself writes, “We suppose that our representations of things, as they 
are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these 
objects, as appearances, conform to out mode of representation” (Critique of Pure 
Reason). Summarily stated, humans pay a price for securing the metaphysical privilege of 
the logos; namely, “the renunciation of any knowledge beyond how things appear to us” 
(4). We can think of being, exist among other beings-in-the-worlds, or even have 
phenomenological encounters, but we are incapable of speaking of a reality independent 
of thought. In essence, this is a subtle form of idealism. Meillassoux writes, “Such 
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considerations reveal the extent to which the central notion of modern philosophy since 
Kant seems to be that of correlationism” (12). Sensation, the realm of empirical intuition, 
is chaotic, and, contra David Hume’s empiricism, cannot provide us with a means to 
structure experience. Why would we ever trust the body or the senses? Kant declares, 
“our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains 
solely that which pertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of marks and 
partial representations that we can ever consciously separate from one another” (234). 
Here, we can see that Kant, while preserving a space for the noumenal, nevertheless—in 
Graham Harman’s term—overmines the reality of individual objects in favor of the 
manifold of intuition, along with a priori forms of space/time and categories of the mind. 
As Bryant writes in The Democracy of Objects, objects—nonhuman actors—“are ‘effects’ 
of something more immediate and accessible (empirical experience and mind)” (26). 
There are several points about correlationism is worth mentioning. First, the term 
correlationism is very general and Meillassoux’s claim that the vast majority of post-
Kantian philosophers are obsessed with the mind-world correlate seems at times 
overstated. Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Deleuze, Donna Haraway, and others certainly 
were not guilty of correlationism at all times. Secondly, Kant is an odd choice as a 
whipping boy for the speculative realists. Hegel absolutized consciousness and many 
elements of his philosophical thought would certainly be said to fit into a correlationist 
mindset. Kant, however, definitely retained a degree of respect for realism as Sayers has 
noted (10-14). He “brackets” the noumena not because it exists in a Platonic world of 
forms, but more out of his belief in the limitations of human perception and experience. 
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Braver notes the paradox that Kant never actually desired to avoid an engagement with 
realism. When Kant “founds anti-realism . . . it is still conceived strictly along the lines of 
a realist metaphysics,” requiring the realism of the transcendental subject – something 
that could produce order in an “unordered” mass (27). We do interact with objects, but 
we cannot be sure that our impressions truly reflect the real existence of objects as they 
would exist freed from any representations. Our experience of the world is all we have 
and that the world is not equal to our impressions of it. Nevertheless, given the trouble 
that rhetorical realists have with matter and realism as I have sketched above, I am very 
confident in the claim that correlationism applies eerily well to philosophical currents 
rhetorical history and theory in their neo-Kantian formations. 
Symptom 3: Anti-Realist Pedagogy and the Rise of Invention 
After Descartes’s and Kant’s twinned assaults on reality outside of the mind in 
favor of epistemic construction, we have a position where the subject functions both the 
object and origin of knowledge. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault has 
identified this post-Kantian move as the “transcendental-empirical couplet.” Philosophers 
no longer begin by observing the world like Aristotle did with his substances and plant-
animal-human taxonomies, but by observing the observer. Braver comments, “The 
observer becomes both that entity that observes the observer (the transcendental) and the 
entity to be observed (the empirical)” (5). Given that the two never align as Sayers’ 
mirror theory or realist correspondence theories require, we are left with Burke’s 
“paradox of substance” as articulated in The Grammar of Motives. In Burke’s well-
wrought description, “Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. 
	   30 
To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any 
selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality” (59). 
The paradox of substance referred to the fact that we could only ever describe what was 
intrinsic to a thing—its essence—by means of something extrinsic to that thing—a re-
presentation of the thing through language. 
 Much in rhetorical theory—mostly unacknowledged—reflects a tacit Cartesian-
Kantian ontology. Many of our rhetorical and pedagogical strategies mirror metaphysical 
assumptions about substance and the activity and passivity of humans and Nature. By 
bracketing realism and focusing on how the mind constructs patterns on an unordered 
chaos, pedagogical strategies mirror this dualist assumption. In “New Challenges for 
Epistemic Realism,” Royer writes, “That is, where Kant insisted on the participation of 
the knower with regard to things known, writing instructors should admit as much, 
regarding writing as one more way, one chief way, in which new knowledge is attained” 
(287). Hence, writing teachers involved in the process movement are engaged in “. . . 
nurturing this fundamental human competence to make meaning” (287). We generally 
begin rhetoric and writing classes by focusing on pre-writing and invention (e.g., 
freewrites, visual concept maps, and brainstorming), honing these skills over processes of 
delivery, memory, circulation, and processes that shift rhetoric toward materiality and 
non-cognitive embodiment. Royer offers an example from Knoblauch and Brannon’s 
Rhetorical Traditions and the Teaching of Writing. In Knoblauch and Brannon, our 
commonplace notions of student-centered activity over the top-down Platonic dialectic of 
teacher or the banking model of pedagogy are predicated upon several Kantian 
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assumptions: “the assumption that writing is a natural competence rather than an acquired 
skill; the assumption that writing needs to be facilitated rather than directed; and the 
insistence that the development of meaning should always take . . . all find metaphysical 
support in Kant’s dualism” (287).  
To recall Berlin’s previous quotation about how all methods of teaching writing 
reflect a reality, epistemic rhetoric’s distilled Kantianism supports Berlin’s contention 
that “all learning is based in ideology and signifying practices” (“Postructuralism” 
863)—a claim that I will directly challenge in Chapter 5. Laclau and Mouffee’s anti-
realism or Crowley’s ideology criticism also reflects similar understandings. In terms of 
invention, Knoblach and Brannon note, “the subsequent pedagogy offers a valuable 
replacement for writing instruction that has been reduced to naming parts” or “a 
convenient packaging of preconceived thought” (60). Their claim, “Discourse enacts the 
world: its knowledge is not about the world but is rather constitutive of the world” is a 
distilled form of Kantianism (60). Consequently, there is no “objective” reality that can 
be known, reducing all knowledge to what Michael Polanyi describes as “personal 
knowledge” in opposition to Karl Popper’s objective knowledge (Sanchez). Consequently, 
philosophy and science—the traditional proponents of an invariable nature—become 
ways to study how humans explore the world, and not statements about the nature of the 
world they explore. The phenomenon is pervasive among theorists of pedagogy and 
rhetorical invention. Knoblauch and Brannon point out “it is this dialectical [e.g., social-
consensus] notion of rhetoric—and of rhetoric as the determiner of reality—that underlies 
the textbooks of Young, Becker, and Pike” (774). With respect to this neo-Kantian legacy 
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in pedagogy, Royer convincingly concludes “the epistemological heritage of Kant has 
served to greatly enlighten pedagogy” (288).  
This basic ambivalence—that is, we need to claim that rhetoric creates knowledge 
(is substantial, is material) rather than acting as stylistic adornment to the proper work of 
scientific discernment or logical positivism—plays out through the two largest trends in 
twentieth-century rhetoric: epistemological realism and anti-realism. Ironically, given 
Kant’s infamous rejection of rhetoric, most in rhetoric have little difficulty in subscribing 
to some version of dualism as a way to carve out the strong defense for rhetoric. Where 
Kant’s account of realism was considerably more nuanced, many rhetorical theorists, 
such as Ernst Cassirer, took dualism—one cognitively knowable reality and one 
unknowable materiality—as warranting a strong anti-realist defense of rhetoric grounded 
specifically in epistemic rhetoric. Where Kant at least acknowledged paradoxes, 
antinomies, and problems of dualism, Cassirer simply retreated to subjective idealism as 
the strong defense of rhetoric. No possibility of an objective, material, or realist world 
was entertained. In his book, An Essay on Man Cassirer writes: “No longer can man 
confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face” (25). He continues: 
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity 
advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense 
constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in 
linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites 
that he cannot see or know any-thing except by the interposition of this 
artificial medium. (25) 
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Cassirer’s decision—which sounds like an early statement of Jean Baudrillard’s 
hypersimulation—had the farthest-reaching consequences for treating invention and 
rhetoric as processes immanent to the human mind. While I will have much to say about 
epistemic rhetoric in relationship to realism in Chapter 2, it is crucial to observe Royer’s 
conclusion; namely,  “epistemic rhetoric is the culmination of many influences that 
ultimately sink their roots in the philosophies of Cassirer and Kant” (287). Royer goes on 
to suggest more far reaching consequences of dualism: “Given that different people see 
the ‘same thing’ differently coupled with Kant’s insight that special categories of the 
mind give shape and meaning to reality, much of modern thought has gone the way of 
denying that objects of reality exist apart from our thoughts about them including our 
values, attitudes, and symbolic use of language” (288). Such was the price that rhetoric 
would pay for the strong anti-realist defense of rhetoric. Seen from the perspective of 
ontological realism, the primary difference between nature and culture is that epistemic 
rhetoric negates nature, and that postmodernism de-negates nature while leaving a split 
between nature and culture. Language cannot refer in any way to physis and all 
knowledge is therefore cultural and constructed. Ironically, as Vickie Kirby and Latour 
will both argue, humans were consequently not a part of nature, but at once removed 
from the world.  
Symptom 4: Anti-Realism and Technology 
A related yet distinct version of anti-realism’s “matter without substance” effects 
areas of concern beyond pedagogy, and this is the final symptom of anti-realism that this 
chapter will explore. Technology is one of the areas in which anti-realism’s unspoken 
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warrant is seldom observed. Over the past few decades and in no small part thanks to the 
spread of global wireless networks and handheld mobile devices, rhetoricians are 
especially sensitive now to technology and materiality’s influence on the rhetorical 
situation. In contrast to the anti-realist rhetorical materialisms and pedagogical theories 
that I have traced, it would seem very unlikely to encounter anti-realism in technology 
scholarship as notable digital and visual rhetoric scholars such as Christina Haas and 
Kathleen Blake Yancey are obviously aware that communication practices have altered 
from print to networked and multimodal media. In digital media, the object’s presence 
cannot be avoided or downplayed simply because communication cannot occur without it. 
 The concern for my dissertation with technology and the legacy of anti-realism is 
not directly neo-Kantian constructivism but an additional consequence of the 
subject/object split of modernity: humanism and technological instrumentality. Simply 
put, it is a pervasive view of active human subjects using passive technological objects to 
complete instrumental rhetorical aims. Similar to how Cloud used materialism to signify 
not actual physical objects but symbols and practices of labor relations, humanism allows 
technological objects have “substance” (materiality) only to the extent to which humans 
symbolize them or use them.13 The status of matter as a “real” entity becomes an index 
through which to study the enduring legacies of anti-realism. Celeste Condit offers a non-
technological example: “the complaint that DNA is nothing but immaterial code is 
frustratingly similar to the ‘common-sense’ dismissal of language by many people on the 
grounds that it is immaterial—mere words, nothing but air vibrating, the opposite of 
‘deeds’ or the real” (327). In other words, who and what is allowed to count as a 
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substance, a being worthy of being accounted for not only animated rhetoric’s 
marginalization, but it now contributes to how rhetoric remains complicit in a sort of re-
marginalization of matter in itself. In the Electronic Word, Lanham offers an analogous 
example for digital media, writing “The electronic world embodies a denial of nature: 
copia can be kept and yet given away. Making a digital copy for you does not impoverish 
me; the only substantial exchange of such a desubstantiated “property” is the physical 
disk that contains the data, and to send the text over a modem from your hard disk to 
mine involves no expenditure of substance at all” (18). Lanham’s electronic “materialism” 
is reduced entirely to what material humans perceive; any flows we do not perceive are 
“immaterial,” thereby imposing a hierarchy of substance or physis even where Lanham 
would seek to call our attention to its presence.  
We will see this pattern repeated by scholars of visual and digital rhetoric in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. The terms of technology alone disclose these 
phenomenological biases. For both Jay David Bolter and Lanham, print had terms such as 
“stiffness,” “immutability,” “stability,” “solidity”; it is “given,” “static,” “fixed” (qtd. in 
Golding 250). An overt ontological line is then drawn between print literacy’s allegedly 
neutral transmission of thinking—a form of anti-realist idealism—and the materiality of 
electronic media by virtue of its perceived and instrumentalized material difference: 
electronic media are characterized by “instability,” “variability,” “fluctuation,” and 
“change”; they are “oscillatory,” “malleable,” “a matter of ‘fluid signs,’ of ‘signifiers in 
motion’ ”  (qtd. in Golding 250). Mark Poster echoes Lanham’s account in an early essay 
on cyberdemocracy in the late 1990’s: “the computer dematerializes the written trace. . . . 
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The writer encounters his or her words in a form that is evanescent, instantly 
transformable, in short, immaterial” (111). To sum up by quoting Eric Vos, “In terms of 
the labels often attached to new media, we are dealing with a virtual, dynamic, interactive, 
immaterial poetry” (216). The attributions of visible and invisible or static and fluid are 
not based on any ontological consideration of the human-technology relationship. Rather, 
these attributions are simply made upon the convenience of perception, reducing 
technology’s materiality to an instrument and preserving the separate spheres of culture 
and technê. 
Beyond rhetorical theory, the attribution of substance to human creative activity 
alone is common, especially in technology scholarship. Technology remains humanized 
and instrumentalized with great consequences for how we think of rhetoric and politics. 
Let me offer a popular example. In “Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna 
Carta for the Knowledge Age,” cyberlibertarians Esther Dyson, George Gilder, and 
George Keyworth offered a utopian manifesto for the cyberage: “The central event of the 
20th century is the overthrow of matter. In technology, economics, and the politics of 
nations, wealth—in the form of physical resources—have been losing value and 
significance. The powers of mind are everywhere ascendant over the brute force of things” 
(n.pag, my emphasis). Paradoxically, what luddites take as the rise of the machine, the 
technological romanticists interpret as a fulfillment of human creative genius. Their 
stance is paradoxical. The mind’s transcendence or ascendance over the technological 
object only occurs through its reliance on a technological prosthesis. It makes sense only 
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given certain anti-realist assumptions about the materiality of human action and thought 
and the passivity of nonhuman matter.  
The Legacy of Anti-Realism: Matter Without Substance 
The four symptoms of anti-realism mean that attempts to deal with physical 
objects, matter, pedagogy, and technology are inevitably circumscribed into a neo-
Kantian-Cartesian framework in the name of the strong anti-realist defense of rhetoric. 
Given this pervasive and enduring epistemic focus on rhetoric and ontological humanism, 
Lacaites and Biesecker claim in 2010 that rhetorical scholarship has only had two major 
paradigms of rhetorical materialism since Burke, McGee, and Perelman’s respective 
“rhetorical materialism” is unsurprising (vi). In “Poststructuralism,” Berlin unsurprisingly 
invoked Burke’s division between symbolic action and the “mere motion” of the World’s 
Body (physis) in order to ground his claim that the linguistic mediates all access to reality. 
The exclusive focus on how language shapes reality is characteristic of this first phase of 
rhetorical materialism. Even when Burke considers nonsymbolic and nonverbal factors in 
his discussions of incipient action and attitude, he inevitably concludes “the nonverbal 
element also persuades by reason of its symbolic character” (Rhetoric of Motives 172). 
Including the insights of Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, Lacaites and Biesecker identify a 
second stage of rhetorical materialism: the concern with “rhetoric’s materiality.” In this 
second stage, it was not enough to look at the effects of language in producing reality, but 
it became necessary to examine the subject’s cognitive ability to produce language and 
meaning. For instance, Lacanian rhetorics look to libidinal drives that lurk behind the 
manifestation of symbolic content.14  
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Yet, Burke, unlike the majority of twentieth-century rhetorical theory, struggled 
throughout all of his writing over where to draw the line between action and motion, 
rhetoric and reality, wondering at one point whether the division between them was an 
“illusion” and whether or not humans were just “things in motion” (Lang. as Symbolic 
Action 32). Thus, I offer a “representative anecdote”—a Burkean idiom—for my four 
symptoms of rhetoric and anti-realism grounded in Derrida’s own problem with 
materiality and realism, “matter without substance,” which I take to be a representative 
anecdote for much of twentieth-century rhetorical theory. Toward the end of his 
intellectual life, materialist fault lines had begun to appear in Derrida’s overwhelmingly 
linguistic approach to realism. At one point late in his intellectual life, he even 
contemplated the necessity of a “post-deconstructive realism,” in his analysis of Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Corpus (see On Touching; Marder), a phenomenology of touching and sensory 
interaction irreducible to signification. Yet, Derrida’s earlier attempts to discuss what I 
call simply “matter without substance” marks the problem with anti-realist accounts of 
materiality and, furthermore, will inevitably plague any attempt to think rhetoric as a 
material force in the world. The anti-realist legacy, the elevation of the active subject and 
the rejection of the passive object cross deeply into the humanist core of rhetorical theory.  
By many accounts, Derrida insisted on reducing the reality of nature to linguistic 
intra-referentiality and discourse but nevertheless needed to deal with the world that was 
filled with material forces and physical objects. In Specters of Marx, Derrida wrote of his 
“obstinate interest in a materialism without substance: a materialism of the khora for a 
despairing ‘messianism’ ” (168-69; Cheah). He further elucidated what he meant by this 
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strange phrase, a “materialism without substance,” when subsequent interviewers 
demanded his clarification of the relationship between deconstruction and Marxism. 
Derrida made it clear that Marxism and materialism were incommensurable in his 
thinking: “It follows that if, and in the extent to which, matter in this general economy 
designates . . . radical alterity . . . then what I write can be considered ‘materialist’” 
(Positions 64). This invocation of materialism was a “paracept”—a third term like 
differance—that would “postpone the reinvestment” of “[logocentric] values associated 
with those of thing, reality, presence in general, sensible presence, for example, 
substantial plenitude, content, referent, etc” (64). Derrida’s concern is not whether 
objects actually exist or the ontological condition of reality. Rather, Derrida wants to 
safeguard the question of knowledge and representation of reality from being answered 
through the lens of positivity. Derrida’s approach to matter mirrors his approach to 
subjectivity. Postponing reinvestment is a political strategy to avoid the negation and 
social exclusion of the (non-white, feminine, queer) Other. It is discussing matter in 
relationship to a transcendental signified that he wishes to avoid at all costs. 
Consequently, as Pheng Cheah argues, defining matter as anything but “absolute exterior 
or radical heterogeneity” is the only manner to avoid such a reinvestment (Cheah 64). 
Matter as presence is what arrests the fluid movement of the text: 
Realism or sensualism—“empiricism”—are modifications of 
logocentrism. . . . [T]he signifier “matter” appears to me problematical 
only at the moment when its reinscription cannot avoid making of it a new 
fundamental principle which, by means of a theoretical regression, would 
	   40 
be reconstituted into a “transcendental signified.” . . . It can always come 
to reassure a metaphysical materialism. It then becomes an ultimate 
referent, according to the classical logic implied by the value of referent, 
or it becomes an “objective reality” absolutely “anterior” to any work of 
the mark, the semantic content of a form of presence which guarantees the 
movement of the text in general from the outside. (65, emphasis original) 
Thus, in this passage and in this particular instance, Derrida’s “materialism” 
paradoxically has nothing to do with matter per se and has everything to do with how 
humans signify and make meaning about matter.  
His representative anecdote—matter without substance—has come to characterize 
not just the theoretical landscape of the humanities, but rhetorical theory as a whole —a 
claim I shall demonstrate time and time again through this dissertation. This charge of 
matter without substance is especially crucial to locate in cases where rhetorical theorists 
have sought to add nature or to add materiality to the rhetorical situation while only 
reinscribing subject-centered and linguistically-mediated paradigms. In this passage, 
Derrida’s claim is firmly in support of anti-realist strictures, impacting his ability and 
desire to examine concrete traces and alliances made by entities outside of the text. It is 
not that there is no world outside of the text; it is that we cannot know the reality of this 
world without language. In a move that authorizes rhetoric’s epistemic focus, since 
reality cannot be established as a mirror of nature, then “matter” means nothing unless we 
invest it with language. Derrida registers that a Cartesian-Kantian anti-realist paradigm 
leaves us with only an option between realism and relativism while leaning toward 
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relativism as a way to avoid the use of realism—whether in philosophical or scientific 
points of view—to substantiate and legitimate social hierarchies.  
Lines of Flight: Openings for New Materialisms 
In his articulation of the paradox of substance which is the epitome of anti-realist 
rhetorics in the twentieth century, Burke makes an interesting aside that will serve as the 
foundation for my dissertation’s interest in rhetoric, materialism, and realism. Namely, he 
writes that despite needing to observe the paradox of substance, “I doubt we shall ever be 
able to be rid of the concept of substance” (Grammar 68). Burke’s aside is an apt one. 
When we actually search canonical philosophical, theoretical, and rhetorical figures in 
the twentieth-century, various stances on realism and the substantiality of matter begin to 
emerge. If “matter without substance” marked the representative anecdote for rhetoric 
through Derrida’s struggle with Marx and realism, then I will introduce this dissertation’s 
nonmodern rhetorical materialism vis-à-vis realism through Bennett’s unique reading of 
Marx in an self-consciously and ironically Derridean fashion of taking one of Marx’s 
marginal and inconsequential writings and making it a way of deconstructing Marx’s 
materialism.  
Marx, interestingly, did address a non-orthodox Marxist materialist realism, but 
not in the works of the Grundrisse, the Manifesto, the Eighteenth Brumiere, or his other 
famous writings. If I were to tell a modern counter-history of materiality in rhetoric and 
composition studies, the Marx that I am interested in is not the Marx who wrote well-
known material-historical dialectic and polemics with Hegel that were then picked up by 
virtually everyone—from McGee to Cloud, Berlin, Horner, and Green—interested in 
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rhetorical materialism in the 20th century. Rather, I am interested in the Marx who wrote 
his doctoral dissertation on Democritus’s student Epicurus. Figures such as Diogenes of 
Sinope with his execretory (bodily) rhetorics, Heraclitus, Gorgias, the sophists, Sapho, 
Favorinas’s multiple sexuality are the Greek figures that many such as Kathleen Welch, 
Victor J. Vitanza, John Poulakos, and others have turned to in order to ground (or 
unground in Vitanza’s case) counter histories of rhetoric. Yet, Epicurus, to the best of my 
knowledge, has yet to be picked up in a major way by any rhetorical theorist dealing with 
materiality and counter-histories of rhetoric. 
Writing after Platonic philosophy, Democritus was a material monist, positing 
that an atom was the element of reality, undermining any phenomenological encounter 
with an object as a primary relation. In The Enchantment of Modern Life, Bennett 
explains that prior to settling on a single base (production and labor) that determined all 
other superstructural (social and symbolic) relations, “Marx turned to ancient atomism 
because he was intrigued by the possibility of a materialism that was not deterministic, 
that is to say, a philosophy that gave primacy to the sensuous, natural world but did not 
picture that world as a mechanistic realm of necessity” (119). Rejecting the French 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Diderot who posited a “concept of the internal 
movement of material elements,” Marx located in Epicurus an “idea that the atom 
occasionally swerved from its straight, downward path through void. Democritus held, 
along the lines of Plato, that chance was a product of humans’ attempts to wrestle with 
their confusions about the order of things” (qtd. in Bennett 119). But, as Marx writes, for 
Epicurus, “ ‘necessity . . . does not exist . . . some things are accidental, others depend on 
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our arbitrary will . . . It is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in necessity is not a 
necessity” (qtd. in Bennett 119) As Cheah and, earlier, C. J. McFadden note, the young 
Marx was in search of a vital theory of matter that lay beneath the perceptible natural 
order of things. In some places in his later writing, we can still find traces of this thought. 
As the older and more cynical Marx writes, the “facts of commodity culture always [turn] 
. . . out to be . . . a fantastic realm in which things act, speak, rise, fall, fly, evolve” (qtd. 
in Bennett 121).  
Unsurprisingly, then, Epicurus would be drawn upon as inspiration by a number 
of vitalists: Lucretius, Spinoza, Hobbes, La Mettrie, Diderot, Bergson and Whitehead. 
Yet, the later Marx proved to be too much of a student of Hegel’s absolutization of 
consciousness. By positing a base as the root, language became transparent. Jim Aune in 
Rhetoric and Marxism echoes the tacit critique of neo-Marxists, claiming that Marx lends 
us “an implicit theory of language and communication that was an unstable mixture of 
romantic expressionism and a positivist dream of perfectly transparent communication” 
(143). Bennett describes how the “swerve” of the Epicurian atom from the stasis of 
Democritus became not an ontological materiality but a “symbol of the active self”; 
matter’s vitality was reduced to an analogy for the self’s desire to realize itself in the geist 
(120). Bennett interprets Marx’s sublation of matter to consciousness: “the swerve is thus 
preserved as belonging to human self-consciousness rather than to both nonhuman and 
human matter” (120). Consequently, there ceases to be a need for Marx to discuss a vital 
realism or the nature of matter qua matter in order to make a claim about materialism. 
The later Marx was no anti-realist to be sure. Yet, in his assumption that it is the human 
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mind alone that is the prime mover for reality, he turns what might be a rather 
provocative and radical view of the self-organization of matter into a human mental 
projection of the world. Indeed, who or what causes something to be set into motion, 
technê, from Martin Heidegger’s world-disclosing to Aristotle, who reserved the final 
cause for human actions (and collective labor relations) alone, the question of the 
vibrancy of matter is the question of ecology, matter and realism. Laments Bennett, 
“[Marx] loses touch with the remarkable appreciation of agency within nature that 
Epicurus actively affirms” (121). From this moment, then materialism, in it is early 
variants, has often dealt with known or perceptible elements.  
Nonmodern Rhetorical Realisms: Why Realism? 
I think we can use this struggle within Marx’s materialism before he settled, like 
much of materialism in rhetorical theory, with an anti-realist “matter without substance,” 
as a way to rethink the relationship between these nonmodern reinvocations of realism 
and rhetoric anew. In a twentieth-century saturated with epistemic accounts of rhetoric, 
Poole and Frost, however, announce that the tide is turning and resurgent interests in 
materiality and realism are on the rise with theories such as “new materialism.” If the 
subject has been de-centered and deterritorialized by psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, 
and posthumanism, they claim, “Our motivation in editing this book has been a 
conviction that it is now time to subject objectivity and material reality to a similarly 
radical reappraisal” (2). While Althusser, Derrida, Butler, Haraway, and Foucault were 
undeniably interested in a form of anti-humanism, these nonmodern critics believe that 
these earlier forms of anti-humanism maintained the human and language apart from 
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ecology and materiality. In the post-2000 theoretical landscape, other radical reappraisals 
such as “object-oriented ontology,” speculative realism, agential realism, ontological 
realism, critical realism, actor-network theory, alien phenomenology, assemblage theory, 
the nonhuman turn, and many more all want to pick up Latour’s call: “it is time to return 
to things again.” In what could be considered a manifesto statement for the motivations 
for a return to a revitalized notion of material realism, Barad writes: 
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at 
every turn lately every “thing”—even materiality-is turned into a matter of 
language or some other form of cultural representation. . . . Why are 
language and culture granted their own agency and historicity, while 
matter is figured as passive and immutable or at best inherits a potential 
for change derivatively from language and culture? How does one even go 
about inquiring after the material conditions that have led us to such a 
brute reversal of naturalist beliefs when materiality itself is always already 
figured within a linguistic domain as its condition of possibility? (114). 
I believe that Barad slightly overstates her case here. However, she correctly 
identifies the anti-realist legacy of the linguistic turn that has characterized much of 
twentieth-cenutry rhetorical theory. My efforts in this dissertation, building from these 
past and new attentions to realisms will be to rethink the realism/relativism and 
matter/rhetoric divide all-together. I want to seriously consider in this dissertation what a 
view of rhetoric means when nature and matter are seen from a conative or quasi-
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agentive capacity. I have already demonstrated that such a conception is difficult to 
achieve given an anti-realist warrant in rhetoric. As I will describe in detail in Chapter 2, 
Latour calls anti-realism a product of the “modern Constitution”, an ontological gap 
between human and nonhuman. In its place, he recommends a “nonmodern ontology” 
where human and nonhuman are seen as (ontologically) equal actors. The hypothesis of 
this dissertation is that a flat ontological view, what I will call “nonmodern rhetorical 
realism” after Latour’s “realistic realism,” Barad’s “agential realism,” Haraway’s “figural 
realism,” and other new approaches to realism, can allow rhetorical theory to actually 
address a complex rhetorical materialism, the vitality of things and objects and their 
relations with humans and with other nonhuman actors. Nonmodern rhetorical realism 
can help us overcome the stale realism/relativism divide wherein we accept the gap 
between human/nonhuman as an a priori given, and concentrate instead on reconceiving 
of rhetoric as it emerges from a shared plane of interaction between humans and 
nonhumans.15 As Margaret Archer has argued, the only way to actually overcome this 
divide is a view of social realism that “makes our real embodied selves living in the real 
world really load-bearing” (25). Postmodern theorist David Harvey suggests that while 
the “multitude in motion” or “postmodern spatial constructions” are crucial 
considerations, “no one knows that any of that mean until real bodies go into the absolute 
spaces of the street” (32). Further, he suggests, “Radical constructivism rests on the over-
estimation of human construction and authorship” (32). 
Again, in the fashion of the nonmodern thinkers who have retained this term, I 
also prefer to invoke the term realism to get at the concrete and quasi-empirical and to 
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point in a very general way to a realm of materiality that is irreducible to representation 
and human instrumentality. As I have noted above, too often materialism and materiality 
simply slip into discursive constructivism. By contrast, in a nonmodern universe, 
“science” has become the new bracketed term to emphasize both our awareness of its 
constructed nature while at the same time indicating how we must employ its empirical 
findings to decenter the human subject. “Science” and the concrete has become the way 
in which rhetorical ontologies of matter can be productively rethought. Poole and Frost 
wisely caution, “And while scientific theories cannot simply be imported into philosophy, 
the tropes and rhythms they suggest can transform theoretical discourses. In fact, it is 
evident from new materialist writing that forces, energies, and intensities (rather than 
substances) and complex, even random, processes (rather than simple, predictable states) 
have become the new currency” (13). To offer a very loose analogy, if Derrida 
deconstructed the subject’s relationship to self-presence and representation, then these 
contemporary nonmodern theorists want to deconstruct materiality itself as a way to fully 
decenter the modern human subject. One major confirmation of this ontological view 
occurred when the Higgs-Bosson particle was discovered during the summer (2012) 
while I was writing this dissertation, it became empirically demonstrable that reality itself 
“came from nothing.” Dark matter is a Leibnizian monad unto itself, a vital force capable 
of splitting and dividing into universes. Non-linear dynamics, complexity theory, and the 
actor-network and assemblage theories necessary to describe them and the speculative 
realism ontologies of matter that they spawn become both new metaphors for human 
symbolic action as well as descriptive of the actual processes of non-symbolic affect. 
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From this example, Bazerman’s claim that rhetoric needed to demonstrate rhetoricality in 
physics has been inverted. It is now matter that shows rhetoricality in human embodiment 
and ecology. 
Although I will explore the return of realism through the lenses of actor-network 
theory, new materialism, assemblage theory, and media ecology, I want to first 
acknowledge that precedents for such a reconception exist within the margins of the 
rhetorical tradition. The actual behavior of material entities independent of human 
perception and their influence on the sphere of culture and rhetoric has never actually 
been far from the direct concern of many canonical figures. Burke entertained the realist 
notion of “recalcitrance.” Later in life, the ardent anti-realist George A. Kennedy 
pondered whether animal phone could actually be rhetorical, positing a wonderfully 
bizarre theory of rhetoric as animal-to-animal energy exchange in “A Hoot in the Dark.” 
In this articulation, Kennedy could even be thought as offering a third stage of rhetorical 
materialism to Lacaites and Biesecker’s two stages: “materiality’s rhetoric.” In another 
example, Blair offers a potentially radical vision of materiality in “Contemporary U.S. 
Memorial Sites” despite her overwhelming focus on language. She argues “There are 
some things that rhetoric’s symbolicity can’t account for . . . [o]ne is its consequence” 
(19). What she means by this is that dynamics internal to the subject’s cognitive process 
cannot explain the full work of rhetoric as it anticipates and outlives the rhetor’s strategic 
aims. Further, she goes on to muse, “[W]hat about the things that happen as a result of 
texts that lie outside the goal orientation, or even the perceptual field, of the rhetor?” (22, 
emphasis mine).16 What Blair could be taken as meaning is that diverse complexes of 
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human-nonhuman sites of affect and influence condition and work over symbolic action. 
Turning to Spinoza, Nathan Stormer has also theorized a “will-to-matter” in relationship 
to rhetoric that comes very close to the nonmodern rhetorical realism that I seek to 
define.17 These, as I will argue, are only starting to be picked up by affect theorists, 
posthumanists, and other trends beyond the linguistic turn; however, without fully 
engaging with the reality of matter, anti-realism, and the nonhuman, such theories—and 
Blair is no exception—have a tendency to reinscribe the Cartesian-Kantian division of 
active subject and passive object.18 Ronald Greene’s more recent work also tends to fit 
into this category. 19 
To anticipate one major objection to my project, this emphasis on the object does 
not in any way undermine the power of language to create reality. Poole and Frost 
indicate that the strong defense of rhetoric’s “either/or” binary—it is either realism and 
not rhetoric or rhetoric and not realism—is a false dilemma resulting from the modern 
Constitution. They argue,  
It is entirely possible then to accept social constructivist arguments while 
also insisting that the material realm is irreducible to culture or discourse 
and that cultural artifacts are not arbitrary vis-a-vis nature. Even as the 
most prosaic or carnal lifeworld unfolds within a socially constructed 
milieu, it does not follow that a) material objects or structures are devoid 
of efficacy in the way they affect either our moods or well-being, or our 
concepts and theories, b) matter is without recalcitrance or directness in its 
own brutish way, or c) acknowledging nondiscurisive material efficacy is 
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equivalent to espousing a metaphysical claim regarding the Real as 
ultimate truth. (27) 
Thus, my prescription for rhetoric’s “matter without substance” paradigm is not 
an abandoning of the term realism and nor it is to calmly assert that a mind-independent 
reality exists, but a refashioning from a nonmodern perspective borne of actor-network 
theory, assemblage theory, OOO’s neo-Heideggerianism, and agential realism. These 
theories can help us more fully realize how rhetoric emerges alongside the world of 
material forces and, furthermore, how understanding the interplay between them is 
equally as important than understanding how symbols themselves create, sustain, and 
circulate realities. 
 Although rhetorical theorists have only recently taken to Latour, with the first 
citation perhaps being Charles Bazerman (2004), followed by Rice (2009), Cooper 
(2010), Rivers (2011), Gries (2012), and many more such as Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric 
by the time that I am writing this dissertation in the summer of 2012, and while interest in 
things across the humanities has never been higher stemming from articles such as Bill 
Brown’s “Thing Theory” essay or Farias’s edited collection Urban Assemblages, it is not 
true that what I am arguing is “new.” New materialism feminism predates object-oriented 
ontology and speculative realism by at least five to ten years (cf. Elizabeth Wilson). 
Rhetorical ecology and vitialism in Cooper, Byron Hawk, and, more recently, Christian 
Weisser, Laura Gries, and Sid Dobrin have consistently raised questions about rhetoric 
and language’s non-discursive materiality (although without largely realizing the 
prevailing Kantian paradigm).20 Even earlier, Whitehead and Henri Bergson pulled on a 
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vitalist thread initiated by Epicarus and continued by drawing on thinkers such as 
Spinozan conatus and Diderot. The point is that—and I feel that my previous anecdote 
about rhetorical materialism remains true—these conversations remain exceptions rather 
than rules for the vast majority of rhetorical theorists, Schiappa’s Rhetoric and Reality 
being a key case in point.21 Alaimo confirms in Bodily Natures that for most social 
theorists and humanities scholars, it is the differences to culture that humans contribute 
that have substance and that matter whereas material objects remain blank screens for 
inscription. Each of the nonmodern realists that I will feature in this dissertation have this 
active/passive divide of the modern Constitution clearly in mind in a way that other 
attempts to deal with materiality and language simply fail to fully encompass. Again, 
what I am arguing is not original. Far from it. What is novel is my attention to rhetorical 
theory per se and my field-specific diagnosis—anti-realism and the elision of matter. 
What is new is my specific attention to how the modern Constitution has played out and 
continues to play out across rhetorical theory in the present.  
Outline of Chapters: From Invention to Delivery 
As I have gestured to above, an undeniable consequence of the anti-realist legacy 
has been the primacy given to cognitivist and subject-centered theories of invention. By 
contrast, nonmodern rhetorical realists are interested in flipping modernity’s privilege of 
the subject, to a temporary privileging of the object in the serve of placing the subject and 
the other in the same plane of material entanglement. Thus, as a framework for describing 
and detailing nonmodern rhetorical realism(s), I will perform a bit of what Burke calls 
“perspective by incongruity.” If the privilege of invention is the tacit consequence of 
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antirealism, then will similarly privilege canon of delivery as an overarching framework 
for this project. Of all the canons, delivery has been the most impoverished in large part 
due to constructivist assumptions about rhetoric. Yet, of all the canons, delivery has taken 
on special importance for digital rhetoric, new media, and networked rhetorics. Thanks to 
the widespread use of technologically mediated communication and multimodal rhetorics, 
as Latour has argued, the proliferation of human-nonhuman hybrids has increased, 
making it more apparent that the cognitive subject has always relied on external 
prostheses such as hypomnesis (artificial memory) or hypokrisis (delivery) in the activity 
of communication as parts of the rhetorical situation that are equally as important as 
invention (cognition). The proliferation of small tech and handhold media now coincides 
with unparalleled networked communication as well as the “prosumer” revolution of new 
media. Whereas delivery was historically relegated to the “fifth canon” by Aristotle in 
favor of invention, many have started to call attention to the canon of delivery, equating it 
with medium (Welch; Trimbur; McCorkle; Porter; Yancey; Sheridan). New media, 
electronic, and digital rhetoric scholars have reclaimed delivery, at times making it 
almost co-extensive with rhetoricality itself. 
This rise of importance of medium and delivery is a microcosm for rhetoric’s 
larger problem with the possibility of nonhuman actors as real, vital, and self-organizing 
entities. I am going to at once accept the argument of delivery as medium and yet fulfill 
its implications by drawing on nonmodern rhetorical realisms. The largest problem with 
this claim is that this group of rhetorical theorists interested in the canon of delivery by 
and large maintains the modern Constitution (Collin Brooke’s work in Lingua Fracta: 
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Toward a Rhetoric of New Media being a close exception). Humanist views of 
technology abound alongside instrumentalist and cognitivist-based assumptions about the 
rhetorical situation. Consequently, delivery as medium is reduced from any complex 
understanding of technology or embodied materiality as reduced to instrumentalization. 
Anti-realism, in other words, underwrites the delivery as medium claims, making it 
difficult to refer to medium as anything other than a passive brute material object used by 
humans to give form to rhetorical events.  
Furthermore, delivery, as we shall see, was always already a particular locus of 
anxiety for Plato and Aristotle because it was where the moment of material embodiment 
and non-logical affect became almost unavoidable. Their process of disembodying 
rhetoric (de-materializing rhetoric) in favor of—more for Plato than for Aristotle—matter 
without substance offers an early allegory for how epistemic rhetoric and digital delivery 
theorists maintain the modern Constitution. Furthermore, the Platonic and Aristotelian 
concerns over delivery are predicated on “acting”—a worry over someone being able to 
simulate mimesis without actually possessing a moral soul. Delivery’s root—hypokrisis— 
becomes a metaphor and ontological condition for how the objects and technologies that 
we use to deliver the work of invention, cognition, and logic are always withdrawn, 
dissembling, and moving us in ways that we did not entirely initiate, control, or set into 
circulation. I will argue that performance, in a materialist sense, is not a negative 
condition that elevates science and philosophy over rhetoric, but an ontological condition 
that structures the way in which rhetorical interaction and delivery are possible. Delivery 
in this sense is simultaneously a microcosm for rhetoric’s diminishment by Plato and 
	   54 
Aristotle and yet particularly singled out become of the necessarily reliance of “logic” on 
embodiment, materiality, and affect—elements that Plato and Aristotle both sought to 
minimize.  
Delivery does not get nearly enough attention from rhetorical theorists who 
attempt philosophical points of engagement with the rhetorical tradition for the reason 
that I mentioned above. We are dealing with the abstract idea of Being in language, we 
are always assumed to be dealing with some sort of human cognitive faculty or mental 
mediation. Delivery would seem to be an afterthought. Thus, by privileging—even 
speculatively because as Brooke rightly notes, no theory of rhetoric is complete without 
considering the entire canon—delivery, I think I will be able to perform a bit of sophistic 
dissoi logoi. That is, it makes a point about the entrenched nature of anti-realism and 
invention emerge more clearly by pretending that delivery is now equivalent with being-
in-the-world. What nonmodern rhetorical realism helps lead us to a view of delivery as 
“ontological hypokrisis” —not an instrumental technê or medium but as a point of 
material and ecological interconnectivity that greatly outpaces any individual act of 
oration, putting a premium on terms and theories that deal with circulation, delivery, 
rhetorical velocity, iconographic circulation, and other performatively inclined rhetorical 
theories. Here, I will exploit the ancient Greek etymology of hypokrisis as acting to re-
thinking rhetorical materiality as essentially performative. Acting is not a negative but a 
positive phenomenon that marks the ontological condition of human and nonhuman 
actors. 
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Following from Chapter 1, each dissertation chapter is organized around a 
representative anecdote that directly reflects a different aspect of my nonmodern realist 
account of delivery.  
Chapter 2 (“The Paradox of Substancing”) works through some of the 
realism/relativism divide that haunted attempts to theorize a rhetorical realism, touching 
on epistemic rhetoric in detail. Kenneth Burke’s “recalcitrance” is offered as an example 
how the best that rhetorical realism theorized from the subject’s point of view can 
accomplish is always already a human produced reality. I offer Burke as a proto-typical 
example for anti-realist rhetorical theories’ problems with realism. In its place, I suggest 
that Latour’s “realistic realism,” overturns the modern constitution and helps us 
understand what is meant by a nonmodern realism. I close by offering Latour’s notion of 
circulating reference as a performative enactment that establishes the exigence for 
needing to re-think delivery vis-à-vis epistemic accounts of invention and rhetoric. I start 
with nonmodern rhetorical realism in order to provide a strong point of contrast for the 
remaining dissertation. 
Chapter 3 (“The Object Styles”) turns to classical rhetorical conceptions of 
delivery in Plato and Aristotle and contemporary scholarship on delivery. Plato and 
Aristotle’s anxiety over delivery as the necessarily non-logical embodied part of rhetoric 
stems from their concern over acting. I take this originary articulation of “matter without 
substance” and then jump to how contemporary delivery scholars have yet to actually 
over Aristotle’s reduction of the role of the body and the nonsymbolic in delivery. 
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Chapter 4 (“Concrescence”) offers a proto-nonmodern materialist account in 
Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintilian. I then turn to Timothy Morton’s OOO-infused idea 
that delivery could be the “first” canon in a world of objects. However, I ultimately turn 
to a vision of ontological hypokrisis through a combination of Barad’s performativity and 
Fuller’s media ecology. By turning to Barad’s agential realism, specifically contrasted to 
the resurgent interest in delivery and technology, I argue that delivery should be seen as 
ontological hypokrisis, requiring us to understand delivery and realism not as a problem 
of representation and relativism, but of performative enactment and the entanglement 
among a variety of human-nonhuman actors.  
Chapter 5 (“Misplaced Concreteness”) offers a case study in Bennett and 
DeLanda’s respective uses of Deleuzian assemblage theory. I examine how software and 
hardware studies’ focus on computational actors are ignored by anti-realist/perceptual 
biases in digital rhetoric. In order to establish the persuasive work of new media texts 
such as videogames, I argue that assemblage theory offers a more accurate method of 
talking about how persuasion obtains. I offer a detailed analysis of Markus Piersson’s 
Minecraft videogame. 
Chapter 6 (“Material Metaphors”) proceeds directly from Chapter 5, turning to a 
politics of delivery aimed at aesthetic bearing witness to the nonhuman actors that 
structure the space of culture. I explore Jane Bennett’s reading of Ranciere through Ethan 
Stoneman’s connection between Ranciere and decorum. Decorum, I suggest, has a direct 
link to Ciceronian anxiety over delivery and rhetoric, making “indecorous” speech a 
viable political action designed for human-nonhumans collectives. In extending Ranciere, 
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I explore how DeLanda’s assemblage theory can concretely inform political pratices in 
the contemporary networked communications environments, what MacKensie Wark calls 
“gamespace.” On the one hand, focusing on non-symbolic material affects allows us to 
better understand political representation, a case study that I ground in analyzing the 
newsgame videogame genre. On the other hand, we can use object-oriented ontology and 
similar practices to foreground new “post-technê” of indecorous delivery designed to call 
attention to nonhuman activities in digital rhetoric through what I define as rhetorical 
allegorithms, material metaphors, and augmented reality in the writing of Harman, 
Bogost, Hayles, Mackensie Wark, and Alexander Galloway. 	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CHAPTER 2 
 THE PARADOX OF SUBSTANCING: CIRCULATING LATOURIAN ACTANTS IN 
THE BURKEAN SCENE 
 
I suggest that anything which possesses any power [dunamin] of any kind, either to 
produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by 
the slightest cause, though it only be on one occasion, has real existence [ontws einai]. 
For I set up as a definition which defines being [ta onta], that it is nothing else than 
capacity [dunamis]  
The Eleatic Stranger 
 
Things-in-themselves? But they’re fine, thank you very much. And how are you? You 
complain about things that have not been honored by your vision? You feel that these 
things are lacking the illumination of your consciousness? But if you missed the 
galloping freedom of the zebras in the savannah this morning, then so much the worse for 
you; the zebras will not be sorry that you were not there, and in any case you would have 
tamed, killed, photographed, or studied them. Things in themselves lack nothing. 
Bruno Latour 
 
Man being generically a biological organism, the ideal terminology must present his 
symbolic behavior as grounded in biological conditions. 
Kenneth Burke 
 
Realism and Anti-Realism Continued 
In a loose sense, rhetorical realists and anti-realists remain in opposition on the 
epistemic question that Socrates, Hermogenes and Cratylus debate in Plato’s Cratylus 
dialogue: can there be an essential or natural correspondence between word and thing or 
does convention alone establish our understanding of reality? The debate between realists 
and relativists in rhetorical history has largely proceeded without the benefit of a Socrates 
trying to forge a middle ground— albeit one that favored philosophy over rhetoric. Yet, 
Lawrence J. Prelli, Floyd D. Anderson, and Matthew T. Althouse have recently (2011) 
argued that Kenneth Burke offers us a realist middle ground more favorable to rhetorical 
theory. Discussed primarily in Permanence and Change, “recalcitrance” is Burke’s 
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idiosyncratic version of rhetorical realism. Interestingly, Burke does not intend to settle 
this debate by siding with either Hermogenes and anti-realism or Cratylus and 
philosophical or scientific realism. Rather, Burke reframes rhetorical realism altogether 
as the reality of our ability to construct symbols and to revise these symbols depending 
on the different perspectives that a rhetor can bring to bear on any given social or natural 
phenomena. On the one hand, Burke’s paradox of substance traced out in The Grammar 
of Motives holds that man, the symbol-using animal, can only refer to the intrinsic 
essence of a thing by an extrinsic referent (a word). As a result, all orientations and 
knowledge claims are necessarily partial. On the other hand, metaphors or even logically 
false and unverifiable claims—such as myths of Aryan supremacy—are productive of 
real effects in the human world. “Words of nonsense,” Burke maintains, “would 
themselves be real words, involving real tactics, having real demonstrable relationships, 
and demonstrably affecting relationships” (Grammar 57-58). 
 Burke obviously does not support the rhetorical realists because science in his 
assessment has no way to avoid the paradox of substance. The scientist may enjoy the 
appearance of a more literal or denominative relationship with her objects, but scientific 
enterprise cannot be separated from symbolic action. Burke argues, “Men can so arrange 
it that nature gives clear, though impartial and impersonal, answers to their questions. 
The dialectical motives behind such methods usually escape our detection, though we get 
a glimpse of them when Galileo speaks of experimental testing as an ‘ordeal’ ” 
(Grammar 38). In other words, Galileo did not perform his scientific experiments in a 
political vacuum. Rather, his findings were continually subjected to competing 
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ideological forces, such as Pope Urban VII’s demand that he speak out against 
heliocentrism.  
Recalcitrance also does not ally Burke with the constructivists because the partial 
points of view of objects “disclose recalcitrant materials that cannot initially be 
encompassed within their terms” (101). If a rhetor can revise her terms, recalcitrance 
offers a more accurate reading of the “situation’s supportive as well as resistant materials” 
(101). Since all orientations are partial, the rhetor is bound to encounter recalcitrant 
material, cultural, or natural phenomena that have been excluded by a given point of view. 
Recalcitrance refers to actual factors that can resist, substantiate, or prompt revision of a 
statement about the world, and it is the human agent who consciously affirms or 
determines these revisions. In my earlier example of Aryan supremacy, racism in our 
current era can no longer be grounded in pseudo-science as there is no demonstrable 
genetic basis for racial inferiority. However, I do not believe that it is an overstatement to 
argue that Burke’s rhetorical realism is less interested in the relationship between the 
scientific discovery of genetic equality and realism than it is in arguing that even 
empirically nonsensical positions such as Aryanism nevertheless have a great power to 
create human-specific realities for certain audiences in response to recalcitrant factors. 
When confronted with genetic evidence, white supremacists have gradually shifted from 
arguments predicated on genetic essence to arguments grounded in race-based cultural 
deficiencies. 
While I am in firm agreement with Prelli et al. that Burke does make a significant 
advance in our understanding of rhetoric and realism, I will suggest in this chapter that 
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Burke’s notion of recalcitrance cannot actually overcome the realist/relativist divide in 
the sense that Prelli et al. suggest. In epistemic fashion, Burke maintains an ontological 
gap between human and nonhuman, culture (nomos) and nature (physis), or, in his 
familiar refrain, action and motion.22 In as far as realism is concerned, Burke is more 
interested in preserving symbolic activity from reduction to scientific description, 
positivism, or logic than he is in assessing the relationship between science and realism.23 
In this sense, Burke’s rhetorical realism is intertwined with the epistemic and 
representationalist paradigms of anti-realism that dominate a great deal of twentieth-
century rhetorical theory. This view of realism places Burke (and rhetorical theory) at 
odds with the view of delivery as nonmodern rhetorical realism that I seek to define in 
this dissertation. Burke is thus a necessary point of analysis for this dissertation. 
Recalcitrance offers, in my opinion, the best attempt to address realism within the 
modernist Constitution while simultaneously highlighting the primary limitations of 
working within this paradigm in the first place.  
As I noted in the previous chapter, the nonhuman turn has in part begun to 
eliminate the ontological gap between human culture and the world of nonhuman activity 
and, consequently, to recast realism through the active participation of nonhumans 
beyond linguistic signification. Working from this point of contention and in a way 
similar to Nathan Stormer’s “will-to-matter,” the political scientist Jane Bennett argues 
for the concept of “thing-power” grounded in assemblage theory and Baruch Spinoza’s 
conatus: “the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to 
impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi-agents or forces 
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with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (viii). For Spinoza, there is 
only one substance—god or nature—and as such all entities—conceptual and 
inanimate—share the same ontological plane and impact each others’ realities. Bennett’s 
thing-power is a form of material (or substantial) realism that examines how nonhuman 
agents actively “impede” human physical and rhetorical activity while requiring that 
scholars discuss humans and nonhumans equally as agents and actors. In Bennett’s 
account of reality, there is no separation of physis and nomos. 
In contrast to Bennett’s thing-power, Burke’s recalcitrance is limited to the 
adjudication of language claims within the confines of what is disclosed to humans, and it 
does not refer to any non-linguistic sites of affect in Bennett’s sense. In fact, Prelli et al. 
criticize Bryan Crable for trying to extend recalcitrance to encompass non-symbolic 
factors. Crable, they argue, “too narrowly focuses on extra-verbal and non-symbolic 
factors that resist orientations, requiring terminological corrections. That emphasis risks 
muting, if not neglecting, communication and other symbolic sources of recalcitrance” 
(114). Prelli et al., like Burke, want a realism that only encompasses the reality of 
humans who use symbols to communicate meaning. Rhetorical realism thus conceived is 
severely limited because it fails to tell us anything about how nonhuman forces are 
allowed to participate in the shaping of rhetorical activity in a way that realism in 
Bennett’s sense would require.  
While Burke’s recalcitrance is undoubtedly a crucial component of a nonmodern 
rhetorical realism, I argue that recalcitrance must be placed alongside a realist conception 
of nonhuman activity if rhetorical theory wishes to radically rethink the 
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relativism/realism divide. I argue that a true middle ground can be located in Latour’s 
“realistic realism.” Although seldom placed in conversation with rhetorical scholarship 
beyond the rhetoric of science subfield, scholars are increasingly turning to Latour in the 
context of posthumanist theories of agency. Latour is admittedly not a rhetorical theorist, 
but he nevertheless offers a way of re-thinking realism, language, and, I will ultimately 
suggest, rhetoric. Latour, as I noted in the previous chapter, criticizes a hierarchy 
established by the “modern Constitution,” an Enlightenment ontology that splits society 
(humans, culture, philosophy, politics) and nature (nonhuman entities, scientific 
practices) into discrete assemblies. This division is artificial and predicated upon 
presuppositions about the separation of nature and culture that cannot be sustained. 
According to Latour, the conspiracy of modernity denies that nature and culture share the 
same space of entanglement. As the object-oriented philosopher Graham Harman 
remarks, “Latour maintains that all actors— both human and nonhuman—are ‘socially’ 
constructed not just by human minds, but also by bodies, atoms, cosmic rays, business 
lunches, rumors, physical force, propaganda, or God” (16). Latour asks us to work on the 
“cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude—to speak like William James” (“Critique” 
233). 
In what follows, I will briefly map Burke’s concept of recalcitrance where his 
description of rhetorical realism is substantially developed. While Robert Wess, Crable 
and other Burke scholars have previously explored recalcitrance in detail, Prelli et al’s 
article will serve as my focus. Prelli et al., in my understanding, are correct both in their 
understanding of recalcitrance and in their criticism of the limitations of previous 
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scholarship. By extension, Prelli et al. best reveal the moment at which Burke’s rhetorical 
realism falls short of being able to encompass nonhuman realism. I then turn to Latour in 
order to develop his realist notion of the “social construction” of humans and nonhumans. 
I explicate Latour through an example of Robert Boyle’s 1657-1660 construction of a 
vacuum air pump that Latour develops in We Have Never Been Modern. Boyle’s pump 
offers an opportunity to rethink the relationship between nature and culture, motion and 
action, and science and rhetoric in what Latour suggests is a founding moment of the 
modern Constitution.  
By focusing especially on how humans must use technology to “reveal nature” in 
the science lab, Latour argues that the realism/relativist debate is a false dilemma that 
only proceeds from our acceptance of the modern Constitution. As Marilyn R. Cooper 
writes, “In contrast, Bruno Latour argues that ‘humans no longer have to make this 
choice that is imposed on subjects’ by Plato’s myth of the Cave, the choice between a 
free disembodied interiority, cut off from other subjects and from objects, or an unfree 
social construction (Politics 51)” (424). In its place, Latour’s realistic realism offers 
rhetorical theorists a conception of what I would call a nonmodern realism that is co-
constructed by human and nonhuman actors “in the sense that their actions make a 
difference to other Actors” (Cooper 424). Rhetorical realism then would not be an 
exclusive matter of adjudicating knowledge claims, but of seeking out and understanding 
how our relations with nonhumans produce what we, after the fact, accept as human 
initiated symbolic activity. In turn, I will employ an extension of Latour’s thinking in the 
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concept of “circulating reference” to make a bridge between nonmodern realism and the 
need to re-think delivery in the world of nonhuman actors.  
Kenneth Burke’s Rhetorical Recalcitrance 
Prelli et al. locate the first critical deployment of Burkean recalcitrance by 
rhetorical scholars in a debate between Barry Brummett’s social consensus theory 
(“Rhetorical”) and Earl Croasmun and Richard A. Cherwitz’s objective realism 
(“Beyond”).24 Croasmun and Cherwitz held that that Brummett’s notion that social 
consensus “creates reality” necessarily “begins with the premise that no person can 
directly confront an object. Rather, knowledge is gained through the mediation of 
symbols” (2). Arguing that Brummett’s epistemic ground results in an unproductive 
relativism, Croasmun and Cherwitz posit an objective world that could be considered 
apart from social constructivism. They maintain that truth resides in the observable object 
and not in the audience’s perception or the mind’s construction. Through this position, 
Croasmun and Cherwitz hope to avoid constructivism and crude form of empiricism that 
defines the world only according to human experiences (e.g. “what you see is what you 
get” realism or naïve realism). Their realism is a variant of what the philosopher Levi 
Bryant describes as “epistemological realism.” Epistemological realism “seeks a 
correspondence or adequation between subject and object, representations and states-of-
affairs” (14-15). In the vein of enlightenment critique that wishes to abolish reality from 
superstition, epistemological realists “wish to distinguish between true representations 
and mere imaginings, arguing that true representations mirror the world as is, reflecting a 
world as it is regardless of whether any represents it” (15). Although Croasmun and 
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Cherwitz did not invoke Burke, McGuire and Melia’s articulation of minimal realism 
directly referenced recalcitrance. McGuire and Melia argue that in Permanence and 
Change, “Burke has implicitly at least argued for the special nature of scientific texts” 
because physical scientists “encounter a special ‘recalcitrance’ from the world they hope 
to describe” (qtd. in Prelli et al. 100). The physical world in itself contributes this “extra-
textual” recalcitrance and it “is not fully accounted for in sheerly linguistic or rhetorical 
terms” (100). 
It is not clear, however, that Burke intended recalcitrance to refer only to 
scientific discourse or to support minimal realism. Indeed, quotations such as “[m]en can 
so arrange it that nature gives clear, though impartial and impersonal, answers to their 
questions” which I cited above undoubtedly led Edward Schiappa to criticize McGuire 
and Melia’s interpretation of Burke. Schiappa cited Brummett’s view that recalcitrance 
applies to scientific and non-scientific approaches alike (Schiappa 409; see also “Some 
Cautionary Strictures” 89 and Permanence 257). Brummett admits that physical reality 
exists: “We simply cannot talk rocks and trees into existence” (425); however, he 
concludes that the (human) experience of reality is mediated by symbols and, furthermore, 
that social constructivists must remain “agnostic” (anti-realist) on the on the question of 
“an independent, objective, reality”(425). He endorses “rhetorical relativism”: “the belief 
that what is real and true is determined only by the social, symbolic, and historical 
context from which the knowing human arises” (p. 82, emphasis original). For the 
rhetorical relativist, recalcitrance could mean any sort of intra-linguistic resistance to a 
symbolic mediation of reality. “Even death,” Brummett hyperbolically claims, “the Great 
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Recalcitrance, is not so objective that it cannot be symbolically shaped through and 
through” (426). 
Prelli et al. propose to resolve this scientific/nonscientific difference in 
interpretation by revisiting not only the sections in Permanence and Change that are 
marshaled in defense of constructivism or objectivism, but also by considering Burke’s 
off-ignored explanation in Attitudes Toward History and other neglected allusions. They 
argue for a comprehensive view in which recalcitrance is a realist term, a communication 
term, and a critical term. Here, I will only focus on the realist term. This focus is not 
against Prelli et al.’s wishes. Regardless of how recalcitrance is deployed across any of 
these three terms, they maintain that recalcitrance always remains open to the structure 
that Burke defines in Attitudes: recalcitrance “refers to factors that substantiate a 
statement, the factors that incite a statement, and the factors that correct a statement 
(Attitudes 47n, emphasis original). I will explain the significance of this statement below, 
but I first need to clarify how the realist understanding of objective and minimal realists 
“misread” what Burke intends by recalcitrance.  
According to Prelli et al., rhetorical realists are interested in Burke in order to 
demonstrate “the extent to which knowledge is rhetorical and the degree to which the 
discourses of the physical sciences are fully amenable to rhetorical analysis, obscuring its 
relationship to Burke’s realism in the process” (103). They maintain that Burke’s realism 
does not support either relativism or epistemic realism: “From Burke’s realist position, 
any perspective and not just scientific perspectives could escape relativism, solipsism, or 
subjectivism insofar as it grappled with the recalcitrant factors it disclosed” (103). In 
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general, recalcitrance is tied to “perspective,” a term roughly commensurate with Burke’s 
definition of “orientation.” An orientation is not a manifestation of transcendental reason, 
but a necessarily contingent, partial, prejudicial, or biased view upon the motivations and 
interests of the rhetor. At first glance, orientation sounds like an endorsement of 
constructivism. However, perspective is not limited solely to humans and is grounded in 
the phenomenological experience of the world. Burke notes, “the grasshopper will find a 
universe that is different from ours because the vocation [e.g. perspective] or ethics of a 
grasshopper is different” (256). Encountering the same phenomenological object, a field 
of freshly harvested wheat, the farmer may be pleased with the aesthetic appearance, the 
smell of freshly threshed stalks, a high protein count, and the prospect of a high yield, but 
the grasshopper, even though it lacks self-consciousness, possesses a biological 
reflexivity that would make it likely seek more cover from predators in a neighbor’s 
unharvested crop. As Prelli et al. describe, “The universe ‘yields’ to our point of view by 
disclosing the different orders of recalcitrance which arise when the universe is 
considered from this point of view” (Permanence 257). 
Recalcitrance, or the “new realism” as Burke calls it, suggests that any orientation 
will necessarily come up against recalcitrant factors and prompt revision with respect to a 
given situation’s resistant or supportive materials: “Once you introduce a point of view 
into the universe . . . (as it is introduced by biological vocation) [that] point of view 
requires an interpretation of events, a reading of the recalcitrant factors favorable and 
unfavorable to the point of view” (257, n2). Prelli et al. allege that Burke’s commentators 
have missed a crucial aspect of recalcitrance in that “Burke thought recalcitrant materials 
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could be incorporated within a perspective through revisions that worked to substantiate 
a situated extension of that point of view” (101). Commentators have been largely 
interested in the corrective applications, such as pointing to empirical evidence to 
challenge true or false claims, but “recalcitrance also denotes factors that can substantiate 
a point of view” (102). In other words, recalcitrance could also refer to factors that do not 
challenge but support a necessarily particular orientation. Prelli et al. claim that 
recalcitrance incorporates materials that support a thesis, materials that challenge a thesis 
and provide support for an antithesis, and materials that motivate the generation of a 
statement in an intermediate position in between a thesis and a counterthesis (102).  
Prelli et al. stress that recalcitrance is not just an intralinguistic form as in 
Brummett’s rhetorical relativism. Burke suggests that recalcitrant materials are also 
“revisions made necessary by the nature of the world itself” (Permanence 257). However, 
I must register an additional distinction here. In this claim, the nature of the world is not a 
nature composed equally of humans and nonhumans as real actors as they would be in 
Bennett’s or Latour’s respective realisms. Rather, the nature of this world is consistent 
with rhetorical realism, explaining only the reality of our partial orientations and the 
inability of language to refer to an essence. Recalcitrance calls our attention to linguistic 
realities in moments where claims that an empirical realist might declare as “false” might 
in fact turn out to be true depending on what materials are disclosed from a given 
orientation. Prelli et al. provide examples of a sunrise and the non-scientific 
understanding of the color green from Permanence and Change. If an astronomer argues 
that the claim, “the sun rises in the east” is an illusion when weighed against the fact that 
	   70 
“the earth is rotating eastward,” then “[Burke’s] new realism would respond that from our 
situated point of view the sun does, indeed, rise in the east; it is not an illusion” (102). 
The orientation of the astronomer encounters recalcitrance in the “commonsense” 
perspective of non-astronomer: “Suddenly, the rotating earth becomes irrelevant, while 
the contrary assertion that the sun rises in the west is flatly wrong; the ‘fact,’ in this 
situation, is clear. Burke made a similar point when he contended that, from a strictly 
scientific perspective, the experience of seeing green leaves is an ‘illusion’ founded in ‘a 
mere phenomenal restating; of certain vibrations affecting nerve tissues’” (102). Rather, 
to quote Burke in Permanence and Change, “real experience” meant the complete “arc” 
of ‘‘external vibrations, the nervous responses, and the resultant sense of green” (260). 
Seen through the lens of Burke’s new realism, ‘‘the quality green becomes as ‘real’ in our 
speculations as it is in our everyday experience. It is not an ‘illusion,’ but like the rising 
sun, is ‘an actual part of the universe’ ” (Permanence 260). Of these examples, Prelli et al. 
conclude, “We can see from these examples that recalcitrant materials from the nonverbal 
world are real, but so too are the purposes and interests motivating the points of view that 
disclosed them” (Permanence 263).  
As it relates to rhetorical realism, this view of the color green is important 
because it means, as Burke concludes later on, that the any “discovery” from a new 
orientation has an “objective validity” as they “are nothing other than revisions made 
necessary by the nature of the world itself” (257). The world is not reducible to a 
“product of our interpretations” (256), and yet our interpretations—depending on our 
orientation—construct reality just as much as the astronomer’s empirical orientation and 
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more so than the reality of the entities-in-themselves or their relations with other entities. 
The factors that “incite” change include nonverbal and nonsymbolic sources of affect, but 
theses sources are reducible to linguistic symbolization. Rhetorical realism is necessary 
only in so far as it avoids reducing rhetorical activity to the terms of biological, 
ecological, or mechanistic motion. Here, Burke’s distinction between the dramatistic and 
the scientific directly informs his thinking of recalcitrance and realism. In Burke’s 
understanding, science is not prone to accept recalcitrance from perspectives that are not 
grounded in science due to its denotative and static vocabulary: 
The scientists, technologists, represent the group that turned the defect into 
a virtue. Their language . . . is devoid of the tonalities, the mimetic 
reinforcements, the vaguely remembered human situations, which go to 
make up the full, complex appeal of the poetic medium. To the scientist’s 
symbols one can respond adequately by looking them up in a book. The 
very lack of pliancy helps to assist them in avoiding the appeal of pliancy. 
The language by which [the technological order] is being rationalized may 
largely surmount the temptations of the anthropomorphic by reason of its 
low anthropomorphic content. It is designed for machines. (Permanence 
58) 
Of the ideas represented in this passage, Prelli et al. draw the conclusion “. . . 
perspectives based on mechanistic metaphor resist revision when confronted with 
recalcitrant materials other than those disclosed from their own terms while perspectives 
founded on poetic metaphor yield to revision when confronted with recalcitrant materials 
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disclosed by other terminological perspectives” (112). Recalcitrance does stem from our 
“objective” condition of living in a world seen through the paradox of substance and from 
our interactions with physical reality; however, recalcitrance is ultimately bound up in the 
cycle of observation and revision made by the rhetor’s necessarily partial perception.  
The question that I raised in my introduction of this chapter is whether or not 
recalcitrance is adequate as a way to overcome the human-nonhuman ontological divide. 
From Prelli et al’s reading, I think it is clear that Burke’s realism only describes human 
realities. It makes no claim about the material reality of nonhuman actors or how they 
might agentively participate in the shaping or impeding in Bennett’s sense of rhetorical 
interaction. Recalcitrance reveals little about how nonhumans contribute to symbolic 
activity other than as a source of reflection for the rhetor. In his view of realism, Burke is 
not an idealist or a relativist, but is nevertheless indebted to the neo-Kantian world view. 
The active cognitive subject produces and reflects upon the known and passive object and 
it is the former’s mind that creates “objective” differences. The problem with thinking of 
recalcitrance from the perspective of language and what appears to humans, as Nathaniel 
Rivers suggests, is that recalcitrance is limited to “a way of adjudicating statements or 
claims about the world” (“Intensely”17).  
To reiterate my claim, what is at stake for me is not whether Prelli et al. are 
correct in their reading of recalcitrance, and, again, I believe that they are correct. Nor do 
I want to dispute that symbols have great powers to draw hierarchies of being and 
formations of political agency for human communities. My point of disagreement with 
Prelli et al. is I maintain that recalcitrance cannot be defined in Burke’s sense and 
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effectively assess the contributions of nonhumans in a way that overturns the ontological 
gap of nature and culture figured through an active perceiving subject and a passive and 
inactive nonhuman object. For Burke, recalcitrance and rhetorical realism are largely 
bound up with adding symbolicity (and rhetoricality) to scientific descriptions as well as 
with explaining differences among humans’ linguistic connotations about natural objects. 
Given this understanding of realism, I feel as though my concern about how Burke’s 
realism relates to nonhuman entities in nature is justified.  
Working from Kant’s a priori mental forms that in the end imposes meaning on 
the chaotic manifold of nature, recalcitrance could be seen as a quasi-idealist form of 
constructing symbolic realities. Far from forging a truly alternative middle ground 
between the relativism/realism debate, Burke might be seen to replace Melia and 
McGuire’s  “minimal realism” with a form of “minimal idealism.”25 A minimal idealism 
would leave the subject’s use of symbols apart from the world of motion in order to carve 
out a dramatistic realism that proceeds from a rejection of epistemic realism. In his 
theorization of rhetorical realism, Burke places meaning first, and—from this position—
rhetoric only emerges as a part of symbolicity itself. From the active subject’s point of 
view, terministic revision is more important to consider than the actual existence and 
affectitivity of nonhumans themselves. Timothy Crusius insists, “Burke is no idealist. 
There is much more to existence than mind. Nor, in Burke’s view, can phenomena be 
reduced to linguistic constructions. Language is not all there is” (88). Crusius is correct, 
and yet the outside of language—Latour’s nonmodern realism or Bennett’s material 
realism—remains circumscribed not to epistemic realism—as it is for Croasmun and 
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Cherwitz and McGuire and Melia—but to our active construction of symbolic forms 
which we revise according to the different perspectives and orientations that the mind 
alone produces and encounters. Despite Crusius’s assertion, Samuel B. Southwell 
confirms that Burke, in a typical gesture of modernity, “. . . is always ready to refer to a 
distinction between the realm of experience created by language and ‘reality’ (though 
‘reality’ is always in quotation marks)” (43). In the context of recalcitrance, such a 
position again is really only ever aimed at adding material consequences to how humans 
respond to non-logical, nonsensical or non-scientific forms. We cannot establish a form 
of realism that can acknowledge Bennett’s “thing-power” or Latour’s realistic realism. 
We are also unable to reframing the realism/relativism divide altogether in a revitalized 
sense of realism. 
Realism Post-Burke 
 Burke’s recalcitrance does indeed mark an improvement on certain aspects of the 
realism/constructivist debate. Before moving to Latour, I want to quickly trace out some 
of the major commentators on this debate that Prelli et al. do not mention. For example, 
Cherwitz published a version of “perspectival realism” with Thomas Darwin to trace a 
“relational theory of meaning.” They hold that perspectivalism has an “inability to 
account for the simultaneous capacity of language to be constrained by and shape objects” 
(17, italics in original). Promisingly, Cherwitz and Darwin theorize rhetoric as a dynamic 
force that evolves out of substance (“language, objects, rhetorics, and auditors”) (20), 
history (“the etymology and past usage of language”), and context (roughly “scene” in 
Burkean terms—physical locations of language, objects, and their relations to one 
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another). Each aspect—substance, history, context—is interconnected and “no one 
constituent is sufficient to articulate how meaning is made” (25). “Perspectival realism,” 
Royer notes, is one of  “. . . a variety of neo-realist positions ranging from the dialectical 
posture of Sean Sayers to the philosophy of organism of A. N. Whitehead. Each in its 
own way avoids the problems inherent in dualist and anti-realist positions by positing a 
reality that is not disjunct but is yet neither merely physical (phenomenal) nor merely 
mental (noumenal). For an alterative need not be chosen from these poles of crass realism 
on the one hand and subjective idealism on the other” (234). Royer is absolutely correct 
regarding the Cherwitz and Darwin’s aims; however, as we saw with Burke above, many 
are not very successful in repositioning realism away from a post-Kantian framework. 
Cherwitz and Darwin diagnose the symptoms of modernity, but their framework lapses 
into a representationalist account of science where human mental constructions remain all 
that is at stake in the constitution of rhetorical realism. They are still avoiding factoring in 
what Latour calls the “missing masses” of nonhuman presence. 
In another prominent example, Sayers’s rhetorical realism rearticulates an 
epistemic realist claim: “In order to go forward towards an objective and realist theory of 
knowledge, on the other hand, it is necessary to recognize that there are things-in-
themselves. There is an objective material world which is not forever cut off from us, but 
which on the contrary is knowable by consciousness” (Sayers 22). Sayers is closer to 
Aristotle than Plato, arguing that mind and matter are transcendentally separated: “In 
concrete reality, these opposites interact and interpenetrate-they are constantly being 
transformed in relationship to each other. Such opposites are dynamically related” (35). 
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Again, Sayers’s founding hypothesis is modern and he is ultimately unable to explain 
how it is that the human being crosses the ontological gap to nature but without 
disturbing the realm of culture.  
 Royer, very generously, tries to draw points of overlap between Sayers’s 
“materialist” account to the philosophy of Whitehead. Whitehead’s opposition to any 
“bifurcation of nature” into nature and culture (or motion and action) is very similar, as I 
will argue below and in future chapters, to Latour’s nonmodern Constitution, Karen 
Barad’s agential realism, or Andy Clark’s neurological thesis that the objects that we 
interact with actually affect the development of our cognitive abilities and patterns. 
Whitehead does not go this far, but does posit a “provisional realism.” Speaking of 
idealism which, he explains, “finds the ultimate meaning of reality in ‘mentality that is 
fully cognitive,’” Whitehead points out its limitations, concluding: “My point is that a 
further stage of provisional realism is required in which the scientific scheme is recast, 
and founded upon the ultimate concept of organism” (Science 93). Further, this provision 
realism “involves a fundamental duality, with material on the one hand, and on the other 
hand mind. In between there lie the concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous 
reality, interaction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel of the 
whole system” (Science 84). While I do not have the space to mount a full exposition of 
Whitehead’s scholarship, all I would comment is that he does not always attend as much 
to the specific reality of nonhumans at least to the extent that Latour and others require. 
  Yet, other than briefly in Sayers and in Royer’s lone essay, “Challenges for 
Epistemic Rhetoric,” Whitehead is never mentioned by rhetoric of science scholars.26 
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Rhetorical theorists such as Anne Berthoff actually mention Whitehead, but the issue of 
realism in his work is greatly elided. Latour fares slightly better than Whitehead within 
the scholarship that specifically attends to the question of rhetorical realism and science, 
being confined to a footnote alongside Woolgar by Allan Gross in Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics. Gross has waffled between “minimal realism” and anti-realism, arguing in 
“Rhetoric Without Constraints,” that “the brute facts of nature” and scientific knowledge 
are rhetorical but reversing course to privilege philosophy in Starring the Text. The 
landscape of rhetorical theory, in other words, and this point is not well-emphasized by 
Prelli et al.’s account, of rhetoric of science and, indeed, rhetorical theory as a whole 
remains thoroughly epistemic, constructivist, or simply, anti-realist in postmodern and 
poststructuralist accounts. In no other area of rhetorical inquiry has realism enjoyed such 
sustained entertainment than in rhetoric of science, a truly noteworthy occurrence for a 
field, that by most accounts, has never even been postmodern (Ornatowski para. 3; see 
also Zerbe).  
In response to growing critical attention in the late twentieth-century, Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly featured a special issue in 1996 advocating its “support” for an 
emerging subfield of communications studies designated as the “rhetoric of science” (7). 
Editors Leah Ceccarelli, Richard Doyle, and Jack Selzer note that the rhetoric of science 
is concerned with how a “traditional understanding of rhetoric” can lend itself to the 
analysis both of the inscriptions (essays, descriptive statements) and deliberative policy 
decisions of scientific discourse (7). Representative approaches were Jeanne 
Fanhnestock’s study of the mobilization of rhetorical figures (metaphor, gradatio, and 
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incrementum) in scientific writing or William Kinsella’s argument that the route from 
observation of the physical world to the establishment of scientific knowledge involved 
rhetorical considerations. “All authors,” Ceccarelli et al. maintain, “examine oral or 
written discourse initiated [and disseminated] by responsible (and often calculating 
agents)” (3). This link between rational or rhetorical agency and purposive activity in 
knowledge creation have come to define the rhetoric of science along with, as Fahnestock 
says elsewhere, the general questions: “To what extent does language do our thinking for 
us? [and] How do the structures or options available in language lead us into certain 
prepared lines of thought or argument?” (ix). In far more than a coincidental 
acknowledgement, the editors note their deliberate oversight: “Missing from this special 
issue are the more postmodern perspectives that call into question the assumption that 
reasoned arguments and intentional persuasive strategies of free agents are the discursive 
realities that rhetoricians should examine” (3). As of the present moment (2012), RSQ 
has, finally, one article by Carl Herndl on Annemarie Mol, the postfeminist actor-
network theorist, and medical technology. In other words, even postmodernity let alone 
more complex accounts of reality such as Latour’s or Whitehead’s remains something 
that those who are most closely attuned to the rhetoric/realism debate have yet to fully 
grapple. In a lone exception, Michael J. Zerbe reiterates this point for rhetoric in 2007 in 
his outstanding book on postmodernism and science. He notes, “This oversight [of 
postmodernism] is all the most startling given that several prominent postmodern 
theorists—Lyotard, Zizek, and Foucault among them—identify scientific discourse as the 
most influential contemporary rhetoric or science in general as the most powerful 
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institutional in contemporary culture” (24).27 Thus, I mention this account of rhetoric of 
science before turning to Latour because while it is true that, especially since 2009, 
Latour is starting to enjoy citation from rhetorical scholars (Rice; Cooper; Barnett; 
Rickert; Hawk; Rivers; Spinuzzi; Dobrin; Gries;), these remain a small minority in 
comparison to the deeply held anti-realist and epistemic foundations of rhetorical theory.  
Constructing the Nonmodern Constitution 
One primary reason that I am dissatisfied with an understanding of realism that 
theorizes rhetoric through symbolic realities that humans create for one another alone lies 
in the outcome that we tend to use this reality to account for how rhetorical events and 
situations emerge. This narrative is invariably an asymmetrical narrative of rhetorical 
interaction where the morphisms of mirror neurons in the brain that alter in response to 
our idiosyncratic behaviorial ecologies are (in)active at the scene of rhetoric. Mirror 
neurons, Diane Davis argues, function as “eloquent deconstructions of [Kenneth] Burke’s 
ultimate order of things, shattering the presumption of an originary biological disconnect 
between self and other” (131). Working from a transcendental (e.g. “conditions of 
possibility”) argument grounded in Emmanual Levinas’s philosophy, in Inessential 
Solidarity Davis begins with Burke’s claim that rhetoric arises because humans are 
divided as singular being, adding that rhetoric does not occur first or only at the level of 
symbolic action, but from the pre-symbolic exposure and relationality to the (human) 
Other’s unrepresentable alterity. In other words, there is no “gap” between biology and 
self, but an ecological co-constitution irreducible to reflection (the adjudication of 
knowledge claims), leading Davis to argue for an “originary (or preoriginary) 
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rhetoricity—an affectability or persuadability—that is the condition for symbolic action” 
(5).28  
I hold that this affectability can be extended to include the material influence of 
nonhumans and this extension can bring us closer to placing Burke and Latour’s 
respective realisms in dialogue. Thomas Rickert suggests in Ambient Rhetoric that we 
can think of nonhuman reality (objects) and rhetoric through the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger. Heidegger is a necessary illustrative detour as it is necessary to begin to 
gesture toward alternative conceptions of materiality in order to eventually re-think the 
relationship between rhetoric and realism in Latour’s nonmodern constitution. As 
opposed to the “presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit) of phenomena in consciousness, the 
withdrawn being of equipment is called “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) that we 
generally notice only when our tools break (Being and Time 90-105). Our consideration 
of tools and nonhuman entities is often limited to a modern—in Latour’s sense—
hermeneutic that separates the user’s intentionality from the tool’s instrumentality. 
Rickert counters, “[t]here is no person + environment: there a fundamental entanglement, 
with individuation of particular facets being an achieved disclosure” (26). “World 
disclosure” is Heidegger’s term for a space of emergence that cannot be cleanly reduced 
into a priori categories such as the act, agent, scene, agency, or purpose of Burke’s 
pentadic ratios. Disclosure refers to a pre-symbolic background of concealed things in 
which our pragmatic and ecological encounters disclose different things to us in different 
contexts and affective registers, and these contexts include material sources. The act of 
writing includes the context of actors such as the “ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, 
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table, lamps, furniture, windows, doors, [and] room” (Being and Time 97). According to 
Heidegger, we are already “thrown” into these conditions, left without the ability to 
demarcate between the given and the constructed. 
Disclosure means that Being (of all actors) is never fully abstracted or represented 
or instrumentalized. As a result, humans do not originate or initiate symbolic action. 
Humans disclose symbolic action in contexts and alliances with human and nonhuman 
actors who themselves are involved in disclosing different qualities to different actors. 
Disclosure is an originary affectability that attunes us to the multiple sites of symbolic 
and material affect. This affectability maintains the object’s withdrawn, readiness-to-
hand status while simultaneously searching out how the recalcitrant factors it generates 
“incite” not mere terministic revision or substantiation, but the conditions of our very 
rhetoricity that engage in relations with a variety of nonhuman actors. For Heidegger, 
Davis, and Rickert, symbolic action cannot appear as immanence—an activity occurring 
entirely within the res cogito—in the Cartesian or Kantian sense, but rather as an 
abstracted end result that emerges from a more complex relationship to nonhuman 
entities. This emergence blurs the ways in which lines can be drawn between action and 
motion.29 Considered apart neither term captures the entirety of the reality that the object 
discloses in its relations with other actors.  
This active, unfolding, and living experience is a rhetorical dimension of 
disclosure that Burke theorizes for language and recalcitrance, but Latour can more fully 
realize its potential for the purposes of thinking rhetorical realism. Latour’s realism is not 
an asymmetrical hierarchy of human action and nonhuman motion, but a symmetrical 
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accounting of reality where both human and nonhumans are treated as equal ontological 
actors. Echoed throughout all of his publications since We Have Never Been Modern, 
Latour’s claim, summarized eloquently by the quotation that opens this essay, is that the 
study of human social relations must return to concrete and real things in order to reverse 
the modern Constitution. As Latour pantomimes his postmodern interlocutors, “But if 
you are not talking about things-in-themselves or about humans-among-themselves, then 
you must be talking about just discourse, presentation, language, texts, rhetorics” (5). 
Latour vehemently disagrees: “When I describe Pasteur’s domestication of microbes, I 
am mobilizing nineteenth-century society, not just the semiotics of a great man’s texts; 
when I describe the invention-discovery of brain peptides, I am really talking about the 
peptides themselves, not simply their representation in Professor Guillemain’s laboratory” 
(5). Latour’s argument does not set aside the importance of language. He maintains, 
“rhetoric, textual strategies, writing, staging, semiotics—all these are really at stake, but 
in a new form that has a simultaneous impact on the nature of things and on the social 
context, while it is not reducible to the one or the other” (5). Latour shares Burke’s 
interest in how symbols create partial and incomplete realities; however, he argues for a 
more complicated understanding of the relationship between scientism and the nonhuman 
object to the point where science and society (the symbolic world) and the objects 
themselves are inseparable and mutually constitutive.30  
Latour’s nonmodern realism places renewed emphasis on scientific techniques of 
representation to challenge idealist linguistic constructionism. At the same time, he does 
not resort to epistemic realism or scientific reductionism of cultural phenomena. In 
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Latour’s words, “Far from perspectives that debate man’s access to reality,” as both 
postmodern and modern perspectives endorse, “the Resistance of objects to observation is 
reality!” (Pasteurization 145, emphasis original). Latour’s view of resistance marks a key 
difference between his thinking of realism and Burke’s. Recalcitrance, for Burke, is not 
specifically tied to nonhumans’ interactions with each other at the level where any 
interaction between actors is significant, whether or not it is noticed by or impacts human 
actors. For Latour, even a tiny drop of spilled British Petroleum oil swallowed by a 
Louisiana Gulf Coast marlin in the 2010 spill that resulted in a case of mild indigestion 
would be as authentic of an instance of recalcitrance at the level of physical force as a 
representation of the same marlin in a congressional subcommittee hearing. Anything that 
makes a difference is an actor, from the microscopic perturbation of atomic particles to 
hallucinations that only occur in an individual’s mind. All entities share in a common 
principle of irreducibility: “nothing can be reduced to anything else; nothing can be 
deduced by anything else, and everything may be allied to everything else” 
(Pasteurization 163). As Latour argues in The Pasteurization of France, any encounter 
between entities reduces the reality of any entities involved in an act of “translation.” For 
Latour, a “thing” is not just an object out there, as part of a stable subject-object 
dichotomy that an active subject constructs or a true object that a passive observer 
reflects. Things operate in a reality “where nonhuman things escape the strictures of 
objectivity twice: they are neither objects known by a subject nor objects manipulated by 
a master (nor, of course, are they masters themselves)” (“A Collective of Nonhumans” 
163).  
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Objects exist as real entities that Latour, in terms borrowed from Michel Serres, 
calls “quasi-subjects” and “quasi-objects”: entities unevenly and incompletely engaged in 
networks of translation. Latour would argue that all entities as recalcitrant. If I take the 
example of an original Platonic dialogue written in Greek, the point is not only that the 
Benjamin Jowett translation differs from the Greek penned by Plato, but also that the 
process of translation—by Jowett, by Heidegger, or by Derrida—generates something 
new with any new relations whether they are made by consciousness minds converting 
Greek to English, Greek to German, or Greek to French or made through relations 
between objects such as the original Greek markings bonded to the papyrus (or velum) 
interacting with the atmosphere in a vain battle to bear its marks for eternity. Each actor 
mediates and reduces others actors differently, making recalcitrance a processes that must 
apply equally to all actors. The “guarantee” of the modern Constitution that humans and 
nonhumans are separate “forbids” us to acknowledge these “translation networks” 
whereby nonhumans and humans are constantly changing as their qualities are translated 
and engaged differently by different actors (Modern 52). Burke’s thinking of 
recalcitrance, if limited to language, participates in eliding the importance of these 
translation networks. If I were to use Burke’s terminology, by positing the “form” of the 
modernist Constitution, Burke might be seen in his separation of action and motion to 
induce the conditions for entelechial fulfillment by “the official work of purification” by 
denying translation, “the unofficial (linguistic and representational) work of mediation” 
(172). 
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Latour locates a founding moment of the modern Constitution through the 
invention of empirical science by offering a novel reading of Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). According to Latour, Shapin and 
Schaffer’s purpose was to “examine how Boyle and Hobbes fought to invent a science, a 
context, and a demarcation between the two” (Modern 16). One half of the modern 
Constitution is composed of science and the empirical proof of transcendental natural 
laws in Boyle’s air pump, and the other half is composed of human culture, philosophy 
and politics represented by Thomas Hobbes’s political leviathan. Hobbes employed 
apodictic argumentation and the “political reasons of primary philosophy” in support of 
the plenists who held that an “invisible ether” occupied the space in-between both cosmic 
and molecular bodies. Furthermore, his political philosophy maintained that nature was 
not made for human beings but was instead a hostile foreign place (“rough brutish 
nature”) that only reason and law could overcome. By contrast, Boyle represented the 
vacuists, positing that a vacuum existed in the in-between space among bodies. Boyle 
thought that science could produce knowledge of the universal natural laws freed from 
human construction and Hobbes flatly rejected the premise by maintaining that only 
logically verifiable principles could provide knowledge of nature’s universality. 
In this split between Boyle and Hobbes, the modernist Constitution provided the 
form that will induce the separation between science and reason and the ontological gap 
in between human and nonhuman that will plague the realism and relativism debates in 
the twentieth-century. Latour suggests that Hobbes leaves us apart from nature: 
“[N]ature’s very transcendence overwhelms us, or renders it inaccessible. Symmetrically, 
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if society is made only for and by humans, the Leviathan, an artificial creation of which 
we are at once the form and the matter, cannot stand up” (31). To a far greater extent that 
Burke’s “minimal idealism,” Hobbes, relegates recalcitrant factors to representation 
while ignoring any recalcitrant influence of nonhumans entities in themselves. Yet, 
observes Latour, nonhumans sustain the durability of Hobbes’s social Leviathan—
nonhumans such as horses, carriages, pens, paper, print presses, bodies that compose the 
leviathan itself, muskets, ploughs, merchant boats, cannons, swords, sewer organization 
as Alain Corbin has described The Foul and the Fragrant, and germs as Jared Diamond 
has documented in Guns, Germs and Steel. Latour summarizes, “Despite the solidity 
procured by the mobilization of things (as revealed by the work of mediation), [for 
Hobbes] we alone are the ones who constitute it freely by the sheer force of our reasoning” 
(31).  
Even though he was firmly focused on physical objects, Boyle performed the 
same separation, maintaining that he could fabricate the laws of nature in the laboratory 
leaving no traces of human hands in a movement to bring a controllable, manipulable part 
of nature into human control. In other words, Boyle would be only a passive observer or a 
neutral conduit who added nothing socially constructed to the events observed. Thus, 
Scot Lash claims, “Boyle gives us a repertoire for speaking about nature (as constructed 
in the laboratory): ‘experiment,’ ‘fact,’ ‘evidence’ and ‘colleagues’—as Hobbes does for 
culture, i.e., politics (as embodied in the Leviathan): ‘representation,’ ‘sovereign,’ 
‘contract,’ ‘property’ and ‘citizens’ ” (25). Taken together, Hobbes and Boyle articulate a 
view of human culture and reason immunized from contamination with nature and vice 
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versa. One would see recalcitrance in operation in language, and the other would deny 
recalcitrance’s existence, maintaining that transcendental knowledge of nature’s truth was 
achievable. 
Boyle claimed that he could discover the truth of this ideological debate between 
plenists and vacuists by returning to the thing-in-itself and revealing the empirical 
existence of “air” by weighing it. Boyle’s air pump allowed for “the discovery of 
Toricellian space at the top of a mercury tube inverted in a basin of the same substance” 
(23). In an apparatus modeled on Otto von Guericke’s, Boyle sought to produce a 
vacuum in a transparent glass container by expelling all air. Latour well-describes this 
technological apparatus: “He enclosed a Torricelli tube within the pump’s glass enclosure 
and thus obtained an initial space at the top of the overturned tube. Then, by getting one 
of his technicians . . . to work the pump, he suppressed the weight of the air enough to 
bring down the level of the column, which descended nearly to the level of the mercury 
in the basin” (23). Further, “Boyle undertook dozens of experiments within the confined 
chamber of his air pump, starting with attempts to detect the ether wind postulated by his 
adversaries [such as Hobbes], or to explain the cohesiveness of marble cylinders, or to 
suffocate small animals and put out candles—these experiments were later popularized 
by eighteenth-century parlor physics” (We Have Never 17). Latour’s reference to parlor 
physics lies in the fact that Boyle’s device allowed “observers to directly perceive the 
experimental processes as well as introduce or even to manipulate samples,” due to 
“ingeniously constructed lock chambers and covers” (171). In a very real sense, as Rivers 
has suggested, Boyle anticipated the successful Mythbusters television show genre. 
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By making alliances through all of these human and nonhuman entities, Boyle 
could produce a durable arrangement of actors—a controlled environment—to allow 
“speech” —the discovery and harnessing of the forces of air—of nonhumans. But what 
kind of speech is this? The answer to this question demonstrates the way in which Latour 
reframes the realism/relativism debate. Latour writes, “We know the nature of the facts 
because we have developed them in circumstances that are under our complete control. 
Our weakness becomes a strength, provided that we limit knowledge to the 
instrumentalized nature of the facts and leave aside the interpretation of the causes” (18). 
Our flaw or weakness is that “we produce only matters of fact that are created in 
laboratories and have only local value” (18). Further, “these facts will never be modified, 
whatever may happen elsewhere in theory, metaphysics, religion, politics or logic” (18). 
It is possible to discover the “facts” of nature, but such facts cannot be made meaningful 
(interpreted) without acknowledging the imbrication of culture. After all, Boyle’s 
demonstration of air’s visibility is already a rhetorical appeal to human construction and 
not to nature in-itself; however, Boyle’s facts about air were not the exclusive result of 
reason (symbolic action) alone. According to Latour, experiments do not produce 
transcendental knowledge of nature but only concrete evidence that a certain alliance of 
actors can be made durable for a certain period of time. The example of the air pump is 
important because while scientists such as Boyle believe that they are engaging with an 
“objective” nature, Latour holds that it is necessarily inseparable from social implications. 
Although the air pump produces real knowledge of an aspect of nature in a localized 
condition, the air pump is nevertheless political in that Boyle uses the air pump to 
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legitimate not only his political theories of scientific knowledge, but to help delineate 
who should be given power within society (e.g., scientists over philosophers). Hobbes 
actually denied Boyle’s findings. The former claimed the grounds of empiricism were not 
commensurate with those of reason, seeking to supplant reason and reason alone as the 
condition of possibility for political interaction without regard to nature.  
From Invention to Delivery 
Latour’s point in his explication of this episode from scientific history is not that 
nature and culture are the same. Instead, his point is that there is has never been a pure 
subject and a pure object with science as a “neutral” intermediary removed from the 
realm of persuasion. Although the symbol-using animal desires to be modern through 
achieving a clean ontological split between human and nonhuman, the truth, Latour 
claims, is that we were never modern. Boyle did not discover the universal “truth” of air. 
Air never becomes universal, except in as far as “its network is extended and stabilized” 
(24). With each reproduction and dissemination of Boyle’s prototype, “and the 
progressive transformation of a piece of costly, not very reliable and quite cumbersome 
equipment, into a cheap black box that gradually becomes standard equipment in every 
laboratory, the authors bring the universal application of a law of physics back within a 
network of standardized practices” (24). A black box, as Latour suggested previously in 
Science in Action, is a set of functioning technological practices taken for granted. Once 
established, black boxes are never opened and questioned, but, unlike Thomas Kuhn’s 
paradigm shifts motivated by humans, the technologies of representation and the material 
arrangements of actors all participate in the shaping of a paradigm. As Latour argues, 
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Boyle certainly could not have predicted what would occur ahead of time with perfect 
certainty. Boyle was “told” by the existing technology of the time period that his 
materials were inadequate to reveal what he wanted to reveal. His process of invention is 
not a product of the res cogito, the divine whisper of Ion, or Aristotle’s belief that the 
artist beings with the form already in mind, imposing his grand design on matter. Boyle’s 
process began in perpetual dialogue with what his materials revealed and failed to reveal 
to him. Similarly, the operations of the elements in the experience also play this role, 
“choosing” to confirm various hypotheses which could not have been anticipated in 
advance by Boyle.  
I will make a very specific argument for the relationship between nonmodern 
realism and delivery in all subsequent chapters. For now, I want to note that even at a 
very basic level, Latour’s nonmodern realistic realism has shifted the point of emphasis 
of rhetoric from invention to delivery. It is equally as if not more important to focus on 
how blackboxes circulate and ally with other material actors than it is to analyze the 
rhetorical forces immanent to Hobbes’s or Boyles’s respective mental constitution. 
Following from Latour’s analysis, the pump itself must be seen as a complex delivery 
machine of assemblage of glass tubes, air particles, wind, rhetoric, scholasticism, 
fantasies of empirical mastery, electricity, water, eyeballs, Kuhnian paradigms, and much 
more: “Discourse is a population of actants that mix with things as well as societies” 
(Modern 90). Invention and delivery cannot be separated and delivery—nonsymbolic 
factors— cannot be subsumed to invention. Participants “all translate, mediate and extend 
the networks” (90). Objects “trace networks” but simultaneously compose “actor-
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networks” (90). By this claim, Latour urges us to use the same terms to discuss humans 
and nonhumans, without privileging action over motion or motion over action. Objects 
are not caused by subjects, but are similar to subjects. Both construct the space of the 
social and the nature through processes of “sorting,” “delegation,” and “mediation.” 
Burke’s recalcitrance would hold that things could be ideally constructed but 
without regard to how natural forces contribute to the act of communication itself to the 
degree that Latour’s nonmodern constitution requires. Yet, while discursive elements 
contributed by humans are a necessary condition for reality (e.g., invention), language 
alone in not a sufficient causal condition. Representation is a necessary activity for 
humans and it is only one part of the reality of society and nature. To return to 
Brummett’s claim that we cannot talk a tree (or a vacuum) into existence (or out of 
existence in Hobbes’s case), idealists are correct that a tree clearly is not a tree without 
our prior and agreed upon representation (abstract container) of a tree. However, if we 
use the tree to build a house, then we must fabricate the house with a variety of allies 
such as nails, hammers, band saws, power drills, and flooring laminate (e.g., delivery). 
The tree undeniably possesses a real physical presence in the world that is irreducible to 
our conceptual significations. Moreover, the binding or linking of these materials must 
accord with laws of physics, geometry, mathematics, and geology. From Latour’s 
perspective, we are constantly in representative, sensory, and empirical dialogue with 
these nonhuman forces as we build, as the reality of nature informs where and when 
materials can be combined or linked at a certain place at a certain time. Historically, as I 
will suggest in the following chapter, the canon of delivery is best suited to describe these 
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processes—not invention. 
According to Latour, science labs are where “objects are made to speak,” but they 
can only do so through technologies of mediation. Elsewhere, Latour develops this claim 
through the example of a Spanish river (“Interview”). In Spain, the politics of water is 
important due to scarcity. Latour argues that the river is a political actor “on two 
conditions: one of them is that the river has to be made to speak through plenty of 
techniques of representation. The question is ‘what is the speech of this river?’ and the 
second one is ‘what is the role played by the river speech where people in charge of water 
management talk about it?’” (37). Experiments of verifiability tending toward blackbox 
status are ways of developing techniques to represent objects such as the river as a real 
entity that gathers humans who need to drink from it and other allies such as fish, animals, 
and soil who may or may not factor into decisions to allocate water to humans. These 
decisions bolster the human population in Madrid or encourage water management 
officials to search out other sources of water while allowing the local animal population 
to flourish. The role played by the river will change depending on whether it is translated 
(mediated) by an ecologist from the University of Barcelona communicating ecological 
consequences in a research article to an audience of scientists in relationship to the 
impact on the local ecosystem or the local Spanish radiocaster equivalent of Rush 
Limbaugh who constantly reduces the river to human use ecologies with without regard 
for the ecology as a whole.   
The river, like the air pump, is an “actant.” According to Lash in “Another 
Modernity, A Different Rationality,” Latour’s notion of “actant” (actor), a term that 
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refers equally to human and nonhuman participants, is taken from Émile Beneviste’s 
narrative theory, where humans and nonhumans share roles in a story. In as far as any 
entity is allowed to play a role (no matter how large or small), it is an actant. The river 
cannot actually talk to us, but, as Latour argues, the point is that “it is useless to tell 
humans from nonhumans in [such stories]. [Rivers] are things we need to assemble 
around in order to solve cohabitation with” (56). Scientists contribute and develop many 
tools for representing objects that neither poetics nor ideal reason can discover alone. 
Agency, Bennett notes, “it is distributed along a continuum, extruding from multiple sites 
or many loci” (28).  
Where Burke argues that the sunrise’s reality is established not on appeals to 
scientific grounds but on differences in orientation, the ability to even observe the sun in 
the first place is inextricably bound up with the real and actual recalcitrance of 
nonhumans. Human communication, notes Bennett, is already composed of humans and 
nonhumans, “my speech, for example, depends upon the graphite in my pencil, the 
millions of persons, dead and alive, in my Indo-European language group, not to mention 
the electricity in my brain and laptop computer” (462). This realization of nonhuman 
participation, I would argue, goes beyond the critique that Bennett (or Latour) describes 
action in the terms of motion. For Latour, this critique would be an artificial separation: 
action is inseparable from motion in reality and we can realize this inseparability without 
resorting to the terms of causal determinism or mechanistic description of which Burke 
complains in scientism. In direct contrast, the refusal to engage with how empirical 
descriptions of the forces of nonhumans condition the scene of action is another way by 
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which the modern constitution remains unquestioned. If we were to consider two 
additional Burkean terms, agency (equipment used for action) and act (action itself), 
Latour would likely claim that neither designates a separable element for the rhetorician 
to extract in her reading of a rhetorical situation. When it comes to discussing reality, act 
and agency are perpetually imbricated. Invention and delivery cannot be separated. 
Reconfiguring Rhetorical Realism 
In a Latourian account of Boyle’s vacuum pump, the vacuum pump’s 
recalcitrance is more than just inert matter given form by humans that then induces 
changes in humans who respond to affective and symbolic statements about the pump. In 
a description of a speed bump, Latour writes, “[a] speed bump is ultimately not made of 
matter; it is full of engineers and chancellor and lawmakers, commingling their wills and 
their story lines with those of gravel, concrete, pain, and standard calculations” (190). 
The vacuum pump, like the speed bump, is present in a way that allows us to point to its 
concrete existence as a way to disprove statements of the scholastics or Hobbes. Yet, as 
an intact yet withdrawn quasi-object, the vacuum pump is engaged differentially by 
scholastics, Boyle, chicken feathers placed in the vacuum to mock Hobbes, politicians, 
tools, technê, and terministic screens. I agree firmly with Rickert that this “presencing” of 
nonhumans is rhetorical, as it invites subsequent battles over causation, the attribution of 
motives, and quandaries over who or what contributed what part to the functioning of the 
assemblage. Recalcitrance in Latour’s sense is not commensurate with symbolic action, 
but serves as part of the conditions of possibility for it. What the overall assemblage 
discloses creates a palpable and contextual need for action or even scapegoating as 
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Hobbes refused to admit Boyle’s visible empirical demonstration as anything other than 
fraud.  
A Latourian worldview should not be taken as a suggestion that everything is 
rhetorical. According to Rickert, the point of viewing reality through human-nonhuman 
assemblages “. . . is that the dynamic relationality emergent in the encounter [of human 
and nonhuman] reveals the world differently, brings to presence vectored forms of 
affectivity galvanized by these interactions” (Ambient 172). To say that the vacuum pump 
is rhetorical means to say that rhetoric is more than the Boyle’s intentional design 
strategies that built the tubes and locking mechanisms. Yet, it also means to stop short of 
arguing that biological or cognitive motion (e.g., reducing all action to motion) is 
rhetorical. Nor, as is the case with any human-nonhuman assemblage, is it sufficient to 
add up all the parts to form a whole. The way the arrangement of elements is given will 
affect the relations that actors taken on as they encounter a space. The style of each 
element changes from the assemblage as a whole and human intention is not sufficient for 
an account of the behavior of each part. Latour’s project is one that attempts to better 
account for and describe—that is, to create a symmetrical account—of all of the 
background elements that allow an assemblage to be suasive and contribute to 
persuadability in Davis’s sense. Since these quasi-objects and quasi-subjects ultimately 
take on different meanings when allied with different actors, Rickert argues that the 
rhetorician cannot merely “extract” the means of persuasion from humans alone. 
From Rickert’s point of view, the vacuum pump could be seen to be materially 
persuasive while nevertheless entangled with networks of relations, which are themselves 
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rhetorical to the “extent that an originary affect is already built in, awaiting catalysis as it 
were” (173). A nonmodern rhetorical realism involves going beyond the claim that the 
pump’s nature induced a set of responses and actions. The pump is already composed of 
human and nonhuman actions that could not have been composed in a way reducible to 
constructivism or nature alone, and furthermore, scientism is essential to help represent a 
fuller picture of the reality of mediation. In the opposition to Burke’s rhetorical realism 
where scientism must be de-privileged to privilege human symbolic action, Latour retains 
and highlights scientific representation and its translation features without allowing 
science to pretend that nature is transcendent. This latter step, as I argued above, is how 
Latour avoids slipping back into relativism. For this reason, Latour and Burke can and 
should be placed alongside each other. Burke is often fascinated with how dramatism 
plays out through things; however, even in his essay “What Are the Signs of What,” 
when he entertains the idea that things could be the signs of words, things remain in the 
end subsumed to act. If we were to place them together, Latour would likely advise 
Burke to drop his exclusive focus on the symbolic and to see how recalcitrance is not just 
a problem of science and symbols, but of any and every exchange of force without 
resorting to the terms of mere motion.  
It bears repeating that Burke’s attitude toward language is very much ingrained in 
twentieth-century rhetorical theory. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
representationalist claim that “there is no neutral choice” in language use—a restatement 
of Burke’s “deflection, reflection, selection” mantra—argues that no language is neutral 
and that even simple facts or reports that strive for denominative language are bound up 
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with the motivations that structure. Schiappa affirms this position suggesting that rhetoric 
“functions ideologically as a strategy even if its use is not intentional” (254). David 
Zarefsky indicates the consequences of an anti-realist worldview, arguing that becomes 
“another perspective, one that accounts for the production, circulation, reception, and 
interpretation of messages” (635). Such an approach means that “rhetorical critics bring 
to any object the focus of making arguments about how symbols influence people” (634).  
Delivery as Circulating Reference 
In closing, I want to clearly articulate how Latour’s realism constitutes an 
advance in the realism/relativism debate. In the opening chapter in Pandora’s Hope, 
entitled, “Do You Believe in Reality?” Latour answers this question with a qualified 
“yes.” In Latour’s assessment, both the relativists and epistemic, philosophical, and 
scientific realists share a false view that an ontological gap separates the “mind-in-a-vat” 
(cognitive subject) from nature (the outside world). If this ontological gap is accepted as 
a given, then the debate over realism can only be whether we can build a stable bridge 
across this gap through science or whether we are ultimately unable to cross it resulting 
in anti-realism and relativism. Modernity allows social constructivism to float free from 
of material confines while simultaneously allowing science to act as if it transcends social 
relations and political imbrications. On this latter point, Burke’s suspicion of science’s 
neutrality—science’s Boyle complex—is well founded. Latour would only add that 
realism cannot be a matter of just placing science back within the realm of language and 
rhetoric and culture. Culture (quasi-subjects) needs to be placed into the same space of 
entanglement as nature (quasi-objects), and this space of entanglement marks the space of 
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a nonmodern rhetorical realism. Thus, composing the “common world” of humans and 
nonhumans means “that we refuse to grant [the outside world] the ahistorical, isolated, 
inhuman, cold, objective existence that it is given only to combat the crowd” (12). By 
crowd, Latour references Socrates and Callicles’s settlement in the Gorgias where reason 
can establish truth in order to avoid mob (demos) rule. As Latour concludes, “But realism 
became even more abundant when nonhumans began to have a history, too, and were 
allowed the multiplicity of interpretations, the flexibility, the complexity that had been 
reserved, until then, for humans” (16). 
Burke’s many hesitations over where to draw the line between action and motion, 
attitude as a space of “personal mediation” between motion and action, metabiology, 
incipient action where materiality conditions our receptivity to symbolic action, and 
many other terms testify to his desire to see language as materially instantiated. In 
“Rhetorics of Nonsymbolic Cultivation,” Rivers identifies attitude as opening in Burke’s 
thought to nonhuman agency. Attitude, writes Burke, is “the point of personal mediation 
between the realms of nonsymbolic motion and symbolic action” (Attitudes 394). Matter 
is physiological motion while action is “modes of behavior made possible by the 
acquiring of a conventional, arbitrary symbolic system” (394). Attitude is something that 
stems from the “centrality of the nervous system,” which obtains from the “experience as 
marked by the powers of symbolicity” (394). Rivers takes this passage in Burke as an 
example of “how humans act out in the world reflect their positions as organisms capable 
of symbolic action” (37). As Burke’s famous line states, the “dancing of an attitude” 
forms a bridge between the body in motion and the body-less symbol. Rivers concludes, 
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“attitudes exist ambiguously as postures we actually take and as a repertoire of postures 
available in our culture and as that subset of cultural postures which we, as individuals, 
harbor as potential. Attitudes are physical, social and individual” (53). Attitude allows for 
embodiment, where, Rivers says, a dancer’s body position “mediates” the symbolic 
components, these positions are themselves symbolically controlled and arranged in a 
dance. For example, a ballet is undeniably discursive and organized by a relationship to 
the study of the history of dance; however, ballet is organized around the limits of the 
motion of the body itself as the body is able to respond to symbolic organization.  
In contrast to accounts of ballet that privileges only the choreographer’s 
individual genius or his engagement with the history of ballet techniques and forms, a 
nonhuman-specific view of “identification” can increase our attunement to the 
contributions of nonhumans, such as costumes, wooden stage, acoustics, and seating pads 
in the theater in order expand the number of actants that participate in shaping attitude. 
Such a view on the body in language is what in part leads Deborah Hawhee to suggest in 
Moving Bodies that Burke’s scholarship is the ground for an “anti-Cartesian, 
noncognitive, nonrational perspective” wherein “a focus on the body as more than just 
the obverse of the mind can enable a productive theoretical move to the thought-work of 
rhythm, energy, material, and movement” (2). Citing Bennett’s material realism, Hawhee 
even extends the implications of her re-reading of Burke to nonhuman actors: “such 
syncretic approaches [that complicate the mind/body division], too, allow a consideration 
of the nonhuman conditions of humans, in other words, the importance of things—
‘natural’ as well as synthetic” (8).  
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While attitude may encourage us to consider a limited spectrum of the “nonhuman 
condition of humans,” Burke will point us only at the presence-at-handness of objects—
their symbolically mediated aspects—as rhetorical participants. Thus, attitude could be 
productively coupled with an ethical form of identification. Burke observes “The 
shepherd, qua shepherd, acts for the good of the sheep, to protect them from discomfiture 
and harm. But he may be ‘identified’ with a project that is raising the sheep for market” 
(Rhetoric 27). In other words, our immediate context in Latour’s sense of translation 
networks carries multiple identifications. These identifications for Burke only obtain in a 
network of symbolic relations, but for Latour they obtain in a network of object relations. 
If Burke were to read Latour, I suspect that he would see that order (the act or identity of 
a thing) is emergent, an ephemeral phenomenon. In Burkean terms, identity of the self 
would be an emergent order out of a parliament of selves in rhetorical competition. 
“Blame,” the attribution of motive, would entail reduction of complexity (or uncertainty), 
as would the assignment of agency, act, purpose, and the other pentadic ratios. From this 
point of view, a nonmodern rhetorical realism would be a kind of resistance to the 
reduction of complexity, to the idea of identities as a stable phenomenon.31 This, in my 
opinion, would be tantamount to a rich Burkean understanding of identification, one that 
his poetics and aesthetics are ideally suited to participate in. Latour can offer rhetorical 
scholars a way to think of rhetoric without falling into subject-object dichotomies, where 
persuasion is not reducible to symbolic action. Instead, rhetoric should be concerned with 
material organization, mediation and translation, processes which themselves are related 
to their participation in larger human and nonhuman collectives. After all, Latour still 
	   101 
needs language to communicate these ideas to others, claiming  
Every word is good if it can be used to cross the boundary between people 
and things . . . the whole notion of actor-network theory is not a very well 
packaged argument, but the rule is simple: do not use culture, the content 
of science, or discourses as the cause of the phenomenon. So the 
vocabulary of actor-network theory is voluntarily poor. It is not a 
metalanguage, but an infralanguage. Its core principle is not to limit a 
priori who or which are the actors and their properties. (Reassembling 
263) 
Latour’s view of language requires rhetorical theorists to see language not in 
terms of the paradox of substance, but in terms of the reality of objects. In the Meno, 
Socrates asks, “how can we inquire into the nature of virtue without first knowing virtue?” 
For Plato, a definition of virtue already exists, then there is no basis to inquire as to its 
nature or essence. Bryant suggests that Burke’s paradox of substance turned on a similar 
problem, and he “unwittingly provides us with a fundamental clue as to the ontological 
structure of substance and why it is necessarily characterized by withdrawal” 
(Democracy of Objects 63). Burke turns to Aristotle for the “paradox of substance.” In 
discussion Locke, Burke writes, “the word ‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, 
derives from a word designating something that a thing is not. That is, though used to 
designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologically refers to 
something outside the thing, extrinsic to it” (Grammar 66). If substance is external, then, 
following Locke, we only encounter the qualities but not the substance of the object. 
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Burke, argues Bryant, is not mistaken, but that his epistemic standpoint traps him into 
making it seem paradoxical instead of real. “It is only when we begin from the standpoint 
of epistemology, from the standpoint of what is given in experience, that substance 
appears paradoxical. And if this is the case, then it is because beginning with 
epistemology leads us to simultaneously claim that the object we experience is its 
qualities and that it is something radically other than its qualities” (83). “Infra-language” 
requires not the paradox of substance—an epistemic standpoint, but the paradox of 
“substancing,” that captures how humans and nonhumans withdraw and emerge 
alongside each other. 
Circulating Rhetorical Referents 
In Laboratory Life, Latour and Steven Woolgar develop an enthnography of the 
scientific laboratory in order to argue for their version of the paradox of substancing: 
“Interpretations do not inform as much as they perform” (285). By this claim they mean 
that representation is not the goal of science. Science’s goal is the performance of 
constructing reality. It is my contention that a nonmodern rhetorical realism not only 
requires scholars to re-think the modern foundations that inform much of rhetorical 
theory, but, as I will argue for the remaining chapters of the dissertation, places a 
renewed emphasis on tracing the material-semiotic flows, enactments, and performances 
that constitute reality. Indeed, the canon of delivery, with its deep connections to acting 
and the diminishment of rhetoric, will emerge as an important if not the most important 
element of rhetorical theory to rethink. 
What Latour pushes us to realize is that we have to re-think rhetoric in particular 
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in a world where truth and false is not necessarily a productive conversation. What does 
the term construction mean? As we can see with anti-realists, “construction” means an 
active subject and a passive object, social constructivism, and a distilled Kantianism of 
Cassir as I noted in the previous chapter. For most, constructionism refers not to “real” 
entities, but to social phenomena such as signs. If gender is constructed, it is not natural, 
restricting performance to discourse and human initiated action. Construction for anti-
realist thinkers means construction without the nature/society distinction. Latour thus 
replaces society with collectivity, because there is no social real that is not bound up with 
reality. Construction refers to how these collectives are drawn and established. 
 Mimesis, intimately connected with problems of rhetoric and, as well shall see, 
delivery, becomes impossible under thinking of reality as an enactment—an idea that 
Latour well-documents in Laboratory Life in the section called “Circulating Reference.” 
This whole tired question of the correspondence between words and world 
stems from a simple confusion between epistemology and the history of 
art. We have taken science for realist painting, imagining that it is made an 
exact copy of the world. The sciences do something else entirely—
paintings too for that matter. Through successive stages they ling us to an 
aligned, transformed, constructed world. We forfeit resemblances, in this 
model, but there is compensation: by pointing with our index fingers to 
features of an entry printed in an atlas, we can, through a series of 
uniformly discontinuous transformations, link ourselves to Boa Vista. (78 
–79) 
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Thus, we remain either in the Cartesian “Mind-in-a-vat” or vacuum-sealed nature. The 
ties for rhetorical realism and a theory of power are very clear. By following the 
scientist’s practice, Latour says, we find “reference”—not adequation or mimesis: “. . . 
the quality of the chain of transformation [and] the viability of its circulation” (310). 
Latour follows the laboratory work of a geographer and a botanist, and the two 
pedologists in Boa Vista. Their laboratory is the jungle. Their question is whether the 
jungle advances on the savannah or whether the reverse is true. Given the disciplinary 
differences—the trained incapacities and recalcitrant interests—there is no consensus. 
The botanists locate varieties of trees native to the savannah inside the forest, indicating 
the forest is colonizing the savannah. The pedologists disagree because one of their 
disciplinary paradigms holds that soil never goes sand to clay, and the botonists’ theories 
would require this. Sandy savannah soil would necessarily become clay: the forest’s soil. 
Latour and Woolgar question, “How do we pack the world into words?” 
Reference is thus a series of transformations or translations, that is, the ways in 
which the facts can and cannot be constructed. The epistemic problem is how to localize 
the differences of all the different actors involved. It is important for scientists not to 
retreat back to the brain-in-a-vat as Burke is prone to do, but to prepare the object to 
better let its differences emerge. First, the scientists study the botanists’ maps to get the 
“lay of the land.” At the actual site, the region is marked and divided by metal tags and 
other markers, allowing plant and soil samples to be collected. From Latour’s point of 
view, this “decontextualization” of the object allows for a new approach. It is not the 
thing-in-itself that is captured, but an enacted construction of reality. The trees, like the 
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zebras in the quotation at the top of this Chapter, as things in themselves perpetually 
withdraw and are unknown in their “contexualization.” Yet, the soil samples, in keeping 
with Latour’s observations about Boyle, are meaningless without being compared to 
color cards established and legitimated by scientific institutions around the world. The 
eye cannot register the differences unaided, but with the cards, numbers can be assigned 
that can identify the soil properties. Numerical patterns, in accordance with “black 
boxed” procedures, will reveal or challenge or revise patterns. The data in turn is 
transformed to data designed to communicate these findings to scientific audiences. 
What is revealed, in the end, contrary to the pedological truth, is that worms and 
microbacteria helped create the anomalous clay. Scientific paradigms are themselves 
altered by the material constraints of the Amazon itself. Latour and Woolgar conclude 
that reference is enabled not by the resemblance between word and thing. Neither it is 
established through a proposition and the nature that it presumes to represent. Rather, 
reference and realistic realism are established through the complex cycle of translations 
when the Amazon soil samples are shuttled from research to final propositions and back 
again. I will cite Latour at length: 
The philosophy of language makes it seem as if there exist two disjointed 
spheres separated by a unique and radical gap that must be reduced 
through the search for correspondence, for reference, between words and 
world. While following the expedition to Boa Vista, I arrived at a quite 
different solution. Knowledge, it seems, does not reside in the face-to-face 
confrontation of a mind with an object, any more than reference designates 
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a thing by means of a sentence verified by that thing. On the contrary, at 
every stage we have recognized a common operator, which belongs to 
matter at one end, to form at the other, and which is separated from the 
stage that follows it by a gap that no resemblance could fill. The operators 
are linked in a series that passes across the difference between things and 
words, and that redistributes these two obsolete fixtures of the philosophy 
of language: the earth becomes a cardboard cube, words become paper, 
colors become numbers and so forth. An essential property of this chain is 
that it must remain reversible. The succession of stages must be traceable, 
allowing for travel in both directions. If the chain is interrupted at any 
point, it ceases to transport truth– ceases, that is, to reproduce, to 
construct, to trace, and to conduct it. The word “reference” designates the 
quality of the chain in its entirety, and no longer adequatio rei et 
intellectus. Truth-value circulates here like electricity through a wire, so 
long as this circuit is not interrupted. (69, my emphasis) 
It is the process—the performance—through which the “truth” is constructed that 
becomes, for Latour, more important than the truth of this episode that we cannot 
discover in advance. And this conclusion has far-reaching consequences for more than 
just the typical realm of science. As we shall see in Bennett, who knows what material 
consequences impact on the social if we open ourselves to the nonhuman exterior? 
Bennett speculates the consequences 
But what if we loosened the tie between participation and human language 
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use, encountering the world as a swarm of vibrant materials entering and 
leaving agentic assemblages? We might then entertain a set of crazy and 
not-so-crazy questions: Did the typical American diet play any role in 
engendering the Widespread susceptibility to the propaganda leading up to 
the invasion of Iraq? Do sand storms make a difference to the spread of 
so-called sectarian violence? Does mercury help enact autism? In what 
ways does the effect on sensibility of a video game exceed the intentions 
of its designers and users? Can a hurricane bring down a president? Can 
HIV mobilize homophobia or an evangelical revival? Can an avian virus 
jump from birds to humans and create havoc for systems of health care 
and international trade and travel? (162) 
In any case, my conclusions here about needing to locate rhetoric in the flux and 
circulations of material-semiotic channels will require us to rethink fundamentally not 
only rhetoric’s relationship to realism, but also to shift from an anti-realist privilege of 
invention to a nonmodern realist emphasis on how humans and nonhumans deliver, 
perform, and enact the conditions of possibility for rhetorical interaction.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OBJECT STYLES: CLASSICAL AND MODERN HISTORIES OF 
RHETORICAL DELIVERY  
 
While the environment sometimes offers challenges that are exclusively mental . . . the 
total environment within which we live and constantly interact is clearly a massive and 
complex mix of the physical and mental 
Lloyd Bitzer 
 
The content or message of any particular medium has about as much importance as the 
stenciling on the casing of an atomic bomb. 
Marshall McLuhan 
 
We have a long trek before we reach the point of even rudimentary understanding of 
rhetoric’s material nature 
Carole Blair  
 
 
 I closed in Chapter 2 by suggesting that the forceful separation of nature (physis) 
from culture (nomos) has haunted scholarly attempts to acknowledge the material 
presence of nonhuman actors in the rhetorical situation. Following from Bruno Latour’s 
nonmodern ontology, I argued that the way to combat the modern Constitution in rhetoric 
is to view how the concrete and actual participation of nonhuman actors serve as a 
condition of possibility for rhetoric. However, while the critiques that some feminist 
rhetorical theorists, rhetorical materialists, and rhetorical realists have underestimated the 
contributions of “matter” as a concrete and affective materiality are easy to demonstrate, 
many scholars would point, nonetheless, to contemporary research conversations in 
technology and digitality as evidence that the materiality and mediality of communication 
have indeed been addressed by rhetorical theorists. Even those who accept my arguments 
about anti-realism’s role in neo-Kantian and epistemic accounts of rhetoric may be 
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tempted to claim that I am setting up a straw man, especially with regard to the 
technological turn in rhetoric and writing studies. 
Before 2000, the implication that rhetoric and writing scholarship had ignored 
technological actors would likely have been less controversial. In an address to the entire 
Conference in College Composition and Communication, Cynthia L. Selfe argued “Our 
tendency to avoid focusing on the technological means that—while we are tolerant of 
those colleagues interested in the ‘souls’ of machines,’ to use Latour’s term—we assign 
them to a peculiar kind of professional isolation ‘in their own separate world’ ” 
(“Technology and Literacy” 1164). This separate world is composed of “computer 
sessions and computer workshops and writing conferences that many CCCC members 
consider influenced more by the concerns of engineers, technicians, and technocrats than 
those of humanists” (1164). Yet, by 2004, in their edited collection, Writing New Media, 
Anne Frances Wysocki, Johndan Johsnon-Eilola, Cynthia L. Selfe, and Geoffrey Sirc 
define new media texts as “those that have been made by composers who are aware of the 
range of materialities of texts and who then highlight the materiality” (15). In other words, 
scholars interested in digital and multimodal composition have increasingly sought to 
study the material role of technologies (Sheridan et al.) and the materiality composition 
in general (Rice, Digital Detroit; Shipka). 
However, given rhetoric’s troubled relationship to materiality and agency that I 
have sketched out in the first two chapters, it is crucial for us to examine whether 
materiality for rhetorical theorists who are interested in technology remains a metaphor or 
an actual condition of communication practice. Along these lines, I want to offer a 
	   110 
cautionary tale from another post-2000 composition movement: ecocomposition. Marilyn 
R. Cooper observed in the “Foreword” to the first edited collection on the subject, 
Ecocomposition: Theoretical and Pedagogical Approaches, that ecocomposition was 
supposed to move beyond the social constructionist foundations of previous ecological 
approaches to writing—a previous paradigm that included Cooper’s foundational essay, 
“The Ecology of Writing.” In the “Foreword,” Cooper argues for an almost nonmodern 
view of writing: “the systems that constitute writing and writers are not just like 
ecological systems but are precisely ecological systems, and that there are no boundaries 
between writing and the other interlocked, cycling systems of our world” (xiv). Yet, by 
2012, Sid Dobrin vented his frustration in Postcomposition that ecocompositionists 
largely succeeded only in adding “nature” as a critical concept of discourse alone along 
with the trinity of race, class, and gender. Simply stated, ecocomposition scholars were 
unable to overcome the nomos/physis divide that characterizes modern thought. The 
materiality of physis, complex systems, and material affect remained and remains 
circumscribed within nomos and human agency. 
Delivery’s Problem with Matter 
The ecocomposition analogy for technology and digital rhetoric scholarship lies in 
the limited ways in which technological actors are allowed agency, that is, are allowed to 
matter. In Wysocki et al.’s articulation of materiality, the problem is less an explicit 
embrace of anti-realism, and more a reduction of technological materiality to 
instrumentality and agency. In perhaps no other area of digital and new media rhetoric 
has the reduction of rhetoric’s materiality—its potential or possible range of material and 
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ecological affectivity—been as evident as in conversations about the canon of delivery. 
Sensitive to our classical and contemporary privileging of language and the canon of 
invention, many digital rhetoric scholars have sought to elevate the canon of delivery by 
equating it with the technological medium. In Electric Rhetoric, Kathleen Welch has 
specifically argued that delivery should not be the fifth, but the first canon, by extending 
the McLuhanesque claim that the “medium is the message” to delivery, thereby 
maintaining “delivery is the medium” (1-28).  
This claim was re-echoed by virtually all delivery scholarship. In doing so, 
delivery scholars seek to challenge Aristotle’s infamous reduction of delivery to its 
marginalized “fifth canon” status. Aristotle disliked delivery in that its nonsymbolic 
aspects involved emotional falsehoods, acting, and non-logical appeals, such as when a 
plaintiff suffering from a mild case of whiplash exaggerates an injury by appearing in 
court with a full-body cast. In other words, visuality, mediality, gesture, and the body’s 
role in rhetoric became in some places a negative form of non-logical persuasion that 
Aristotle thought should be only employed—if at all—due to the lack of logical 
competence in the audience (Rhetoric 1404a). I will discuss this point in detail below. 
While Aristotle certainly does document the importance of the body to oratory and 
persuasion, delivery became the way in which the nonsymbolic was reinscribed to the 
canon of invention. 
However, in the rush among contemporary scholars to revitalize the fifth canon 
and re-privilege delivery, there have been very few considerations of how technologies 
themselves work independently of human agency in the process of delivery. Here, Karen 
	   112 
Barad’s phrase “matter doesn’t matter” from Chapter 1 in this dissertation does not mean 
that digital rhetoric scholars have not considered the presence and influence of 
technological actors in their work. Rather, the problem is the limited ways in which 
technologies are considered as actors in and of themselves. Let me offer a representative 
example. In James E. Porter’s definition of digital delivery, his consideration of the 
rhetoricality of the medium is restricted to technê as technical knowledge: that which the 
writer controls and intends, or, in Porter’s words, “how audiences are likely to access, 
engage, and interact with information” (208). Other delivery and circulation scholarship 
follows a similar pattern. Some have argued, for example, that the writer’s selection of a 
file format is a primary rhetorical activity (Sheridan et al. 140-51). Choosing a .pdf file 
format will enable one’s composition to be widely read and easily distributed online. By 
contrast, electing to publish in some obscure eReader format like .mobi will likely limit 
one’s audience if the audience does not feel like downloading and installing extra 
software just to read a single file. To reiterate my earlier point, the standpoint of 
nonhuman agency is not that these elements and decisions about file formatting are 
unimportant. Rather, it is more that these accounts fail to theorize the activity of delivery 
as it participates in, and is shaped by, a complex and evolving system of nonhuman actors 
beyond the immediate rhetorical situation. Only two very recent (2012) titles on 
delivery—Ben McCorkle’s Rhetorical Delivery as Technological Discourse and Sheridan 
et al.’s The Means of Persuasion—even acknowledge Latour’s scholarship and other 
nonmodern approaches to technological agency as a possible way to conceive of delivery 
and circulation. Consequently, I would suggest that contemporary scholars of delivery 
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and digial/new media rhetoric have yet to overcome Aristotle’s partial reduction of the 
role of delivery and the activity of nonsymbolic forces in persuasion. In terms of re-
theorizing technological and material agency for new media, the canon of delivery then is 
a particular important area of focus for a nonmodern rhetorical realism as I have gestured 
toward in Chapter 2. 
If digital rhetoric and delivery scholars seek to admit technology and nonsymbolic 
factors into the rhetorical situation, then my argument is that we should move beyond an 
instrumentalist and modern view of these factors. It my purpose to articulate what an 
expanded and noninstrumental view of technology, materiality, and delivery can reveal 
about the conditions under which we practice and theorize rhetoric. I will suggest in this 
chapter that Platonic and Aristotelian anxieties over allowing communication to be 
conducted through the use of nonlogical forces has been tacitly repeated by contemporary 
scholars of digital rhetoric and technology in reducing technology to “matter without 
substance.” This trend cuts across Welch’s assumption in Electronic Rhetoric about 
delivery being a critique-centered process of technological de-mythification and up 
through, in part, Collin Gifford Brooke’s recent reclassification of delivery as 
“performance” in Lingua Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media. In Martin 
Heidegger’s sense that I described in Chapter 2, delivery theorists treat technology as a 
presence-at-hand Object and not a withdrawn readiness-to-hand Thing. It is precisely for 
this reason why I believe that examining nonmodern rhetoric through the canon of 
delivery is a crucial project toward challenging the anti-realist legacy of rhetorical 
materialism. It enables us to see how a mere focus on technology and technological 
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materiality in the interest cannot adequately answer Selfe’s challenge without radically 
overturning the symbolic/constructivist paradigms that inform the vast majority of 
rhetorical theory. Delivery additionally serves as a convenient scholarly conversation 
through which to organize a nonmodern theory of technological agency and rhetorical 
materiality for the remaining chapters.  
In what follows, I will first address Platonic and Aristotelian reductions of 
delivery to establish the point of contrast for contemporary scholars. Then, I will 
demonstrate how contemporary scholars unsuccessfully attempted to reclaim the 
materiality and mediality of the fifth canon, focusing especially on Welch, Porter, Brooke, 
and McCorkle’s work. Finally, I will close by arguing that a nonmodern realist view of 
delivery can actually benefit from the classical understanding of delivery’s etymological 
root: hypokrisis (acting, dissembling, concealment). Hypokrisis must come to serve as an 
ontological (realist-like) condition of materiality, objects, and human and nonhuman 
actors alike. This redefinition will offer a foundation toward a more complex 
understanding of the types of agencies and material affects that composing and delivering 
with algorithmic actors in new media such as videogames and augmented reality entail in 
subsequent chapters. 
Platonic Mimesis: The Noise of Delivery 
McCorkle accurately suggests that of all the five canons  “delivery has perhaps 
the most problematic history” (2). In classical terms, delivery is primarily considered in 
orality as the “right management of the voice to express various emotions and is tightly 
coupled with style” (Honeycutt 12). Across its historical understandings as hypokrisis, 
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elocution, actio, or lexis “it has been variously regarded as the most importance 
component of the entire rhetorical system, scrutinized as the most suspect or disdainful, 
and even outright ignored as the canon non grata of rhetoric” (2). It is precisely for the 
engagement with non-verbal, non-logical, and non-symbolic factors that delivery has 
such a “disdainful” reputation.  
The following section will trace this “problematic history” in Plato and Aristotle. 
Many scholars who are interested in reclaiming delivery as the medium quickly move 
beyond Plato and Aristotle to Demosthenes and the Romans’ more sympathetic 
treatments of delivery. Yet, I want to hesitate over Plato and Aristotle’s respective 
accounts because their conceptions of delivery clearly expose the vexed relationship 
between realism, materialism, and rhetoric in relationship to delivery. In Plato, the 
demand that language and identity reflect a metaphysically invariable order—an orderly 
cosmos—is well documented by rhetorical theorists (Vitanza, “Notes Toward”). What is 
less discussed is how this demand relates to delivery through Plato’s particular concern 
over acting (hypokrisis) and nonsymbolic forms of rhetoric and these in turn relate to 
norms of who and what are excluded from the rhetorical situation as present and agentive 
beings. In particular, I want to tease out the connotations between acting and delivery 
because this foundation will be employed to reconceptualize a nonmodern theory of 
delivery as ontological hypokrisis. 
 Platonic notions of mimesis were grounded in a concern with acting as a form of 
concealment opposed to dialectic and metaphysical truth. Plato’s famous line in the 
Republic states, “The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or 
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in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways” (436b). If the cosmos is 
to be an orderly whole and not an “unruly shambles” as Socrates feared then identity and 
social movements similarly had to be stable and transparent. Classicist Anne Duncan 
claims that acting for the Greeks introduced a deep suspicion for a mimetic notion of 
stable identity (Swearington, Ethos). Duncan describes “mimesis as the act of theatrical 
impersonation, and identity as the sense of possessing a self that is an integrated whole, 
consistent over time and in different settings” (2). Duncan notes that the Greeks 
possessed an almost postmodern concern with identity: “A conception of identity as fluid 
or constructed, in particular, was something the ancients often attributed to actors, and 
not admiringly” (7). For example, “Lucian’s discussion of pantomime recalls a story 
where a barbarian talks to a pantomime actor in the process of laying our his five 
character masks for a play. The barbarian complained, ‘My friend, I didn’t realize that 
although you have one body, you have many souls’” (7).  
Displaced onto the foreign Other, the barbarian’s voice is that of the Greek 
thinkers such as Plato: bodies (appearance) and souls (essence) must strive to mirror each 
other. To offer a famous example from before Plato’s time, the Illiad discusses how the 
warrior’s body enables battle and the actor’s body enables drama. For the Greeks, the 
body’s visible manifestations and oral articulations are thus the mirrored extension of 
personal identity and moral identity. This basic struggle between mimesis and 
concealment is central to understanding the idea of performance and its relationship to 
modern constructivist accounts of rhetoric (Miller, “Kairos”). It is true that 
hermaphrodites such as Favorinus and characters in Ovid’s Metamorphoses described 
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moments of gender instability and physical change. However, Duncan maintains that 
these accounts were considered to be exceptions and the classical world stressed 
consistency, unity, and self-control, particularly in their political and rhetorical texts. The 
Greeks required predictability and responsibility for legal reasons and accountability 
reasons. The ideal was “possession of personal identity as the possession of a stable, 
coherent, integrated self where appearance matches essence” (7).  
Acting and drama were consequently a source of anxiety for philosophers and 
political thinkers. Acting in particular foregrounded the idea that someone could act or 
speak in a way that was different from their internal stable character. According to 
Duncan, Greek drama is nothing more and nothing less than “the capacity of the body to 
‘lie’—to appear other than what it ‘really’ is—that enables mimesis to occur” (8). Given 
this anxiety over acting, it is unsurprising that delivery’s Greek word is hypokrisis, the 
English root of hypocrisy—saying one thing and doing another. As George A. Kennedy 
noted in his translation of the Rhetoric, hypokrisis is the act of playing a part on the 
stage—a simulation of the unstable gap between presence and absence, essence and 
appearance, acting and truth-telling, and the philosopher and the actor (or sophist) (195n). 
It is in this alignment of soul and body that we find the perpetual anxiety in Plato over 
acting in relationship to rhetoric. “At a fundamental level,” Duncan argues, “[Greek] 
theater is a confrontation between the actor and the spectator. No matter how well the 
actor plays the role, the spectator retains a sort of awkward awareness of the actor’s 
‘otherness,’ his or her body beneath and behind the costume” (9).  
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Coupled with the individual self-division is an additional political and social 
anxiety about “the way in which theater makes the socialization process of a given 
society apparent and transparent” (9). In anticipation of contemporary cultural studies 
concepts such as Judith Butler’s “performativity” and mimicry in Gender Trouble (xiv), 
or Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the “habitus” (“The Logic of Practice”). Greek 
communities, like many social formations in human history, tended to naturalize the 
historical and material contingencies that gave rise them.32 Many social groups like to 
imagine—mythologize—that their collective identity is the product of divine, historical, 
or immanent telos, “making [their] workings seem natural or inevitable and not 
contingent or constructed” (Duncan 11). Yet, by contrast, Duncan suggests that “A play, 
on the other hand, shows actors reproducing those norms through conscious study and 
imitation” (11), begging the question of whether identity and “stability” is authentic or 
reflective of one’s inner moral intention and virtue.  
In a microcosm, acting is a space where the logics of non-contradiction, identity, 
and politics are continually placed into question by mimicking the forms of identity that 
give rise to political interaction. As Solon complained, “Yes, but it won’t be long . . . if 
we hold this sort of ‘play’ in such high esteem, before it rears its head in our contractual 
engagements too” (18). In this comment, we are able to glimpse additional implications 
for acting’s association with rhetoric. Invoking the same Platonic slippery-slope fallacy 
that the Bush administration used against cartoon and videogame violence, Solon refused 
to allow the audience the ability to differentiate between fiction and falsehood. He 
claimed that familiarity with drama (or, by extension, rhetoric) would enable spectators to 
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engage in financial or political dealings with dishonestly. Such an attitude is a common 
classical problem for rhetorical theorists. Along similar lines, Isocrates argued that the 
surest path to virtue while studying rhetoric was to study speeches on virtuous topics, 
presumably encouraging one not to act but to believe and know. Thus, the philosopher 
who knows truth has the responsibility to express it while the sophist—the actor who 
“plays” or acts as a philosopher—is the one who attempts to pass off enthymemes as 
equal to syllogistic reasoning.  
 Hypokrisis is an additional way in which Platonic rejections of rhetoric as an art 
can be situated. In the Gorgias, Plato writes, “[Rhetoric] seems to me then . . . to be a 
pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural 
bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery. . . . 
Well now, you have heard what I state rhetoric to be—the counterpart of cookery in the 
soul, acting here as that does on the body” (466a). Neither rhetoric nor acting could be 
arts. According to Duncan, “Plato’s unwillingness to grant acting the status of a skill, a 
technê, and his insistence that people should only do one thing (and thus should not 
impersonate different characters, if they engage in impersonation at all) . . .” (19). Truth 
is the Platonic demand for “transparency” in all acts of communication. There can be no 
possibility of acting, mimicking, or concealing if one actually communicates the truth. To 
take the example of non-logical speech such as poetry, Socrates maintains that it is divine 
inspiration in Ion inspires the performance of Homer and not poetic or rhetorical technê. 
In fact, Ion is so effective as a rhetor in “concealing” the origins of his poetic speech that 
he actually deceives himself! In Plato’s caricature, the danger of poetics (or rhetoric) is 
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that Ion actually believes that his ability to recite Homeric lines about sailing and fighting 
actually give him true knowledge ocean navigation and military command. 
Plato confirms his hostility to acting by banning actors along with poets from his 
ideal political community. In The Republic, the Guardians can only engage in mimesis in 
proportion to their essential character (“do not imitate slavish or unworthy people”) as 
imitation alters “habit and nature” (395d). Actors who played more than one character 
were to be sent off along with the sophists and rhetoricians, “because people in this city 
should only be able to do one thing,” that is, the one thing in accordance with their nature 
wherein soul and body are unified (398a). In The Republic, rhetoric, quite literally, would 
not exist and “acting” would be indistinguishable from reality and the natural social 
hierarchies reflected in them. Platonic rhetoric, like acting, is the art of appearance but 
not truth. Elsewhere, Plato has Socrates conflate style and delivery, wherein a good rhetor 
can adjust the content of a speech to the needs of the “souls” of the audience (Phaedrus 
62-63; 72). Acting, however, is more ambivalent than rhetoric because there remains the 
possibility that the actor could self-present in a way that accorded to his character. By 
contrast, the rhetor must conceal some part of his aim or else he would have no need to 
engage in rhetorical deception. He could just speak the truth as a philosopher without 
pretending to be one.  
Eliminating the Noise of Delivery in the Republic 
For Plato, hypokrisis is an enactment, a performance of the logos, using ideally 
words that are one’s own and that reflect knowledge and truth but not self-interest. It is 
the rhetor who is alleged to move the audience to her own self-interest which is 
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necessarily set in opposition to truth. Such was not often the case as even famous Greek 
rhetors employed speechwriters (Duncan 2). Delivery thus conceived means—if one is 
practicing non-logical persuasion—employing a self-othered body that one does not 
possess or that acts in ways contrary to the speaker’s intentions. In a small bit of 
historical coincidence, the Romans often viewed prostitutes and actors as occupying the 
same social level. For the Greeks, delivery is hypokrisis—a deceitful judgment—but 
judgment predicated on a dissembling, a doubling of the gap between invention and 
embodiment, dialectic and rhetoric, that undoes the relationship between essence and 
appearance. Sean Morey’s Delivery@Machines offers an excellent parsing of delivery’s 
etymological roots as well as suggests some novel ways to recontextualize them. Hypo 
etymologically has a variety of meanings, “under, beneath, down, from below; underhand, 
secretly; in a subordinate degree, slightly” (“Hypo,” OED 3). Krisis (krinein) roughly 
translates to judgment. If we take the roots together with the context of acting we end up 
with acting—hypokrisis—as the ability to “undercut” the truth. As Morey notes, the 
English derivative (hypocrises) also reinforces this idea of dissembling and concealment: 
“To alter or disguise the semblance of (one’s character, a feeling, design, or action) so as 
to conceal, or deceive as to, its real nature; to give a false or feigned semblance to; to 
cloak or disguise by a feigned appearance” (“Dissemble” 5). In many ways this 
dissembling could be conceived as re-representing, making manifest, or better, delivering 
what the other canons invented, memorized, styled, or arranged. As a judgment, 
hypokrisis refers to this subterranean realm that operates not at the cognitive and logical 
level of the head and brain, but through the visceral—abject—faculties of reason (and I 
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will define what I mean by reason momentarily). 
The suggestion that I am about to make regarding the significance of hypokrisis 
and embodiment is tentative and speculative. However, it is a necessary path to explore in 
order to develop a thread between delivery and materiality that Aristotle more directly 
engages. Plato’s demand for transparency and stability manifested through the logos 
results in a denial of the materiality and ecological situatedness of his audience. Sharon 
Crowley observes, “Classical rhetorical theory was devised a long time ago in cultures 
that were rigidly class bound and whose economies depended upon slavery. They were 
invented for the use of privileged men, speaking to relatively small audiences. Those 
audiences were not literate, and the only available technology of delivery was the human 
body” (Composition in the University 8). In a very important way, the negation of the 
material, “responseable,” and affectable body is the negation of the demos and the 
recognition of their capacity for speech as an equal political subject. Plato’s “orderly 
cosmos” is reflected in his elitist elevation and privileging of logic as a form of discourse.  
This claim about elitism is not controversial. In The Gorgias, Socrates satirically 
rejects Callicles’ claim that an elite intellectual “might” should rule over the demos, 
arguing instead that a single individual’s “might” would be inconsequential compared to 
the physical power of the “10,000” in the Athenian mob. Thus, Socrates grounds his 
inferential system of dialectic in transcendental and metaphysical principles, thereby 
legitimating inegalitarian social arrangements. Those who do not have logical training 
should never pretend or “act” (like the Sophists are held to imitate philosophers) as if 
they possess this training (e.g., pretend to be something other than what they are). Thus, 
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if elite dialectic is the only permissible language game, then Plato has radically denied 
the audience or the participant in a conversation any emotional or affective response as an 
embodied participant in the world. Michel Serres beautifully articulates the Platonic 
elitist dialectic in Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy. For Serres, the ideal dialectic 
must transfer or disseminate an ideal message from sender to receiver while minimizing 
or ignoring the effects of the medium and ecology of other potential debators or 
interlocutors. In information theory terms of Claude Shannon, Plato wants to 
communicate—or incarnate the soul—through a channel—the body—without having the 
logical content contaminated by extraneous noise (e.g., nonverbal factors or equal 
interlocutors that expose the arbitrary exclusion of material and affective processes of 
concealment).  
Serres rejects the antagonism (sender/receiver) model of the dialectic, and argues 
that the more plausible scenario is triadic. As William Rasch summarizes, “Rather, 
[speaker and interlocutor] are united against a common enemy, the parasitic third party 
called ‘noise,’ in whose interest it is to interfere and promote confusion” (Niklas 
Luhmann’s Modernity 58). Serres writes, “To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man 
and to seek to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion of the third man” 
(67). Thus, Plato secretly desires for geometrical harmony of mathematics in all speech 
acts, the “kingdom of quasi-perfect communication, . . . the king of the excluded third 
man, in which the demon is most definitely exorcised” (69). Serres’ account of the 
dialectic directly relates to Plato’s rejection of the technology of writing. To offer Jacques 
Derrida’s well-rehearsed phenomenological interpretation of the Phaedrus, writing 
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foregrounds a material interruption to the self-present immediacy of speech as is well 
known from the Phaedrus dialogue (Dissemination 66-90). Plato couched his rejection of 
writing via poiesis through the restoration a particular type of audience: the Socratic 
interlocutor. Writing was hypokritical: it could be disseminated and dissembled and be 
interpreted in ways that the speaker did not intend. Writing potentially affects different 
actors in ways other than what the designer intentionally inscribed upon it.33  
Plato’s desire is not to restore equality to an audience, despite his boasts that a 
blacksmith or a slave could follow the linear form of the dialectic, but to have the ability, 
constantly, to control the definition of terms and the pace of logic for an interlocutor 
(audience), a privilege denied him by writing in either poetic, mythical, or mimetic forms 
of acting other than what one could held accountable to be. Elements of acting and 
delivery—the nonhuman interlocutors—were to be minimized at all costs. Thus, to return 
to Serres, “the act of eliminating cacography, the attempt to eliminate noise, is at the 
same time the condition of the apprehension of the abstract form and the condition of the 
success of communication” (Hermes 68). The exclusion of “noise” becomes the 
exclusion of the Other—the blacksmith and the slave, and the communicating, material 
body. Even when Meno the slave boy can be taught “math.” Meno can be taught to “act” 
like something other than what his innate moral nature is capable of. However, at best, all 
he can do is simulate mathematical thinking and dialectical intercourse. Thus, Plato’s 
rejection of “noise” comes in his desire not to allow anything to appear as anything other 
than what it is at the present moment of communicating to meaning. There can be no due 
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consideration of the process of circulation or delivery under this restrictive view of the 
materiality of language and the embodiment of the speakers. 
The extension of the desire to make the logos transparent to the exclusion of 
“noise” then will become in Aristotle an occasion to deny delivery a central role. 
Delivery—acting—ends up being the degrees of “noise” which threaten to dissimulate 
and dissemble the work of logic. For Plato, it is sufficient to say that “noise” is equivalent 
to hypokrisis—acting. At both the level of reason and the materiality of speech as writing, 
Plato attempts to immunize the logos from contamination from noise. Further evidence of 
my claim can be seen in Socrates’s death in the “The Apology” At the end of his life, 
Socrates physically turns away from speaking to the representatives of the demos face-to-
face, and speaks to the Ideal judge. The Ideal judge is freed from being moved by noise, 
concealment, and hypokrisis and, therefore, cannot be possibly be an embodied human 
being who will necessarily engage multiple senses in the activity of communication. The 
Ideal judge is immune to “noise” and acts only to acknowledge the correct processes of 
reasoning coming forth from Socrates is actually inhuman. In his reading of the Gorgias 
in Pandora’s Hope, Latour indeed makes this claim that Platonic reasoning is predicated 
on an appeal to a “nonhuman outside” of transcendence (15). In a speculative sense, the 
Platonic judge is a metaphoric computer responding automatically to algorithmic prompts. 
There can be no dissembling of the logos or active interpretation and singular, affected, 
and embodied responseability from the audience. The Ideal audience can only perceive 
truth where speech and invention (logos) or the soul and the body are aligned. Following 
from Serres’ invocation of Shannon, Plato’s Ideal judge is an early prototype for a 
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computer algorithm. Such a prominence of rhetoric would be the end of rhetoric, 
reducing all responses to an act of communication to “Yes,” “No,” and “Why of course, 
Socrates.”  
Aristotle’s Platonic Remediation of Delivery 
As has been well established by rhetorical scholars, Aristotle clearly addressed 
how to create an effective rhetorical persona as a form of communication. In contrast to 
Plato, he allows rhetoric the status of an art and he does not consistently raise the same 
moral objections. Despite this more sympathetic articulation of rhetoric, delivery—in as 
far as the scraps of Aristotle or his students’ notes that we have access to confirm—
remained a particular and remarkable source of concern for him due to its connotations 
with acting and hypokrisis. In various writings, Crowley has reminded us that Plato and 
Aristotle cannot and should not be unproblematically lumped together. However, delivery 
may offer an exception to this rule. In his translation of the Rhetoric, Kennedy suggests 
that this ambivalence or “negative attitude toward delivery probably also derives from 
Plato” (195n). Beyond Aristotle’s inherited suspicions of acting and delivery from Plato, 
Kennedy describes how Aristotle additionally worried “about the use of acting and 
performance in court to embellish or even to lie about certain ailments” (195n2). No 
doubt because of these negative sentiments, historical surveys of delivery such as Martin 
Jacobi’s essay in Delivering College Composition tend to focus on Cicero and Quintilian. 
Jacobi, like many in rhetorical scholarship, is interested in practical suggestions for 
performance and his lack of attention to Aristotle is understandable. Jacobi comments 
that Aristotle was “merely conflating delivery with style” in keeping with Plato (18). As 
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Timothy Morton humorously writes, following from Aristotle, “We often assume that 
delivery is secondary [to rhetorical invention], kind of like the volume control or the 
equalizer on a stereo—it’s a matter of conditioning the externals of rhetoric” rather than 
being a primary rhetorical force in its own right (“Sublime Objects” 25).  
Yet, the simple fact that we do not have access to all of Aristotle’s notes makes it 
difficult to establish his thinking on the canon as a coherent argument. However, this fact 
has not stopped commentators such as Don Bialostosky for making grand inferences 
about Aristotle’s position on delivery. Bialostosky argues that Book III of The Rhetoric 
offered no practical advice or a characteristic list of techniques for delivery. Bialostosky 
suggests that this is a strange occurrence for the philosopher who was first and foremost a 
master taxonomizer with the other canons. Bialostosky comments, “It is interesting that 
Aristotle, who rarely holds back from being the first to investigate a subject or to 
formulate the art of practice, dismisses this one as too vulgar to be worthy of his attention” 
(397). Yet, given not only the possibility that Aristotle’s notes were lost, but also the fact 
that there are competing versions of Aristotle (including Persian translations), it is simply 
impossible to maintain this claim to the extent that he suggests. It is true that within the 
nineteen sections that contemporary scholars have organized The Rhetoric into, eleven 
sections focus on lexis (style, literary tropes) and taxis (arrangement). It is also true that 
the first section focuses on hypokrisis but offers a critique instead of advice for successful 
physical performances. Yet, when Bialotowsky concludes, “It is rare to see him take as 
many conflicting turns of evaluation as he does in the brief section in which he takes up 
the topic” (396), unfortunately, it is often difficult to substantiate these claims beyond the 
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realm of conjecture. Thus, I believe that the safer and qualified claim is that delivery 
represented a potential source of moral danger to the practice of rhetoric. 
A more productive and tempered reading of Aristotle’s account of delivery can be 
found in Morey’s Delivery@Machines. As Morey observes, in the Poetics, Aristotle is 
not even convinced that delivery, due to its connotations with acting, deserves to be 
included as a part of rhetoric. In section 19 of the Poetics, Aristotle dismisses delivery as 
rhetorical. He actually classifies elements of delivery such as “Modes of Utterance” and 
diction as a species of the genus “poetic delivery”: “But this province of knowledge 
belongs to the art of Delivery and to the masters of that science” (XIX). Throughout these 
passages in the Poetics, Morey, turning back to Bialostosky, notes that Aristotle writes a 
more straightforward or “neutral” account of delivery in contrast to its diminished role in 
poetics. Invoking Plato’s concerns above over the poets’ responsibility for the 
dissemination of their language, Aristotle wonders whether the poet who writes the lines 
must not be responsible for whether a poetic line is a “command, a prayer, a statement, a 
threat, a question, an answer, and so forth. To know or not to know these things involves 
no serious censure upon the poet’s art” (XIX). Intriguingly, Morey argues that Aristotle 
introduces a clear distinction between the poet and the one who delivers (acts) the lines of 
poetry. In my terms, the medium and the message are quite distinct! It is the actors of 
such poems who must know how to deliver the lines, not the poet, and, Aristotle argues, 
“we may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry” 
(qtd. in 395). As Bialostosky observes, Aristotle refers this mode of speaking “to an ‘art 
of Delivery’ that belongs in neither poetics nor rhetoric” (396).  
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What we can take away from this reading is that in certain passages in the Poetics, 
hypokrisis offered a vexed relationship with materiality and non-logical factors that 
Aristotle tries to immunize while safeguarding the primary work of invention in logic, 
speech, and language. In one way, we might infer that he has retained Plato’s “mimetic” 
requirement for speaking beings where body and soul must align to the exorcism of 
hypokritical noise. In one related example, he privileges moments where authors acted in 
their own plays. In these circumstances, Kennedy notes, “Thus there was no need to 
consider the oral interpretation of a play separately from the presentation of it by the 
author. With occasional exceptions, plays were only performed once, but written copies 
were available to the reading public” (195 n.4). As was the case with Plato, we see 
Aristotle worried about dissimulation and the logos taking on different meanings than the 
logical invention of the rhetor. To draw a modern day parallel, we might imagine that 
Aristotle could express horror by reader-response theory and poststructuralist approaches 
to rhetoric where, to invoke Roland Barthes, “the death of the author” is the birth of the 
reader. To be “material” is to be circulatory and bound up with other actors and in other 
networks.  
As has been more well-documented, The Rhetoric also offers fragments of writing 
that further indicate Aristotle’s potential distrust of delivery. He firmly concedes that any 
comprehensive treatment of rhetoric will necessarily address the topic. In other words, 
delivery has a role in rhetoric that should not be completely eliminated. Yet, it is also true 
that it that it is in The Rhetoric that delivery gained its infamous “vulgar” status, and I 
will quote him at length on this subject, 
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An art concerned with [the delivery of oratory] has not yet been composed, 
since even considerations of lexis was late in developing, and delivery 
seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood. But since the whole 
business of rhetoric is with opinion, one should pay attention to delivery, 
not because it is right but because it is necessary, since true justice seeks 
nothing more in a speech than neither to offend nor to entertain; for to 
contend by a means of the facts themselves is just, with the result that 
everything but demonstration is incidental; but nevertheless [delivery] has 
great power, as has been said, because of the corruption of the audience. 
(III.i.5) 
I want to draw another speculative comparison to my reading of Plato above via Serres. 
This passage indicates that Aristotle has retained the Platonic conceit of wishing to 
eliminate various sources of “noise”—nonsymbolic forces, emotion, styles, affects—
from spoken facts. The body—and any potential ability of language to be a materializable 
and interactive affect at phenomenological registers other than the symbolic—is cast 
aside because any persuasive elements that the body responds to that is not logic is 
irrational. The audience’s ability to respond, deliberate, and be affected is removed in a 
similar sense to the Socratic Ideal judge.  
What we find in Aristotle’s scattered notes on delivery is the desire to limit the 
non-symbolic “accident” or semblance—dissembling or concealment—from the work of 
delivery. Delivery is where even bare facts that should be transmitted without artistic 
proof (atechnê) become exposed to the possibility of cookery. In keeping with Plato’s 
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metaphor, Aristotle refers to delivery as “adulterating wines” (III.ii.4), an analogy that 
hearkens back to Socrates’ complaints of the intoxicating effect of rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus. The full passage reads: 
Authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak 
not artificially but naturally. The latter is persuasive, the former the 
opposite; for [if artifice is obvious] people become resentful, as at 
someone plotting against them, just as they are at those adulterating wines. 
(III.ii.4 1404b) 
Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric as concealment is commonly understood, as Carolyn Miller 
has suggested in “Should We Name the Tools?” Paradoxically, Aristotle here admits that 
some degree of artifice is in fact necessary to the act of persuasion, while his previous 
condemnations of delivery are intended to minimize its “adulterating effects.” 
Thus, I do not believe it is any great stretch to claim that Aristotle considers 
delivery a part of the canon not because it is part of the art of rhetoric, but because of its 
potential to undermine truth (and I credit Morey with calling my attention to this 
dimension). Aristotle writes, it is “because of the corruption of the audience” that 
delivery has great power (Rhetoric 1404a). In the end “to contend by means of facts 
themselves is just,” and rhetoric tends toward stylistic adornment in that “everything 
except demonstration is incidental” (1404a). By corruption, Aristotle surely means that 
the audience does not understand dialectic (episteme) and settles for (doxa). In his desire 
for the transparency of the logos and for the motivation of the rhetor to match the facts 
(e.g., for the soul and body to be aligned), Aristotle, like Plato, implicitly wishes for the 
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actual disappearance of an embodied audience, the demos, who responds to any other 
form of affect than the idealism of the logos. Audiences must be present, but Aristotle 
desires to negate certain affectable elements of their presence, especially their ability to 
respond to something other than proofs grounded in dialectic or oral persuasion. Again, 
to repeat my earlier point, Plato and Aristotle differ greatly, but it would seem as if they 
share many points of overlap regarding their distrust of delivery. Thus, Aristotle writes, 
“the assemblyman and the juryman . . . friendliness and hostility and individual self-
interest are often involved with the result that they are no longer able to see the truth 
adequately, but their private pleasure or grief casts a shadow on their judgment” (1.1.7). 
The Greek reductions of delivery as well as style were far reaching. Richard 
Whatley suggests in the current-tradition/neo-Aristotlean movements that followed the 
Enlightenment, “[to] be sure that style does not outshine the sense” (17). In this sense, 
delivery must mediate between the realms of invention-style and an actual audience while 
being carefully restrained by—as we shall see in Chapter 6—decorum and morality.  
Delivery Matters without Mattering: Digital Delivery 
 To recap the points raised in the previous section, Plato can be interpreted as basic 
split between logical/propositional/content and delivery/medium/form. As a necessary 
form of “embodiment” delivery is viewed as a disruptive but essential property of the 
artifice of rhetoric. From Plato and Aristotle’s respective views, delivery was not a technê 
to be embraced, but an abject—a source of noise—to be safeguarded against or employed 
only out of recognition of the intellectual inferiority of the demos. The body, in other 
words, was to be the “featherless biped” that Diogenes of Sinope, another classical 
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thinker interested in visual and bodily rhetorics, criticized in Platonic accounts of 
language and, we could add, in the Aristotleian disembodiment of the rhetor’s audience.34 
One possible reading of Plato is that he desired a state of pure communication where an 
argument would issue forth from a de-sexed, de-materialized, ghostly, and absent body.35 
Any broader considerations of material ecology, dissemination, and circulation were also 
to be avoided. 
 In the next chapter, I will actually redefine a typical reading of the Platonic 
understanding of hypokrisis and concealment as a nonmodern/realist ontological 
condition of all material entities as they engage in and structure the activity of delivery. 
Of course, this argument will necessarily constitute a speculative extension of Plato. 
Before making this argument, however, I want to compare these classical understandings 
of delivery to its reclamation by rhetorical theorists in the late twentieth-century. My 
argument is that contemporary delivery theorists have only partially overturned Plato and 
Aristotle and still far short of a theory of delivery that can account for a nonmodern 
theory of technological agency. Delivery theorists are sensitive to how the canon of 
delivery has historically exposed the nonsymbolic character, mediality, and materiality of 
all speech acts. Adrian Johns, a frequent touchstone in these conversations, points out in 
The Nature of the Book that print culture provides only the illusion of a fixed text, and the 
digital only makes this illusion more visible. Such is still a testament to the influence of 
McLuhan’s influence seen in claims such as “environments are invisible. Their ground 
rules, pervasive structure and overall patterns elude easy perception” (Medium is the 
Massage 84). What he means by this is that new communications technologies make 
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visible the technological mediation of older communications technology. The modern 
tendency is to “naturalize” technology, rendering its complex affective influences to 
instrumental invisibility. Along similar lines, delivery scholars specifically reject Plato 
and Aristotle’s respective attempts to preserve the transcendental nature of reason/logic 
by eliminating its material and embodied dimensions.  
However, by equating delivery with the medium, delivery theorists nevertheless 
preserve a social constructivist view of language and rhetoric while circumscribing 
“medium” to the instrumental use of technology or the transmission of symbolic content. 
As I will go on to argue in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this reduction of technology to human 
perception and instrumentality haunts discussions of new media rhetoric where rhetorical 
theorists have generally joined the humanities writ large in looking at the meaning and 
cultural contexts of technologies without actually examining the role played by hardware, 
software, and algorithms. Delivery is the medium but only in so far as scholars do not 
actually have to engage with technology beyond what appears on the screen. 
Demosthenes, one of the few Greek thinkers who embraced delivery, famously used to 
practice oratory by shouting at waves (Lucian 1-16). As I will suggest below, the analogy 
with contemporary delivery scholars would be the equivalent of Demosthenes practicing 
his oratory by shouting at a painting of waves, and pretending as if human perception and 
mental images could always substitute for a more complex and reciprocal accounting of 
the ecological unfolding of delivery within complexes of human and nonhuman action. In 
refusing to allow materiality itself to possess an affective hypokritical hidden nature, 
delivery theorists have missed some of the most crucial insights offered by new media 
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theorists, actor-network theorists, hardware and software studies, and assemblage 
theorists who, I will suggest in the next chapter in a way similar to Sean Morey’s re-
classification of delivery via Deleuze and Ulmerian avatar, but with a specifically 
ontological emphasis, form the contemporary equivalent of the classical precedent in 
delivery seen in Demosthenes, Diogenes, Quintilian, and Cicero.  
In the centuries that followed its classical formulations, delivery largely 
diminished in prominence in Western rhetorical traditions until the 1990’s.36 Despite the 
resurgent interest in delivery, as of 2006, Jacobi is correct in his claim, “delivery today is 
often sidebarred in rhetorical theory courses, and perhaps because of the privileging of 
written over oral rhetoric . . . it is not studied or taught in the way that invention, 
arrangement, and style are” (21). Delivery was not alone in its marginalization. Welch 
also argues that that the “truncation” of the five canons into style, arrangement, and 
invention is also reinforced by the majority of writing textbooks with both delivery and 
memory falling by the wayside.37 Delivery is implicitly taught in acting courses in the 
theater department or through elocution in speech studies or a small number of 
communication studies departments. Delivery’s importance as it still is today in public 
speaking classrooms, is often in exercitation (practice exercises) and declamations of 
rhetoric (Jacobi 17). Retaining its link to embodiment and acting, delivery is often 
reduced to a form of rote training that ensures that the logos has been inscribed upon the 
soul or the mind, and can be recalled effortlessly and, at best, stylistically. It is heavily 
regulated by “memory” in other words. For many in rhetoric, there exists the general 
impression that delivery is a list of obvious elements for effectively delivering the 
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primary canons (e.g. invention, style, and arrangement) much in the same sense as one 
delivers a pizza. Brooke writes, “Delivery, in everyday parlance, is a transitive process; it 
is rare to speak of delivering without an object that is being delivered” (170). When it is 
acknowledged, delivery is a secondary consideration that remains subsumed to invention 
and cognition. 
This legacy of neglect helps explain why the rise of pervasive technological 
mediation, computers, and digital and visual rhetoric became a natural exigence to 
revitalize the fifth canon. McCorkle offers an excellent literature review of contemporary 
delivery scholarship since Richard Lanham and I have no intention of doubling his efforts 
(10-65). I will instead simply emphasize some of the major works that will allow me to 
demonstrate the limitations inherent in the delivery-is-the-medium claim. The 
reclamation of delivery owes large inspiration to Lanham’s landmark text The Electronic 
Word. In The Relation of Environment to Anti-Environment, McLuhan writes, “An 
environment is naturally of low intensity and low definition. That is why it escapes 
observation” (15). In McLuhan’s assessment, humanists traditionally focus on the 
symbolic content and not the ground. Drawing on McLuhan, Lanham productively 
redefined rhetoric from an invention-centered and de-materialized activity to an act of 
“composing with various materials to create diverse kinds of communications for various 
purposes and audience” (148). As Lanham maintains in The Electronic Word, print 
culture and codex book supported a “transparent” aesthetic: “In this world, language is a 
neutral and transparent conduit for preexistent facts. . . . One can see how easily this 
transparent ideal for language mapped onto the aesthetics of print. The ‘crystal goblet’ 
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theory of typography that matured in the nineteenth century was simply a Ramist theory 
of language transferred to the aesthetics of print” (195-96).38 Such observations form the 
foundation for Lanham’s famous “at/through” division that would inform the extra-text 
features of objects, whereby homogenous formal elements (uniform typeface) encourage 
us to look through the text, ignoring the material and visual instantiations that we can 
only see by looking “at” it.39 In other words, he made a strong move to emphasize the 
materiality of writing while simultaneously overturning the form/content and 
message/medium splits that sustained a view of writing as unmediated. Lanham 
importantly made a connection between delivery and technology provoked by the 
increasing mediation of society through electronic texts.  
While Lanham certainly provided a strong impetus to consider the medium of 
rhetoric, he was by no means alone. Prior to Lanham, William E. Tanner’s (1976) 
“delivery, Delivery, DELIVERY” used delivery to analyze material or physical attributes 
of text, focusing on elements such as “layout, typography and related textual design 
elements” (171).40 The different fonts in his title performatively and self-consciously 
highlight the materiality and visuality of print aesthetics. Tanner and Lanham’s work 
were both cited as exigences for revitalizing the canon of delivery in subsequent essays 
such as Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s Eloquence in the Electronic Age, John Frederick 
Reynold’s “Classical Rhetoric and Computer-Assisted Composition,” Reynolds’s edited 
collection Rhetorical Memory and Delivery, Robert J. Connors’ two part essay, “Actio,” 
and Sam Dragga’s “The Ethics of Delivery.”41 This edited collection remains a landmark 
study of electronic delivery, looked to resurrect the “problem canons” of memory and 
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delivery. They were problem canons precisely because of their imbrication with archival 
technologies and technologies of communication that computers were making more 
visible. In the introduction, cultural materialist Bruce Horner stated the exigence clearly: 
“there can be no complete rhetoric without a consideration of all five of its canons” (15). 
Several theorists in this collection immediately tied delivery to Walter J. Ong’s thinking 
of secondary orality. Sheri L. Helsley writes in the afterword, “when we interpret 
delivery as presentation or secondary orality, we do important things for our students. We 
restore the reclusiveness and synthesis originally envisioned in the interaction of the five 
canons” (182).  
Another noteworthy essay in this collection is Jay David Bolter’s “Hypertext and 
the Rhetorical Canon,” where he actually makes the claim that delivery should not only 
be reinstated but conceived of as the master canon. If for static texts, a piece of writing is 
linear and it is arranged and organized so that it appears to mirror the cause-effect 
reasoning of thought, then the nonlinear narratives of hypertext make up an interactive 
assemblage: “In electronic rhetoric, delivery once again becomes central, because the text 
itself is defined in the act of delivery” (99-100). In electronic texts such as hypertext 
websites or fiction, the rhetor cannot ultimately control how the reader interacts with the 
various links and nodes present on the text. Delivery, for Bolter, means an entirely post-
rhetorical or posthuman view of rhetorical interaction more akin to Roland Barthes’s 
Pleasure of the Text where the reader and not the author create the text’s meaning. 
Connors as well examines how the absent author is delivered in electronic environments. 
	   139 
If Plato already suspected a self-division in the actor/rhetor, then electronic writing was 
held to have multiplied and fragmented this split self.42 
At this point, I want to highlight the specific claims of scholars who equate 
delivery with the medium. According to Welch’s essay “Reconfiguring Writing and 
Delivery in Secondary Orality,” delivery should be taught as a form empowerment and 
critical consciousness about the effects of the medium on rhetoric. Further, Welch 
maintains that “delivery is a site for excavating how electronic forms of discourse have 
changed the way that rhetoric operates now and how strong-text theorists . . . have not 
taken account of it. Delivery now is secondary orality in the sense that Walter J. Ong 
develops it” (22). Later in Contemporary Reception, Welch renewed her arguments for 
study of the delivery predicated on McLuhan and Ong: “rather than limiting delivery to 
physical gesture and expression that take place during speaking, we can relate it to the 
idea of medium. This point is made in Patrick Mahony’s article “Marshall McLuhan in 
the Light of Classical Rhetoric” when he reveals that the fifth canon ultimately signifies 
medium” (Contemporary Reception 99). Mahony writes, “As a theoretician of rhetoric, 
McLuhan’s main contribution lies in the fact that he has developed and broadened the 
fifth category of traditional rhetoric” (qtd. in Welch 99). Welch concludes, “If delivery is 
regarded as medium, then the dynamics of the canon are reinvested with their original 
power” (100).43 To Welch’s argument, Jamieson adds an important criteria: the renewed 
attention to delivery should not only include the analysis of media but the production 
through media as well. This sentiment is echoed by Reynolds’ declaration: “the full 
original power of the classical canons is restored only if they can be sued for both 
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encoding and decoding. Further, as writing teachers, we must help our students discover 
not merely their medium, but what to do when using that medium” (106). Given the 
history that I have sketched, such a view sounds very empowering in the sense of Donna 
Haraway-esque definition of cyborg writers: “cyborg writing is about the power to 
survive . . . on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other” 
(“A Cyborg Manifesto” 175). Subsequently, scholars such as Jamieson began to engage 
in an Aristotle-like examination of the technê of multimodal delivery itself including 
“pans of audience, fade-out effects” and other techniques of televisual editing (156).  
Delivery Is Still (Not) the Medium: Problems with Delivery’s McLuhanism 
Andrea Lunsfords’ Computers and Writing Conference address, “Writing, 
Technologies, and the Fifth Canon” (2005) and Kathleen Blake Yancey’s Delivering 
College Composition (2006) both demonstrate that renewed attention to delivery has 
indeed been widely called for in recent years. “In our present moment,” McCorkle 
confirms, “a number of rhetorical theorists are extending our body-centric notion of 
delivery so that it no longer deals exclusively with the vocal or gestural aspects of an 
oration but also with the medium, design elements, or paratextual features of non-
oratorical artifacts” (2). Following from the claim that delivery is the medium, delivery 
has now taken center-stage to the point where it is firmly imbricated in processes of 
invention and logic. By 2009 in “Why Napster Matters,” DeVoss and Porter baldly argue 
that we should not merely reclaim the fifth canon; rather, we should posit a unique 
“theory of digital delivery” itself that reflects contemporary developments in networked 
writing, multimodal production, digital literacy, and technological development. Carolyn 
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D. Rude writes 
These analogies to visual design and medium reinforce the important 
concept that until an idea becomes public (through publication or through 
delivery of a speech to an audience), it cannot influence an audience to act. 
The presentation of content influences its availability and reception. 
Performance has the power to make concepts understandable and to 
convey urgency. Delivery is essential to persuasion. (58) 
Subsequent contributors to scholarship on delivery have also extended or 
supplemented delivery through considerations of “post-rhetorical” features such as 
circulation through various technological networks (Eyman; Porter; DeVoss). Delivery is 
now frequently allied to non-symbolic aspects of rhetoric, including the “construction of 
websites, graphic design, digital video, and related digital texts” (Lynch and Horton; 
Farkas and Farkas), document or interface design (Brooke), paratextual features, or, more 
recently, the selection of computer file format (Sherida et al.). All delivery scholars 
explicitly or tacitly accept Welch’s presupposition that delivery should be the medium of 
communication or the technology used in the creation of symbolic content. Granted this 
presupposition, the most recent debates over the past five years now center on whether 
postproductive activity, recomposition, “rhetorical velocity” (DeVoss and Porter), and 
circulation are part of the canon of delivery and primary rhetorical activities or distinct 
postrhetorical events that occur after the act of delivery as Douglas Eyman has 
maintained. 
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There are three major points that are worth emphasizing at this late 1990’s/early 
2000’s juncture in the historical reclamation of delivery. First, the focus on McLuhan and 
Ong comes at expense of considering theorists of technology who argued that technology 
was much more than its instrumental affects such as can be seen in the work of Martin 
Heidegger or Friedrich Kittler. Also not considered were posthumanist perspectives in N. 
Katherine Hayles or actor-network approaches in John Law (and Latour). To be more 
accurate, it is that the invocation of technology comes by only a partial realization of 
McLuhan’s actual thoughts on the medium. McLuhan’s famous figure/ground shift is 
predicated on gestalt psyschology where, to reinvoke Lanham’s at/through distinction, we 
look at symbols/representations and through mediums. To very clear by what I mean here, 
I am not accusing delivery theorists of avoiding a focus on mediality as the ground—far 
from it! It is more the case that what actor-network demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
and I will continue to demonstrate in subsequent chapters, we are still looking through 
technology—at the figure and not the ground—when invention, anti-realist 
constructivism, and human agency is the hermeneutic paradigm. Indeed, this pattern of 
selectively drawing on certain technology theorists who complement but do not interrupt 
the constructivist mindset of rhetoric will continue throughout the present given the anti-
realist/culturalist bias of humanities scholars.  
For example, it is worth mentioning that McLuhan himself did not actually focus 
on our instrumental use of technology alone. Where Porter equates delivery with 
information (a passive technological object), McLuhan indicates that technology was an 
affective agent in the world: “the effects of technology do not occur at the level of 
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opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without 
resistance” (18). Although Latour and McLuhan are seldom placed into conversation, 
McLuhan definitely recommends a Latourian form of “accounting” (as I defined in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation), that is, he recommends probing the “ground” of 
technology and compiling a list of objects engaged in relations without being specific 
about their relationships.44 Simply put, the medium for McLuhan is more than merely 
learning instrumental technê in Jamieson’s sense. Similarly, Latour, like the assemblage 
theorists and hardware and software studies theorists I will consider later, is interested in 
an empirical account of “science” as a ground for practices “in the making” and the 
process of establishing and forging new alliances. Against Welch’s account, Latour, like 
McLuhan, does not begin with stable passive objects which the user encodes and decodes, 
but in the Deleuzian middle: “Things and thoughts advance or grow out from the middle, 
and that’s where you have to get to work, that’s where everything unfolds” (“On Leibniz” 
15). In fact, as Harman has pointed on in “Everything Is Not Connected,” McLuhan 
actually makes a move to dissociate rhetoric from symbolic activity: “If dialectic is the 
art of the surface, rhetoric is the art of the background” (“McLuhan” 3).45  
Second, from Lanham to the present, we can observe the emergence of a single-
overarching problem that will haunt with the selective or incomplete “recovery” of 
delivery’s materiality. Lanham’s (like McLuhan’s) primary motivations for “revealing” 
the mediality of print communication were predicated on the emergence of new 
technologies of communication seen from the immediate perspective of the user. I do not 
want to be misinterpreted in making this claim. In McLuhan’s sense, Lanham desires to 
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analyze the “ground” beneath the figure (the symbolic). However, while Latour’s actor-
network theory strives for an empirical, archaeological, and symmetrical narrative, 
Lanham’s narrative remains asymmetrical and modern. As McCorkle has observed, 
following from Lanham’s McLuhanism, the general interest in delivery as the medium 
was not born, in other words, of a more complex and historical engagement with 
technology as a material actor or ecological force in the world. Such a problem has been 
widely noted by new media theorists like Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, who writes in the 
introduction to New Media, Old Media, “the moment one accepts new media, one if 
firmly located within a technological progressivism that thrives on obsolescence and that 
prevents active thinking about technology-knowledge-power” (xiv). In other words, “new 
media,” not unlike scholarly interest in delivery, is a term that tells more about the 
motivations and critical lens of the theorists who desire to carve out new media as a 
singularly unique analytical entity—a set of discrete objects for study—than it ever does 
describe the material contingent human and nonhuman forces that give rise to the human-
nonhuman technological relationships. Thus, McCorkle warns that delivery scholars must 
be careful of fetishizing the current prominence of delivery as exceptional. He makes this 
claim not only because delivery was in fact prominent in other classical thinkers such as 
Demosthenes and Quintilian, but also because such claims tend to reflect a Western 
ethnocentrism. As Angela Haas has documented, American Indians wampum trade was 
an era social arrangement that privileged delivery as a rhetorical medium.  
Three, and this claim is really an extension of the second point that McCorkle 
raises, it is worth questioning why mediality becomes the privileged locus and not 
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materiality in general. Jodi Shipka’s Toward a Composition Made Whole suggests that 
too often technology’s materiality is reduced to digital or televisual media. Similarly, 
while McLuhan is very valuable in many respects, he only gives us a theory of 
technological agency to the total determination of the affective capacities of other non-
technological actors in the activity of delivery. McLuhan fetishized the medium as the 
prime mover in modern societies, ignoring, actually, the constitutive agency of human 
and non-mass media technological participants. In other words, McLuhan replaced the 
view of a subject totally determining the technological object, with the view of the 
technological object totally determining the subject. In the evaluation of cultural, social, 
and rhetorical phenomena, the medium is the only mover for McLuhan while Latour and 
other nonmodern thinkers are also interested in non-technological actors such as 
sidewalks, scientific reports, disposable coffee cups, summer blockbuster films, cow 
herding practices, and freeways. An actant can be an automatic door opener in Latour’s 
vision of reality, or it may be Michel Callon’s scallops in the sea. Furthermore, although 
materiality is a necessary concern in the interests of telling a symmetrical narrative of 
reality, a nonmodern view also respects Burke’s understanding that symbols and ideas 
themselves create affects independent of their medium of transmission as they circulate 
through neural pathways, social movements, handshakes, and barred arms in front of 
tanks. In other words, scholars would not only need to examine “pan-outs” and fades in 
Jamieson’s example above, but include the other actors—human as well nonhuman—
within other networks that condition the complex emergence of producing a television 
show.  
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Delivery is (Almost) the Medium: McCorkle and Brooke 
While a restricted and, in certain places, uncritical McLuhanism govern the origin 
of the delivery is the medium claim, two of the most recent scholarly treatments of 
delivery in Brooke’s Lingua Fracta and McCorkle’s Rhetorical Delivery as 
Technological Discourse do offer crucial revisions on this perspective. In fact, the way in 
which I will argue that the seeds of the way in which the canon should be defined in a 
nonmodern cosmos can be found in element that lie within both scholars’ work. I will 
suggest that each has articulated a part of a nonmodern theory delivery that the other is 
missing, and I intend to combine them into a cogent statement. From McCorkle, we get a 
rigorous attention to the empirical practices of materiality and technology divorced from 
a fetishization of the symbolic, instrumental, and representational. Yet, McCorkle does 
not offer a new theory of materiality through which to conceive of delivery. He is 
ultimately interested in taking a broader material and historical look at how the canon has 
been theorized. Simply put, he has diagnosed the problem, but has yet to actually take the 
step of arguing for the way in which the canon can be redefined.  
By contrast, Brooke does in fact offer a theory of delivery predicated on a non-
instrumental view of delivery in new media technology. He is less interested in historical 
studies than in articulating a unique theory of delivery specific to new media composition 
and digital rhetoric. However, Brooke suffers from the problem that McCorkle identifies: 
he is too fixated on what is ontologically distinct about new media technology, and fails 
to develop a broader understanding of the canon historically and materiality. He 
successfully decenters invention and starts to grant technology a sense of agency, but his 
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understanding of delivery as performativity falls short. Thus, taking a nonmodern 
historiographical accounting from McCorkle and ontological redefinition away from 
instrumentality from Brooke, I will close this chapter by locating the way in which I will 
argue that canon can be productively redefined. 
McCorkle offers a broad historical perspective of materiality, technology, and 
delivery. McCorkle’s very accurate claim,  
one that will carry great resonance for helping us complicating delivery 
and materiality, is that while the idea that delivery’s scope can be widened 
to accommodate the practices associated with graphic design, digital 
editing, or the manipulation of formal elements within a medium is a 
powerful and fruitful notion for the field’s analytical and productive 
efforts, what these new theories of delivery do not acknowledge that this 
interaction with technologies of communication has happened throughout 
the history of rhetoric as a discipline. (152) 
He mainly faults some of the previous theorists that I have discussed (Welch; Porter; 
Trimbur) for failing to situate delivery beyond the current historical moment. McCorkle 
continues, 
Rhetoric itself is part of that cultural process of remediation, one that 
operates on a level distinct from the formal or technical. In other words, 
rhetoric is not only is a passive means by which writing enters culture but 
also actively helps writing become an increasingly invisible or naturalized 
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component of the media landscape by virtue of enfolding speakerly and 
writerly qualities together in prescriptive oratorical performance. (53)  
Such a redefinition is an almost archetypal pattern in a long history of interaction 
between rhetoric and technology. It offers a sort of symbiotic relationship where delivery 
rises to prominence when massive changes in the way we communicate are subject to 
technological change. Technological change makes rhetoric’s materiality “visible” and 
delivery theories rise in prominence. By contrast, when the post-Gutenberg printing press 
becomes naturalized, logocentrism once more avoids any self-conscious attention to 
mediation and pretends as if communication were an unmediated representation of 
thought. Invention and social constructivist models once again reign supreme. 
McCorkle’s point is that the Lanham-McLuhan-Welch bloc limited their gaze to 
modern technology. I noted the American Indian wampum examples above, but even the 
Greek pynx, for example, amplified the speaker’s voice in order to reach the back row. In 
a sense, as Sean Morey has suggested, we practice rhetoric now in an era where the pynx 
is networked through cameras, speakers, and networks that enable a similar goal: the 
universal and pervasive means to reach an audience via multiple mediums and to offer a 
message (70; see also Benkler; Shirkey). According to McCorkle, 
. . . rhetoric has always been concerned with prescribing rules that deal 
with the manipulation of material and formal elements of nonverbal texts, 
even if such rules haven’t always been explicitly labeled as ‘delivery.’ . . .  
What these new theories of delivery do not acknowledge is that this 
interaction with technologies of communication has happened throughout 
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the history of rhetoric as a discipline. . . . Prima facie, redefining delivery 
works based upon the logic of immediacy. It takes natural advantage of 
the canon’s traditional connection to the comparably more ‘natural’ mode 
of spoken discourse and uses it to build a new association with the 
emergent technologies of digital writing. In short, the act of redefining 
delivery generates a direct equation between the performing rhetorical 
body and the entire class of texts that otherwise have no direct material 
connection to the body. (29, 3) 
McCorkle’s argument boils down to the idea that delivery scholarship lacks a broader 
conceptual of the historical development of the canon as well as a more open and 
comprehensive understanding of the materiality of delivery.  
In making this observation, McCorkle stops just short of realizing the nonmodern 
argument about delivery that I want to make simply because his interest is broader than 
re-theorizing delivery. In other words, one cannot find a claim in his book along the lines 
of, “delivery should be rethought through considering new ontologies of materiality and 
nonhuman agency.” Rather, his primary point in Rhetorical Delivery as Technological 
Discourse is to open delivery to a broader dialectical history and to show how its 
comparative privileging or marginalization corresponds to our naturalization instincts. 
Frankly, McCorkle’s study is a welcome exercise in historiography more than a novel 
redefinition of the canon. We can see this in such claims as: “To assume that the arrival 
of digital technology has somehow ‘allowed’ us to make such a connection [between 
delivery and technology] glosses over the various ways in which delivery has functioned 
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as a kind of discursive and institutional validation of new emerging technologies at 
various moments in Western culture” (36). Here, we can see McCorkle’s focus primarily 
on the discourse about delivery and how the canon’s relative degrees of privileging or 
marginalization function as a lens for rhetoric’s more general anxiety about technology.  
Where McCorkle provides an exigence for re-thinking of the canon as an 
emergent relational phenomena distributed across a range of technological actors, Brooke 
actually poses a redefinition of delivery in new media environments. Similar to my 
purpose in this dissertation, Brooke wants to reclassify “delivery as performance” in 
order to reflect the “newness” of new media, arguing that we cannot treat new media 
objects as “discrete ‘objects’ ” that we deliver and instrumentality. Rather, he urges us to 
work toward an “intransitive, constitutive performance, rather than transitive or 
transactional delivery, when it comes to new media” (175). 
Brooke usefully situates his definition of delivery in between Welch’s 
Contemporary Reception and John Trimbur’s essay “Delivering the Message.” With 
respect to Welch’s criticism of the “form/content” divide in composition classrooms that 
I noted above, Brooke wisely notes that one problem with equating delivery with medium 
is that the demand of “visibility” that such a claim rests upon (174). He offers the 
example of one of Welch’s classroom exercises that involved, “interpreting an apparently 
ordinary electronic text, such as a Coca-Cola advertisement, and probing its ideological 
positioning as it emerges from the rhetorical canon of delivery” (Contemporary 
Reception 160). Welch adds to the students’ ideological analysis by having them locate 
Jamieson’s instrumental dimensions of “camera and actor positioning, editing, lighting, 
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production qualities related to camera and actor position” (162). Brooke offers two 
specific points of criticism. First, similar to my discussion of Boyle’s invention in 
Chapter 2, Brooke argues that Welch’s definition of means that the parts— the rhetor’s 
immanent technê and conscious elements—never add up to the emergent and delivered 
whole. To recast his criticism in the language that I have been using in this dissertation, 
the participants’ presences in delivery are never fully exhausted in any relation. Secondly, 
he observes that an “ironic subtext” exists in that Welch’s questions do not actually talk 
about the networked medium, its technological specificity, but could apply to nearly any 
television show regardless of whether it was viewed online or through a standard 
television screen. Given Brooke’s interest in theorizing a form of delivery specific to new 
media, this criticism of Welch is highly relevant. 
In contrast to Welch, Brooke suggests that Trimbur’s emphasis on circulation 
over delivery allows scholars a more productive lens. “Delivering the Message” remains 
a discursive touchstone within technology and composition scholarship. He argues that 
aspects such as the typographical analysis of the material dimension of printed static texts 
is a way to help composers locate themselves within labor processes and the 
“rematerialization” of literacy practices. Trimbur’s essay is notable because he suggests 
that a focus on typographical conventions are what allow us to “see writing” as it is 
embedded within a given compositional product. To take up Welch’s television example 
again, for Trimbur, “students would inquire into the way that advertisement circulated on 
particular TV channels, at specific times, during certain shows, and so forth” (178). In 
comparison with Welch, Trimbur moves beyond the immediate and isolated rhetorical 
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situation toward theorizing the ongoing and circulating affect of delivery. In other words, 
delivery is not strictly a process that is isolatable to symbolic content or instrumental use 
of medium 
However, Trimbur fails to consider a complexity of material relations involved in 
the activity of writing. For example, Cynthia Haynes notes in her essay “In Visible Texts” 
that Trimbur does not consider the materiality of scrolling textchat in virtual worlds or 
moving images. There are two additional problems with Trimbur’s formulation. On the 
one hand, he points us to a material dimension in rhetoric only insofar as it enables our 
sight. On the other hand and much more problematically, Trimbur’s understanding of 
“materiality” is limited a fairly orthodox Marxist labor paradigm. In both bases, these is 
no possibility that the materiality of writing in the processes of delivery and circulation 
has any semblance of agency. Brooke makes a similar criticism but through a different 
point of emphasis. Brooke argues, “Circulation captures the importance of movement in 
the way that information spreads, but it is too easy to fall back into traditional 
characterizations of physical transfer. The equation of delivery with medium 
acknowledges the shaping role that information and communication technologies play, 
but it can too quickly become static set of features the deconstextualizes delivery” (175).  
 Brooke’s own notion of delivery as performance attempts to remedy this point of 
contention. He turns to Barthes’s concept of the middle voice (“intransitive”) as he hopes 
to work against delivery models where “the author delivers ‘reality’ to a passively 
consuming reader through the medium of language” (176). In this choice, however, we 
see an immediate limitation. His model in turning to Barthes (and in other chapters) for 
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new media is hypertext fiction. Barthes shifts performance from the author to the reader, 
as have numerous commentators such as Bolter. Hypertext is a privileged locus because it 
is a material and phenomenolgocical instantiation/performance of the author 
relinquishing final control over her symbolic content, and enabling the reader to complete 
the meaning of the “finished” product. All new media, to a certain extent, share this 
property of hypertext. In contrast to old media such as television that flowed one-
directionally into a user’s home and never from a user’s home to the producers, 
networked new media, Web 2.0, and so-called prosumer cultures are characterized by 
user-generated content. Delivery thus obtains in the complex and embodied encounter 
between reader and text and is not a neutral reflection of the work of the author, or, better, 
the one who designed the operating system. 
In making this theory of delivery specific to the material and technological 
properties of new media, Brooke has the right idea and contributes an incredibly valuable 
refashioning of all of the canons for their applicability to new media. However, one 
potential difficulty lies in his overemphasis of the interactivity component of new media, 
retaining the modernist view that “old” media was predicated on a passive audience 
dictated to by corporate presence. This decision is likely a product of the times when the 
book was written. When “new media” gained critical currency, new media was trying to 
actively differentiate itself from “old media.” In other words, Brooke in part falls pray to 
the ahistoricality of the canon of delivery that McCorkle and Chun respectively 
complained of above. Let me make this point clear. Brooke notes that performance is not 
an either/or to set against transitive objects: “The saw Web whereon we can find 
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Wikipedia [performative] also contains links to .pdf files – graphic replications of printed 
pages that are frequently uneditable. Put simply, there are plenty of examples of each 
kind of delivery” (171). Here, performance is akin to a description of a technological 
“interface,” Brooke’s proposed term for all new media artifacts. Interface prompts us to 
avoid viewing new media as a static object. By avoiding an ontological engagement with 
technology and materiality and in strongly differentiating new from old at the level of the 
visible and encountered interface, he places too much stock in the view of technology 
from the user’s point of view, missing an invitation to speculate more broadly about the 
relationship between delivery and rhetoric’s materiality more broadly construed in 
Latour’s nonmodern sense. To repeat my earlier claim, this is the part where McCorkle’s 
perspective on delivery is required to supplement Brooke’s. As I will go on to argue in 
the next chapter, an nonmodern universe of objects would have to hold that all objects 
have this interfacial characteristic. 
 Another point of contention with Brooke’s understanding of delivery as 
performance lies in his commendable but problematic tie of delivery to politics and 
morality. For example, he cites the Q question where the weak defense of rhetoric is tied 
to Plato and Isocrates, but also to Ramus’s division of the canon into philosophy and 
rhetoric as style and delivery. The Strong defense is social-epistemic and assumes that all 
truths are manmade. Rhetoric is allowed to become a fully creative art in the sense of 
how Richard McKeon shifts rhetoric from decorative art to architectonic practice. Brooke 
claims that this makes “performance” the key ingredient, because it is the liberated 
“hypertext”-like new media creator who creates meaning. Yet, ironically, for an author 
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who wants to bring technology back in, Lanham is an anti-realist. Performance, thus, is 
human initiated and human constructed. Brooke attempts to extend these into strong and 
weak defenses of technology, wherein the weak defense, “treats it analogically as 
separable into good or bad technology” and locates values within the technologies 
themselves but not the particular practices, and a strong defense that “would see 
technologies value only in specific uses; information technology, in particular, would not 
simply represent messages conceived prior to their ‘physical presentation,’ but rather 
would be understood as a crucial element in the constitution of the message,” seeing as an 
“interface, rather than an object” (178); Brooke is correct to value this dimension of 
media; however, performance only emerges through considering technology from a 
human user’s standpoint. This again is why performance is drawn upon to offset to 
“transitive” view of technology and it has no hold on the ontological reality of objects 
themselves.  
Here, my point is not that what Brooke is arguing is fundamentally different from 
the notion of performance as ontological hypokrisis that I will propose in the next 
Chapter. Rather, it is that by failing to theorize delivery, circulation, and rhetoric through 
a nonmodern view of technology and human relationality, delivery and circulation 
remains a human initiated phenomenon. Culture remains separate from physis and 
technology. Technologies do, in fact, structure our existences to a far greater extent than 
is reflected in a reclassification only of new media objects as “interface.” I agree fully 
with McCorkle in that I do not believe we should think of performativity from the 
standpoint of the technological specificity of the internet and web 2.0 technology. Rather, 
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all objects, all technologies, from the pynx to activist newsgames, are engaged in a form 
of interactivity, presence and absence, material performativity that is not just restricted to 
the user’s instrumental ability to interact with a .pdf; seen from the standpoint of 
circulation, a .pdf can be made searchable, commentary added, and so on. Brooke’s view 
is a definite improvement to “seeing discourse as circulating rather than something that 
we circulate” (179), but delivery still remains not a Thing, but an “object”—albeit not a 
fully instrumentalizble one. However, we cannot keep re-emphasizing, as Mark B. 
Hansen does that “digitalization underwrites a shift in the status of the medium—
transforming media from forms of actual inscription of ‘reality’ into variable interface for 
rendered the raw data of reality” (178). Indeed, in “New Media Dwelling,” Jenny Bay 
and Thomas Rickert have maintained that Hansen, like Brooke, reduces technological 
essence to shifts in human perception alone, reinscribing a covert form of humanism even 
within the pretenses of maintaining of posthumanist view of technology. Maintaining this 
gap and seeing “performativity” as a unique property of new media rather than as a 
property of all acts of delivery, is yet another way of retaining a humanist measure for 
technological intercourse. 
Toward Ontological Hypokrisis 
Delivery has yet to actually overcome Aristotle’s reduction of the role that 
nonsymbolic actors play in the activity of delivery. Compare Brooke’s notion of interface 
to the understanding of computational and algorithmic new media articulated by software 
and hardware studies theorists. In Programmed Visions, Wendy Chun describes how the 
very material contingency and circulatory nature of computer code in itself should also be 
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taken into consideration. The commonplace view of code as fixed and static is misleading. 
Chun argues, “Code does not always or automatically do what its says . . . it carries with 
it the possibility of deviousness . . . execution, and a whole series of executions, belatedly 
makes some piece of code a source, which is again why source code was initially called 
pseudo code” (24). In excellent Derridian fashion, she maintains, “source code becomes a 
source only through its destruction, through its simultaneous nonpresence and 
presence . . . it is neither dead repetition nor living speech; nor is it a machine that erases 
the difference between the two. It, rather, puts in place a relation between life and death, 
between present and representation, between two apparatuses” (24-25). Chun’s argument 
confirms the view of delivery through code and procedural rhetorics is a form 
hypocritical self-deception. Hypokrisis etymologically means dissembling, acting, and 
performing while nevertheless retaining a hidden—concealed—potentiality for new 
actions across new assemblages of actors. Chun confirms once more the relevance of the 
classical understanding of delivery as hypokrisis at the material/medial level for 
contemporary considerations of technological agency and materiality.  
 Chun’s comments point to the fact that it is not just rhetors who conceal their 
means of persuasion and affect by “acting” in the event of delivery and the 
materialization of rhetoric. When we move the rhetorical situation from Welch’s 
isolatable view of delivery or from Brooke’s phenomenological view of technology, all 
computational actors are “devious” and not fully disclosed. Why stop with language or 
technology? In a biopolitical era of genetic decoding and neurorhetorics and nonhuman 
actors, I would argue that it is necessary to consider how the body itself gathers and is 
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gathered. How do technologies self-organize into emergent totalities with human users? 
In Spinoza’s conatus or Heideggerian Dasein, DNA’s disclosure itself contains accidents 
and self-organizing tendencies—performances. Celeste Condit offers a non-technological 
example: “the complaint that DNA is nothing but immaterial code is frustratingly similar 
to the ‘common-sense’ dismissal of language by many people on the grounds that it is 
immaterial – mere words, nothing but air vibrating, the opposite of ‘deeds’ or the real” 
(327). Indeed, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost argued that the human genome project 
upon completion abandoned any pretension of genetic determinism, looking instead at the 
complex interplay among genes, environment, diet, and environmental conditions (7). As 
I will suggest in the next chapter, concealment—acting—is both a metaphoric and actual 
property of all material actors in a nonmodern realism. Agency and rhetoric are thus 
emergent phenomena. We cannot isolate the rhetorical situation a la Lloyd Bitzer. Instead, 
as Jenny Edbauer writes in “Un/Framing Models of Public Distribution,” rhetoric is a 
“doing,” an unfolding event of the circulation of forces. In other words, who and what is 
allowed to count as a substance, a being worthy of being accounted for not only animated 
rhetoric’s marginalization, but it now contributes to how rhetoric remains complicit in a 
sort of re-marginalization of matter in itself. 
The most recent new media scholarship is already drifting in these directions. 
Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska argue in Life After New Media that we need to stop 
thinking of new media as a “set of discrete objects (the computer, the cell phone, the iPod, 
the e-book reader)” study instead the “interlocking of technical and biological processes” 
(1). To invoke Cooper’s claim above about whether writing is an ecological metaphor or 
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reflective of the actual processes themselves, Kember and Zylinska note, “doing so 
quickly reveals that life itself under certain circumstances becomes articulated as a 
medium that is subject to the same mechanisms of reproduction, transformation, 
flattening, and patenting that other media forms (CDs, video cassettes, chemically printed 
photographs, and so on) underwent previously” (2). In contrast to Michael Carter’s 
postmodern assertion in Where Writing Begins that writing begins with the decentered 
subject in language, the nonmodern view of new media writing and delivery does not 
begin with affect set into motion by a human actor. Rather, rhetoric and writing emerge 
relationally within the specific material conditions of possibility for communication 
within a number of complex points of emergence, while allowing objects to conceal 
themselves. In contrast to Brooke, “intransitivity” for Kember and Zylinksa is not merely 
a property of new media, but of all actors—hardware along with software and graphic 
user interfaces. Thus, in Chapter 4, I will argue that the key to understanding new media 
rhetoric and writing in a world of nonhuman technological actors will be to revise our 
understanding of delivery’s hypokritical nature as an ontological material condition—a 
variant of a nonmodern agential realism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCRESENCE, CIRCULATION, AND ECOLOGY 
 
The [object] is . . . directly involved in a political field; power relations have an 
immediate hold upon it; the invest it, mark it, train it, . . . force it to carry out tasks, to 
perform ceremonies, to emit signs . . . power is not exercised simply as an obligation or 
prohibition on those who do not have it; it invests them, is transmitted by them and 
through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle 
against it, resist the grip it has on them. 
Michel Foucault 
 
According to Bohr, the central lesson of quantum mechanics is that we are part of the 
nature we seek to understand . . . Matter, like meaning, is not an individually articulated 
or static entity. Matter is not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site 
passively awaiting signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for scientific, feminist, 
or Marxist theories. Matter is not a support, location, referent, or source of sustainability 
for discourse. Matter is not immutable or passive. It does not require the mark of external 
force like culture or history to complete it. Matter is always already an ongoing 
historicity. 
 
Karen Barad 
 
 Just link. Just link. Just link 
Victor J. Vitanza  
 
Matter and Hypokrisis 
 
Building on the history of classical and contemporary delivery that I documented 
in Chapter 3, my suggestion is that a nonmodern conception of delivery will enable us to 
more productively describe the activity of delivery in new media and digital rhetoric. 
Unlike general humanist accounts of rhetoric, David Metzger argues in The Lost Cause of 
Rhetoric that Aristotle calls rhetoric a dynamis, “a faculty for discovering the available 
means of persuasion” (17). For Metzger, Aristotelian rhetoric is not isolatable to a 
specific performance or act. Rhetoric is instead a condition for any such act. Despite 
Aristotle’s dislike of certain elements of delivery, Metzger’s interpretation offers a view 
of rhetoric as an unfolding and emergent practice. This interpretation is more in keeping 
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with Thomas Rickert’s ambient rhetoric than with Kathleen Welch’s or James E. Porter’s 
reduction of delivery technology to the user’s manipulation of symbolic information. 
Unlike Aristotle, dynamis in Rickert’s sense would not be an exclusively human-initiated 
or cognitive faculty, and it is my argument in this chapter that it is along these lines that 
delivery as an activity of “ontological hypokrisis” can be articulated.46  
In particular, delivery’s Greek etymological root—hypokrisis—and its 
relationship to acting and concealment must extend far beyond the rhetor’s concealment 
of artifice and instead refer to the rhetor’s agentive emergent within networks of 
nonhuman material actors. In a nonmodern universe, the body does not simply deliver 
symbolic content through a neutral medium. The body—the object or the nonhuman—
delivers: it writes and is written upon. In Bodily Natures, Stacy Alaimo offers the 
example of her hair follicles. During Greenpeace’s 2004-2005 campaign against mercury 
contamination, Alaimo describes how she took advantage of their offer for consumers to 
send in a sample of their hair to be tested for mercury contamination. She writes, “When I 
received my results, I imagined various routes that mercury may have taken to my body 
(tuna sandwiches in childhood? Dallas air pollution?), but I was also struck by the bare 
number on the page (.35) and the process by which scientific testing transformed my hair 
into a chunk of data (not unlike Latour’s ‘circulating reference’) (19-20). Regardless of 
her conscious actions, Alaimo’s hair has been written on by her ecological relationships 
with chemicals and other environmental factors. She offers the nonmodern concept of 
“Trans-corporeality” to describe both humans’ perpetual entanglement with nature 
(physis) and all bodies’ capacities to act and to be acted on by complex material 
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complexes and agencies. Matter “conceals” in the sense that its self-organization and 
conative vibrancy transcends our instrumental aims and representational mastery.  
A view of new media delivery as ontological hypokrisis should offer an identical 
vision as the one that Alaimo suggests in transcorporeality. Ontological hypokrisis should 
be able to describe technology’s self-organization and our trans-corporeality with and 
through nonhuman actors. A realization of delivery scholars’ goals of equating medium 
with delivery needs to account for Kevin Kelly’s articulation of the “technium”: “a word 
to designate the greater, global, massively interconnected system of technology vibrating 
around us” (282). Kelly argues that technologies have always co-produced the 
instrumental conditions under which we use them. Humans produce technologies and 
technologies help to produce the human. Technologies participate greatly in shaping the 
conditions—material dynamis—under which agency and rhetoricality obtain. The fact 
that technologies can be instrumentalized is not as important as the analysis of network of 
interdependencies in which technological actors are situated and the degrees of influence 
that they exercise on other human and nonhuman actors. Thus, we must improve on 
Bruno Latour’s nonmodern framework of technological agency from We Have Never 
Been Modern that I discussed in Chapter 2. Referenced by Alaimo previously, Latour’s 
concept of circulating reference makes little ontological claim about matter’s 
substantiality or reality. Latour is what Graham Harman describes as a “relationist”: he 
examines relations and provides accounts for how meanings circulate and take form 
within the human-nonhuman collective (Prince of Networks 213). As Latour readily 
concedes in Reassembling the Social, actor-network theory does not provide a “positive” 
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account of reality (e.g., an ontological statement of what exists) (151-175). His primary 
goal is to offer new conceptual and analytical means of analyzing the composition of the 
social. To offer a proper ontological consideration of nonmodern delivery, I will need to 
incorporate not just the Latourian procedure of accounting, but also an ontological re-
envisioning of matter itself away from its neo-Kantian, Cartesian, and Newtonian 
legacies. In other words, I suggest that it is necessary to offer a rhetorical ontology that 
departs radically from its anti-realist and epistemic roots in the twentieth-century.  
To accomplish this aim, I have three main goals. First, I want to draw on Morey’s 
Delivery@Machines and Duncan’s Performance and Identity to locate a nonmodern 
prototype for delivery in the classical thought of Demosthenes, Quintilian, and Cicero. 
Largely ignored or not fully explored by contemporary delivery scholars, these classical 
thinkers offered a view of rhetoric where delivery was the privileged canon. Furthermore, 
they articulated a nascent conception of delivery as a process that occurs in an ecological 
space of entanglement and emergence. I will draw largely on Morey’s reading of these 
figures because my primary purpose in this dissertation is not to make a classical but a 
contemporary intervention. I consequently will suggest that the contemporary equivalents 
of these classical models can be found in the work of certain nonmodern scholars who are 
associated with the nonhuman turn. In particular, I will draw on the Heideggerian-
inspired object-oriented ontology (OOO) branch, including Graham Harman and Timothy 
Morton. In particular, I will focus on Morton’s essay, “Sublime Objects,” as he 
specifically theorizes what he defines as an “object-oriented delivery” (14). Morton’s 
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OOO provides conceptual frameworks that are very useful for conceiving of delivery as 
an ontological condition of rhetoric.  
Secondly, I will extend and modify the OOO emphasis on the object’s withdrawn 
(e.g., concealed) reality through Karen Barad’s concept of “agential realism.” These two 
theories—OOO and Barad’s agential realism—overlap in very productive ways. Agential 
realism is useful as a point of contrast with OOO because Barad focuses not only on what 
objects conceal in the activity of delivery, but also the ways in which objects emerge as 
concrete forces in the world with regard to human perception and representation. Where 
delivery as performativity for Collin Gifford Brooke referred to the human perception of 
new media, Barad turns to the physicist Niels Bohr to propose a neo-vitalist 
understanding of material performativity as an ontological condition of all human and 
nonhuman actors.  
Third, I will connect Barad’s realist performativity to Matthew Fuller’s critically 
underused theory of media ecology to develop a nonmodern theory of delivery that 
accounts for the material presence and affect of nonhuman actors. Neither Barad nor 
Morton are particularly interested in media studies or technological objects. I will argue 
that Fuller offers a productive inroad for connecting agential realism to how delivery 
occurs in new media artifacts. In particular, I will focus on his account of the Deleuzian 
figure of the metalworker and what he calls the “machinic phylum” of materiality in 
relationship to the phenomena of pirate radio. Far from abstract or metaphysical 
speculation, this redefinition of new media delivery as ontological hypokrisis will in turn 
ground my case studies of videogames and algorithmic actors in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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Embodying Delivery: A Materialist Counter-History 
 Where Plato was critical of acting and Aristotle expressed a distrust of delivery in 
certain areas of The Rhetoric, other classical rhetoricians retained a more positive 
endorsement of delivery. Many revisionist accounts of delivery will reference in passing 
the Attic orator Demosthenes (Welch; McCorkle). Yet, other than noting a few of his 
unusual training practices and lauding his attention to delivery, few commentators have 
attempted to rigorously connect Demosthenes’ precedent to contemporary frameworks in 
a complex way that acknowledges his unique ecological approach to rhetoric. In this 
section, I will suggest along with Morey that Demosthenes offers a precedent for a 
material and ecological understanding of delivery that rejects our ability to immunize the 
logos from the processes of acting, materiality, delivery, and circulation. In his chapter in 
“Remixing Hypokrisis” (22-69), Morey also productively ties this framework to Cicero 
and Quintilian. Both Roman rhetoricians greatly expanded delivery’s role to encompass 
nonsymbolic factors. All three rhetoricians will serve as an important point of contrast 
that will allow me to articulate a nonmodern theory of delivery where delivery is 
conceived as a process of working with and alongside nonhuman actors. 
Held by Plutarch to be either an “orphan” student of Isocrates or rumored student 
of Plato, Demosthenes purportedly listed delivery as the first, second, and third most 
important elements of any speech (14). Plutarch asserts that it was the actor Satyros who 
is held to have taught Demosthenes “deportment and delivery” (14). Other accounts such 
as Cicero’s in de Oratore agree that Demosthenes was acutely aware of the body’s 
important role in persuasion and regulating the caprices of the mind. Demosthenes even 
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shaved half of his head at one point to force himself to stay inside and train as appearing 
in public with such a haircut would have subjected him to a great degree of social ridicule 
(5-8). Quintilian suggests that head-shaving fit within Demosthenes’ broader purpose: 
“he used to hide away in a place where no sound could be heard and no prospect seen, for 
fear that his eye might force his eye to wander” (The Orator’s Education 347-349). In 
contrast to the autonomous Cartesian cogito of modernity or the Platonic fear of poetry’s 
circulation and dissimulation freed from the exacting strictures of the dialectic, 
Demosthenes—as both Duncan and Morey suggest—felt that his own mind was already 
compromised by an “internal dissimulation.” To invoke a contemporary cliché, rhetorical 
training for Demosthenes was an issue of “matter over mind” and not “mind over matter.” 
Indeed, Demosthenes’ broader point is that “ecology” (oikos, dwelling) is no mere 
metaphor for writing and rhetoric. Rather, persuasion occurs ecologically through 
materially-situated beings, bodies, and environments in the world. In a famous example, 
his ability to vocally project was weak, and so he spoke with pebbles in his mouth to 
improve his mouth’s muscles (11). Quintilian would later indicate that great physical 
strength was required of any great speaker, “And when the great part of the speech is 
over, at least if fortune smiles upon us, almost anything goes—sweat, fatigue, disordered 
clothing, toga loose and falling off all round” (XI.3.147-148). Other descriptions suggest 
that Demosthenes would run while practicing his speeches to make sure that his body was 
very prepared for the physical strain of a lengthy oration (Plutarch 16; Duncan 18). As 
Morey notes, Demosthenes’ example proved to be so influential that Cicero praised him, 
instructing aspiring Roman rhetors to 
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do as the famous Athenian Demosthenes did, whose preeminence in 
oratory is unhesitatingly admitted, and whose zeal and exertions are said 
to have been such that at the very outset he surmounted natural drawbacks 
by diligent perseverance: and though at first stuttering so badly as to be 
unable to pronounce the initial R. of the name of the art of his devotion, by 
practice he made himself accounted as distinct a speaker as anyone; later 
on, though his breath was rather short, he succeeded so far in making his 
breath hold during a speech, that a single oratorical period—as his 
writings prove—covered two risings and two fallings of tone. (de Oratore 
193) 
Morey also observes that Demosthenes often “overloaded his senses in what is perhaps 
the best-known scene of his training” (72).  Demosthenes “used to rehearse his speeches 
on the beach, against the crash of the waves, to accustom himself not to be frightened by 
the roar of the assembly” (de Oratore 351). Where Aristotle could be seen in some places 
in The Rhetoric to minimize the role of delivery to present the audience with only the 
facts, Demosthenes wanted to engage all of an audience’s senses in the service of 
persuasion. If Platonic mimesis required the body to mirror the soul, then it would appear 
as if Demosthenes had reversed this order: it is the soul that must appear to mirror the 
material and ecological gestures of the body.  
 Unsurprisingly, delivery was the central point of concern for Demosthenes’ 
rhetorical theory. At one point, a potential client came to him complaining of being 
assaulted and Demosthenes said, “on the contrary, you have suffered none of the things 
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you describe” (qtd. in Duncan 11). The client “raised his voice” and became indignant, to 
which Demosthenes then said, “Yes, by Zeus, now I hear the voice of someone who has 
been wronged and suffered” (11). For Demosthenes, as for many of the Sophists, “truth” 
was always already a contingent affair. More importantly, even logical persuasion always 
already relied on non-logical factors of delivery. These anecdotes not only lend credence 
to Ben McCorkle’s claim that delivery did in fact occupy a central framework for 
rhetorical theory in the past, but they also serve to indicate a fundamental fact about 
delivery. Rhetoric and persuasion are achieved by an unavoidable interaction with the 
world not only for strength training but for “responseability” and affectivity with the 
audience in Diane Davis’s sense. Responseability does not only refer to the Levinasian 
withdrawal of the human Other. It takes on an additional meaning in that the mind is 
never freed from its material confines. The Demosthenian mind is never the Cartesian 
“brain-in-a-vat” that Latour has suggested is a symptom of modernity. In many ways, 
Demosthenes anticipates visual and ecological theories of rhetoric in that rhetorical 
effectivity is something that occurs within the constraints and affordances of the physical 
environment and the world of objects that work on and condition our bodies and minds. 
There is no separation between medium and message.  
Cicero and Quintilian: Delivery as Performance 
As we move from Demosthenes to the Romans, delivery has clearly switched to 
an essential component of rhetoric. Morey describes how “pseudo-Cicero’s” Rhetorical 
ad Herenium (RAH) states, “Delivery, I am telling you, is the one dominant factor in 
oratory. Without it, even the best orator cannot be of any account at all, while an average 
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speaker equipped with this skill can often outdo the best orators” (III.213).47 The canon 
of invention gathers materials into conceptual topics; the canon of delivery becomes a 
way to gather listeners and objects. In Quintilian and Cicero, we find a form of rhetoric 
that is very much attuned to the ecological mediation of the speaker and is much more 
forgiving of comparisons between delivery and acting. Quintilian writes of the great 
actors that “they add so much to the charm of even the greatest poets, that the verse 
moves us far more when heard than when read, while they succeed in securing a hearing 
even for the most worthless authors, with the result that they repeatedly win a welcome 
on the stage that is denied them in the library” (III.2.15). Unlike Plato’s fear that poetry 
(or acting by extension) would convince Ion to embark in a surely hazardous journey 
across the Mediterranean, Quintilian and Cicero view acting’s ability to evoke emotion—
regardless of the content of the speech—as a way that non-logical and affective 
persuasion should be employed.  
Morey describes how delivery in the RAH enjoys greater prominence than a 
pejorative connotation with acting, and I want to expand on this idea a bit. In contrast to 
Aristotle, pseudo-Cicero fully prescribes techniques for delivery, but notes that one must 
disguise them when performing, so not to look like one is performing: “the gestures 
should not be conspicuous for either elegance or grossness, lest we give the impression 
that we are either actors or day labourers” (IV.4.2). Contra Aristotle, “concealment” does 
not refer to “truth” or “falsity” but to a condition of possibility for all speech acts. It is not 
only in symbolic action, but in the activity of delivery as well where the rhetor must 
conceal her artifice. This concealment is not borne necessarily out of a desire to mislead, 
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but out of respect for the power of delivery. Despite the fact that she is indeed “acting” or 
performing, rhetorical gestures must appear spontaneous, natural, or unrehearsed. 
Hypokrisis (delivery) could now be conceived as a bottom up process that begins with the 
body’s central role in rhetoric. Delivery could be seen as part of the reclamation of the 
full spectrum of the embodied and present act of speaking. Yet, when RAH declares, 
“This, nevertheless, one must remember: good delivery ensures that what the orator is 
saying seems to come from his heart” (III.15.27), we see a shadow of the seed of Plato’s 
distrust of acting and rhetoric. Through delivery, it is possible to make it seem as though 
the body and soul are aligned when the words that the rhetor utters have no relationship 
to truth. 
 In contrast to pseudo-Cicero or Demosthenes, Cicero’s writing offers detailed 
descriptions of specific techniques of delivery. He does retain a distinction between the 
actor and the orator. Martin Jacobi comments “the [orator] should not use gesticulation 
but ‘emphatic delivery,’ should have ‘a strong and manly exertion of the lungs, not 
imitated from the theater and the players, but rather from the camp and the palestra,’ and 
‘should stamp the foot’ ” (Cicero qtd. in Jacobi 28). Cicero also provides a solid ground 
for contemporary delivery scholars’ claims that delivery should be the technological 
medium. Of course, Cicero’s medium was the body. He writes, “every emotion of the 
mind has from nature its own peculiar look, tone, and gesture” (de Oratore 18). 
Furthermore, he adds “The entire body of the human being, all facial expressions and all 
the utterances of the voice, like the strings on a lyre, ‘sound’ exactly in the way they are 
struck by each emotion” (III.216). Along similar lines, Cicero identified specific 
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techniques for the instrumental use of the body. As Morey notes, Cicero pays particular 
attention to the face: “But everything depends on the face; and this, in turn, is entirely 
dominated by the eyes. . . . For delivery is wholly a matter of the soul, and the face is an 
image of the soul, while the eyes reflect it” (III.221). In this passage, we see a more 
specific articulation of the body/soul dichotomy that was only an implied part of 
Demosthenes’s oratorical practice.  
In a way similar to the author of the RAH, Cicero’s concern is that the artifice of 
rhetoric—including the act of delivery—must not be discerned by the audience lest the 
rhetor be confused with an actor. I will quote him at length: 
The face is the only part of the body that can produce as many varying 
signs as there are feelings in the soul; and there is surely no one who could 
produce these same effects with his eyes closed. . . . Consequently, it is 
quite important to regulate the expression of the eyes. We should not alter 
the appearance of the face itself too much, so as to avoid distorting it or 
acting like a fool. (III. 221) 
Here, we can see that Cicero remains plagued by the connotations between delivery and 
acting. He continues, 
It is the eyes that should be used to signify our feelings in a way suited to 
the actual type of our speech, by an intense or relaxed, or a fixed or 
cheerful look. Delivery is, so to speak, the language of the body, which 
makes it all the more essential that it should correspond to what we intend 
to say; and nature has actually given us eyes, as it has given the horse and 
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the lion their manes, tails, and ears for indicating our feelings. So the most 
effective element in our delivery, next to the voice, is the expression on 
our face; and this is controlled by our eyes. (III.222-23) 
In a greatly expanded sense by comparison to Demosthenes, Cicero’s comments indicate 
that it is human nature itself that requires the use of non-symbolic aspects of rhetoric. 
Although the rhetor must conceal her artifice, delivery and nonsymbolic elements are 
now firmly classified as natural aspects of communication that humans invariably 
respond to. It is also worth noting that this passage and many others in de Oratore offer a 
taxonomy of delivery-related technê. This taxonomy anticipates the twentieth-century 
taxonomies of delivery seen the scholarship of Kathleen Jamieson or Porter.  
To a far greater extent than either Cicero or Demosthenes, Morey suggests that 
Quintilian even more radically anticipates nonhuman participation in rhetoric while 
subsuming invention beneath delivery. Quintilian claims, “[Invention] is not so important 
as the manner in which we produce it, since the emotions of each member of our 
audience will depend on the impression made upon his hearing” (XI. 3. 243). Morey 
offers the following passage from Quintilian as possible evidence of his prototypical 
posthumanity:  
Gesture conforms to the voice and joins it in obeying the mind . . . a dance 
too is often understood and emotionally effective without the voice; 
mental attitudes can be inferred from the face or the walk; and even dumb 
animals reveal their anger, joy, or wish to please by their eyes or some 
other bodily signal . . .  Nor is it surprising that these things, which do 
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after all involve some movement, should have such power over the mind, 
when a picture, a silent work of art in an unvarying attitude, can penetrate 
our innermost feelings to such an extent that it seems sometimes to be 
more powerful than speech itself. (XI.3.67) 
Unlike Cicero’s primary focus on the face, Morey describes how Quintilian extends the 
scope of delivery to the entire body, noting that “the head occupies the chief place in 
Delivery (as does the body itself)” (XI.3.68). Of special importance are the hands, 
“without which Delivery would be crippled and enfeebled” (XI.3.69-70). The hands 
“almost match the entire stock of words. Other parts of the body assist the speaker: the 
hands, I might almost say, speak for themselves” (XI.3.69-70). Much like in Cicero’s 
writing, Morey suggests that delivery for Quintilian is assumed to be a part of human 
nature. Quintilian notes that the hands are “the common language of the human race” 
(XI.3.85-87). In the terms of Chapter 3, the point here is that the hands are a nonverbal 
form of but Platonic mimesis and truth are not the goal: “For example, you can suggest a 
sick man by imitation a doctor feeling the pulse, or a lyre-player by shaping your hands 
as if you were striking the strings. You should refrain from such things in pleading” 
(XI.3.88-90). Instead, an orator should be “very different from a dancer; he must adapt 
his Gesture to his sense more than to his words . . . I do not approve of his miming 
attitudes and making a visual display of whatever he says” (XI.3.91-93). Drawing on 
Deleuze, Morey notes that the body becomes an “assemblage”—a term I will return to 
below—that supplements the work of the rhetor. Quintilian does not describe physical 
appearance, although cleanliness and a “handsome toga” were a must (XI.3.94). As a 
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prosthesis or a form of sensory immanence, persuasion and delivery for Quintilian 
involved a complex understanding of the relationships among delivery, space, and 
materiality. Yet, Quintilian does ultimately stop short of articulating a true prototype of a 
nonmodern theory of rhetoric.  
 There is an undeniably larger history to be told about these three figures that 
connects delivery to bodily histories of rhetoric and to issues of politics, gender, and 
materiality. I would definitely encourage interested readers to read Morey’s account of 
these three figures in detail. As I mentioned in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, given the 
undeniable solutions and problems that hypokrisis poses for truth, it should come as no 
surprise that actors were held in the same esteem as prostitutes in ancient Rome (Duncan 
20). Thus, Cicero and Quintilian’s respective reclamations of a covert form of acting for a 
model of delivery carries within them this continued hypokritical tension. Delivery is 
potentially the leasing or renting of one’s body for energies and actions that do not reside 
in the logos—that which is immanent to the cognitive working of one’s mind. However, 
my immediate concern with these classical figures lies in how they variously conceived 
of delivery as a central element in the rhetorical canon. Furthermore, they situate delivery 
as an ecological activity through the necessary reliance on nonhuman actors such as 
waves, bodies, togas, and faces. Classical delivery in Demosthenes, Cicero, and 
Quintilian always works to productively negotiate the relationship between delivery and 
acting. In their writing, delivery as a necessary moment of the embodiment of the logos 
or as an independent force in the world capable of producing its own effects offers a way 
to problematize the Platonic relationship between physis and nomos and episteme and 
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doxa.48 
The Renewal of Realism in Object-Oriented Delivery 
As I have noted in the previous section via Duncan and Morey, Demosthenes, 
Cicero, and Quintilian embraced a robust proto-material theory of delivery. Delivery was 
once central to certain theorists of rhetoric as a practice that existed alongside the canon 
of invention in importance. After all, one still had to plan, arrange, and memorize body 
positions and gestures in advance for effective oratory. Yet, this composing-thinking 
subject was held to invent within the material and ecological affordances and constraints 
of nonhuman actors. The rhetor needed to train the body to be responsible to the myriad 
multiplicities of affects and sensations—actors and networks—that confronted any rhetor 
in the activity of delivery. Such is the classical attunement to the necessary 
“materialization” of rhetoric. Simply put, all bodies (all objects) are actors and hypokrites 
in delivery: they conceal their true reality and virtual potentiality for agency. Agency is 
something that is only revealed in part through objects’ interactions with other actors. 
However, in a nonmodern universe composed of and by the actions of nonhuman actors, 
delivery must be seen as a process that emerges as part of a larger whole where the roles 
and influence of material actors themselves are concealed. This claim that objects 
conceal is not one that presupposes that inanimate objects are intentional or conscious 
actors. Such would be the “polypsychipist” thesis explored in part by Harman in The 
Quadruple Object and more recently by Alex Reid in his blog the Digital Digs.49 Within 
our hermeneutic paradigms in rhetoric, we refer to objects and language as “concealed” 
when they are part of our instrumental artifice. By contrast, an ontological understanding 
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of hypokrisis refers more to the fact that we never fully control or represent the objects 
around us as they condition the space through which our rhetorical agency obtains within 
a given act of persuasion. 
In this section, I want to flesh out the relationships among hypokrisis (acting), 
rhetoric, and materiality by turning, in part, to the object-oriented philosophy camp 
within the broader context of the nonhuman turn. Drawing on Harman, Morton’s essay, 
“Sublime Objects,” actually proposes an “object-oriented rhetoric” grounded in the canon 
of delivery that can serve as a connection between the classical models of material 
performativity that I just described and Barad’s agential realism. While problematic in 
certain respects, Morton’s use of Harman’s thinking does in fact offer a connection 
between nonmodern realism (and materiality) and delivery that I will use Barad and 
Fuller to build on. 
Before moving to Morton, I want to briefly describe Harman’s OOO in the 
context of nonmodern realism debates. In Tool-Being, Harman begins with Edmund 
Husserl’s theory of objects. Husserl hoped to return to discussions of the reality of the 
object after the Cartesian cogito and Hegelian absolutization of consciousness. While it is 
true that phenomenology like empiricism “ ‘brackets’ the natural world, focusing solely 
on an object as it appears to us,” Harman argues that the key difference between an 
empiricist and Husserl is that Husserl “introduce a new and profound dualism within the 
phenomenal realm” (“Technology, Objects and Things” 18). Husserl argues that we 
encounter an object as a unity even if we only encounter it incompletely in sensation. Let 
me offer the example of a coffee cup that I brought back from my year living in Beijing, 
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China. When I see my coffee cup, I am seeing my coffee cup, and not light waves emitted 
to the receiving cones in my eyes that transmit signals to my nervous system. Even 
though an ant crawling up the side of the coffee cup, a Chinese speaker who can interpret 
its Chinese characters as “lo po, wo ai ni,” (literally, “Wife, I love you”) and non-Chinese 
speakers each experience vastly different facades of the coffee cup, for Husserl, it is 
nevertheless the same coffee cup as a sensory unity.50 The coffee cup, like any object, is 
never “identical with the qualities through which it is presented, since it can be viewed 
via countless different profiles while still remaining the same things in our eyes” (18). 
Harman continues that Husserl’s return to “the things themselves,” did not mean a 
return to realism. Rather, the latter referred to “things as present in consciousness, not 
independent things hidden from view in a real outside world” (qtd. in 18). According to 
Harman, this distinction is where Husserl’s most famous student, Heidegger, “makes a 
permanent break with his teacher” (18). I have already alluded to Heidegger’s famous 
tool analysis and his understanding of the difference between presence-at-hand/readiness-
to-hand in Chapter 1. However, Harman’s repurposing of the tool analysis forms a key 
part of OOO. Harman writes, following from Heidegger,  
our most frequent mode of dealing with things consists not in having them 
in consciousness, but in taking them for granted as items of everyday use. 
If I perceive a table and try to describe its appearance, I silently rely on a 
vast armada of invisible things that recede into a tacit background. The 
table that hovers visibly before my mind is outnumbered by all the 
invisible items that sustain my current reality: floor, oxygen, air 
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conditioning, and bodily organs. (18) 
As opposed to the presence-at-hand of phenomena in consciousness, the being of 
equipment is called readiness-to-hand that we generally notice only when our tools break. 
Combining parts of Husserl and Heidegger, Harman’s OOO works from a fairly 
simple yet rich hypothesis. Heidegger only extends the withdrawal of technological 
objects to humans’ relations with objects, whereas Harman argues that even the reality of 
nonhuman objects withdraw from one another in this fashion. In other words, all 
entities—human and nonhuman—encounter each other as broken tools—presence-at-
hand—in a phenomenological manner while never fully exhausting the “readiness to 
hand”—the realist essence—of an object. In Harman’s definition in The Quadruple 
Object, “objects are those which both display and conceal a multitude of traits” (25). He 
posits a theory of substantial objects with the following two self-described “weird” 
conditions: “[Objects] must be autonomous in two separate directions: emerging as 
something over and above their pieces, while also partly withholding themselves from 
relations with other entities” (25). In Harman’s assessment, an object’s substantial reality 
is never fully revealed or, to borrow Latour’s term, “translated” in any interaction with 
other objects. If entities can engage in different relations while reserving the potential to 
engage in others (that is, to display different qualities to different actors), then Harman 
believes that concealment and withdrawal is an ontological condition of all objects. 
Objects are locked into what Harman describes as a “duel” between their visible sensual 
qualities and their inner withdrawn subterranean essence. It is these “sensual qualities” 
that unconceal and appear, but, to borrow Aristotle’s terminology, we cannot confuse an 
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object’s substance with its accidents or qualities.  
As Harman’s thinking demonstrates, Aristotle’s thinking has gained new currency. 
He argues “The Platonic or Kantian doctrine of a world beyond the senses is fused with 
an Aristotelian-sounding distinction between the unity of a substance and its plurality of 
traits” (Quadruple Object 95). However, at its core arguments, a philosophy of objects 
demands that what we hold to be ontologically true of relations among humans and 
nonhumans must also apply to the relations among nonhumans and nonhumans. Thus, 
OOO can be used to locate moments of human centrality or ambiguity regarding the 
status of objects within a given theory of reality. Take the so-called process philosophies 
of Bergson or Alfred Whitehead that invoke a metaphysics of Becoming instead of Being. 
Harman remarks that process philosophers find it  
naïve to think of coffee cups as basic elements of the world, since coffee 
cups really must be just aggregates of inorganic chemicals, fragments of 
apeiron, or an active ‘coffee cupping’ rather than the stasis of a solid 
coffee cup-thing, or result of a long evolutionary struggle. In this view, 
objects only gain their reality from elsewhere and thereby destroy the 
reality of individual objects because objects are too shallow to be the 
fundamental reality. (17) 
In The Quadruple Object, Harman offers numerous arguments of how various 
philosophical traditions from Anaximander to Deleuze have either “overmined” or 
“undermined” the object’s reality as a basic ontological unit. 
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Object-Oriented Delivery 
Working from Harman’s OOO, Morton makes a specific connection between 
OOO and delivery in “Sublime Objects.” With due respect to the scholarly tradition of 
philology, I want to be very clear from the outset of this section that Morton’s goal is not 
to maintain fidelity to classical definitions of delivery. In a goal not unlike Brooke’s 
redefinition of the canons of rhetoric for new media in Lingua Fracta, Morton’s intention 
is to creatively repurpose classical definitions to create new analytical ratios that can 
elucidate how delivery and rhetoric might work in a nonmodern ontology. If objects are 
never fully translated in their encounters with other objects, then objects exist at all 
different sizes and scales. Morton suggests that all objects are objects wrapped in objects:  
Objects encounter one another inside another object—electromagnetic 
fields, for instance, or a valley. . . . More generally, media translate and 
are translated by messages. We never hear a voice as such, only a voice 
carried by the wind, or by electromagnetic waves, or by water, or by kazoo. 
Water makes whales sound like they do. Air and gravity make humans 
speak certain words in certain ways. Valleys encourage yodeling. (14) 
In other words, regardless of Plato’s and Aristotle’s best attempts to immunize logic and 
speech from non-logical and nonsymbolic forces, humans have always been reliant upon 
their ecological relationships with nonhuman actors to create conditions of affordance 
and constraint for how their speech acts materialize in specific material practices. Morton 
goes on to suggest that delivery is the first part of what he calls an “object-oriented 
rhetoric”: “Because rather than simply being the envelope in which the message is 
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handed to you, delivery is the message, directly” (16). By extension, he argues, “We 
could rewrite the whole of rhetoric as object-oriented by reversing the implicit order of 
Aristotle’s five parts of rhetoric. Instead of starting with invention and proceeding 
through disposition to elocution, then on to memory and delivery, we should start with 
delivery” (12).  
 As I documented in Chapter 3, Brooke argues that as of 2010, digital rhetoric 
studies and rhetoric and writing studies as a whole retain a rather commonsense view of 
delivery: “Delivery, in everyday parlance, is a transitive process; it is rare to speak of 
delivering without an object that is being delivered” (170). By contrast, Morton’s 
definition is actually closer to some of the Greek and Roman understandings. Richard 
Lanham argues that delivery (and rhetoric) was much more constitutive for many Greeks 
than for twentieth-century rhetorical theorists: “Delivery did not deliver its messages as 
simply as United Parcel or FedEx, which bring the stuff to your door, ring the bell, and 
leave. It involved communicating the message in such a way that would be accepted and 
attended to rather than refused, ignored, or thrown in the wastepaper basket unread” (23-
24). Combining Lanham’s observations with Morton’s reclassification, delivery in this 
sense would not be reducible to Ciceronian taxonomies or Porter’s “digital delivery” as 
instrumental technê. Rather, delivery would be a material potentiality for interaction that 
would be closer to a version of Metzgar’s Aristotelian dynamis that I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. However, dynamis would take on an expanded sense of 
describing the ability to act and to be acted on that all actors possess. While not in direct 
dialogue with rhetorical scholarship, Morton usefully makes a similar connection 
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between Quintilian and OOO. Morton writes:  
If we rethink delivery not as a bottle into which the already-existing 
argument is poured like a liquid, nor as an envelope that delivers the 
message like mail, but as a physical object and its sensual medium, we 
will be thinking of it like Quintilian, who says of great actors that “they 
add so much to the charm of even the greatest poets, that the verse moves 
us far more when heard than when read, while they succeed in securing a 
hearing even for the most worthless authors, with the result that they 
repeatedly win a welcome on the stage that is denied them in the library.” 
We can proceed from thinking of voice as an object in its own right to 
asserting that a pencil resting against the inside of a plastic cup is a 
delivery of a pencil, a certain kind of physical posture similar to a loud 
voice or a cajoling whine. A house is delivery, disporting its occupants 
and its rooms and its backyard into various configurations. A record player 
is delivery, as is an mp3 player. A book is delivery. A waterfall is delivery. 
A computer game is delivery. A spoon is delivery. A volcano is delivery. 
A ribbon is delivery. A black hole is delivery. (17) 
From Morton’s OOO-infused redefinition of delivery, it is clear that the sensual qualities 
of objects and their concealment—matter’s organization itself—has been conflated with 
the activity of delivery. Delivery has become an ontological condition of an object’s 
substantial reality and its generalized faculties for affect. Delivery for OOO is not 
reducible to any specific or particular manifestation or technê. 
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Morton’s creative originality seen here in “Sublime Objects” and across his 
corpus of writing (especially in Ecology Without Nature) lies in his ability to revitalize 
classical figures into nonmodern contexts. Thus, he specifically indicates moments where 
classical terminology related to delivery can be productively re-thought along the lines of 
OOO: “Consider the Latin root of persuasion (suadeo), which has to do with how one 
object urges, impels, induces or sways another. The aesthetic, in other words, is not a 
superficial candy coating on the real, but is instead the lubrication, the energy and the 
glue of causality as such. To think so is truly to exit the Ramist pinball machine” (15). 
“Exiting the Ramist pinball machine” is Morton’s Burkean representative anecdote for 
leaving the realm where non-logical forces, affect, and sensation are carefully sutured 
from logic and thinking. Peter Ramus is infamous in the rhetorical tradition for reducing 
rhetoric to style and equating invention with philosophical logic. Morton continues to 
argue along a similar vein: “Pronuntiatio is more like the manifest appearance of an 
object to another object. It speaks to the dissembling part of hypokrisis. Actio sounds 
more like execution (Heidegger’s Vollzug); the dark unfolding of an object’s hidden 
essence. Actio speaks to the way objects magically foam with being” (19). Like Brooke’s 
reclassification of delivery as new media performance, Morton wants to resist the idea of 
objects are “transitive” and passive actors. Yet, he goes on step further in making 
delivery synonymous with the Being (DaSein) of all Beings. In a sense, delivery marks 
the qualities and relations that objects are capable of taking on—the ways in which they 
move and evolve through ecological phase spaces and are capable of interacting with 
other entities to move them to action and reaction.  
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For my purposes, a nonmodern rhetorical theory does not need to go as far as 
Morton’s division between pronuntiatio and actio, as intriguing and insightful as his 
novel reconfiguration may be. In particular, I want more fully to explore Heidegger’s 
term Vollzug in the context of OOO and delivery. Vollzug means “execution” in the sense 
of executing an order or a law. There are clear resonances in Vollzug to the Greek 
understanding of hypokrisis as judgment. The possibility of delivery as a materialization 
of Vollzug interests me because this is the precise moment when an objects discloses its 
relation or quality while remaining withdrawn, virtual, and a quasi-object or a quasi-
subject. Furthermore, such an understanding shares obvious points of overlap with the 
early Platonic understanding of hypokrisis as acting. Unacknowledged by Morton, 
Harman had previously argued in Guerilla Metaphysics that Vollzug is closer to our 
conventional understanding of the word “performance” (104). Harman writes,  
Performativity [in Judith Butler] is a recent concept forged to fight all 
notions of hidden essence, which it replaces with a kind of nominalist 
essence fabricated on the outside by a series of public actions. Execution, 
by contrast, is an essentialist concept through and through, even if not in 
the traditional sense of an essence that could be made present in an 
adequate logos. Rather than an essential list of properties that the 
philosopher could gradually make visible, the executancy of a thing is a 
dark and stormy essence that exceeds any such list of properties. (104) 
Performance does not refer to linguistic or discursive phenomena, but to material 
engagements. Objects perform as they gather and disclose with one another. “The object 
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styles,” as Harman claims, in a comment that also reinforces the fact that style and 
delivery are often closely paired together in rhetorical history. Harman might as well 
have written, “the object delivers.”  
Vollzug—performance—emphasizes not just the withdrawal but the appearance, 
the hypokrisis: the manifestation of acting through local and concrete practices. In other 
words, by focusing on the moment the object discloses and performs and by respecting its 
“withdrawn” characteristics that are never exhausted in perception or instrumental use, 
performance thus takes on a definition that would describe at once Brooke’s new media 
performance but also the behavior of a vast range of material objects—technological and 
non-technological alike. A nonmodern realism necessarily encompasses a variety of 
human and nonhuman actors performing from a milieu of culturally- and materially-real 
forces. Where for classical delivery theorists, concealment was something that the rhetor 
consciously practiced, this nonmodern definition of delivery means that concealment 
simply is. Concealment and hypokritical acting would be qualities of all objects. 
Rhetorical agency in the activity of delivery then is something that radically precedes the 
initiation of rhetor. This declaration does not foreclose the possibility of agency. Rather, 
Latour like Morton questions the degree to which human actors are intentional or 
meaningful. As Latour puts it in his essay “A Collective of Humans and Nonhumans” in 
Pandora’s Hope, 
What interests me here is the composition of action marked by the lines 
that get longer at each step. . . . Who performs the action? Agent 1 plus 
Agent 2 plus Agent 3. Action is a property of associated entities [my 
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emphasis]. Agent 1 is allowed, authorized, enabled, afforded by the others. 
The chimp plus the sharp stick reach (not reaches) the banana. The 
attribution to one actor of the role of prime mover in no way weakens the 
necessity of a composition of forces to explain the action. It is by mistake, 
or unfairness, that our headlines read “Man flies,” “Woman goes into 
space.” Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that 
includes airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not 
fly, the U.S. Air Force Flies. Action is simply not a property of humans 
but of associations of actants, and this is the second meaning of technical 
mediation. Provisional ‘actorial roles’ may be attributed to actants only 
because actants are in the process of exchanging competences, offering 
one another new possibilities, new goals, new functions. (184)51 
Agential Realism: Leaving Plato’s Cave 
Part of realizing the value of delivery as ontological hypokrisis (Vollzug) for new 
media will first require us to admit that, beyond actor-networks of emergence, matter 
itself is fundamentally hypocritical. This “hypokriticality” extends beyond OOO’s 
metaphysical speculations about realism and refers to an actual concrete condition of the 
ways in which objects interact and unfold. Relationality itself is hypokritical. In my 
assessment, Morton’s emphasis on OOO-style concealment and delivery is only one step 
toward a redefinition of delivery for a nonmodern cosmos. Concealment, however, must 
extend from a description of an object’s withdrawal to encompass the concealment of 
objects in a different sense: the ways in which objects actually and agentively circulate 
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and interact to establish the conditions of agency and rhetoric within complex systems. 
As Rickert has observed in Ambient Rhetoric, Heidegger’s thinking is not necessarily 
incompatible with actor-network theory. Latour draws on and extends Heidegger in 
several key moments across his writing. Neither is Heidegger’s thinking 
incommensurable with Fuller’s ecology or the realist assemblage theories that I will 
discuss in Chapter 5. However, I will readily observe that the ways in which Heidegger 
has been principally taken up by those involved with OOO seldom work back from 
ontology to a Latourian form of accounting for the ways in which objects and humans co-
materialize together. Thus, concealment, for me, needs a different inflection which is why 
I prefer the term Vollzug (performance). Vollzug means paying attention to the specific 
materialization and performativity of objects—more in the sense of a potentiality or 
virtuality that accompanies an object’s actuality—and not just observing that objects 
possess a concealed realist core. Thus, while I believe that delivery can and should be 
reframed as an ontological condition of all objects and nonhuman actors, I believe that a 
different ontological understanding of agency and matter help tie ontological hypokrisis 
to the pragmatic analysis of technological actors as they engage in actor-networks and 
ecologies. I will suggest that this alternate model can be found in Barad’s work and 
writing about agential realism. Discussed in detail in Meeting the Universe Halfway, 
agential realism is a posthuman concept inspired by Niels Bohr’s quantum physics as a 
way to rethink performativity. In this section, I want to discuss her definition of agential 
realism through an example of the piezoelectric crystal in fetal imaging technology.  
Barad’s scholarship is part of a growing movement called “new feminist 
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materialism.” New feminist materialism includes many scholars such as Elizabeth Grosz, 
Elizabeth A. Wilson, Rosi Braidotti, and Poole and Frost. Like most associated with the 
movement, Barad specifically wants to shift theoretical paradigms from 
linguistic/cognitive representation to material performance within critical and cultural 
theory. According to Rosia Braidotti and, more recently, Vickie Kirby in Quantum 
Anthropologies, Butlerian performativity in Gender Trouble is held to have relegated 
materiality to discourse about the body.52 Although Butler’s arguments remain a crucial 
tool for analyzing how gender normativity has been established, the criticism is that her 
early work tells us comparatively little about the status of the body’s materiality beyond 
discourse and signification. Simply put, Butler’s thinking of performativity is held to be 
limited to the anti-realist/representationalist paradigm of modernity. Barad writes, “The 
move towards performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from 
questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e. g., do they mirror nature 
or culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions” (Meeting the Universe 802). In 
Barad’s assessment, representation—mimesis or imitation in Plato’s sense—forbids 
materiality the ability to act or conceal by requiring a correspondence between mental 
image (word) and thing. Here, she is clearly in dialogue with a typical anti-realist or 
epistemic realist gestures of rhetoric’s linguistic and epistemic turns wherein scholars 
assumed either that the thing-in-itself is fixed and recoverable as it exists a priori or that 
the thing-in-itself was not knowable at all.  
In contrast to a view of representation as a perfect representation of a fixed 
Newtonian point, Barad receives of representation as performative “enaction,” a term she 
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takes from Jerome Brunner and Francisco Varela—who describe the human not as a 
being endowed with transcendental reason, but as one material actor among many 
material objects who is constantly interacting with material forces. In a claim that is very 
similar to Alaimo’s notion of trans-corporeality, they write, “[the human is] a sensory-
motor-based embodied agent in which meaning emerges through a continually historical 
process of ‘active living’—a history of coupling between us and the dynamical 
environment ‘not as a representation system, but as constrained imagination (which the 
name enaction evokes)’ ” (1). By turning in part to the language of systems or complexity 
theory, Barad sees not necessarily an overturning but a radical extension of Butler’s 
notion that gender is an “active doing” (Meeting the Universe 804). However, Barad 
always reminds Butler scholars that reality is not just composed by humans 
manufacturing discursive images and nor is the manufacturing of these images freed from 
material acts of delivery. 
 Barad suggests that Bohr’s epistemology offers a way to conceive of a 
performative or, to use a related term from Nigel Thrift, “nonrepresentational” reality 
because Bohr radically challenged representation and the subject/object distinction 
(Nonrepresentational Theory). In classical physics, following—apparently—its own 
empirical laws of non-contradiction, only waves were held to be able to produce 
diffraction patterns. It is waves and not particles that could simultaneously occupy the 
same location. Yet, Bohr was able to demonstrate that at the quantum level, particles are 
able in some circumstances to behave like waves. In other words, there was no invariable 
metaphysical essence of light. Light emerged through a paradox wherein the same 
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substance—light—takes on the appearance of different emergent phenomena depending 
on what it is allied with and who is observing it. According to Barad, Bohr allows us to 
see the undecideability inherent in how all of our representation practices do actually 
have an impact on the object of investigation, “given that diffraction not only shows the 
entanglements of meaning and matter, but is itself an entangled phenomenon” (24). Bohr 
concluded that it was impossible to differentiate the act (agency) of observing from the 
object. Building on this observation, Barad suggests that an observer achieves meaning 
“on the condition that the experimenter introduction a constructed cut between the two 
[e.g., either particle or wave]” (25). By extension, the objective reference of measurement 
is not the object-in-itself, but phenomena where “phenomena” are what Barad reclassifies 
as “intra-actions” of the “object” and the “agencies of observation” (805). Interaction 
marks the world of Newtonian physics and Platonic rhetoric where the simulation of truth 
cannot occur in hypokrisis, concealment, and acting. By contrast, “intra-action” marks the 
space of Vollzug: material enactment. Here, multiple audiences—human and 
nonhuman—are embodied, present, and actively participating in communication 
activities that humans after the factor impose order upon. What Barad calls the human 
“agencies of observation” are not reduced to passive actors in an inversion of the 
Latourian modern Constitution. Humans actively participate in the construction of the 
scene of observation (26). 
In her essay, “Performing Culture, Performing Nature,” Barad offers an 
illustrative example of how ontological performativity occurs at a material quantum level 
via a comparison with Butler’s performativity vis-à-vis gender analysis. She specifically 
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criticizes Butler’s reduction of performativity to discourse through the example of the 
fetal imaging sonogram in Gender Trouble. Butler writes,  
consider the medical interpellation which (the recent emergence of the 
sonogram notwithstanding) shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a ‘she’ or a ‘he’, 
and in that naming the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain of language 
and kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that ‘girling’ of the 
girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is 
reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time 
to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect. The naming is at once the 
setting of a boundary and also the repeated inculcation of a norm. (Gender 
Trouble 8) 
For Butler, the temporal materialization of the sexed body is what produces gender. It is 
discourse about the body that when applied to the body will encourage the conscious self 
to perform its gender in certain ways. Yet, Barad believes that we should not fail to 
analyze how the technology itself participates in the construction of gender alongside 
discursive norming. Barad complains: “Butler explicitly brackets the questions of how 
the relatively recent emergence of ultrasound technologies might affect this process” (15).  
Barad points to studies such as Rosalind Petcheskey’s “Fetal Images” to analyze 
the impact of fetal imaging technologies both on abortion politics and on women’s 
experience of pregnancy. Where 2-d technology worked with visual appeals, then new 3-
d imaging technology that Christian anti-abortion groups are attempting to force into 
Planned Parenthood clinics nationwide, dramatically raises the sensible magnitude, 
	   192 
“inducing a kind of manic exhilaration over the epistemic earnings potential of this 
virtual reality tour of the body that makes real-time 2-d ultrasonography seem downright 
rudimentary” (16). Ironically, giving an anticipatory nod to the unpredictable conditions 
of agency that structure delivery and circulation, she observes that anti-abortionists had 
already taken advantage of these “Nilsson-esque” qualities, to constitute valid scientific 
proof of their viewpoint (16). Barad comments that “discoursing” in Butler’s Foucaultian 
sense is not just about discourse, but about how technologies themselves come to matter 
alongside discourse. The specific argument that she makes is worth reproducing in 
entirety: 
However, while Butler’s temporal account of materialization displaces 
matter as a fixed and permanently bounded entity, her theory of 
performativity focuses exclusively on the discursive/citational nature of 
the iterative process of materialization and thus leaves unexamined the 
material dimension of regulatory practices, including the productive and 
enabling aspects of material constraints and exclusion and the material 
dimensions of agency. (17) 
Barad concludes “Butler theorizes performativity only in terms of how discourse comes 
to matter; she fails to analyze how matter comes to matter” (17, emphasis original).  
By contrast, Barad turns to her understanding of agential realism to locate how 
apparatuses such as the fetal imager are “constituted through particular [material] 
practices that are perpetually open to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other 
reworkings” (18). As is the case in point with the 3-d imager enabled by the non-related 
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developments of a new piezoelectric crystal, it is one element in a larger whole composed 
of “apparatuses and material-discursive phenomena, materializing in intra-action with 
other material-discursive apparatuses” (18). They materialize in conditions of “medical 
needs, design constraints (including legal, economic, biomedical, physics and 
engineering ones); market factors; political issues; other research and design projects 
using similar materials; the particularities of education background of the engineer; and 
so on” (17). In making such a claim, Barad is not seeking to privilege the material over 
the immaterial or the object over the subject. She readily concedes that Foucault remains 
correct in that the production and reproduction of technology involves particular 
disciplinary practices of the hospital or the prison or the military. Furthermore, 
“technicians, physicians, and engineers are surveiled” in these spaces (18). Although 
regimes of subjectification have changed through the control society or governmentality, 
we can still see the uneven production of docile bodies in these spaces.   
Given this complex ecology, Barad is able to use agential realism to redescribe 
how gender and delivery function at the material-semiotic level. She writes, “the 
piezoelectric transducer is the interface between the objectification of the fetus and the 
subjectivization of the technician, physician, engineer, and scientist” (20). The traducer 
produces subjectivization and it is indissociable from the body it images: “That is, the 
marks on the computer screen (the sonogram images) refer to a phenomenon that is 
constituted in the intra-action of the apparatus and the object (commonly referred to as 
the ‘fetus’); the objective referent for the properties that are observed is the phenomenon, 
not some presumably independent object of this knowledge of practice” (21, emphasis 
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original). Closely related to Heidegger’s sense of Vollzug, Barad has identified agency 
and delivery as emerging from the space of disclosing and attunement (Stimmung). 
Attunement in Heidegger’s sense refers to how a body adjusts to the ways in which 
Being—adjusting for OOO’s extension to all objects—is disclosed or unconcealed. Yet, 
for Barad, concealment does not only refer to the substantial withdrawn reality of objects. 
Rather, it allows for this dimension while also incorporating the emergence of multiple 
points of agency and subjectification that occur with the context of the wand as a 
technological actor—an aspect that OOO theorists generally avoid theorizing. 
Thus, “realism” in Barad’s sense has taken on a different point of emphasis than 
the speculative realism that informs OOO. Despite its devil term status, she suggests that 
realism is useful term to retain because it enables us to “consider whether technoscientific 
practices might be usefully considered as open-ended regulatory practices through which 
human, nonhuman and cyborgian forms of agency jointly produce the phenomena being 
investigated, rather than a mere description of observation-independent reality” (Meeting 
the Universe 803). For me, her account of realism emphasizing Vollzug—the moment of 
disclosure—more than Harman’s emphasis of metaphysics and concealment. 
Representation is predicated upon the ontological gap between nature and culture, but 
“intra-action” in a realist sense means considering the “mutual constitution of entangled 
agencies” such as is the case in the 3-d imager (803). Meaning does not necessarily 
reflect a metaphysical order of substantial realism, but is generated through complexes of 
relations. Meaning is not subjective, rational, or an exclusively human property. Matter is 
thus not a stable referent for discourse, but an “always already an ongoing historicity” 
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that participates in the ways in which we represent reality (821). Representations 
(enactments) of reality do not diminish in importance. They are always already 
materializing, circulating, and hypocritically delivering actors. Barad suggests that 
representations are ‘‘condensations or traces of multiple practices of engagement’’ 
(“Performing Nature” 53).  
In this definition, we can see clear resonances between Barad’s thinking and 
Latour’s view of circulating reference (as I discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation) but 
with a more specific ontological claim about material self-organization. That is, 
representations are performances of our struggle with real material entities and 
constraints. Barad writes, “[If] intra-actions are constraining but not determinate,” then 
we have neither a transcendental reality that science can reveal in Boyle’s sense nor a 
completely free subjectivity (Meeting the Universe 805). Rather, we have a “material-
semiotic” field, to borrow Donna Haraway’s phrase, where “particular possibilities for 
acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities entail a responsibility to 
intervene in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is 
excluded from mattering” (826–827). “If,” Barad articulates, “our descriptive 
characterizations do not refer to properties of abstract objects or observation-independent 
beings, but rather through their material instantiation in particular practices contribute to 
the production of agential reality, then what is being description by our theories is not 
nature itself but our participation [our performance] within nature” (827). 
Realism, then, takes on a very specific terministic redefinition quite unlike the 
realism referenced by Latour, rhetorical realists, or anti-realists. Barad writes, “That is, 
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realism is reformulated in terms of the goal of providing accurate descriptions of agential 
reality—that reality within which we intra-act and have our being—rather than some 
imagined and idealized fixed external reality. According to agential realism, reality is 
sedimented out of the process of making the world intelligible through certain practices 
and not others” (804). Crucially, the observation of a reality that we along do not produce 
does not alleviate our responsibility or accountability for our relative degrees of 
intentionality and agency within intra-action. Rather, it makes agency emerge more 
clearly albeit in a distributed ahumanistic fashion. Barad claims, “Therefore, we are not 
only responsible for the knowledge that we seek, but, in part, for what exists. In 
anticipation of complaints that symmetry elides a critical examination of why some 
bodies are materialized in negative ways . . . these fail to integrate the human 
construction of gender, ethnicities” (804).  
 In reconceiving of matter along these lines, Barad joins a number of thinkers in 
the new material feminist group who want a new ontology predicated upon material 
realism where we want to conceive of matter as a vital entity that possesses its own 
modes of “self-transformation, self-organization, and directedness” (Poole and Frost 10). 
Matter is no longer the Cartesian inert and thereby “disturbs the conventional sense that 
agents are exclusively humans who possess the cognitive abilities, intentionality, and 
freedom to make autonomous decisions and the corollary presumption that humans have 
the right or ability to master nature” (10). The take away for rhetoric and delivery 
scholarship is that matter does not tend toward inertia or equilibrium and is self-
organizing. Thus, Poole and Frost claim that performativity marks the way in which 
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material actors deliver: 
tumbleweeds, animal species, the planetary ecosystem, global weather 
patterns, but also new social movements, health and crime and economics 
are all amenable to the kind of explanation developed by complexity 
theorists. Such phenomena are now understood as emergent systems that 
move with a superficially chaotic randomness that is underlain by patters 
of complex organization, which in turn function as foci for further 
organization and development. Such systems are marked by considerable 
instability and volatility since their representation is never perfect; there is 
a continuous redefining and reassembling of key laments that results in 
systems’ capacities to evolve into new and unexpected forms. (15) 
In a clear nod for thinking circulation and delivery, Poole and Frost claim, “their logic of 
proliferation is again resonant with new materialist senses of contingent, immanent self-
transformation” (14). Agential realism as ontological hypokrisis means a greater 
accounting for the material role of objects as they produce and undermine subjectivities.  
“Compactants”: Matthew Fuller’s Nonmodern Media Ecology53 
 At this point, with agential realism established to provide a framework for 
delivery as ontological hypokrisis, it is necessary to begin working toward how this view 
of delivery can pragmatically influence the ways in which we read new media objects and 
technologies. Simply put, it means conceiving of delivery in an even more radical way 
than Demosthenes’ ecological sense. Technological objects must be seen to actively 
establish the conditions of possibility for human agency and symbolic action, that is, the 
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conditions under which we are able to materialize rhetoric. In particular, delivery as 
ontological hypokrisis means that we have to study the hardware of digital rhetoric—its 
world of nonsymbolic actors—in addition to the world of representations, symbols, and 
mythologies that these technologies sustain. I will specifically illustrate through a case 
study of videogames in the next chapter why this is the case. Before leaving ontological 
hypokrisis, I want to make a specific connection between agency and the material 
processes of delivery by turning to Fuller’s critically neglected theory of media ecology 
in Media Ecology. Much like Barad, Fuller starts moving from theoretical and ontological 
considerations of matter and technological self-organization to the articulation of specific 
compositional strategies that describe what it means to theorize and practice rhetoric in a 
world of nonhuman agency. Fuller offers—akin to Morton—new rhetorical figures for 
the analysis and production of new explanatory idioms while nevertheless elucidating the 
materially affect role of objects. I will suggest that Fuller’s ecology is a necessary 
stopping point because Barad leaves it into question what specific mode of material or 
conative self-organization is unique to digital media and hardware as these are not her 
primary objects of analysis. By contrast, Fuller offers more specific connections between 
a material vitalism and digital media. Furthermore, he offers specific strategies for 
resistance as defined within a nonmodern world of technological actors. 
 Fuller’s approach to media systems is not Heideggerian but Deleuzian.54 Thus, his 
text employs collage and the rhizome as its lens for viewing objects.55 Fuller’s point of 
view is often difficult to grasp because his text performs the content of its theoretical 
framework. Media Ecologies does not offer straightforward and linear arguments. Rather, 
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like Dada painters “who played off actual real objects by nailing them or gluing them 
next to each in a painting,” Fuller argues through collage, juxtaposing various 
heterogeneous elements to blur clear conceptual boundaries (2). Ecology, much like 
Barad’s performativity, is a “massive and dynamic interrelation of processes and objects, 
beings and things, patterns and matter” (2). Similarly, his examples often seem 
incongruous as he moves seamlessly from John Hillard’s photo series A Camera 
Recording Its Own Condition to London’s pirate radio scene. In the example of pirate 
radio, he describes an ongoing battle for the regulation of London’s airwaves between 
pirates and the London police officials that can only be fully explained through an 
ecological analysis. The pirates constantly challenge the police’s regulation of airwaves 
and limitation of their freedom of expression, but the technologies themselves play an 
active and agentive role in the unfolding space of public resistance and activism. 
 A conventional rhetorical analysis of this situation as it relates to delivery might 
begin by analyzing the representational content and the specific mediums through which 
the pirates’ content circulates. However, Fuller’s notion of ecology begins with the 
objects themselves seen through Deleuze’s “minoritarian literature” (13). A minoritarian 
literature mobilizes “an ‘infinite patchwork’ of ‘singularities, remarkable and non-
totalizable parts extracted from a series of ordinary parts” (Fuller 13). Thus, Fuller offers 
an extensive list of all the “intra-acting” elements involved in maintaining pirate radio: 
Pirate radio: transmitter, microwave link, antennae, transmission and 
studio sites; records, record shops, studios, dub plates; turntables, mixers, 
amplifiers, headphones; microphones; mobile phones, SMS, voice; 
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reception technologies, reception locations, DJ tapes; drugs; clubs, parties, 
flyers, stickers, posters. (15) 
Pirate radio is undeniably activist in nature but without being predicated upon an fully 
“intentional” or humanist agent in the sense of an autonomous rhetor who is entirely 
responsible for the control of his or her message and medium. Pirate radio is illegal and 
bound up with governance and police action, causing a broadcast technology “arms race” 
to escalate between police and pirate radio stations. As a result pirate studios began to 
separate themselves from their transmitters so that the discovery of the transmission did 
not mean that delivery-machines would stop. Pirate radio is predicated upon violating 
commonly held material-technological literacies; or, simply put, black boxes and present-
at-hand broadcast objects are always viewed primarily existing in readiness-to-hand 
states. In their analysis of the pirate radio incident in “New Media Dwelling,” Jennifer 
Bay and Thomas Rickert note that elements such as the turntable are actually “stalled 
computers,” when used as intended—they only read previously recorded data on a 
turntable (25). By contrast, hip-hop DJs make the turntable into a recomposition 
instrument that could actually function as both a new delivery and memory device when 
combined with digital technologies or processes such as scratched. They write, “The 
turntable introduces another kind of feedback loop into music production, and this in turn 
radically transforms what can happen in the studio. Fuller concluded, ‘the turntable 
invents the DJ in order to compute’ ” (x). This statement is a full realization of Harman’s 
claim that the object styles (e.g., delivers). Where Barad is correctly interested in how 
technologies participate both in complex ecologies and how they engender certain forms 
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of subjectification, Fuller more accurately diagnoses how technologies themselves never 
fully unconceal even when they are instrumentalized. Concealment here is something 
more akin to a Deleuzian “virtual” potentiality that always exists and threatens to 
deterritorialize a stable system.  
 Fuller refuses to separate the process of delivery into form and content or medium 
and message. He specifically turns to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “machinic” in 
1000 Plateaus to explore how these connections obtain through “a whole interrogative 
field of social, juridical, legislative and economic formations” (Media Ecologies 20). As 
an emergent phenomena greater than the sum of its individual parts, pirate radio refuses 
these dichotomies through its “capacity to generate medial growths that ground 
themselves in the attempt to impose form on them. . . . That is, the attempted 
hylomorphism itself becomes ‘content’—there is a coevolution, an arms race that feeds 
the machinic phylum” (23). Thus, what resonates with one part of the ecology will affect 
what occurs in the other parts at both symbolic and nonsymbolic registers. Let me offer 
an example. In the case of pirate radio, the police force originally was just allowed to 
confiscate transmitters only. Yet, the legal regime in London eventually attempted to 
curtail pirate radio’s delivery and circulation range by expanding their jurisdiction to 
seize pirate radio equipment, including the “ability in law and practice to seize studio 
equipment” (23). The pirates’ response reflected not only intentional resistance, but an 
awareness of how the technologies themselves were vital components that could 
undermine the police. The pirates began to physically separate the space of the studio 
from the space of transmission by drawing on microwave links to sustain the networks. 
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As a result, Fuller claims, “it is now harder to locate and capture a studio connected in 
this way to a transmitter than it was before the legislation was introduced” (23). 
Rhetorical theorists have indeed picked up complexity theory and assemblages 
(Hawk, A Counter-History, Small Tech; Reid, Two Virtuals) as a way to re-think 
ecological rhetorics beyond social constructivism (Cooper, “Ecology”) and 
ecocomposition’s reduction of nature to discourse. Yet, we have been slow to actually 
engage and examine the specific role of the machinic phylum in rhetorical phenomena: 
the non-symbolic actuality of delivery machines that enables the possibility space of 
pirate radio’s political and rhetorical activity. For example, Jim Ridolfo and Nicole 
DeVoss (2011) recently offered the term “rhetorical velocity” to describe delivery and 
circulation in networked spaces. This term referred to how composers in new media and 
networked environments had to take into consideration how their given composition 
would inevitably be circulated and recomposed by other actors. However, rhetorical 
velocity does not extend to an ontological or affective property of the objects themselves. 
From the perspective of ontological hypokrisis, the recomposition of the DJ’s turntable or 
the pirate’s radio is surely as much of a part of the rhetorical velocity of pirate radio. 
Thus, I believe that further exploration of the machinic phylum offers models to help 
reconceive of delivery-related digital rhetoric concepts such as rhetorical velocity.  
Fuller makes a productive comparison between media ecologies to the “machinic 
phylum” of Deleuze and Guattari that provides an technology-specific update on Alfred 
North Whitehead’s metaphysics of process: “The machinic phylum is materiality, natural 
or artificial, and both simultaneously; it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation, 
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matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression”, or simply, “persistence and 
change of many individuals through time” (2). Thus, a “machine” includes technology, 
but it also includes the conative striving of the body’s DNA as it gathers and responds to 
attractors within its phase space. Phyla, notes Fuller, “are replaced or added to by other 
systems of reference, such as clades, analytical tools produced by emergent tools and 
discourses, such as genetic databases, which provide access to dimensions and 
interpretations of evolution other than those simply available to the interpretative eye” (2). 
Manuel DeLanda, who Fuller draws on for his own understanding of Deleuze, describes 
the machinic phylum as “The overall set of self-organizing processes in the universe. . . . 
These include all processes in which a group of previously disconnected elements 
suddenly reaches a critical point at which they begin to “cooperate” to form a higher level 
entity” (qtd. in Fuller 24). When objects reach a critical mass and emerge, it becomes 
necessary to speak not only the symbolic velocity that these machines house, but—if I 
may suggest a new terms— their rhetorical viscosity (e.g., their material substance, 
agency, and affectivity)—their Vollzug. Under such a term, it becomes possible to see the 
space of rhetorical interactions where existing state of constraints has been switched into 
another. Thus, while Latour is often interested in an after the fact analysis of the 
distribution of agency, Fuller via Deleuze begins to argue that what Gottfried Leibniz 
calls the “fold” or what rhetorical theorists could just as easily call kairos, means not only 
choosing the mode of composition as DeVoss and Ridolfo mean and anticipating the 
circulatory energies of human users, but attempting to anticipate the emergent moment of 
delivery at the level of the machinic phylum. In Heidegger’s terms, the machinic phylum 
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is not a space that emerges from critique and representation, but attunement to the 
projection space enabled by the mood (stimmung) disclosed by what he frequently calls 
our authentic “being-in-the-world” (e.g., existing as we do as unconcealed Beings). To 
return to Morton’s reclassification of delivery via OOO, the machinic phylum offers an 
accurate analysis of the materialization of moment of Vollzug: delivery as ontological 
hypokrisis. 
Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the machinic phylum through an example of the 
metallurgic artisan—a nonmodern equivalent of the rhetor Demosthenes shouting at 
waves. Fuller describes the metallurgist:  
Tracing this flow of matter and the intensive points at which it changes 
from ore into a purer form, from solid into a molten state, is complicated 
by and echoed in the flow’s relation to the points at which following it 
becomes subject to circuits, to arrangements between a here and a there, 
between one fixed state and another. Flows are connected, for instance, to 
the mercantile, to divisions of labor that separate out the roles of merchant, 
prospector, and artisan into distinct categories of behavior and access to 
modes of perception and action. (182) 
Importantly, the metallurgist is “Not properly nomadic, not capable of becoming 
sedentary, metallurgists become itinerant. Cursed into this border category by their 
knowledge, they must engage, carefully, with each strata and work with seams and 
thresholds” (183). Simply put, there is no “line of flight” that is sufficiently free from 
material intra-action and enaction in Barad’s sense. In contrast to Giorgio Agamben’s 
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excellent appropriation of Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener who says, “I prefer 
not to,” to dis-engage in demands for essentialism in identity and community, the 
metallurgist has no place that she can turn to in order to disengage from the dominant 
material and affective game that is ecology in a world of nonhuman actors. In Fuller’s 
sense, we can never say, “I prefer not to” to the objects that are always working on us as 
rhetorical actors. 
In the metallurgist, the actual and manipulable—and Heidegger reminds us that 
manipulation means a modern Cartesian directive to fix and “to hold in the hand”—meet 
their withdrawn virtual dimension of any hypokritical unfolding. Such an in-between 
state implies that the rhetor in the act of delivery is more of a conduit and a point of 
transmission than the originator of rhetoric. Fuller argues  
The metallurgist possesses an intense relation to materiality: a 
proprioception of and through the changes of state of the matter that one is 
working with, becoming aware of its tics and glitches in terms of how they 
are mobilizable, in what realms they operate in topological terms, what 
they connect to or elide. (184)  
The metallurgist does not view the process of delivery in Porter’s sense of technê as 
technical knowledge. Rather, the metallurgist employs “experiential science or tacit 
knowledge formed through the use of impurities and changes in structure and integration 
of metals by leaps between temperatures through heating and quenching. (An alliance of 
access to wood or charcoal, ores, and water was needed)” (184). This minoritarian 
science contrasts to the hylomorphism—what Fuller calls the “form-matter model”—of 
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many philosophers of materiality since Aristotle (Hansen, Technêsis). By contrast, Fuller 
suggests that nonhuman actors themselves are able serve as efficient causes that work 
toward a permanently unsettled final cause of the social and the polis. Fuller writes, “In 
the treatise on nomadology by contrast, Deleuze and Guattari propose an emphasis on the 
morphogenetic capabilities of material itself: the moments when a series of forces, 
capacities, and predispositions intermesh to make something else occur, to move into a 
state of self-organization” (184). Turning again to 1000 Plateaus, Fuller argues, 
“Hylomorphism is ‘a model of the genesis of form as external to matter, as imposed from 
the outside like a command on a material which is thought inert and dead.’ Yet, the 
machinic phylum, following from Simondon’s account, is the ‘process of individuation, 
whereby materials produce their own capacities of formation in relation to the 
morphogenetic affordances around them’ ” (185).  
 The significance of this allegory for ontological hypokrisis can be seen by 
returning to Fuller’s pirate radio example to fully explicate how the machinic phylum 
relates to the activity of delivery. Friedrich Kittler correctly argued long ago that 
“electricity does not equal electronics” (Discourse/Network 74). Thus, what produces 
events like pirate radio are analogue electromagnetics (“transmitters coils, T21200 
gramophone, and other components”), and digital delivery mechanisms (“the GSM 
phone—something of a bastard case in that it necessarily maintains an interface to 
electromagnetic waves; and computationally based samplers and synthesizers, etc.”) 
(Media Ecologies 27). Fuller offers the following conclusion:  
Both electric and electronic sound technologies also allow a sense of a 
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doubling of the machinic phylum in that the manipulation of singularities 
and flows at one level becomes explicable only when it manifests at 
another—in sound waves. Just as for generations of zoology, organic 
phyla were sensible only through our seeing them in particular senses as 
mutational fields of a shared body-plan, this area of the machinic phyla is 
operated in and manifest through sound. The threshold into self-
organization is crossed only when a bunch of components becomes 
something else. (186) 
This doubling of electricities of sound transmission in this performative space echoes the 
hypocritical nature of code that Wendy Chun describes in Programmed Visions as I noted 
at the end of Chapter 3. Fuller concludes, “The machinic phylum of the radio in this sense 
is that of the creation of flow among dense population, an expanded form of phyla that at 
once multiplies the domains in which it is traced but is also produced in the attempted or 
actualized imposition of hylomorphic patterning—law, the state, or the technologies of 
capture employed by it” (185). 
 Thinking back to the shift from Butler’s discursive-material performativity to 
Barad’s material entanglement and intra-action, Fuller clearly shows us the complex 
material interplay in delivery between symbolic and nonsymbolic factors and agencies. In 
a media ecology, no actor truly gains mastery of the system. For example, the law and 
London police order are never able to fully subsume their area of authority to what is 
actualized, as the case of pirate radio demonstrates. Here, the relationship is not one of 
“submission” but of forging and conditioning—the space of the metallurgist. Importantly, 
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this model of delivery and enaction at once encompasses yet supplements the decoder-
encoder hermeneutic of Welch’s theory of delivery in Electric Rhetoric. Fuller claims, 
“Readings of these formations, their utilization, the finding of such loopholes within 
them—all constitute a way in which hylomorphic patternings themselves can become 
hyle, matter for the constitution of flow” (186). Specifically, he describes how “Radio’s 
section of the electromagnetic spectrum was born regulated. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the British government made the wireless telegraph a state monopoly, assigning 
it to the Post Office, with oversight granted to the Admiralty. The only portion of the 
spectrum not directly falling under state control and procedures of licensing is that visible 
to the naked” (186). Thus, Fuller’s observations can be seen in relationship to most recent 
decisions by US and European authorities to close down the PirateBay, Rapidshare, and 
other repositories of copyrighted media that are illegally distributed and downloaded. 
What constitutes a “line of flight,” or an effective way of realizing the emergent 
protcological whole as a metallurgist attempt to deliver rhetoric in a nonmodern universe, 
will undoubtedly have to take into account not merely the symbolic import—the 
deliberative arguments about the pros and cons of state interference and regulation—but 
also the alterations in the machinic phylums that structure the space of these encounters, 
deliver, and rhetoricity in general. 
 Fuller confirms that idea that all media and technological structures possess 
virtual dimensions that exceed any protocological control:  
All standard objects contain with them drives, propensities, and affordances 
that are “repressed” by their standard uses, by the grammar of operations 
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within which they are fit. (This “repression” should not necessarily be 
construed negatively. It is likely itself to arise as the result of a previous or 
immanent recombination, disassembly, or adaptation.) Together in 
conjunction with another such object, a chance arises for something to 
happen, a signal to get strange by coming out the wrong end. To list out a 
grammar for the set of ideas developed here should simply provide an 
opportunity for reduction to fall into this same trap and start sprouting. (186) 
 Here, Fuller’s point of view really is not very different from Heidegger’s. He wants to 
avoid reducing our considerations of media environments to calculative enframing 
[Gestell] while respecting the always new and creative tactics for resistance inherent 
within our relationality with objects’ concealed subterranean essence (e.g., Harman’s 
OOO) or virtual potential (e.g., Deleuze). As metallurgists who operate through and 
alongside media machines, our rhetorical agency obtains only from within this particular 
assemblage and configuration of humans and nonhuman by exploiting the noise, the 
chance, and the elided. Fuller concludes,  
Indeed such parts can no longer be disassembled; they produce an ecology. 
Not a whole, but a live torrent in time of variegated and combinatorial 
energy and matter . . . The pirates, from the sounds broadcast to their 
collaging approach to technologies, are founded precisely on a sense of 
this synergistic and livid capacity. Other work here exists in between this 
permutational power and its edges. Such a torrent can be used to drive 
other little machines that dip a drive or an organ into it, setting them 
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ticking away, gurgling, jumping. (187) 
Consequences for Rhetoric 
One way to locate ontological hypokrisis then is not merely positing that 
objects—like rhetors—conceal their artifice and reality, but through the type of analysis 
that Fuller and Barad articulate. We could propose rhetorical counter-histories like pirate 
radio that describe how objects’ material properties exercise quasi-intentional agentive 
influence on the social beneath the symbolic. For example, Cynthia Cockburn and Susan 
Ormrod in Gender and Technology in the Making argue that there is a symbolic history 
of the microwave oven and a material history. In the symbolic history, early microwaves 
targeted men by playing on the high tech aspect. Microwaves’ usability offered a great 
degree of control over heating coils, watts, and temperature. Amazingly, early 
microwaves were sold in electronics stores along with video recorders! It was only after 
the male market reached its saturation point, that the female audience was considered as a 
market segment. In this shift, Cockburn and Ormrod note that “the operating ‘bells and 
whistles’ were replaced by simple knobs with pictures. In order to heat a cup of soup, it 
was no longer necessary to follow a series of complicated instructions regarding how to 
control the intensity and duration of the electromagnetic radiation; one had only to touch 
the little-picture-of-a-cup of soup button” (57). They comment, “The two microwaves 
were equally functional, intended to speed the preparation of meal, but the one gendered 
its users as technologically competent, the other as incompetent” (57). 
This symbolic-material history is a crucial part of the instrumental side of 
hypokrisis. However, ontological hypokrisis cannot treat this symbolic history as a finite 
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resting point. The functionality of the microwave itself will necessarily create emergent 
effects as it engages with different actors and networks across its heliomorphic plane. 
Regardless of its originary inscription in gender relationships, the entelechy of the 
microwave—the fact that it enables food to be quickly heated—began to encourage the 
development of a certain type of mean: frozen foods to be consumed by a single person. 
The microwave is not an intentional actor; however, when human markets realize its 
entelechy, the microwave itself will actually prompt change in our eating habits. The 
microwave enables more meals to be eaten alone or to be consumed on the job in order to 
minimally interfere with one’s work. In a sense, the microwave begins to participate in 
the decline of communally produced meals and prompting the deterioration of family 
socialization around the stove.  
Yet, the microwave is only a single affective force, and not the sole causal agent 
in the ecological system. Agency is distributed among a variety of actors such as human 
capitalists and mobile refrigeration units. The microwave only fulfills another dimension 
of its virtual proper being when frozen foods and other easily reheatable meals are widely 
available, and second, when human beings are prepared to adopt these as an alternative to 
preparing a meal from scratch with fresh ingredients—a dimension accelerated by the 
increased cost of living, slashed wages to the middle class, and the erosion of union and 
collective wage bargaining. More globally than microwaves, Levi Bryant reminds us that 
“flows of capital and the ability of capital to exercise its power literally needs highways, 
satellites, trains, farms, land, fiber optic cables, ocean going ships, and so on” 
(“Onticology and Politics” para. 3). If such channels do not develop, and if the energy 
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necessary to run these channels is not available, then capitalism’s flows disappear. As 
David Harvey observes, “capital only exists in the motion of capital” (15). We can see 
with this history that it is not enough for rhetorical theorists of delivery to focus on the 
symbolic action alone or the instrumentalization of delivery. Rather, they must turn to a 
non-Platonic form of episteme (realism), where rhetoric includes not only uncertain 
statements—all statements are uncertain statements and are not matters of fact but 
matters of concern—but materializing influences of the rhetoric’s materiality. 
 In terms of our understanding of delivery as a process that is intimately 
intermeshed with material actors, the microwave and Fuller’s account of pirate radio 
mark a definite improvement toward understanding delivery as ontological hypokrisis. 
Fuller adds that we must go beyond the Latourian re-description of how elements are 
composed, and to theorize how elements themselves “produce their own capacities of 
formation in relationship to the morphogenetic affordances around them” (18). Fuller’s 
theory of ecology looks at how material actors themselves circulate meaning by 
delivering. Events emerge out of a near-Brownian motion, aleatory, semi-random, and 
chance re-contextualization: rhetorical velocity and rhetorical viscosity that emerge out of 
a successive series of machinic phyla and matter’s performative self-organization 
alongside human agency. Successful delivery machines can harness and allow invention 
to cohere, creating post-hermeneutic affordances and constraints or, in Heidegger’s terms, 
spaces of projection and gathering: Vollzug. 
A nonmodern realist theory of delivery, then, would have to account for the fact 
that material things deliver and gather, and, furthermore, acknowledge that our 
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audiences—in opposition to Plato’s de-materialization of the rhetorical situation—are 
affective—both human and nonhuman. Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford’s classic text 
“Audience Addressed, Audience Invoked” differentiates writing for a known, material, 
and real audience from the inventive process of imagining this audience. In the latter, our 
imagination has to devise rhetorical tricks in order to inculcate a sense of this audience in 
the reader. To help develop our imaginations, they seek to move beyond a fixed or static 
notion of audience, by adding several sub-types: “invoked audience can include your self, 
friends, colleagues, critics, a mass audience, future audiences, past audiences, or 
anomalous audiences (such as fictional characters); addressed audience can include future 
audiences, mass audiences, critics, colleagues, friends, as well as your self” (166). In a 
clear resonance for delivery and circulation beyond the immediate rhetorical situation, 
they write: “the term audience refers not just to the intended, actual, or eventual readers 
of a discourse, but to all those whose image, ideas, or actions influence a writer during 
the process of composition. One way to conceive of ‘audience,’ then, is as an 
overdetermined or unusually rich concept, one which may perhaps be best specified 
through the analysis of precise, concrete situations” (168). 
In his 2010 Rhetoric Society of America presentation, Byron Hawk speculates 
about how we might radically expand the idea of audience for a cosmos populated by 
nonhuman actors. Delivery as ontological hypokrisis means that audiences are, to 
repurpose Hawk’s arguments for my context, “materially real and in some cases 
imaginable and in other cases totally emergent, all of which are equally constitutive of 
the discourse, and to the recognition that any such analysis has to be of precise and 
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specific material situations and relationships. This is a real call for rhetoricians that, as far 
as I can determine, hasn’t been taken up to its fullest potential” (“Audience” 5). Hawk’s 
conclusions are especially apt if we do not limit our analysis to what “influence[s] a 
writer during the process of composition” as Ede and Lunsford do, while, in a sense, 
collapsing invention and delivery to see how invention changes through different modes 
of circulation. This is what it means for an object to perform in a way that is irreducible 
to the writer-text-receiver model or simple transmission models of rhetoric—some of 
which I located in delivery scholarship in Chapter 3. What if our first audience is the 
hardware-software feedback loop, object-oriented delivery, or Chun’s hypocritical 
computer code? Is it the keyboard? The air? Ontological hypokrisis makes these concerns 
manifest and part of thinking of delivery as “the first canon” of networked 
communication and digital rhetoric. Drawing on Margaret Syverson’s The Wealth of 
Reality, Jenny Edbauer posits what remains one of the clearest ecological approaches 
toward a nonmodern vision of agency and writing as a distributed activity. Through 
Syverson it is possible that “we can speak of the distribution of . . . [text composing] 
across physical, social, psychological, spatial, and temporal dimensions . . . [T]he social 
dimensions of composition are distributed, embodied, emergent, and enactive” (23). 
Edbauer gives an extended example that is worth citing in length: 
Writing is thus more than a matter of discrete elements (audience, a writer, 
text, tools, ideas) in static relation to one another (a writer types her ideas 
into a computer for an audience who reads the text). Rather, writing is 
distributed across a range of processes and encounters: the event of using a 
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keyboard, the encounter of a writing body within a space of dis/comfort, 
the events of writing in an apathetic/energetic/distant/close group. A 
vocabulary of ‘distribution’ points to how those elements are enacted and 
lived, how they are put into use, and what change comes from the in-
processes-ness itself. (“Unframing” 13) 
According to Edbauer, the rhetorical situation is not a “noun” of static-ness, but an 
“event-ful” verb of action. City space is not fixed, but designed by the verb “to city” in 
order for us to “do rhetoric.” 
In his webtext installation “Stomp Box Logic,” Hawk echoes Edbauer in making 
a specific case for how technology is indeed our “first” audience in a nonmodern cosmos. 
Stomp boxes allow for a hypokritical form of invention and delivery: “the performance 
and the mix. Both are aspects of composition, and converge on the same object—the 
digital track—but activate different aspects of the object” (2). He looks at artists such as 
Ashanti’s Beatjazz, “a born-digital genre played through samples and loops that he 
records and develops through improvisational instruments” (3). He identifies, for 
materialist rhetorics, (at least) three audiences for Beatjazz: “1. the objects and machines 
and as a primary audience, 2. the entire system or assemblage as a secondary audience, 
and 3. the human affects created through the system’s feedback as a tertiary audience” (3). 
There is no rhetorical situation without this technological audience. In fact, there never 
was one without these entities, despite Plato’s best attempts to rid himself of those 
troublesome (non-logical) subjects and objects. Thus, Hawk’s example helps demonstrate 
why it is necessary for delivery—itself bound up with ecologies of technology from the 
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pynx to the stomp box—to move far beyond the “tertiary audience” which is where much 
scholarship on delivery has yet to move. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MISPLACED CONCRETENESS: WRITING NEW MEDIA ALLEGORITHMS AND 
PROCEDURAL RHETORICS 
  
When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear by means of 
human making. But neither do they appear without the vigilance of mortals. The first step 
toward such vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents-that is, 
explains-to the thinking that responds and recalls. 
 
Martin Heidegger 
 
Writing and Agency in Rhetorical Assemblages 
 
One of the points of reclassifying delivery as ontological hypokrisis is that it 
enables us to ask new questions about rhetoric by interrogating what it means to write 
through new media and technology. In recent years, circulation has emerged alongside 
delivery scholarship as a part of the canon of delivery or as an extension. Sensitive to 
instrumentalist conceptions of technology, circulation scholarship rigorously engages 
with a fuller range of technological actors and networks through which persuasion 
occurs. In their 2012 publication, The Available Means of Persuasion: Mapping a Theory 
and Pedagogy of Multimodal Public Rhetoric, David M. Sheridan, Jim Ridolfo, and 
Anthony J. Michel are correct when they suggest “Rhetorical theory has yet to confront 
the full implications of taking circulation into account. Circulation has not yet reached the 
theoretical richness of other key concepts such as ‘process’ or ‘audience,’ to illustrate 
what is might mean to take circulation seriously as a key theoretical concept” (61). Yet, it 
is also true that circulation scholars—like delivery scholars—are largely focused on 
human-initiated acts of circulation.  
It is my claim that rhetoric and writing scholarship can benefit from such specific 
understandings of agency and delivery as an emergent and distributed phenomenon 
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distributed across an assemblage of human and nonhuman actors. Turning to Bruno 
Latour and neurophenomenology, Marilyn R. Cooper articulates how perspectives such 
as Bennett’s can inform our conceptions of composition pedagogy and rhetorical agency. 
In contrast to “commonsense” views of agency as intention or as a product of free will, 
she suggests, “agency is an emergent property of embodied individuals. Agents do reflect 
on their actions consciously; they do have conscious intentions and goals and plans; but 
their agency does not arise from conscious mental acts, though consciousness does play a 
role” (421). Furthermore, Cooper argues, “Agency instead is based in individuals’ lived 
knowledge that their actions are their own,” concluding via Bennett, “agency is the . . . 
capacity to make a difference in the world without knowing quite what you are doing” 
(Bennett qtd. in Cooper 421).56  
Cooper ultimately believes that agency is an emergent property and not a 
possession that “function[s] as part of the systems in which they originate. And causation 
in complex systems is nonlinear: change arises not as the effect of a discrete cause, but 
from the dance of perturbation and response as agents interact” (421). Following from 
Cooper’s analysis, it is not enough for rhetorical theorists to focus on the symbols and 
representations that we make about the world of objects. Rather, we must begin to pry 
open the blackboxes of the technologies and mediums around us as they condition the 
material and embodied spaces through which agency obtains and meaning is delivered 
and circulated. Rhetors and writers undeniably possess some level of understanding of 
their intentionality when they attempt to persuade an audience through a given medium. 
Nevertheless, Cooper’s arguments confirm that rhetors and writers are not always certain 
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or aware about the full range of material and ecological consequences of their actions 
within the various technological assemblages that they communicate in. The view of 
rhetoric and the processes of delivery/circulation as an assemblage requires rhetorical 
theorists to focus not merely on the symbolic or representational content of cultural 
phenomena, but to consider the role played by the material instantiation of symbolic 
phenomena as they enter into and are affected by different nonhuman actors. 
Such a view of reality dramatically shifts the ways in which we are able to 
conceive of rhetoric, politics, and ethics as theories of rhetoric and writing predominantly 
focus on the subject’s inventive processes that are then manifested through a passive 
technological object. Against such a perspective and to return to the quotation that I cited 
at the end of Chapter 2, Bennett speculates: “But what if we loosened the tie between 
participation and human language use, encountering the world as a swarm of vibrant 
materials entering and leaving agentic assemblages? We might then entertain a set of 
crazy and not-so-crazy questions: Did the typical American diet play any role in 
engendering the widespread susceptibility to the propaganda leading up to the invasion of 
Iraq? In what ways does the effect on sensibility of a video game exceed the intentions of 
its designers and users? Can a hurricane bring down a president?” (162).  
This chapter explores nonsymbolic forms of rhetoric such as procedural and 
algorithmic rhetorics as conceptual and practical (and vibrant) tools that allow us to 
explain rhetorical and writing practices in a world of nonhuman technological actors. In 
the quotation above, Bennett intended the question, “In what ways does the effect on 
sensibility of a video game exceed the intentions of its designers and users?” as a mere 
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passing hypothetical. She does not offer any analysis in Vibrant Matter related to digital 
rhetoric or video games. In this chapter, however, I will in fact consider and elaborate on 
her question in detail. My case study involves questions of digital rhetoric and 
multimodal public writing in the context of activist newsgames and “do-it-yourself” 
(DIY) video games. These video games represent an emergent form of “born digital” new 
media that are designed specifically for viral circulation, recomposition, inter-textual 
citation, and being embedded within social media. In this context, I will take up the 
media studies theorist Alexander Galloway and Jane Bennett’s Deleuzian assemblage 
theory, and work toward a nonmodern understanding of the persuasive political work that 
occurs in newsgames, video games, and digital interfaces in general by considering the 
affective influence of the nonsymbolic or nondiscursive aspects of digital technology. In 
particular, the Bennett has raised regarding politics and nonhuman agency will require us 
to focus on nonsymbolic aspects of new media and technology or else we will miss a 
great deal of the rhetorical work that occurs when we write with and through technologies 
as they, to invoke Marshall McLuhan’s famous quote, “work us over completely.”  
I will highlight at first what will seem like a promising route for digital rhetoric 
theorists to explore nonsymbolic aspects of technology; namely, how procedural 
literacies in James Paul Gee and Michael Mateas and procedural rhetorics in Ian Bogost 
attempted both to demonstrate and to overcome symbolic, representationalist, or semiotic 
accounts of new media and video game interfaces. As I will briefly note in the first 
section, scholars have tended to follow Porter’s view above and focused on the user’s 
interaction with the symbolic content in the act of composition and delivery. The interest 
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for rhetorical theorists in these conversations is that proceduralist accounts are 
specifically tied to improving our understanding of political activism through the 
persuasive capacities of digital new media. Simply stated, procedural rhetorics also help 
answer the question of what it means to write, compose, and persuade through video 
games as a medium of delivery and networked circulation. 
However, my claim is that procedural rhetoric simultaneously marks an 
improvement in the interpretation of the nonsymbolic aspects of new media and 
constitutes an additional interpretative obstacle. Consequently, I maintain that 
assemblage theory allows us realize why such proceduralist accounts of the role 
nonhuman actors within new media ultimately fail to realize a vibrant world of 
nonsymbolic agencies. Proceduralist theorists’ principle failing lies in that they replace a 
monolithic focus on “symbols” with an equally monolithic focus on “coded procedure” 
whilte retaining an instrumental view of rhetoric. They presuppose a view of rhetoric and 
delivery where it is the human and not the technology that becomes the passive object, 
captive to the game designer’s Aristotelian manufacturing of a “soul” that can be 
incarnated into the player (audience). In its place, I will articulate a view of nonsymbolic 
agency in new media interfaces that treats both the player and the technology as 
symmetrical actors within a dynamic and emergent assemblage. What I describe in this 
chapter answers Nicole DeVoss and Jim Ridolfo’s call for rhetorical scholars to develop 
a unique “theory of digital delivery,” while nevertheless addressing what Jenny Bay and 
Thomas Rickert call the “ontological weight” of digital rhetoric: the full ecological and 
material presence of the nonhuman actors that serve as a condition of possibility for 
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rhetorical agency. Rickert and Bay forcefully declare, “[Technology and rhetorical 
scholarship] need to accommodate things [e.g., nonhuman actors] more than they need to 
accommodate us” (“New Media and the Fourfold” 182). While this conclusion and the 
attention to hardware, software, and algorithms may tempt some to invoke the specter of 
technological or material determinism, I will demonstrate in this chapter and in Chapter 6 
that these considerations do not foreclose the possibility of political intervention. Indeed, 
Sheridan et al. note that for those such as Bennett, Cooper, and Latour who argue that 
“agency ‘exceeds the subject,’ [and] is distributed across complex networks of human 
and nonhuman actors, including people, discourses, and technologies” it is also true that 
“none of these theorists excludes the roles of education, planning, or design” (106). 
Consequently, this framework will enable me to explore in Chapter 6 how and in what 
way these theoretical concerns relate directly to forms of political intervention and forms 
of indecorous delivery through new media delivery such as videogames.57 
The (Im)materiality of Digital and Visual Rhetoric 
Far from esoteric philosophical discussions of reality, the issues that I outline in 
the following section directly concern rhetorical theorists, delivery, circulation, and 
digital and visual rhetoric scholars, and composition theorists and teachers. Specifically, 
these issues impact the ways in which we allow nonhuman actors to be present and 
visible in the rhetorical situation without subsuming them into what Latour calls “modern 
Constitution”: an ontological separation between active human actors and passive or 
instrumental nonhuman objects.58 In “The Programmable City,” the software studies 
scholar Robert Kitchin describes what it means to view a technological actor such as 
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software not through a lens of instrumental technê—Porter’s concern with delivery and 
circulation—but as a participant in a vital and conative assemblage: 
[S]oftware has been understood from a technical, instrumental perspective 
that treats it as largely an immaterial, stable, neutral product, rather than as 
a complex, multifaceted, mutable set of relations created through diverse 
sets of discursive, economic, and material practices. Where the role of 
software has been acknowledged, the focus of analysis has been the 
technologies and infrastructures that software enables, rather than the 
underlying nature of software that powers such technologies. The 
consequence is to study how telematic networks shape, for example, 
traffic management, but to largely ignore how such effects are manifestly 
the result of the rules. (945)59 
Kitchin’s quotation illustrates the consequences for technology and media studies when 
they fail to develop a larger ecological picture of technological agency. In the example of 
traffic management software, I read Kitchin as suggesting that cultural (and rhetorical) 
critics avoid considerations of protocol and algorithmic procedurality precisely because 
of the stigma that these elements are “technical” and “fixed.”  
Arguably, rhetorical theory and composition studies’ institutional attitudes toward 
technology have dramatically improved since 1999 when Selfe wrote these words. 
However, Kitchin’s conclusions demonstrate that her point is nevertheless valid in a 
different but related register. It is not that scholars have not focused on technology. 
Rather, what is “humanistic” about technology largely includes its symbolic content. 
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Hearkening back to Aristotle, the blackboxed functionality of technological objects 
largely remains the domain of episteme and expert discourse (e.g., “engineers, 
technicians, and technocrats”), and not doxa and the rhetorical, symbolic, and discursive 
analysis of the language that we use to describe and make meaning about technological 
objects. As a result of this oversight of the actual properties of technology, Kitchin 
suggests, “The way the discourses and practices of traffic management are translated into 
the routines and algorithms of code is vitally important to how the traffic system operates 
and yet we know hardly anything about how such translations occur: traffic system into 
code; code reshaping the traffic system” (945-46). To express the matter more 
schematically, rhetorical theorists are historically more interested in the language that 
engineers use about their objects than in the technical properties of the objects themselves. 
The lesson that we should draw from the renewed attention to software, hardware, and 
nonhuman technological actors is not necessarily Stephen Ramsey’s claim in Toward an 
Algorithmic Criticism that humanities scholars need to learn how to how to program 
textual search algorithms.60 Rather, Kitchin’s (and Bennett’s) point is to concede that 
treating technological objects as visible and present actors only through considering the 
user’s direct manipulation is inevitably to miss the deeper material registers that influence 
and constitute technological rhetorics and the activity of delivery.61 
The rise of new media theory was roughly commensurate with the development of 
software studies in the early 2000s, leading the media studies theorist Lev Manovich to 
declare confidently that code was the new hermeneutic key to interpreting digital media 
since all digital devices shared this property in common. However, when digital rhetoric 
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scholars generally examine media interfaces such as a videogame as a form of new media 
writing, they demonstrate the validity of Kitchin’s observation.62 A 2008 Computers and 
Composition special issue entitled “Reading Games: Composition, Literacy, and Video 
Gaming” is typical of this approach. Topics in the special issue included public writing in 
online gamer communities (Johnson); textual conversation produced in games (deWinter 
and Vie); and semiotic approaches to video games seen in the work of New Literacies 
theorist Gee (Alberti), whose scholarship I will engage below. No attention was given to 
the operation of code, algorithms, hardware, software and hardware studies, platform 
studies, or ecologies of rhetorical interaction in the sense of Bogost, Galloway, or other 
games studies or new media theorists. I make this observation not in any way to dismiss 
the validity or necessity of this scholarship. Indeed, I firmly agree that such efforts are 
crucially valuable to understanding the operation of rhetoric in video games, new media, 
and online virtual worlds and to recognize them as valid forms of rhetorical expression. 
My point is more that this sort of scholarship misses including the role of important 
nonsymbolic elements as they participate in the shaping of meaning. In as far as “writing” 
and “rhetoric” involve new media including video games, the overwhelming tendency is 
for scholars to focus on the contents of the screen and not the technologies themselves 
(Haas).63  
Noting a definite human perceptual bias that many have called “screen 
essentialism,” media studies theorist Lisa Gitelman observes that, “critics [starting with 
McLuhan] have long noted, the success of all media depends at some level on inattention 
or ‘blindness’ to the media technologies themselves (and all of their support protocols) in 
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favor of attention to the phenomena, ‘the content, that they represent for users’ 
edification or enjoyment” (6). Working from a similar set of concerns, Bogost views 
screen essentialism as a dominant paradigm within digital rhetoric. “Digital rhetoric,” 
Bogost observes, “typically abstracts the computer as a consideration, focusing on the 
text and image content a machine might host and the communities of practice in which 
that content is created and used . . . [F]or scholars of digital rhetoric, to ‘function in 
digital spaces’ often means mistaking subordinate properties of the computer for primary 
ones” (Procedural 25). Elizabeth Losh confirms Bogost’s point of view: “in the standard 
model of digital rhetoric, literary theory is applied to technological phenomena without 
considering how technological theories could conversely elucidate new media texts” (9). 
Losh and Bogost indicate that “literary theory” means the interpretation of narrative or 
representational elements independent of the interactive and algorithmically-governed 
nature of new media texts. Wendy Chun seconds Bogost’s opinion, writing that visual 
culture studies also “treat the interface or representations of the interface, as the medium” 
(Control and Freedom 18). I want to make it very clear what these sorts of arguments are 
suggesting. Gitelman’s argument is not that representations and symbolic content in 
videogames are unaffective or that they do not contribute to persuasion or gender and 
identity formation. It is more the point that in videogames and any computational media, 
the meaning of representations are inseparable from their algorithmic manifestation—that 
is, the way in they materialize which we have to access to them. 
This focus on the screen is a common hermeneutic problem within media studies 
as a whole. In Mechanisms: New Media and the Forensic Imagination, notable digital 
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humanities scholar Matthew G. Kirschenbaum offers a distinction between 
“phenomenological materialism”—graphic user interfaces and digital symbols—and 
“ontological materialism”—the material underpinnings for the former (12). The problems 
with screen essentialism and phenomenological materialism lie in the fact that scholars 
generally only attribute materiality, presence, affect, and agency to the elements that the 
user interacts with and perceives. By contrast, N. Katherine Hayles argues, “the visual 
form of the letter on the screen [is] fully material . . . even though the ‘letter’ exists as a 
stored sequence of binary digits with no tactile, material apparency to it in that 
fundamental condition” (171–172). While what the user perceives are “flickering 
signifiers,” to limit the critical gaze to the screen constitutes “a selective focus on certain 
physical aspects of an instantiated text that are foregrounded by a work’s construction, 
operation, and content” (qtd. in Gitelman 131).  
Phenomenological materialism or screen essentialism is significant because this 
oversight plagues some accounts of digital and visual rhetoric even when the intention is 
to address the nonsymbolic visual aspects of delivery and rhetoric. In the introduction to 
one of the first major visual rhetoric collections, Marguerite Helmers and Charles A. Hill 
addressed scholars’ needs to see how arguments and persuasion operated in photographic 
and cinematic expression. They write,  
Rhetoricians working from a variety of disciplinary perspectives are 
beginning to pay a substantial amount of attention to issues of visual 
rhetoric. Through analysis of photographs and drawings, graphs and tables, 
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and motion pictures, scholars are exploring the many ways in which visual 
elements are used to influence people’s attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. (2) 
Despite this commendable attention to visual forms of persuasion and affect, Helmers 
and Hill (tacitly) warrant their arguments for a visual rhetoric by resurrecting Aristotle’s 
anxiety over delivery as acting. As I noted in Chapter 3, Aristotle disliked delivery in that 
its nonsymbolic aspects involved emotional falsehoods and non-logical appeals, such as 
when a plaintiff suffers from a mild case of whiplash exaggerates an injury by appearing 
in court with a full-body cast and an IV drip. In other words, visuality, gesture, and the 
body’s role in rhetoric become a negative form of non-logical persuasion that Aristotle 
thought should be employed only due to the lack of logical competence in the audience.  
In a subsequent essay, Hill concludes that visual rhetoric necessarily includes a 
similar anxiety over the use of nonsymbolic persuasion: “It is likely that verbal text, 
because of its analytic nature (being made up of discrete meaningful units) and because it 
is apprehended relatively slowly over time, is more likely to prompt systematic 
processing, while images, which are comprehend [sic] wholistically and almost 
instantaneously, tend to prompt heuristic processing” (“The Psychology of Rhetorical 
Images” 25). As more “vivid” than speech or text, somatic and sensory responses 
manipulate the viewer and, consequently, an “awareness” of this manipulation is what 
they advocate for “enlightening the critical mind” (10). Advertisers, Hill concludes, 
don’t want to persuade people to buy their products, because persuasion 
implies that the audience has given the issue some thought and come to a 
conscious decision. Instead, advertisers want to […] compel people to buy 
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a product without even knowing why they’re buying it—as a visceral 
response to a stimulus, not as a conscious decision. And this is best done 
through images. (33) 
At a purely phenomenological level, Hill is correct in drawing a distinction between 
reading text and viewing moving images. Roland Barthes expressed a similar distinction 
in Camera Lucida when he argued that a “punctum,” an unconscious piercing of affect, 
was possible only in consideration of the static photograph and not the motion picture 
which progresses too rapidly for contemplation. Barthes’ division parallels Hill’s 
division: both draw an ontological or definitional line in terms of “persuasion” being 
always already a purely symbolic and semiotic phenomenon. As a consequence, Hill 
indicates his hope that images should serve reflective rhetorical purposes while not 
attempting “to banish emotional and aesthetic concerns” (and he regrettably does not 
offer any examples of how to achieve the desired reflection) (3). Images (the 
nonsymbolic) lack the deeper analysis that textual interpretation alone provides.  
This mindset is so entrenched that even J. Anthony Blair’s criticism of Hill on the 
grounds of reducing visual rhetoric to “symbolic inducement” nevertheless would 
improve upon the latter’s framework only if “it would possible to construct from what is 
communicated visually a verbal argument that is consistent with the visual presentation” 
(23). Extended to video games, both Hill and Blair would surely urge scholars to focus 
only on narrative and symbolic elements that can be isolated and reflected on within the 
medium, marginalizing important or constitutive role played by the algorithms or other 
nonsymbolic aspects. Hill and Helmers assume that if materiality is admitted into the 
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rhetorical situation as an affective agent, then nonsymbolic factors will entirely determine 
the rhetorical situation, effectively arguing against the possibility that nonsymbolic 
factors have any relationship to persuasion. Yet, challenging this claim is one of the main 
points of contention for the rhetorical consideration of nonhuman agency. Hill and 
Helmers’ argument presupposes that communication—even oral communication—can be 
freed from materiality and nonhuman affect. While video games may foreground their 
algorithmic rules, even Plato acknowledged that the sweetness of the voice—the specific 
way in which it materialized for an audience in delivery—could make a weaker logical 
argument appear the stronger. While there is a consideration of truth and falsity to be had, 
my larger point is rather that delivery is always already a materializable event. Thus, 
marginalizing nonsymbolic factors as nonrhetorical is frequently taken as a logocentric, 
speech-privileging invitation to ignore how all rhetorical acts involve mobilizing and 
being affected by nonhuman relations of force. 
 James Paul Gee’s frequently-cited scholarship on videogame literacy is another 
example of this trend.64 However, I want to gesture toward two more recent examples 
serve to demonstrate why this division between symbolic and nonsymbolic is problematic. 
In one example, the scientific journal Cognition recently (2012) demonstrated, having 
students read textbooks in non-standard fonts actually increased their retention: “making 
material harder to learn can improve long-term learning and retention. More cognitive 
engagement leads to deeper processing, which facilitates encoding and subsequently 
better retrieval” (qtd. in Lang 3). The researchers concluded that humans are actually 
wired to learn and retain information better in “disfluent” conditions. Thus, nonsymbolic 
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factors in text actually create more lasting retention than arguments mounted through 
standardized fonts that are designed to render the medium invisible. In terms of 
conceiving of visual persuasion, the nonsymbolic factors at least equally if not more 
important, in a very loose sense of the term, in the “persuasion” of the reader than the 
symbols and meaning that is communicated. What I take from this neurocognitive study 
is that language is always already a materializable and materializing force in the world. 
Bennett reminds us that speech was never just a product of the voice alone. Our agency 
as speakers emerges through an assemblage. To revisit Bennett’s quotation again that I 
cited in Chapter 2, she argues, “my speech, for example, depends upon the graphite in my 
pencil, the millions of persons, dead and alive, in my Indo-European language group, not 
to mention the electricity in my brain and laptop computer” (462).65 My point is that 
retreating from the analysis of the constitutive affect of the nonsymbolic aspects of the 
medium by calling them “coercive” and privileging an ostensible “non-material” focus on 
the reflective/symbolic ultimately avoids engagement with the messier entanglements 
between rhetoric and nonhuman actors that, as I will demonstrate momentarily, will be a 
prerequisite for understanding how persuasion operates in video games and other 
interactive media. 
In a second example, I want to consider the philosopher Steven Shaviro’s 
formulation in Post-Cinematic Affect of a profound shift in the experience of filmic 
environments. Even though human audiences always experience film in analogue, the 
mechanisms that produce commercial films have become heavily digitalized. Shaviro 
observes that this digitalization enables a small but growing trend wherein commercial 
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films are manufactured via market-demographic research in order to maximize an 
audience’s biological pleasure and pain cycles to the detriment—prominently featured in 
Michael Bay’s admittedly terrible Transformers series—of editorial ingenuity, plot and 
narrative coherency. Unfortunately, the “death of the director” in this case is not as 
liberating for the viewer in a proportionate sense to how Barthes noted in the 
poststructuralist death of the author. In fact, the death of the director corresponds to the 
potential enslavement of the viewer in a seeming confirmation of Hill’s fears about 
nonsymbolic coercion. One way in which Shaviro explains post-cinematic affect is 
through the allegory of neurocinema. Whereas commercial film editing historically 
functions in the “interpretive mode” (e.g. montage requires the viewer to compare two 
distinct series of an image), post-cinematics are marked by an “executive mode” where 
demographic research and data collection are used to inform cuts that pace the film. Cuts 
in action sequences within films such as the Bourne Identity do not relate to each other or 
to the action, but simply operate in a way to suggest a sort of disorienting speed of 
disparate visual perspectives. In fact, the online video-sharing platform Vimeo offers an 
interview with The Dark Knight trilogy director, Christopher Nolan, who offers details 
shot-by-shot analysis of the temporal and spatial incoherency of some of his own 
sequences. 
These trends indicate that the nonsymbolic production of affect is received as a 
perceptual stimulus and not as symbolic action. As I read Shaviro’s criticism, post-
cinematic affect and neurocinema have moved us from the production of ideology in 
mass media cinema theorized by scholars such as Walter Benjamin to a second-by-
	   233 
second manipulation of a viewer’s affective state through complex nonsymbolic factors. 
However, this detailed consideration does not allow us to merely to decry the 
nonsymbolic as coercive. Indeed, one could hardly call Bay’s executive mode coercive 
because it does not communicate any overall persuasive message. Rather, these cuts are 
designed as a specific nonsymbolic technê to maximize an audience’s emotional sensory 
input for action sequences in order to sustain interest in an otherwise dramatically and 
narratively incoherent film. Bay’s plan, in a sense, is to manufacture just enough interest 
in order to fulfill the broader and by no means unified goals of the complex of actors and 
networks involved in the overall production of The Transformers. As an assemblage, we 
can situate post-cinematic affect in the Transformers within the production of new digital 
Foucaultian figures of subjectification, the military-industrial complex, jingo-istic 
nationalism, Fox News right-wing ideology seen in Bill O’Reilly’s cameos, Hasbro’s 
toys, and the increasing market-driven big data digitalization of all media. Slowing down 
the action sequences would hardly allow the viewer to better reflect on the symbolic 
content. Given these two examples—visual disfluency and post-cinematic affect—
theorizing digital rhetoric increasingly means heeding Jodi Deane’s claim in Blog Theory 
that, “At certain levels, media are very influential, and their material properties do 
(literally and figuratively) matter, determining some of the local conditions of 
communication amid the broader circulations that at once express and constitute social 
relations” (10).66  
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Procedural Rhetoric 
To return to Kitchin’s observations above, the problem with treating video games’ 
and technology’s nonsymbolic aspects as passive, invisible, or static is that video games 
and many new media interfaces have meaning that is intimately bound up with their 
algorithms as I will detail below. It is only within the last few years that a handful of 
rhetoric and composition scholars have begun specifically examining the materiality of 
technology and its nonsymbolic aspects of software and hardware.67 As I will argue in 
this section, viewing video games as part of an assemblage means accounting for one 
nonhuman actor in particular: the algorithmically-bounded procedure. As Bogost defines 
it in Persuasive Games, procedural rhetoric is an analytical term unique to this 
nonsymbolic aspect of the computer medium. Conceiving of procedural rhetoric as a 
complex point of interconnection between technological agency and symbolic action will 
allow me to better indicate how to realign the symbolic vis-à-vis the nonsymbolic without 
subsuming the latter into the former. Along these lines, Collin Gifford Brooke correctly 
argues in Lingua Fracta that new media “texts” should be reclassified as “interfaces” 
precisely because of their interactivity, and focusing on the relationship between rhetoric 
and algorithms as technological actors can help supplement such understanding. On the 
one hand, I will demonstrate how Bogost’s procedural rhetoric constitutes a basic 
advance for nonsymbolic understandings of digital rhetoric while nevertheless 
subscribing to a variant of the modern Constitution. On the other hand, I will also seek to 
refashion the concept of procedural rhetoric in order to suggest how procedures can 
undermine symbolic content—an undermining that can be detected through a rhetorical 
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or compositional post-technê (defined below) that Galloway and Wark call “the 
allegorithm.” 
Bogost’s neologism procedural rhetoric joins Galloway’s conception of protocol 
(discussed below) as part of a growing trend to analyze all media including video games 
as cultural artifacts through software, hardware, and platform studies. As the titles of 
these studies denote, media scholars have begun to focus on the operation and 
functionality of media devices alongside symbolic or representational content that they 
host.68 Procedurality became a source of concern for new media theorists in the 
pioneering work of Lev Manovich (2002) and Janet Murray (1998). Bogost’s procedural 
rhetoric directly engages with what he sees as an elision of the operation of code in favor 
of semiotic analysis among digital rhetoricians of all shades.  The result of focusing on 
the representational content has been a tendency to semioticize game elements in Gee’s 
sense and to consider them in the abstract from their medium of transmission in a way 
similar to how we might analyze a novel or a poem for its metaphors and allegories but 
not in terms of the material of its paper, the chemical makeup of its ink, or in relationship 
to prevailing printing press technology. Cultural critics want to know what a video game 
means at a narrative, representational, or conceptual level, but not necessarily how a 
video game technologically structures the reception of semiotic or symbolic meaning. 
Bogost challenges this semiotic or representational bias through procedural rhetoric 
wherein software inscription can persuade gamers “through rule-based representations, 
modeling real-life processes, and interactions rather than the spoken word, writing, 
images, or moving pictures” (3).  
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In an outstanding review of the rise of proceduralism in new media theory and 
games studies scholarship, Miguel Sicart argues “Proceduralism both justified the 
cultural validity of computer games providing arguments for the exceptionality argument 
(computer games as unique, expressive cultural objects), and opened the possibility for a 
new take on serious games that combined design approaches with a strong humanist 
discourse” (11). According to Sicart, procedurality is not only what defines video games 
as a medium, but it is also the unique or “specific way” that ethical, political, and 
aesthetic values can be constructed. Bogost began thinking through procedural rhetoric in 
an earlier work, Unit Operations (2006), arguing “. . . games create complex relations 
between the player, the work, and the world via unit operations that simultaneously 
embed material, functional, and discursive modes of representation” (106). In the 
previous quotation, Bogost clearly argues that narrative and symbolic elements cannot 
just be “read” or interpreted without considering how they are uniquely embedded by 
computational media. By simulating rules and presenting pre-designed values, the 
player’s processual understanding of these values in a video game is what allows a game 
to produce meaning. Bogost argue that “A simulation is the gap between the rule-based 
representation of a source system and a player’s subjectivity” (107), and “. . . the unit 
operations of a simulation embody themselves in a player’s understanding. This is the 
place where rules can be grasped, where instantiated code enters the material world via 
human players’ faculty of reason” (99). These statements contain a nuanced and complex 
point. Literary critics and cultural theorists are accustomed to ascribing meaning to things 
that already signify—words, phrases, ideas and concepts that can easily be recognized as 
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linguistic forms created by humans to communicate linguistic meaning. By contrast, the 
radicality of Bogost’s idea is that he treats unit operations—“discrete, disconnected 
actions” of individual actors such as coded-procedure over “systems operations” such as 
our experience at the graphic user interface—as primary elements. Critics would typically 
fall prey to screen essentialism by focusing on the graphic interface that clearly signifies 
meaning to us while avoiding ascribing meaning that occurs in the non-semiotic, 
asignifying, and non-intentional realm of code. That is, code is written in a binary 
language. We never actually perceive or comprehend all of the zeros and ones that the 
computer reads when we open Microsoft Word while the code is nevertheless the 
governing logic of our encounter with the software program. Bogost offers an example of 
the contrast between unit and systems operations: “In software technology, object 
technology exploits unit operations; structured programming exhibits system operations. 
In human biology, DNA nucleotide bonding displays unit operations; the Darwinian idea 
of acquired characteristics illustrates system operations” (3).  
Bogost draws the idea of unit structures to claim in Persuasive Games that video 
games were equally if not more capable than other media of contributing to the formation 
of cultural attitudes. Bogost argues, “for my purposes, procedural expression must entail 
symbol manipulation, the construction and interpretation of a symbolic system that 
governs human thought or action” (Persuasive 5). An example is instructive to 
demonstrate to illustrate his point. Bogost describes a hypothetical situation of a customer 
who wishes to return a defective product that she has recently purchased. “The very 
concept of returning a defective product,” he maintains, “is only made possible by the 
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creation of rules that frame that very notion [e.g., store policies for returns]” (5). 
Therefore, he continues, “When we do things, we do them according to some logic, and 
that logic constitutes a process in the general sense of the world” (7). For video games, 
procedure is an inscription that “enacts processes” after they have been “authored in code, 
through the practices of programming” (29). The relationship between procedure and 
symbolic action stems from Mateas’s notion of procedural literacy, which is about “the 
ability to read and write processes, to engage procedural representation and aesthetics, to 
understand the interplay between culturally-embedded practices of human meaning-
making and technically-mediated processes” (53).  
The Politics of Procedural Rhetoric 
Yet, while procedures are what legitimate video games’ expressive capacities, we 
see here the emergence of a Faustian bargain that will ultimately trouble all strict 
proceduralist accounts of video games. The first Bush administration exploited such 
assumptions about procedural literacy in criticizing violence in video games. If games 
persuaded through following and manipulating systems, then it followed that if games 
might persuade in favor of socially positive methods then we could also learn violence 
toward others in first-person shooters. Rather than engaging in an abstract or 
representational musing about violence such as that which occurs in Fyodor 
Dostoyevski’s Crime and Punishment, first-person shooters allowed fantasies to be 
enacted, simulated, and performed—a problem that video games continually encounter 
due to correlational associations with the motivations of the perpetrators of the 
Columbine Massacre. More recently, the Norweigian mass killer Anders Breivik joined 
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the line of post-Columbine shooters when he cited video games as an enabling influence 
on his behavior. By defining itself in this way, procedural rhetoric cannot avoid the 
ancient Ciceronian complaint about any systematic and deterministic effect of rhetoric. 
We “place weapons in the hands of madmen,” hoping that the good (historically) man 
will use rhetoric for good (De Oratore III: xiv.55). Losh confirms this reduction, 
suggesting that those who call for video game literacy support procedural rhetoric when 
game literacy models good behavior (collaboration, solving puzzles), but retreat from this 
position when the behavior is negative (stealing cars) (21).69  
The issue of how nonsymbolic forces relate to persuasion and how this 
relationship can be mobilized for strategic political ends as a form of new media rhetoric 
and writing is critical for my argument. After all, a detailed accounting of nonsymbolic 
factors would be interesting but not useful if it could not be directly tied back to the 
operation of rhetoric in a set of emergent literacy and digital rhetoric practices. Thus, I 
will offer a few concrete examples of how procedural rhetoric is held to work by 
considering the newsgame genre and use these as a point of contrast to make my turn 
back to assemblage theory. Despite my attention to nonsymbolic aspects, I firmly 
concede that older forms of biological essentialism and identity politics remain in play 
and are remediated through ever more novel and subtle procedural and protocological 
ways. For example, as central narrative devices, serious topics, or minor characters, gay, 
lesbian, bi-sexual, and transgender themes and identities enjoy little presence in popular 
and mainstream video games. While invisibility is a result of heteronormative exclusion 
that takes the form of explicit or thinly-veiled homophobic slurs from soldier avatars such 
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as Duke Nukem, some popular games make heteronormativity a core element of the 
game experience. Mia Consalvo complains in her essay, “Hot Dates and Fairy-Tale 
Romances,” that Electronic Art’s The Sims (2000) only spawns heterosexual marriages. 
This is a particularly blatant form of exclusion in a video game in which players control 
variables to influence the natural evolution of an urban society. Same sex marriages have 
to be manually forced together by the player, thus coding queer identities as abnormal.  
In 2009, Singapore-MIT GAMBIT Game Lab created the experimental game A 
Closed World as a strategic political response to institutional homophobia across gaming 
industries and cultures. Intended as an exploratory bildungsroman, the player follows a 
young queer character who tires of oppression and insensitivity in a hometown called 
Gest. The initial goal is to overcome the fear of the “forbidden forest”—the area of non-
heteronormativity metaphorically figured as an unknown and dangerous outside by the 
character’s parents and friends. As Judith Butler has argued in Gender Trouble, figuring 
the Other in such terms is a cultural policing mechanism designed to perpetuate, in words 
of one villager, a “normal Gest” (n.pag). After the character faces back-and-forth 
dialogues with family and villagers who attempt to persuade the character to stay, the 
character braves the forbidden forest and discovers that the villagers were correct. The 
forbidden forest does indeed contain monsters; however, once engaged in dialogue, the 
character discovers that the monsters serve as metonymic representatives of other 
historically marginalized identities. The game designers challenge a historical figuration 
of Otherness and social deviancy as monstrous—a figuration that Butler and other queer 
theorists correctly argue is a historically-specific cultural construction and not a 
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biological essence. In contrast to many commercial games where battle and player-
controlled avatar movements are the procedures that allow one to progress in the game, A 
Closed World feels uncanny. The player operates at the Socratic level, valuing “courage,” 
“composure,” “passion,” “logics,” and “ethics,” in the face of existentially probing 
questions about the construction of social identities. 
 A Closed World offers an excellent opportunity to reflect on the relationship 
between politics and representation in video games in relationship to procedural rhetoric. 
What initially interested me in this game as an example of procedural rhetoric was the 
presumed alliance between what the Galloway has called “social realism” at the symbolic 
level and procedural persuasion in gaming (“Social Realism” 1). If social realism—
mimetic or literal models of actual social exclusion mechanisms—is what perpetuates 
heteronormativity in video games then an identical invocation of social realism that is 
inclusive of the Other is an understandable response. In this sense, A Closed World 
attempts to persuade heterosexual players to develop self-reflexivity about the ways in 
which their heteronormative selves are constructed vis-à-vis the queer Other. Persuasion 
(e.g., procedural rhetoric) occurs by limiting progress in the game to procedurally-
ordained steps that correspond to social realist enactments of social alienation. Such 
procedural assumptions about persuasion are widely employed by many Other-directed 
political games. To take a recent (2012) example, Auntie Pixelante’s Dys4ia, a 
transgender video game, requires players to progress through her autobiographical 
narrative, dodging metaphorical and literal verbal bullets from the feminist allies that 
Auntie Pixelante (aka Anna Anthropy) had expected support from after her operation. In 
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another scene, the player must repeatedly push the down-arrow button on the keyboard in 
a failed attempt to get women’s garments to fit on Anthropy’s post-op body. The player 
metaphorically engages in the “process” of dressing rather than only interpreting a 
symbolic representation of the activity. 
After spending a lengthy amount of time playing A Closed World, Dys4ia, and 
similar activist gender games, I am in firm agreement that such procedural strategies are 
conducive to meaningful existential contemplation about the ways in which gender and 
the body are constructed. Furthermore, these video games are vital resources for the 
development of an Other-directed politics that utilizes the unique persuasive, 
nonsymbolic, and affective capacities of the video game medium deployed in social 
media and networked environments. The title of Anthropy’s latest (2012) book, Rise of 
the Videogame Zinesters details how DIY game design is a rising form of digital literacy 
given the rapid development of user friendly design programs such as GameSalad that 
allow anyone to create games for smart phones, web browsers, and virtually any other 
digital interface. Given all of these factors, procedural rhetoric seemingly offers a vital 
conceptual tool in order to theorize the interplay between symbolic and nonsymbolic 
forces in digital rhetoric and multimodal composition as they work toward persuasion 
without reducing the latter to narrative, symbol, representation, semiotics, or other 
cultural manifestations divorced from material instantiation. Still, I question the 
presumed alignment between procedure and persuasion held tacitly by the designers 
themselves and explicitly by canonical game studies concepts such as Bogost and Mateas 
(and, to a lesser extent, Gee). Despite the positive political content of these video games, 
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these prevailing analytical approaches to video games with political content nevertheless 
help to reinforce two problematic assumptions that prevent us from a more complex and 
accurate picture of the relationship between procedural persuasion and politics in a 
nonmodern ontological universe: first, that persuasive political games necessarily deal 
with expressly or primarily with political content and, second, that persuasion occurs 
when a player’s role in “learning” or being persuaded is reduced to a passive object of 
following the pre-determined narrative of the game designer.  
My concern emerges more clearly through some examples drawn from the 
emerging persuasive game genre of “newsgames” discussed in great detail by Bogost, 
Ferrari, and Schweizer in Newsgames: Journalism at Play. Newsgames are the casual 
video game equivalent of a newspaper political cartoon. They are designed in and for 
social media networks for the widest possible circulation due in part to their simple 
interfaces and short play periods. While fans of the television program The Colbert 
Report might recall Bogost’s July 8, 2007 guest appearance and subsequent 
demonstration of the newsgame Oil Gods, my favorite example of a newsgame is 
Gonzalo Frasca’s September 12. The universes of single-player newsgames are easily 
reduced to persuasion governed by code when the player takes on a single or limited 
persona—a U.S. bomber in September 12—and can only advance in the game by 
committing morally problematic actions, such as bombing both civilians and terrorists in 
a Middle Eastern village setting. Bombing inevitably creates collateral damage and kills 
innocent bystanders. The game persuades the player by generating more and more 
terrorists after each bomb strike to the point where bombing becomes a pointless way to 
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solve the problem. While most video games require direct player input, September 12 
makes player input an undesirable goal. If the player does not elect to pursue an 
ineffective bombing campaign and just observes the village, then the terrorists will 
eventually disappear. Thus, September 12 argues against patriarchal assumptions that 
non-Western societies are incapable of policing themselves or forming organic political 
orders within their own societies unless aided by a benevolent Western father-figure who 
can liberate and teach them—a semblance of the master-slave, colonizer-colonized, or 
imperialist dynamics criticized by postcolonial theorists such as Frantz Fanon, Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, or Homi Bhabha. 
Although I enthusiastically agree with Frasca’s anti-imperialist political message, 
the persuasive genre of his and other newsgames is identical to the Socratic dialogue of A 
Closed World and Dys4ia, with the game designer serving as Socrates, and the player as 
young Phaedrus who eagerly follows along. Recalling the general import of postmodern 
ur-theorist Jean-Francois Lyotard’s criticism in Just Gaming, Plato’s dialectical mode of 
teaching is not empowering to the interlocutor’s (player’s) intelligence. The player does 
not actively participate in the shaping of knowledge as an equal with her interlocutor but 
enters the terrain as an intellectual inferior—a Phaedrus concealing his written notes in 
fear that his immature mental powers of logical understanding will fail him. Phaedrus 
cannot discover the truth through his own innate cognitive abilities and is in need of the 
wisdom and the modeling of a logical progression of reasoning that philosopher, Socrates, 
alone will perform. Socrates reveals the primrose path of reasoning that leads to the truth, 
and the pupil’s participation is limited to passive affirmation—a never-ending cycle of 
	   245 
Phaedrus saying, “yes,” “of course,” and “I wish and pray for things to be just as you say” 
(Phaedrus 554: 278b).  
Challenges to Procedurality 
Bogost attempts to negotiate this tension between pre-determining the gamer’s 
subjectivity while needing to acknowledge the existence of non-coded additional factors 
that would prevent procedural rhetoric from being mobilized by the military’s America’s 
Army series that glorifies combat in an attempt to persuade teenagers to enlist (Mead). He 
writes, “while we often think that rules always limit behavior, the imposition of 
constraints also creates expression” (Persuasive 7). Yet, despite this acknowledgment, he 
concludes in the end “. . . play refers to the possibility space created by processes 
themselves” (42). By locating the meaning of the game in the formal properties of the 
rules which the player then completes and fulfills while being guided by the rules, Sicart 
maintains that for proceduralists, “the game is the rules, both in terms of its ontological 
definition (the what in “what is a game”), and in its function as an object that creates 
meaning in the contexts in which specific players use it” (Sicart 16). Sicart goes on to 
argue that a player’s creativity is ultimately disregarded by proceduralist accounts. A 
similar criticism is suggested in the title of Brathwaite and Sharp’s article “The Mechanic 
is the Message.” The title is pun on Marshall McLuhan’s “medium is the message” axiom 
whereby Brathwaite and Sharpe suggest that for proceduralists the meaning of the game 
is not on the act of playing it, but in whatever meaning the designer embeds in the system 
itself (and there are clear resonances here with the delivery is the medium argument as 
well). While Bogost is quite correct to call our attention to unit operations such as codes, 
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he nevertheless limits what counts as an affective actor within a video game to the 
programmer’s design of the code. Christopher A. Paul makes a similar claim: “Bogost’s 
approach to rhetoric is rather narrow . . . If rhetorical analysis is a critical perspective, 
focusing beyond mere persuasion, all elements surrounding games are influential 
symbols worthy of study, as all games function persuasively” (9). Along these lines, we 
could also recall Wendy Chun’s discussion of the hypokritical nature of code in 
Programmed Visions that I discussed in Chapter 3. 
Indeed, algorithms definitely possess an effective and an affective influence on 
persuasion in gaming. Following from Paul’s criticism above and before turning to 
assemblage theory, I want to note two quick examples, the first adapted from Paul’s use 
of the art of “theorycraft” to challenge procedurality and the second from Galloway’s 
understanding of what he calls the informatics of code. Theorycraft is a term that comes 
not from games studies scholars but from players. According to WoWWiki “Theorycraft 
is the attempt to mathematically analyze game mechanics in order to gain a better 
understanding of the inner workings of the game. The term originated in the Starcraft 
community as composite colloquialism between the name Starcraft and Game Theory” 
(n.pag). The World of Warcraft (WoW) more popularly employs the term and the 
WoWwiki’s description is worth quoting at length:  
The term DPS [damage per second], itself, was one of the first advents of 
theorycraft as it applies to real-time games. Gearscore is another highly 
used, yet still incredibly controversial, result of theorycraft. Theorycraft 
has an impact upon everything from Player Interface setup and 
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customization, to build and rotation discussions, to event recording. In 
general, as a player becomes more involved in the game, they also become 
(wittingly or unwittingly) more involved with theorycraft and the effects 
of its practice. (n.pag) 
Tied intimately to the algorithms of the game, theorycraft is an emergent practice that 
procedural rhetorics cannot account for as procedural rhetorics largely limits itself to the 
designer’s Platonic logics. By contrast, theorycraft is a clear indication that semi-
autonomous player initiative undermines the designer’s ideal of a finished product; 
however, at the same time, Paul reminds us that theorycraft is neither separable from nor 
commensurate with procedure. As a result, in WoW, some player builds became more 
popular for different statistical reasons as the makeup of raid parties changed, causing in 
turn Blizzard’s need to alter character builds and boss strengths in relationship to 
theorycraft’s prominence. Theorycrafting is firm evidence of one common bit of gamer 
wisdom: players play the procedure (the game) and not necessarily the representation. In 
my opinion, such topoi offer great insight into the development of nonsymbolic forms of 
literacy. The type of “insider knowledge” that Gee identifies at the level of semiotics also 
obtains at nonsymbolic registers. 
One of the better arguments for a consideration of politics seen through 
procedurality divorced from any presumed connection with social realist representation 
lies in Galloway’s Essays on Algorithmic Culture. In an analysis of Sid Meier’s 
Civilization series, most critics are drawn to what Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman and 
Brian Sutton-Smith identify as the “cultural rhetoric” of games: racist representations, 
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Eurocentric narratives of civilizational conquest, and gender. Thus, in considering 
Civilization, Galloway suggests that a cultural rhetoric approach “might then construct a 
vast ideological critique of the game, focusing on its explicit logocentrism, its 
nationalism and imperialism, its expansionist logic, as well as its implicit racism and 
classicism” (96). Just as The Sims teach us that gays do not form civil unions naturally, 
Civilization teaches us that non-white peoples are “athletic” and women are “emotional,” 
thus implicating players in the normative stereotyping within the game (96). Furthermore, 
like many of the cultural representations of the newsgame genre, Civilization simplifies 
the diversity of human life by selectively focusing on some changes (Tsarist Russia) but 
not others (Soviet), excluding indigenous peoples such as the Inuits and avoiding 
questions of imperialism, hybridity, diaspora, and migration that challenge metanarratives 
of global development grounded in the nation-state and capitalism. If these egregious 
examples of cultural rhetoric were not enough, Galloway concludes that the game enacts 
Western logocentrism: “[Civilization] is structured around a question of knowledge, with 
all human thought broken down into neatly packaged discoveries that are arranged in a 
branching time line where one discovery is a precondition for the next” (Essays 92).70  
While cultural rhetoric would confirm the validity of a procedural rhetoric 
analysis, Galloway has an alternative viewpoint on the relationship between politics and 
procedure. When we consider the algorithm that the player interacts with in Civilization, 
the point is not merely that the game contains racist representations, but “whether it 
embodies the logic of informatics control itself . . . The massive electronic network of 
command and control that I have elsewhere called ‘protocol’ is precisely the visible, 
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active, essential, and core ingredient of Meier’s work in particular and video games in 
general” (Essays 92). The context of Galloway’s claim is his interest in how the 
management of Western post-industrial societies is controlled by horizontal, distributed, 
and noncentralized networks. Whereas earlier populations were managed by centralized 
power formations and sovereign figures such as monarchs, neoliberal democratic 
societies are managed without kings and queens (e.g., Foucault’s shift from Sovereign to 
Disciplinary power). The transnational flow of commodities and information instead 
structures our experience of being a participant of a given nation-state. “Protocol,” taken 
from the Greek protokollon, meant an element (a flyleaf) glued (kola, kollon) first 
(protos) to any document guaranteeing its authenticity: an apt description for the process 
that Galloway is tracing. By protocol, he means the technologies—the unit operations—
through which all information flows are regulated.  
In a way similar to Bogost, Galloway locates political operations in technological 
protocols that many would ordinarily just ignore in the assessment of video games or 
media systems in favor of studying cultural rhetoric. Instead, Galloway maintains that 
dominant internet protocols such as TCP, IP, DNS, and HTTP actually structure what 
would be an otherwise chaotic networked space: “Like their diplomatic predecessors, 
computer protocols establish the essential points necessary to enact an agreed-upon 
standard of action” (7). In Galloway’s understanding, protocol represents an absolute 
triumph of technological form over representational content as there can be no discussion 
of meaning without protocological assistance: “[Technological] protocols are highly 
formal; that is, they encapsulate information inside a technically defined wrapper, while 
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remaining relatively indifferent to the content of information contained within” (8). Thus, 
rather than seeing a computational process as necessarily having a causal relationship to 
representation, Galloway argues the converse that procedure—protocol—actually has an 
autonomous level of affect and interaction from representation.71 For example, a packet 
sniffer program such as Wireshark can reveal all of the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of 
any wireless devices near a computer. Prior to any user opening a specific webpage in a 
mobile phone browser, the mobile phone has already been engaged in constant 
communication with the wireless network, sending and exchanging empty packets of 
information that would be the human equivalent of shouting, “Is anyone there?” every 
second (Chun, Control). 
Galloway’s specific interest in Civilization—or any video game—lies in how the 
user is forced to be very self-conscious of how algorithms are mobilized to influence the 
evolution of the gamespace. While it is true that Civilization has a linear representational 
narrative that would be guided by procedures, there are also  
nonlinear narratives that must unfold in algorithmic form during gameplay. 
In this sense, video games deliver to the player the power relationships of 
informatic media firsthand, choreographed into a multivalent cluster of 
play activities. In fact, in their very core, video games do nothing but 
present contemporary political realities in relatively unmediated form . . . 
by making it [e.g. protocol] coterminous with the entire game, and in this 
way video games achieve a unique type of political transparency. (92) 
Simply put, if our lived existences are increasingly regulated by technological 
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protocols, then video games’ importance can be measured by how their algorithms invite 
us to think about our relationship to protocol—the Platonic world of coded harmony 
where each element in the gaming cosmos has a clear role and purpose in the moment of 
gameplay and is incapable of acting in any other way than its assigned role. Galloway 
maintains, “the gamer is not simply playing this or that historical simulation. The gamer 
is instead learning, internalizing, and becoming intimate with a massive, multipart, global 
algorithm” (90). Civilization reduces all elements of social evolution to quantifiable bits 
of information subject to algorithmic manipulation, asking us to think about how the 
algorithms of control parallel or mirror those in our daily lives. If we think of how credit 
scores structure access to personal or home loans, pervasive GSP surveillance through 
smart phones, or the current (2012) arguments by the Obama administration over whether 
social media companies such as Facebook should allow the FBI to wiretap all users’ 
communications without permission, Galloway certainly has a point about how much our 
lives resemble a video game or video games resembles our lives (see Yin). In what 
Deleuze refers to as a post-disciplinary “control society,” such issues are a crucial aspect 
that some video games not only foreground but actively participate in. In Gameplay 
Mode, Patrick Crogan observes, “Most media studies and video game researchers either 
outright reject or avoid engaging the mainstream moral panic approach to video games 
and their relation to violence. They throw the baby out with the bathwater, avoiding the 
question concerning technoculture’s relation to war and the military that computer games 
pose so insistently beyond the media effects debate, which itself is unable to articulate it 
adequately in these terms” (13). 
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By examining how the player responds to the act of controlling and manipulating 
the limited set of variables that she can control within a gamespace, it is not procedural 
rhetoric that seamlessly produces persuasion, but what Galloway calls “allegorithms”: 
“Instead of offering better clues, the ideological critique (traditional allegory) is 
undermined by its own revelation of the protocological critique (control allegory)” (90). 
Allegory refers to the sorts of analytical findings of cultural rhetoric accounts that argue 
that Civilization participates in the continuing patriarchal or racialized logics of 
normative exclusive. Allegorithms are allegories that follow from tracing how the 
algorithm models information control independent of the representations. In Galloway’s 
protocological framing of video games, Bogost would be seen as applying persuasion 
through traditional allegory and missing the dimension of allegorithms, specifically in the 
sense of how players actively construct meaning through the gap between the ideal world 
of the code and imperfect social and physical algorithms that structure embodied 
existence. In Galloway’s words, an allegorithms is an analysis that detects “a special 
congruence between the social reality depicted in the game and the social reality known 
and lived by the player” (83). This ability to compare the code to the world is a space of 
creativity, agency, and political subjectivity that proceduralist accounts cannot account 
for in their desire to make sure that persuasion is entirely controlled by the game designer 
and the immediate coded-procedural world of the video game. Thus, in Civilization, 
avatar skin tones are “not an index for older, offline constructions of race and identity,” 
but “an index for the very dominance of informative organization and how it has entirely 
overhauled, revolutionized, and recolonized the function of identity” (102). Civilization is 
	   253 
at once about racism and also the technological protocols and procedures that sustain 
racism—a technological answer to Gayatri Spivaks’ claim that “It is crucial that we 
extend our analysis of [any] example beyond the minimal diagnosis of ‘racism’ ” (121, 
emphasis original). The player enacts and completes meaning primarily at the level of 
informatics and other protocological game elements, but these elements do not result in a 
deterministic universe of procedurally-bound representations. 
In consideration of Galloway’s framework, allegorithms are no longer in the 
realm of an asymmetrical determination for any of the given members of the assemblage: 
machine, designer, or the player. They are instead emergent phenomena in both Cooper’s 
and Better’s respective understandings. These technologies possess agentive capacities 
that correspond to their relations with other actors. In terms of connecting these thoughts 
back to rhetoric, it is clear that rhetoric, circulation, and delivery have taken on a different 
understanding. The reduction of rhetoric and writing to rational and instrumental control 
is a common view. In a way similar to Porter above, Joseph Petraglia has also argued that 
the technê of writing and rhetoric should only include the mastery of technical genres and 
exclude unconscious and nonsymbolic sources of affect. Byron Hawk counters such a 
perspective, suggesting “[t]echnique is both a rational, conscious capacity to produce and 
an intuitive, unconscious ability to make, both of which are fundamental to technê” 
(“Toward a Post-Technê” 372).72 Hawk has identified a nonmodern perspectives on 
rhetoric and writing that deal with animate and inanimate bodies called “post-technê”: 
“For me, this notion of [post-]technê pushes the discussion away from a humanist 
conception of the subject that is caught in a subject/object dilemma (i.e., do humans 
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control technology or does technology control humans?) toward one that is posthuman. 
Such a move does not do away with the human as much as it redescribes the human in 
terms of complexity” (372).  
To draw connections back to my previous consideration of digital rhetoric and 
Gee, post-technê allows for the consideration of complex ecological picture of the 
various material and affective agencies within video games. Brian Street has correctly 
challenged the positions of scholars like Walter J. Ong, Eric Havelock, and others who 
claim that alphabetic technology (e.g. writing) produced different forms of subjectivity, 
including the claims that the unique makeup of the Greek alphabet produced the West’s 
sophisticated bureaucracies. Harvey Graff argues as well that “literacy is above all a 
technology or set of techniques for communications and for decoding and reproducing 
written or printed materials: it cannot be taken as anything more or less” (Labyrinths 19). 
In making this claim, he takes a large swing at Elizabeth Eisenstein’s scholarship. As a 
literacy technology, quoting Eisenstein, he maintains that the printing press cannot be an 
“agent of change” by itself (qtd. in Labyrinths 19). Yet, the benefit of assemblage theory 
is that it does not ask us to choose from Graff’s “either-or” binary (e.g., “either” it must 
be a pure subject and pure passive technical object “or” all of reality is subject to 
technological determinism). Of course the print press is not agent of change by itself. Yet, 
neither could the public sphere and the modern nation state have evolved with it. 
Furthermore, no human genius alone manifested it instrumentally. As Stephen Johnson 
observes in Where Good Ideas Come From, the printing press emerged as part of “the 
adjacent possible,” the title of the first chapter of his book. Gutenberg the printing press 
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technology was appropriated from an already black-boxed technology: the wine press. 
Furthermore, other actors such as movable type, ink, and paper all needed to exist as well 
before the printing press could be realized. Their conative drives themselves of movable 
type itself had already influenced rhetorical history through Peter Ramus’s spatial view of 
invention (McCorkle, “Pressing Matter,” 68-89).73 Tracing the complex material and 
agentive ratios within video games as persuasive mediums enables scholars to perceive 
the “adjacent possible” in rhetoric where accounts such as screen essentialism and 
procedural rhetoric limit who or what counts as a contributing or affective actor. 
Rhetorical Assemblages: Emergent Delivery Practices in Videogames 
I interpret Hawks’ point to mean that the claim of delivery as medium requires a 
non-instrumentalist view capable of negotiating and accounting for the various human 
and nonhuman actors that contribute to persuasion and meaning. Post-technê occurs 
through a specific form of delivery that co-emerges through our interaction with new 
media technology. Learning how to “write” and persuade through new media, video 
games, and, by extension, other computational media such as augmented reality apps, 
HTML5 web projects, Flash, and so on require an intimate understanding of nonsymbolic 
post-technê such as allegorithms. My interest in allegorithms is tantamount to revealing 
the nonsymbolic forms of rhetorical “concealment” in Carolyn Miller’s sense.74 
Concealment is bound up in the delivery of video games as persuasive mediums that 
function as rhetorica docens: the metacritical awareness of how certain hidden 
mechanisms constitute and, in my case, work against symbolic action and persuasion 
(“Should We Name the Tools?” 20). If rhetorica utens (the activity of rhetoric) conceals 
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the rhetor’s artifice in order to persuade, then rhetorica docens serves to highlight its 
presence not only at a symbolic or figural level, but at a material and allegorithmic 
instantiation. Simply stated, what procedural relations do game designers conceal and 
what allegorithmic relations can the civically minded rhetorical critic exploit and 
manipulate in the evaluation and construction of a persuasive game as a form of new 
media writing? I will revisit this point below. 
It is my belief that assemblage theory and allegorithms can provide a better 
understanding of rhetorica docens—the civic pedagogical goal of rhetorical training—
because it is able to situate procedure and the user within a more diverse and emergent 
set of material and ecological rhetorics. For Bogost’s newsgames, persuasion indeed can 
be said to occur in “a closed world” where it might seem as though the designer can be 
Plato to the player’s Socrates. Political affect and persuasion in videogames occurs where 
neither political representations nor the predetermined narrative of the game designer are 
in play. However, these emergent agencies cannot be detected through symbolic accounts 
of the games’ non-political representations or in terms of procedural rhetoric alone even 
though, as I will readily concede, symbols aligned with procedures do play a definite role 
in creating affect and persuasion. Rather, their role can be better seen if we consider 
videogames allegorithms through Bennett’s Deleuzian-DeLandian assemblage theory. 
While it is an improvement, the problem with procedural rhetoric as Bogost 
defines it is that the human agent, the programmer, ultimately remains at the center of the 
rhetorical situation. What is persuasive and affective are only those instrumental elements 
established by the coded procedure, to what I believe is the complete overdetermination 
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of other emergent forms of meaning and material affect. Thus, I want to more thoroughly 
develop Bennett’s articulation of thing power and assemblage in relationship to 
procedural rhetoric in order to explicate this point. 
For Bennett, the various value judgments that we might have about September 12 
should proceed from an understanding of a game not as a self-contained or transparent set 
of parts and wholes but as a component of an “assemblage.” 75 Yet, if we revisit to 
Bennett’s vitalist concept of “thing-power” from Vibrant Matter that I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, it is clear that the attribution of “agency” to nonhuman actors in the context of 
circulation scholarship means that objects deliver and circulate meaning alongside 
humans. The relationship between “thing-power” and delivery/circulation is better 
understood if we consider this diverse ecology of nonhuman actors through another one 
of Bennett’s conceptual terms, “assemblage” that I gestured toward via Matthew Fuller as 
the end of Chapter 4. At the outset of this chapter, I want to articulate in detail what is 
meant by the term “assemblage”—a form of material realism—as it will directly inform 
the rest of the chapter’s subject matter: namely, how we should conceive of pragmatic 
political activities and rhetorical agency through new media writing seen through the lens 
of assemblage theory. Bennett’s invocation of assemblage derives heavily from 
philosophers of materiality such as Manuel DeLanda, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix 
Guattari.76 In Bennett’s understanding, nature (physis) is a heterogeneous “phase space” 
composed of the interactions of parts that do not add up to the emergent whole, as “the 
effects generated by an assemblage are . . . emergent properties, emergent in that their 
ability to make something happen . . . [and they are] distinct from the sum of vital force 
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of each materiality considered alone” (24).77 In her chapter “Edible Matter,” Bennett 
illustrates this abstract description by considering the example of omega-3 fatty acids and 
potato chips. Eating potato chips not only causes increased body mass, but also includes 
the memory-stunting effects of hydrogenated fats (41). Seen from the perspective of 
thing-power and memory loss, agency is not a sole property of human actors: “In the case 
of . . . potato chips, it seems appropriate to regard the hand’s actions as only quasi- or 
semi-intentional, for the chips themselves seem to call forth, or provoke and stoke, the 
manual labor” (41). Further, even though it is “I” who thinks before and after the fact that 
“I” intentionally eat chips, Bennett claims, “To eat chips is to enter into an assemblage in 
which the ‘I’ is not necessarily the most decisive operator” (40).78  
To offer a point of contrast, Bennett’s description of the chips’ agentive capacities 
within the assemblage does not hearken back to psychoanalysis and the Freudian 
unconscious. While these factors might certainly be said to apply at some level 
(depending on one’s theoretical preference), Bennett employs the de-centered “I” to 
demonstrate that all rhetorical actions are bound up with affordances and constraints of 
nonhuman actors in addition to cognitive elements. If we were just to theorize the potato 
chip example through Freudian psychoanalysis, we would necessarily undermine any 
potential influence of the chips-in-themselves as actual forces in the world, holding that 
representations or forces within the mind are more “real” or primary than the chip’s 
interaction with the body or other actors (and this is not, of course, to claim that the 
unconscious is not itself a force that produces reality). According to Bennett, a typical 
cultural studies perspective often reduces the reality of potato chips in a similar manner 
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by treating obesity as a product of a human decision (e.g., poverty, long work days, 
convenience, and so on) conditioned by corporate fast-food advertising.79 Similarly, I 
often employ such an approach in my first-year composition classes when I ask my 
students to perform an analysis of the visual rhetoric and pathos-laden appeals of fast-
food advertising. Aided by Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leewuen’s Reading Images and 
Hans Enzenberger’s The Consciousness Industry, my students easily argue that visual 
grammars enable the fast food industry to conceal their products’ unhealthy contents and 
to coerce the unwitting viewer. 
At the same time, focusing only on symbols and representations means that I also 
ask my students to ignore any material role played by the food itself, overlooking the fact 
that fatty foods are heterogeneous and they perform different activities as they interact 
with elements of our bodies. As essential fatty acids necessary for metabolization, 
omega-3 fatty acids differ greatly from saturated fats. The former are not nutritional and 
therefore stimulate the physiological drive for eating—an empirical confirmation of 
Lay’s famous slogan: “Betcha Can’t Eat Just One.” When consumed in Lay’s potato 
chips or McDonald’s french-fries, omega-3 fatty acids add fat to our bodies, stunt our 
memories, and they also improve human moods which affects how humans interact with 
one another. Pointing to national depression statistics, Bennett notes that Omega-3 fatty 
acids that occur in wild fish offer more positive ways to interact with this element. Food, 
Bennett concludes, is “an actant in an agentic assemblage that includes among its 
members my metabolism, cognition, and moral sensibility. Human intentionality is surely 
an important element of the public that is emerging around the idea of diet, obesity, and 
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food security, but it is not the only actor or necessarily the key operator in it. Food, as a 
self-altering, dissipative materiality, is also a player” (51).  
Assemblages challenge the pervasive trend among social and critical theorists 
who hold that meaningful social analysis is only possible by studying “society as a whole” 
(macro-level phenomena) or individuals (micro-level phenomena). An assemblage is a 
concept that allows us to describe a social form’s concrete interactions with other actors 
without reducing it to either macro-level or micro-level explanations. Finished and stable 
forms such as discrete individuals or pervasive social institutions are only an a forteorori 
(after the fact) designation that we make while excluding an account of how individuals 
and institutions emerge and take a specific form. Assemblage theory argues that social 
entities exist at all levels of scales, from an individual who purchases a copy of Max 
Payne 3, to a team of North American programmers who design the game engine, to a 
graphics design unit in South Korea who handles the rendering of Max’s face, to 
Electronic Arts’s transnational corporate marketing presence. Rather than seeing a video 
game as a finished or static product that reflects a programmer’s design, an assemblage 
urges us to see video games as evolving and emerging phenomenon engaged in a host of 
agentive and affective interrelations with a variety of extra- and intra-game actors. 
In one of the first articles to explore not Bennett’s specific articulation but the 
idea of video games as assemblages, Taylor argues, “The notion of assemblage is one 
way to help us understand the range of actors (system, technologies, player, body, 
community, company, legal structures, etc.), concepts, practices, and relations that make 
up the play moment” (332).80 While Bogost correctly urges us to explore one 
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interrelationship—procedure and representation—that had been ignored by previous 
games studies theorists, Taylor suggests that there are still many interrelations that must 
be explored in order to account for the “play moment” (332). In the case of September 12, 
there are the interrelations between macro-structures such as Persuasivegames.com, fan 
input and mods, and other game designers; the online space of the game and its histories; 
the emergent practices of gamer communities which include behavior such as adding 
instructional content to wikis and YouTube; the micro-practices of our unique subjective 
appreciation of the game that is conditioned by our personal histories; the broader social 
world which still tends to look negatively on games and gamers; technological systems 
and software interactions; the material forms and constraints of keyboards, screens, 
bodies and vision; and broader legal, institutional, and protocological structures that 
shape our activities as players.  
One could argue that these extra-game phenomena are secondary to the primary 
processes of procedurality that the player directly experiences. After all, there is no 
programmer actively recoding the software on my computer at the exact moment of the 
player’s encounter with the bombing algorithm. Such an objection misses entirely the 
point of thinking of video games and social phenomena as assemblages and rhetoric as an 
ecological and emergent phenomenon. Just as we cannot abstract semiotic readings of 
procedural unfoldings within a game, we cannot abstract the game from a broader 
continuum that produced and continues to influence the space that the player directly 
encounters. As Taylor writes, “In arguing for such an approach, we can see then that 
computer games are not simply the packaged products that come off the shelf (or tucked 
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neatly into the downloaded executable) but artifacts that traverse multiple communities of 
practice and can hold multiple, often contested, meanings” (333). 
Assemblage theory thus provides us with a way to explore social and political 
realities in more complexity and with special attention to how concrete, material and 
empirical forces unfold through processes within assemblages. Indeed, as DeLanda 
would suggest in Intensive Science, we cannot focus on an overall system (capitalism) or 
an individual (player), but must study all of the various components—themselves 
composed of assemblages—that make up the process of playing a game. Thinking back 
to Chapter 4, John Trimbur’s neo-Marxist account of circulation was prone to this 
problem in that he reduced the materiality of cultural phenomena to their labor input 
alone. He would likely undermine video games as actors in a same way the 
psychoanalysis undermines the reality of the potato chips in the example above. 
“Thinking about games as assemblage,” Taylor argues,  
wherein many varying actors and unfolding processes make up the site 
and action, allows us to get into the nooks where fascinating work occurs; 
the flows between system and player, between emergent play and 
developer revisions, between practices and player produced software 
modifications, between local (guild) communities and broader (server) 
cultures, between legal codes, designer intentions, and everyday use 
practices, between contested forms of play, between expectation and 
contextualization. (332) 
Thus, it is the analysis of the distributed and dispersed process of emergence for any 
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given social phenomena that we would otherwise attribute to individual initiative or 
overall social structure that marks the difference between an assemblage and typical 
social theory.81 
There are two additional assemblage theory concepts that can help us to 
understand the complex interrelations among the bombing algorithm and the player 
through an assemblage: “attractor” and “phase space.” It is possible to conceive of the 
bombing algorithm as a virtual “attractor” within the assemblage. DeLanda suggests that 
the virtual designates a realm that the programmer could not have anticipated or set into 
motion as this anticipation would mean that he could determine how each of the parts of 
the game are attributable to an emergent whole. This explains DeLanda’s concern with 
“catalysis,” emergent behavior, and the lack of an overall mechanism of mechanical 
causation to which emergent behavior can be reduced. In one example, DeLanda suggests 
that smoking is a catalyst rather than a cause of lung cancer. Lung cancer can be caused 
by environmental fumes for some and other lifetime smokers never develop a full cases. 
Similarly, our genes and diets also play a factor in the onset of lung cancer. Smoking, 
thus, is just a catalyst for lung cancer. To return to September 12, as far as “procedural” 
advancement in the game is concerned, the bombing algorithm could just as easily turn 
off students from playing before they receive the other persuasive message. No activity of 
the programmer “caused” all affective outcomes within the game. An attractor is not a 
pre-determined entity; rather, it is a state toward which a dynamical system evolves over 
time. Attractors are what help any set of systems from degenerating into utter chaos.  
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As an illustrative example, let me consider a very basic system that is composed 
of a marble and a bowl.82 If I drop the marble into the bowl, then the attractor or 
“singularity” of the system will be the bottom of the bowl. In other words, the bottom of 
the bowl is the attractor for the system that the two actors tend toward over what 
DeLanda calls the “phase space” of their encounters. In The Democracy of Objects, Levi 
Bryant offers a useful analogy for DeLanda’s distinction between the of phase space of 
an object and its powers. He provides the example of a pendulum that swings through a 
series of points (two maxima and a minima): “Each of these points is a point in phase 
space. Moreover, none of these points are ever occupied all at once. Likewise, we can 
think qualities or properties as points an object manifests or actualizes as points in a 
phase space. The power of the pendulum is its ability to move through this phase space, 
to produce these actualizations, while each point the pendulum moves through is a local 
manifestation of this power of the pendulum” (175). Frasca’s September 12 has one 
major attractor that tries to overdetermine all other possibilities. The player eithers bombs 
and spawns new terrorists or is inactive and the terrorists disappear. Newsgames reflect 
the sort of classical understandings of potentiality such as when Aristotle’s acorn contains 
the oak tree in their orientation that the programmer controls the outcome in the pre-
player definition. By contrast, an attractor is similar to a coiled spring—a virtual 
possibility contained within an actual state.  
Newsgames as Rhetorical Assemblages 
Following from a vitalist theory of emergent affects, the task that assemblage 
theory asks of videogames is to examine, in Bennett’s reading, what is not set into motion 
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by the programmer. Thus, the emergent agential ratios of videogames even within 
allegorithms must be clarified as a post-technê that works to undermine the humanist 
agent’s actions. For example, of all forms of procedural rhetoric, first person military 
shooter games such as the Call of Duty Black Ops series often gain the most notoriety 
among popular commentators who cite the correlation between playing violent 
videogames and the horrific behavior of those such as Anders Breivik, the Norweigian 
mass murderer. First-person shooters also attract criticism because of their blatant 
misogyny where the denigration of females is often a common symbolic topoi.  
Yet, a 2010 study by Jing Feng, Ian Spence, and Jay Pratt claims that a 
neurocognitive effect of playing first-person shooters produce material affects that, at an 
ontological level, actually undermine the gendered symbolic content. As the ex-President 
of Harvard, Larry Summers, infamously argued, men are innately hardwired to be 
mathematical spatial thinkers and women are contextual, emotional, and relational 
thinkers. Feng, Spence, and Pratt, however, asked female volunteers to play several hours 
of first-person shooter games, and were able to demonstrate that spatial reasoning in 
females is actually developmental; that is, it is enacted and not innate. They found that 
there is no biological or genetic reason why women “lack” the same spatial cognitive 
reasoning skills as men. These researchers’ findings echo those of cognitive philosophers 
such as Andy Clark, who suggests that spatial reasoning, like cognition in general, is a 
process of individuation that is the result of the morphogenesis of the body as it relates to 
space. Invoking the specific descriptive terminology of assemblage theory, we could say 
that both the female and male brain will function as a field of potentials whose local 
	   266 
manifestations will form and re-form through a variety of spatial dispositions and in 
response to a multitude of attractors. Thus, regimes of attraction are formed by 
algorithms in certain videogames, that, contrary to the Cartesian split of mind and matter, 
will actually encourage the brain to particular formations of affect. In a very general 
sense, assemblage theory redefines the brain through its various but certain capacities to 
act and to be acted on. To invoked a clichéd phrase, the brain on videogames is not the 
same as the brain not on videogames. In Feng, Spence, and Pratt’s study, the emergent 
phenomena of increased spatial perception, despite being surrounding by negative gender 
constructions, actually has a ontological implication about the ways that all human bodies 
form meaning against technologies that can be used to undermine these negative gender 
constructions. 
Still, the “ontological” complexity of spatial cognition itself cannot be treated as a 
finite resting point for analysis of the affective work of videogames. Assemblage theory 
demands that we connect this unexpected emergent property to greater complexes of 
actors. As Claude Pias has suggested, the post-WWII military was largely responsible for 
the emergence of video games in terms of developing flight and combat simulators – a 
relationship that games scholars often downplay or ignore. In the present, the America’s 
Army videogame series endorsed by the U.S. Military relies on procedural persuasion to 
encourage children and young adults to think about enlisting by simulating the processes 
of boot camp and being deployed for war. Let me offer a deliberately hyperbolic 
argument for illustrative purposes. Let us imagine that females, who make up 74% of all 
casual gamers, were to start playing more first-person shooters such as Halo. Might we 
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not infer because of the procedures involved that they might become more susceptible – 
at a neurocognitive level—to symbolic arguments in games such as America’s Army that 
they should enlist? Regardless of whether this outcome is likely or improbable, it serves 
to highlight that this new emergent attractor of spatial reasoning will inevitably 
participate as an affective agent in the other complex social and material assemblages in 
which videogames participate. Does this realization in any way replace or dismiss the 
need to theorize and criticize the symbolic and the ways in which gender and cultural 
ideologies are produced in video games? Absolutely not. I want to be very clear on this 
point. What assemblage theory serves to highlight is the need to more concretely analyze 
the complex range of material actors involved in instrumental acts of persuasion. At this 
same time, assemblage theory simultaneously functions as an ecological resource to 
undermine modernity’s presuppositions of the human’s rational, social, and cognitive 
autonomy apart from our entanglement with nonhuman actors in technology and nature. 
Technology, thus, will take on emergent products and establish conditions for our 
rhetorical agency that both reflect and yet will be exceeded by an instrumentalist 
conception of delivery. As I will argue in the next chapter, such a conception places a 
great premium on politics and ethics: how and why we choose to represent certain 
material actors and not others. 
Modeling Allegorithmic Assemblages 
It should be clear that while considering video games as assemblages requires us 
to consider the evolving interrelations among many procedural and nonprocedural actors, 
assemblage theory also serves to highlight nonrepresentational relations among different 
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intra-game elements. I have already gestured in previous chapters to the relationship 
between rhetoric and actor-network theory and, by extension, assemblage theory. But 
does assemblage theory amount to a politics? I would argue that assemblage theory is not 
political in the sense of forming direct acts of coercion or persuasion. Rather, assemblage 
theory gives us a descriptive means of tracing the ways in which political hierarchies in 
video games are formed and contested under material constraints, diverse complexes of 
actors, attractors, and phase spaces.  
The point of applying assemblage theory to videogames is that linear causality is 
not the only area of affect or persuasion. Agency and action—the use of the bombing 
algorithm and other attractors within a phase space depend on what we and others in the 
assemblage put into play in the world. This conclusion, it bears repeating, is the opposite 
of that reached by the proceduralists for whom player initiative and creativity is 
foreclosed. I, along with Jennifer Whitson, Stefano de Paoli, and Michael Kerr, 
emphasize that assemblages for DeLanda are a concrete phenomenon where “social and 
natural phenomena should be conceptualized as the dynamic result of the empirical and 
historical relations among empirical elements, rather than thorough listing their essential 
traits or making timeless classifications” (3). It is the simplicity and serious political 
content of newgames that confirm for some the need to discuss video games and rhetoric 
through a deterministic persuasive universe; yet, newsgames such as September 12 are 
also allegorithms with a single main attractor. Whereas the interest for proceduralists in 
lies in the alliance between the player’s completion of the meaning pre-established by the 
game designer, digital rhetoric scholars need to examine at the more subtle 
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interrelationship between player and algorithm. The player cannot play the game in the 
traditional sense of agent or player-driven completion. Enactment is non-engagement, 
allowing the algorithm to model the complexities of a metonymic Middle Eastern society. 
The attractors thus place a level of persuasive affect occurring in the moment of 
recognition where the player “wins” by allowing the Middle Eastern society to—I 
imagine—sort out its own problems free from Western terrorist-inducing foreign policy. 
In a popular undergraduate textbook on terrorism, Jonathan R. White argues that for 
every one terrorist in the field, over one hundred and fifty people are needed as tacit 
support (e.g. those who either directly support the terrorist or are aware of him but do not 
turn him in to the authorities). Thus, military bombing ostensibly increases—if I may 
invoke former President Richard M. Nixon—the “silent majority’s” tacit support of 
terrorists in the field. 
Digital rhetoric and composition scholars interested in gaming rhetorics and 
literacies must not be misled by the lack of creative opportunities for the player within 
newsgames that indeed tempt one to limit persuasion to procedural rhetoric. Instead, 
scholars must seek to highlight game mechanisms beyond procedural control, looking at 
informatics, attractors, and phase spaces. Persuasive affect obtains at the level of the 
modeling of the informatics of control or, in this case, the abdication of control. 
September 12 situates terrorists as an attractor moving through a phase space. Because of 
the dominance of the algorithm, the possibility exists that the player will only actualize 
what she or he wants to directly control and affect, become frustrated with the lack of 
progression and quit, gaining a part of the message (her actions only cause more 
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terrorism) but missing the virtual dimension (if we leave it alone, it goes away). If I were 
to apply DeLanda’s assemblage and Galloway-Wark’s allegorithms to Anthropy’s 
Dys4ia, I might wonder what a video game that did not prescribe a narrative outcome but 
enabled transgendered and hetero-elements to function as attractors for the modeling of 
informatics of oppression would look like. What if The Sims were The Queer Sims San 
Francisco Edition, and heterosexual couples had to be placed together manually and 
same sex couples were the ‘natural’ evolving norm? This revision would still be social 
realism, but a social realism aided by an informative modeling and not merely reshaping 
the relations of representation. Such a distinction would necessarily alter how we tend to 
think of the types of persuasion involved in video games as they relate to politics. Along 
these lines, Anthropy notes that revisionary mods of popular games such as Extra Mario 
Bros gives more levels, powerups, and expansion of Mario’s “moveset”; however, 
revisions such as Super Daisy Land attempts a “feminist” revision by allowing players to 
play as Daisy and not just male avatars of Mario and Luigi. Anthropy concludes, “But 
that’s not exactly a hack of Super Mario, and there’s a richer subject for gender 
correction in game mods” (74). I fully agree with Anthropy’s assertions, but I might also 
point out that activist game designers might do well to think of representational 
correction as a process that occurs through a complex assemblage and not just an alliance 
of representation and procedure. 
To be clear, I do not intend my comments in this chapter to pose a limitation to 
video games theorists interested in politics. After all, art, creativity, and rhetoric do not 
do well with limitations, as I noted above in my appreciation for A Closed World and 
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Dys4ia. Neither it is my suggestion that describing games in the terms of assemblage will 
make us more politically engaged or less responsive to simulations of anti-social behavior 
in Grand Theft Auto or homophobia in Duke Nukem. After all, we are always already 
involved in a complex milieu of competing and emerging assemblages that work to 
contribute toward the effectiveness of a direct act of symbolic persuasion by a rhetor or a 
video game. Nevertheless, I do maintain that assemblage theory aligned with rhetoric will 
better position us to interpret and perhaps intervene in the delicate political work that 
comprises video game interactivity.  
In terms of theorizing persuasion, while a gesture toward pre-symbolic or pre-
representational affect is heavily implied in my reading, I want to return to Miller’s 
distinction above between rhetorica docens and rhetorica utens. Miller productively 
argues that rhetoric has been marked by two historical trends: aggrandizement and self-
denial. On the one hand, many follow the paradigmatic examples of Kenneth Burke—
“where ever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is ‘meaning’ there 
is ‘persuasion’”—and Robert Scott in claiming that all epistemic meaning is contingent 
and inherently rhetorical. Indeed, as I noted in Chapter 1, Richard Lanham’s “strong 
defense” of rhetoric is firmly predicated on the fundamental inability of scientific, 
technical, or any disciplinary language to mirror or represent nature. Yet, one of the 
consequences of the “strong” constructivist or “strong” epistemic defense of rhetoric 
manifests in hermeneutic problems such as screen essentialism and phenomenological 
materialism. On the other hand, treatises as early as Aristotle’s have urged the artifice of 
rhetoric to remain hidden or concealed the techniques at work “authors should compose 
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without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally” (Miller 20). 
Michael Cahn goes so far as to call concealment the “heart of rhetoric.”  
As a form of civic engagement, newsgames attempt to hide their procedural 
artifice and to conceal the invisible hand of the designer, thereby making the designer the 
privileged agent of persuasion. However, Miller suggests that concealment goes beyond 
the “dissimulation of intentions” (20). It is far closer to hypokrisis (acting) as the complex 
and emergent materiality of delivery in the way that I have described in Chapter 3. Miller 
writes, “It is the conviction that the means by which intentions are concealed must also 
remain undetectable. It is a dissimulation of means as well as ends” (20). In Miller’s 
reading, public rhetoric is perpetually trapped in a cycle of practicing effective public 
rhetoric (rhetoric utens) and learning metacritical and theoretical awareness (rhetorica 
docens) about the means of persuasion. Yet, Miller locates a paradox: namely, if we teach 
students to become better judges of rhetorical practice then we implicitly argue that they 
should learn and employ the tricks of concealment. However, as a consequence, “the 
strategies of the cunning practitioner will increasingly be revealed by the increasing 
critical acuity of the citizen-audience. We seem to have another endless regress, a 
continual escalation of cunning concealment and critical unmasking” (32). Likewise, 
learning post-technê such as allegorithms does not actually answer Cicero’s worry about 
arming madmen or the “Q Question” that Lanham names in honor of Quintilian: is the 
individual who knows how to write with allegorithms also a good moral and ethical 
rhetor? Will these new media post-technê such as post-cinematic affect remain effective 
once they can no longer be concealed to an audience? These questions may be impossible 
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to answer. In any case, my conclusions demonstrate that any conception of an analytical 
and productive approach to “new media rhetoric” (Brooke) requires a better attunement 
to the contingent and emergent interplay between nonsymbolic factors in technology and 
symbolic agency. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, foregrounding the materiality 
of software, hardware, and nonhuman actors more broadly speaking will take the form of 
an ethical rhetorica docens that has direct relevance for new media and multimodal 
composition pedagogy. Along similar lines, these conceptions will also enable me to pose, 
finally, the question of how and in what way nonhuman actors actually shape political 
and rhetorical publics. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MATERIAL METAPHORS: INDECOROUS DELIVERY, MORALITY, AND 
POLITICS IN THE DEMOCRACY OF THINGS 
 
[B]ut perhaps the better question to ask is not that of the relevance of these new 
materialisms to political thought and their implications for concrete politics but how they 
radically put into question the fundamental categories of political theory, including the 
concept of the political itself. For what we consider as concrete political forms, 
institutions, practices, and activities, and the discourses that irrigate them, such as 
rational choice theory, positivism, empiricism, and dialectical materialism, are 
underwritten by ontologies of matter and life 
Pheng Cheah 
 
It’s always been the artist who perceives the alterations in man caused by a new medium, 
who recognizes that the future is the present, and uses his work to prepare the ground for 
it  
Marshall McLuhan 
 
Let us contrive not merely the merger of contradictions recommended by Bergson, but 
also the multitude of imperfect matchings, using scientific terms for words usually treated 
sentimentally, or poetic terms for the concepts of science 
Kenneth Burke 
 
Politics and the Nonhuman 
In Chapter 5, I offered an analysis of newsgames through the lens of assemblage 
theory. In the context of my dissertation, assemblage theory offers another articulation of 
the broader conception of nonmodern realism that, in turn, I have suggested should 
characterize the canon of delivery (ontological hypokrisis). However, any relationship 
between these various approaches to rhetorical ontology and politics has yet to be 
specifically argued. Politics in the liberal political tradition is interested in the distribution 
of the goods, rights, and duties that compose the common. Unless nonhuman actors 
suddenly gain human speech capabilities, politics and ethics are still debated and 
established through language. With due regard to the self-organization of matter and the 
emergence of agency in actor-networks and assemblages, humans nevertheless retain the 
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ability to instrumentalize multimedia delivery systems for symbolic and nonsymbolic 
action. Furthermore, while declarations of nonhuman agency may recast human agency 
from a cognitive or linguistic property to an activity that emerges from material, 
cognitive, social, and nonhuman forces, humans definitely retain the agency to commit 
acts of negation, political exclusion, violence, and environmental harm. Regardless of 
how we might speculate about the rights of any nonhuman entity, our commonsense 
relationship with the objects in the world also means that we will inevitably tend to 
theorize political arrangements in terms of their relationship to the assemblages sustain 
human interests and values.  
Many scholars affiliated with the nonhuman turn have suggested that nonhumans 
function as autonomous actors that create and shape political publics. Bennett directly 
makes such a case in her “Political Ecologies” chapter in Vibrant Matter. Across his 
various writings, Bruno Latour has also reclassified the human polis as what he calls a 
“collective of humans and nonhumans” in Politics Without Nature (14). Along similar 
lines, John Protevi’s Bodies Politic specifically suggests that politics is not the 
isomorphic and homogenous body politic of post-enlightenment political theory.83 
Protevi argues that humans and nonhumans dwell in an affective “bodies politic” 
composed of multiple material bodies (or attractors)—symbolic, non-symbolic, civic, and 
ideological—that exist at all different scales of existence. He writes, “The concept of 
bodies politic is meant to capture the emergent—that is, the embodied and embedded—
character of subjectivity: the production, bypassing, and surpassing of subjectivity in the 
imbrications of somatic and social systems” (xii). Language and deliberative rhetoric do 
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undeniably shape reality in Protevi’s account of political interaction. However, it is 
simultaneously the case that human-nonhuman hybrids such as Terri Shiavo’s machine-
supported existence in a hospital bed also function as attractors that affect the unfolding 
of political debates and issues. 
Echoing Bennett, Latour, and Protevi, ecocritics such as Stacy Alaimo have 
drawn political conclusions about nature’s agency. Alaimo writes, “[c]ivil rights, 
affirmative action, and identity politics models of social justice—all of which assume that 
individuals are bounded, coherent entities—become profoundly altered by the recognition 
that human bodies, human health, and human rights are interconnected with the material, 
often toxic, flows of particular places” (23). Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s risk theory, she 
suggests that political decision making for individual citizens must increasingly draw on 
scientific knowledge simply to comprehend the vast number of toxic risks in the 
contemporary global environment.84 Alaimo concludes that environmental justice should 
strive to be “rather literal, demonstrating material connections between specific bodies in 
specific places” (33). She refers to the emergence of human-nonhuman “hyperobjects” 
such as global warming. A hyperobject is the literary theorist Timothy Morton’s term for 
human-nonhuman assemblages like Styrofoam or plutonium (The Ecological Thought 
148). The vast circulation and chemical half-lives of either chemical substance are 
massively distributed in time and space. According to Morton, hyperobjects are 
impossible to entirely document, represent, control, describe, or categorize as they 
involve so many discourses, actors, networks, and affective materialities.  
From these examples, it is clear that many who are affiliated with the nonhuman 
	   277 
turn and nonmodern realisms presuppose an implicit or explicit political duty and ethical 
obligation. In this concluding chapter of the dissertation, I want to leave my direct 
discussion of ontological hypokrisis and realism, and explore the broader relationships 
among rhetoric and politics in a world of nonhuman actors. I firmly agree with the 
aforementioned group of scholars that politics as well as ethics are subjects in need of 
clear articulation in relationship to claims of nonhuman agency. I also echo Pheng 
Cheah’s sentiments in the quotation that opens this chapter. Cheah argues that the 
agentive capacities of nonhuman actors call into question the very category of the modern 
political subject itself. At the same time, I want to be clear from the outset that the path 
from nonmodern ontology to the realm of politics and, in turn, political rhetoric is far 
from self-evident. Even when scholars are willing to acknowledge the need to theorize 
the nonhuman, Gerard de Vries summarizes the view of many in his criticism that Latour 
and other actor-network theorists “closes off the quest for the object of politics” (805).85 
For others who are openly hostile to the nonhuman turn, the act of flattening all objects 
and actors into ontologically equal footing and challenging humans’ immanent reasoning 
and agency capabilities makes it difficult to return to theories of politics that presuppose 
human agency and rational-critical debate (Galloway, “The Poverty of Realism”). 
Nevertheless, Graham Harman offers an equally as valid rejoinder to these criticisms: “if 
it remains unclear how we would go about letting nonhumans be political actors, it seems 
clear enough that any politics based on a bad ontology of human-versus-world will reach 
bad political conclusions” (Harman, “Review” 128).  
If we are to accept claims such as Latour’s that objects can “form political publics” 
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and that humans should function as “representatives” in the “parliament of things,” then it 
is clear that we must define the stakes of this project in detail as it relates to delivery and 
nonmodern realism (We Have Never 154). One promising starting place lies in Bennett’s 
combination of Latour’s Deweyian pragmatism and Jacques Rancière’s political 
philosophy of dissensus. However, Bennett’s efforts are largely in the service of 
wrestling Rancière’s humanism into an unwieldy Latourian framework. In comparing 
Rancière and Latour, I am less interested in trying to extend or challenge Rancière than I 
am in suggesting how his thinking can help provide a political and aesthetic framework to 
guide rhetorical responses in a world of nonhuman actors. Rancière offers a very specific 
idea of politics as dissensus and aesthetic effects that are generated through action. In my 
reading, Rancière can be said to offer less a cautionary lesson of the humanist pitfalls of 
modernity—Bennett’s reading in part—and more a unique theory of aesthetic political 
expression in relationship to the appearance and visibility of excluded actors within the 
polis. I will suggest that the political project for ontological hypokrisis should involve the 
invention of aesthetic or—more accurately—rhetorical ways of communicating to one 
another the ways in which objects are allowed to be acknowledged as political actors or 
agentive forces.86 Where Bennett wants to use Latour to push against Rancière’s 
humanism, I will suggest that we should use Rancière’s emphasis on the aesthetics of 
visibility in relationship to politics to extend some of the latent aesthetic-political 
connections within Latour’s conception of politics. 
In what follows, I will first take up the rhetorical theorist Ethan Stoneman’s 
connection between Rancière and rhetorical scholarship on decorum and indecorum. In 
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my reading, decorum and indecorum directly relate Rancièrian politics to delivery 
scholarship through Ciceronian theories of delivery, rhetoric, and decorum. I will then 
shift to Bennett’s attempt to extend Rancière’s humanism in an attempt to theorize the 
indecorous delivery of objects. Working from and yet slightly departing from her reading, 
I will turn to Latour’s notion of “emergent publics” as an alternative conception of 
indecorous delivery that works against the modern Constitution. While the self-
organization of matter and nonhuman actors in global-warming accelerated hurricanes 
and gas-fracking in themselves can autonomous “disrupt” the space of the polis and 
create emergent political publics, Latour frequently calls upon us to be more proactive in 
bearing witness to invisible nonhuman actor-networks. He consequently develops an 
intriguing relationship between morality and politics where indecorous aesthetics and 
morality (ethics) can be closely aligned with politics. Rancière wants aesthetic dissensus 
to occur out of presupposition of human political equality that dominant regimes of the 
sensible will not allow. Latour desires aesthetic dissensus that occurs out of a 
presupposition of ontological equality in which we maintain all actors—human and 
nonhuman—as what he calls active “mediators” (things) rather than passive 
“intermediaries” (objects). Aesthetic interruptions as a form of political/ethical action 
borne out of a presupposition of ontological equality therefore forms a viable form of 
political activism and indecorous delivery. 
In this final chapter, my goal is to offer a form of political-aesthetic action as 
indecorous delivery suitable for a world in which nonhuman actors are allowed to be 
present in the activity of delivery (ontological hypokrisis). Returning in the end to this 
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dissertation’s concern with rhetorical realism, I will close by drawing on models in the 
object-oriented philosophers’ turn to metaphor as a way to “simulate” the withdrawal of 
the object’s reality. I will offer my own novel extension of metaphor as a form of 
indecorous speech through what I define as “material metaphors” via Katherine Hayles. I 
will offer several illustrative examples of how multimodal publics might emerge around 
protocological actors in videogames and new media art.  
Rancière, Delivery, and Appropriate Indecorous Speech 
Despite his increasing influence across the humanities, Rancière enjoys 
surprisingly little citation in rhetorical scholarship. To the best of my knowledge, 
Stoneman’s article, “Appropriate Indecorum,” is the first that places Rancière’s 
philosophy into dialogue with a set of concerns for rhetorical scholarship. Stoneman 
recontextualizes Rancière’s idea of “politics” the concept of decorum to define a new 
category of political speech entitled “appropriate indecorous speech” (129). Indecorous 
speech is enabled by the recognition of the speaker’s ability to address the polis as an 
equal political subject. It necessarily interrupts what Rancière labels as the “partitioning 
of the sensible” and the “police order”: the sum total of institutions, ideologies, and 
discourses that support unequal distributions of political subjectivity. As I noted in 
Chapter 4, where Cicero recommend decorum—speech that supports the ideals of the 
community and the polis in an inherently conservative project that reigns in the morally 
suspect elements of rhetoric and delivery—Stoneman recommends indecorous rhetorical 
acts by drawing on Rancière’s framework.87 In this section, I will provide a partial 
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introduction to Rancière, drawing in part on Stoneman’s reading, and directed in the 
service of teasing out a relationship between delivery and decorum/indecorum.  
Decorum has been held to be relevant to contemporary social phenomena by a 
number of rhetorical scholars.88 According to Stoneman, these efforts paralleled attempts 
by other rhetorical theorists interested in continental philosophy “to foreground the 
aesthetic capacity of rhetoric to create, sustain, and transform perception via the symbolic 
manipulation of appearances” (130). However, Stoneman goes on to suggest that those 
who have studied the aesthetic in relationship to decorum “surprisingly” failed to theorize 
the possibilities or potentialities of indecorum (130).89 He contextualizes his efforts as an 
attempt to update these aesthetic interests through more recent post-continental work in 
aesthetic evidenced by Rancière’s political philosophy. Stoneman offers a comprehensive 
literature review of scholarship on decorum that I will not rehash in this limited space. It 
is more important for my project to focus in on Robert Hariman’s scholarship on 
decorum in great detail as Hariman’s account describes the most relevant links between 
delivery and decorum.  
According to Hariman, Cicero’s understanding of decorum “blended significant 
aspects of rhetorical practice, social awareness, and political structure into an aesthetic 
sensibility that directed the selection of diction appropriate to one’s subject or situation” 
(152). In an early articulation of Richard Lanham’s strong defense of rhetoric, decorum 
became the way in which rhetoric moved from the production of self-interested lies and 
falsehoods to a socially-responsible technê. In De Oratore, Cicero offers a definiton of 
decorum: “In oration, as in life, nothing is harder than to perceive what is appropriate. 
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The Greeks call this to prepon; let us call it decorum or ‘propriety.’ . . . The universal rule, 
in oratory as in life, is to consider propriety” (20.70–71). In contrast to Greek thinkers 
where appropriate speech (to prepon) included lists of rules and techniques for the 
adaptation of speeches for any rhetorical situation, Hariman suggests that Cicero’s sense 
of decorum expanded it in a more theoretical and epistemological sense. Cicero definitely 
provided Aristotelian-style lists of rules for composition and delivery. While he 
attempted to restore the canon of delivery to prominence, he nevertheless felt that an 
understanding of decorum was necessary to provide moral guidance and control for any 
such rules or techniques. Thus, delivery as “acting”—hypokrisis—would be seen as an 
appropriate action instead of an inappropriate form of flattery or lying that bent the 
audience to the rhetor’s self-interested aims. In this understanding, canons such as 
delivery moved beyond the memorization and adoption of rules to a more fundamental 
awareness of the political and social codes that structured the rhetorical situation. These 
latter codes included nontechnical understanding of the ways in which any instance of 
decorous speech is influenced by social relations. In a sense, Cicero knew that social 
knowledge and guidance was necessary to avoid mere “hypocrisy” (saying one thing and 
doing another in the colloquial sense). Elaine Fantham and Michael Leff have also noted 
the moral complexity of his treatment in the context of decorum.90 
 By extending decorum beyond techniques of speech making, Hariman indicates 
that Cicero creates a continuum between the awareness of social relations and decorum. 
Cicero writes, “But the decorum to which I refer shows itself also in every deed, in every 
work, even in every movement and attitude of the body” (De Oratore 1.126). Here, 
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Cicero has implied the existence of a symbiotic relationship among the proper inventional 
(moral) attitude in the mind and the rhetor. To borrow the terms of Aristotle’s material 
causes, the ideal rhetor is in effect a supplementary presence who must possess the 
commitment to the “final cause” of the constitutionally-bound polis as established by the 
“efficient causes” of the politicians. In a direct connection to the materialization of 
delivery, the rhetor needed to consider the appropriateness of “action as well as words, in 
the expression of the face, in gesture and in gait” (20.74).91 For Cicero, this moral core 
was what must be incarnated into an audience. It enabled the rhetor to employ all the 
means at hand and the full range of non-verbal delivery systems in the effort to conserve 
social norms. Hariman suggests that “higher-order decorum” has three main features: “(a) 
the rules of conduct guiding the alignment of signs and situations, or texts and acts, or 
behavior and place; (b) embodied in practices of communication and display according to 
a symbolic system; and (c) providing social cohesion and distributing power” (156). 
Stoneman’s account of decorum draws heavily on Hariman’s reading of Cicero, asserting 
“decorum sustains social order through the creation and interiorization of decorous 
modes of subjectivity” (Stoneman 133). An additional example could be drawn from 
Richard McKeon in that social awareness thus conceived marked an “architectonic force” 
that integrated “thought and action, form and content, and wisdom and eloquence” (112). 
Simply put, rhetorical morality or sensibility is “the sensibility of an active mind attuned 
to its social environment” (155).  
The problem with such a view of delivery and decorum is that Cicero was not an 
egalitarian political theorist. According to Hariman, decorum consequently reproduces “a 
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world of distinct classes maintained largely by heredity: higher responsibilities have been 
assigned to the class with the higher character, and the social and natural worlds 
correspond in making the classes speak and think as they are” (153). Unlike Plato, who 
grounded political and social hierarchies in a cosmologically invariable order, Hariman 
indicates that Ciceronian decorum is established entirely by social consensus. Yet, social 
consensus still retains the basic distinctions between the polis (those capable of political 
speech) and the excluded demos (women, slaves, non-propertied men). This distinction 
will prove to be of crucial importance to connecting Rancière’s thinking to decorum. If 
the political status quo is that aristocratic males gain rhetorical training while the slaves 
such as Meno were denied the faculties for speech on a priori grounds, then rhetorical 
decorum consists of Socrates and Callicles debating in the Gorgias dialogue (Latour, 
Pandora’s Hope 216-235). Socrates and Callicles’ disagreement over the use of rhetoric 
is predicated on their prior agreement that the demos, the mob of “10,000,” should be 
excluded from the polis. Delivery’s (and rhetoric’s) moral or ideal aim is to be 
strategically manipulated by processes of invention infused by the logic, gesture, pose, 
and attitudes of decorum. Decorum, in Cicero’s words, is what helps us avoid “put[ing] 
weapons into the hands of madmen” (De Oratore III.XIV: 55). By this phrase, Cicero 
sought to resolve the moral problem of teaching rhetorical technê to individuals who 
were had no innate faculties of phronesis and arête. 
 Given this context for the conserving—conservative function—of decorum, 
Stoneman finds a clear exigence to turn to Rancière in order to tease out a rhetorical 
theory of appropriate indecorous speech. If decorum reinforces unequal political 
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hierarchies, then indecorum was never considered as a legitimate form of rhetorical 
interaction. Seen through the lens of Rancière’s major English translated work, 
Disagreement, Stoneman maintains “indecorum is elevated [by Rancière] from a negative 
constraint on rhetorical performance to a political standard marked by dissensus, 
appearance, and the assumption of equality” (131). He argues, “[Rancière’s] constellation 
of politics, aesthetics, and rhetoric affords rhetoricians the conceptual material with 
which to treat decorum as a normative and perceptual system of social identification and 
to reframe indecorum as an emancipatory and self-suasory mode of political 
subjectivization” (130).  
Rancière’s thinking makes sense in the context of indecorum because of his 
idiosyncratic definition “politics.” Politics is not something that must obtain in decorous 
speech, parliamentary halls, logic, nature, or social intercourse. Rather, politics is the 
demonstration of political equality in an act of dissensus. Furthermore, it is an act 
undertaken not in relationship to other competing factors (e.g., within previously 
sanctioned channels and institutions), but through an internalized dialogue with the self. 
The first step toward politics begins not with a Platonic interlocutor—a demonstration of 
equality in a message delivered to another—but within the self in recognition of how it 
has been subjugated to partitions of the sensible: “Proving to the other that there is only 
one world and that one can prove the legitimacy of one’s action within it, means first of 
all proving this to oneself” (Disagreement 50). Politics is not circulating a Facebook 
petition in August 2012 to ban Mitt Romney from the ballot in my home state of 
Washington because he failed to register in time as the GOP ballot candidate. In this case, 
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activists are working within normal procedural channels of election intercourse and, in a 
sense, their actions have affirmed the legitimacy of America’s de facto two party election 
system. If decorum makes a necessary movement of conserving, and if any given social 
arrangement is hierarchical, then Rancière concludes that the presupposition of equality 
will necessarily be symbolically disruptive of these hierarchies. Politics is Rosa Parks and 
other African-American activists actually sitting down on the bus and acting as if they 
were politically equal to white passengers. 
Stoneman’s connection between indecorum and dissensus makes more sense if we 
better comprehend Rancière’s two key forms of community-making: police inequality 
(decorum) and political equality (indecorum). These two forms, he writes, “must remain 
absolutely alien to each other, constituting two radically different communities even if 
composed of the same individuals” (34). The police order, however, is not the false 
consciousness of Marx where all “false” social identities are derivable to the layer of 
labor relations and the historical dialectic. Also unlike Michel Foucault’s early 
scholarship on the knowledge/power combination, the police order is not concerned 
exclusively with the production and control of docile bodies (e.g., discipline). The police 
order is much less specific and concerns in general the establishment of communicative 
and behavior norms as they are invented, circulated, reaffirmed, and produced to be then 
distributed to how bodies are ordered by these norms. “The police,” Rancière argues, “is 
thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, 
and ways of saying, [and] sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular 
place and task” (29). As a result, he claims “Policing is not so much the ‘disciplining’ of 
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bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of occupations and the 
properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed” (29).  
The police work to ensure the exclusion of the demos, or, the count of those “who 
have no count”—those who cannot play an active part in the decision-making processes 
of society. In keeping with aesthetics, police ordering regulates visibility and invisibility: 
“It is an order of the visible and sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and 
another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (29). 
Stoneman clearly articulates the significance of these distinctions in Rancière: “That is to 
say, the police does not simply assign to each body certain norms, occupations, and tasks; 
at a more general level, it inscribes in the very recognition of social performance the 
more or less automatic perception of status, identity, and entitlement and disentitlement” 
(134). Performance here means that humans who are divided or rendered invisible are 
made to “perform” as if their egalitarian political selves were already realized and 
confirmed by their fixed identity in the social order. Inscription is thus a “partition or 
regime of the sensible” (Disagreement 14, emphasis original).  
In my perspective, rhetoric and delivery have a primary role in the establishment 
of decorum—a major manifestation of the police order—as it is symbolic statements that 
enable markers of identities to order social roles and tasks. The police “puts bodies in 
their place and their role according to their ‘properties,’” and these properties are not 
innate, but naturalized (27). In Rancière’s articulation, the police thus constitute “the set 
of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
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legitimizing this distribution” (28). There are additional points of overlap between the 
history of delivery and Rancière’s thinking in this passage. As I documented in Chapter 3, 
Plato often expressed his dislike of acting (delivery) on the same grounds: acting 
entertained the possibility that non-logical forms of persuasion were in operation. The 
body’s movements—its delivery—and its soul must be aligned for the articulation of 
mimetic truth to occur. Thus, Plato declared in the The Republic that actors must be 
dismissed along with poets (and rhetors). The Guardians were permitted to engage in 
mimesis only in proportion to their essential character (“do not imitate slavish or 
unworthy people”) as imitation alters “habit and nature” (395d). In this context, the 
police order would be very hostile to the notion of “acting” (that is, appearing as 
something other than one’s prescribed essence) and would do its best to eliminate any 
political notion that an identity could be performed or indecorously incarnated by the 
demos. All police orders must appear to be naturalized from the police order that Latour 
calls the modern Constitution that separates human from nonhuman to the police order of 
the ontology of racism that refused to grant African-American actors equal political or 
economic whites. 
 Given this discussion of the police and the partitioning of the sensible, politics is 
an inherently dissensual act—“a rupture in the logic that presupposes superiority and 
inferiority” (24). Politics does not consist of voting in standard elections as we standardly 
conceive of political participation, but in “an extremely determined activity antagonistic 
to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or 
lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that 
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configuration—that of the part of those who have no part” (29–30). In Rancière’s specific 
understanding, politics only occurs by those who are symbolically dispossessed by the 
police order, but this exclusion is what marks the space of the political. Politics occurs 
when an individual shifts a socially-produced identity for a political inscription of 
equality. “In the final analysis,” Rancière writes, “inequality is only possible through 
equality. This means that politics doesn’t always happen—it actually happens very little 
or rarely” (17). Furthermore, politics does not take the form of a new police order, a new 
mode of government or a more equitable distribution of wealth and commodities, but 
what “shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It 
makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once 
there was only place for noise” (30).  
To return to Ciceronian decorum, Rancière’s understanding of politics as 
dissensus places a real premium not on invention but on delivery—the space of emergent 
political transaction and action of bodies and speech acts within space. Delivery has 
always been concerned with how communication and thinking appears and materializes 
for an audience. Invention only occurs in the “self-suasory” phase while, as Stoneman 
confirms, the major enthymematic premise has already been supplied. Rancière suggests 
the outcome: “This means starting from the point of view of equality, asserting equality, 
assuming equality as given, working out from equality, trying to see how productive it 
can be and thus maximizing all possible liberty and equality” (51–52). As its goal is not 
to form a new institution or mode of government and redistribute political equality, 
politics has no life except in enunciation, circulation, performance, and demonstration. 
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Political equality is not a goal but rather “the presupposition which everyone must strive 
to validate on their own account” (51). The specific form itself is not as important as the 
form that it reacts against and its inventive logics could be numerous. Dissensus 
specifically ties rhetoric to political practice, by “the production through a series of action 
of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field 
of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of experience” (35).  
The ties between dissensus and delivery and performance are clear. Without the 
necessity of logical invention, Rancière declares that aesthetics is “a delimitation of 
spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously 
determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience” (Politics of 
Aesthetics 13). Rhetorical activity as politics would be “a matter of appearances,” by 
introducing “a visible into the field of experience” Disagreement 74, 89). Where human 
voices were invisible, unrecognizable and reduced to phone (noise) of animals, politics is 
what enables speech, “thus making apparent both a body and capacity that had been 
discounted from the sensible arrangement of police aesthetics,” working toward a 
community born of aestheticization the “virtual or immaterial community of equalities” 
(x). The virtual community is “An insubstantial community of individuals engaged in the 
ongoing creation of equality” (84). The insubstantial community does not exist beyond 
the space of its appearance in dissensus. In a kind of articulation of an Arendtian place, 
Stoneman notes, “the concept of an immaterial community simply means that subjects 
cannot achieve a reality that would outlast their moment of appearance” (139) Political 
community appears and fades that exists only in the moment of its delivery and its 
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demonstration. Yet, since it is not a permanently achievable legislative or deliberative 
state, it is an “endlessly renewable community independent of constitutional amendments, 
communicative norms, and the approval of those who have a part” (139).  
 While my interest in Rancière’s thinking lies in the relationship between 
indecorum and delivery, Stoneman offers several productive and intriguing connections 
between rhetoric and dissensus that are worth noting. Stoneman writes, “Despite 
Rancière’s virtual silence on the subject of rhetoric, the active and enthymematic 
character of political equality has bearing on its rhetorical effectivity” (137). What 
Stoneman means by this claim is that dissensual arguments—much like those for 
nonhuman agency against the modern Constitution—are going to be seen as the “weaker, 
less persuasive argument” (137). Where Protagoras argues that Sophistic rhetoric should 
be for “making the weaker argument stronger” (6b), Rancière’s conception of dissensus 
is not a movement to make the weaker argument the stronger. It disavows the narrow 
hierarchies of decorum (e.g., police orders) that have already established what will count 
as weaker and stronger arguments. Thus, dissensus does not work to side with either 
Callicles or Socrates, but to make visible the prior exclusion of the demos—the count of 
those who have no count—that their disagreement presupposes. In Stoneman’s words, the 
aim of indecorous speech “aims toward disruption rather than assent” (138). To make the 
weaker argument the stronger would be to accept the presupposition of inequality that 
allows us to make distinctions between white and nonwhite (human and nonhuman) in 
the first place. “There is order in society,” Rancière writes, “because some people 
command and others obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things are required: 
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you must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey it. And to do 
that, you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you” (16).  
Along similar lines, Stoneman’s refashioning of dissensus as appropriate 
indecorous speech attempts to avoid reasserting hierarchies of the police order. Whereas 
propriety denotes “specific but impersonal rules for correct behavior in familiar 
situations,” appropriateness is the rule that determines “whether or to what extent one 
ought to adhere to the instructions of a specific code” (Stoneman 164). Stoneman 
concludes,  
To the extent that all systems of decorum cohere with a principle of 
inequality, rendering bodies unseen and voices unheard, they are ethically 
unsound and do not “fit” the moral situation of fundamental equality. To 
these unethical configurations of human being-together, political subjects 
oppose demonstrations of equality that are both appropriate and 
indecorous. They are ethically appropriate insofar as inequality is always 
unjust, and they are indecorous to the extent that they antagonize police 
renderings of the social body. For that reason, we may interpret Rancierian 
politics as a mode of appropriate indecorum. (142) 
From Stoneman’s account of appropriate indecorum, we can see that rhetorical 
adaptation—the manufacturing of an ethos appropriate to the audience in delivery—
means that rhetors should not merely adjust to but react against norms of decorum and 
delivery. Rancièreian politics is thus thoroughly rhetorical or at least intimately combined 
with forms of delivery that must be indecorous, antagonistic, and aesthetic. Rancière’s 
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goal is not to motivate action by, to invoke Kenneth Burke’s terms, creating identification 
by division, that is, by appealing to common interests. The “common” already reflects the 
police order. Rather, Rancière wants to make manifest the exclusions in the composition 
of the “common,” and this making manifest constitutes politics.92 Consequently, we see a 
key reason why Rancière is gaining interdisciplinary appeal across the humanities. 
Politics in his sense cannot be co-opted into existing neoliberal political frameworks 
while nevertheless retaining a framework for political action. 
From Objects of Discourse to Objecting Objects: Bennett’s Politics of Nonhumans 
In my understanding, Rancière helps address Melissa Deems’s call for rhetoric 
and communication theorists to study and articulate forms of intervention without 
allowing norms of decorum to appropriate or reconstitute themselves as a metanarrative 
and a positive political program. However, it is clear that Rancière is primarily interested 
in human-initiated forms of political action and agency. Although I have alluded to the 
modernist Constitution as a partition of the sensible, it is unclear how Rancière’s key 
terms relate to politics in a nonmodern universe. In this section, I will turn to Bennett’s 
attempt to extend and complicate certain Rancièrian concepts. I want to acknowledge up 
front that I enthusiastically endorse his analytical principle that humans should think of 
politics from a presumption of equality. I have no problem with this presupposition. At 
the same time, I do not believe that a world of ontological hypokrisis is necessarily 
incommensurable with this presupposition. We do not live in a zero sum conceptual 
world where the nonhuman’s political gain is the human’s political loss. Indeed, this 
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either-or mentality is already a product of police order thinkers relative to the modernist 
Constitution in ecology and environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, I am in agreement with Bennett in one regard. Even if we 
unconditionally grant Rancière-Stoneman’s theory of indecorous speech, such acts of 
disruption will never obtain without the assessment of the role played by material and 
ecological substructures. In the so-called Western “first world,” the relationship between 
dissensus and technology should also be rigorously examined given the pervasive 
reliance of the police order on networked and digital technologies.93 Thus, Rancière’s 
turn—in Stoneman’s assessment—from ideal Reason and the logos to the contingencies 
of the enthymeme still ignores or marginalizes the embodied and materializable activity 
of delivery and its circulation of affects beyond the immediate rhetorical situation. 
Should we act out of presupposition of equality only to downplay or ignore 
presuppositions of ontological inequality in our relations with nonhuman actors? 
Rancière’s vision of rhetoric, much like Lloyd Bitzer’s elemental model of the rhetorical 
situation, seems in many ways predicated on the face-to-face assembly of the Greek 
agora. The notion of a lone rhetor addressing the crowd with his voice must be seen to 
encompass all forms of indecorous speech and their emergent material effects and affects. 
Yet, indecorous speech must be located among buildings, Paris Communes, Che 
Guevara’s Chilean mines, transmedia, and distributed networked cultures such as 
YouTube, 4Chan, PostSecret, or other viral networks.94  
At the same time, I am not willing to entirely accept Bennett’s argument that we 
should be suspicious of any theory of politics that only encompasses human-initiated 
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interruptions into social identities. In my mind, the accusation that Rancière remains 
“modern” in Latour’s sense should simply take the form of an acknowledgement that he 
is primarily interested in analyzing the operation of theorizing symbolic action and 
politics dissensus. In a similar sense, Burke is also guilty of this focus, while he 
nevertheless offers crucial rhetorical resources for determining rhetorical effect and affect 
at the level of the symbolic. Where Foucault was interested in institutions such as mad 
houses and prisons, Latour is interested in the science lab in relationship to ecology. In 
my opinion, both sets of analyses—culture and nature, and symbolic and nonsymbolic— 
are necessary to help diagnose how partitions of the sensible are formed from multiple 
and overlapping ontological contact zones.  
In this section, I will take up Bennett’s extension of Rancière in Chapter 7 of 
Vibrant Matter (“Political Ecologies”). In particular, I will make some inroads between 
Bennett’s extension and the context of indecorous forms of delivery. To repeat my early 
point, Bennett specifically conceives of her project as political in nature. She seeks to 
create a hybrid politics between Rancière and her Spinozist-Deleuzian version of 
assemblage theory. Thinking back to her example of Omega-3 fatty acids that I discussed 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, she maintains that in a nonmodern ontology, objects 
create these “worlds” without our conscious intention or control. That is, objects “speak” 
in their material presence and as forces in the world by behaving in unpredictable and 
non-linear ways. These nonlinear points of emergence defy our ability to cleanly separate 
the world into active humans and passive nonhumans in order to attribute the human as 
the sole causal agent for cultural phenomena. These worlds extend beyond our 
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calculability and representational capacities, but humans are nevertheless obligated to the 
set of duties placed upon them by such empirical revelations as global warming, gas 
fracking, and Omega-3 fatty acids. Bennett imagines that the emergence of these aleatory, 
transversal, and unpredictable worlds places a set of ethical obligations and distributes 
duties to us not from any top-down liberal state model, but from within the assemblages 
that we find ourselves entangled. She declares, “If [traditional] environmentalism leads to 
the call for the protection and wise management of an ecosystem that surrounds us, a vital 
materialism suggests that the task is to engage more strategically with a trenchant 
materiality that is us as it vies with us in agentic assemblages” (111). 
One valuable contribution of Bennett’s extension of Rancière lie in the moments 
where she is able to locate openings for nonhuman material affectivities and a Latourian 
notion of the emergent public. She argues that Rancière is attuned to these points of 
concern as he “both talks about dissonances coming from outside the regime of political 
intelligibility and models politics as a unique realm of exclusively human endeavor” 
(xviii). Bennnett points to a “before” space that exists prior to any symbolic/human-
initiated political space. This “before” space is composed of “singular disruptions [that] 
are neither intentional acts nor aleatory eruptions; Rancière locates them in the between-
space of the staged event [e.g., politics as dissensus]” (105). This view would shift 
dissensus from a human-initiated event to something that more closely resembles the 
view of delivery as ontological hypokrisis that I have been outlining. Dissensus would be 
achieved as a product of nonhuman autonomous (aleatory) action, and human 
responseability to these forms of action in Diane Davis’s sense of being responsive to the 
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Other’s (the Object’s) withdrawal from perception. Given the existence of this “between-
space,” Bennett suggests a comparatively straightforward connection between these 
dissonances and “[Latour’s] notion of publics as human-nonhuman collective that are 
provoked into existence by a shared experience of harm. I imagine this public to be one 
of the disruptions that Rancière names as the quintessentially political act” (xix). Rather 
than politics being only a result of an individual’s self-suasory activities, Bennett recasts 
Rancièrian politics as an acknowledgment of our material and ecological existence. 
Of course, Rancière would likely object that a rock will not come to a self-
recognition born out of a presupposition of equality, spurring itself to speak on its own 
behalf in an act of disruption. Simply put, it is impossible for us to apportion the right of 
an inanimate actor’s right to entelechial or conative striving to persist in its being as a 
form of political solidary and collective anarchism against police orders.95 Thus, “harm” 
would invariably be something that we had to notice and reflect on regardless of whether 
we entirely set political issues into motion or not. In fact, Bennett relates a story where 
she asked Rancière at a 2010 talk at Johns Hopkins if it was possible to speak of a politics 
of nonhumans (110). He replied with a simple “No.” As I described in the previous 
section, Rancière examines how virtually or potentially disruptive human forces (the 
demos) are not recognized by but nevertheless exist within the sphere of the police order 
(the public). The goal of appropriate indecorous speech is to expose of the arbitrariness of 
these divisions. Politics is neither about decorous conservation of the status quo nor about 
dialectical response to a previously articulated set of problems. Politics is only “the name 
of a singular disruption of this order of distribution of bodies” (Rancière qtd in. Bennett 
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105). What the police order holds to be animal noise—phone—converts, in Rancière’s 
words, to “argumentative utterances” which signifiy “equality of speaking beings” (qtd. 
in Bennett 105). The “mise en scenes that reconfigure the relations of the visible and the 
sayable” reveal “the ultimate secret of any social order” which is that “there is no natural 
principle of domination by one person over another” (qtd. in Bennett 105). Consequently, 
Bennett suggests that for Rancière nonhumans cannot count as part of the demos as any 
dissensual act must be accompanied by, in Rancière’s words, a “desire to engage in 
reasoned discourse” (qtd. in Bennett 104) 
Given this stance, Bennett argues that Rancière ultimately undertheorizes the 
extent to which dissonances do indeed emerge from nonhuman actors that disrupt the 
police order of bodies and nonhuman actors. First, she complains that Rancière’s 
“description of the [political] act increasingly takes on a linguistic cast. . . . It is an 
‘objection to a wrong,’ where a wrong is defined as the unequal treatment of beings who 
are equally endowed with a capacity for human speech” (106, emphasis original). 
Secondly, she argues that Rancière’s philosophy is already predicated on a limited notion 
of a universal public that is grounded in Latour’s modern Constitution. She suggests 
“Rancière would be helped here, I think, were he to adopt Dewey’s insight about multiple, 
coexisting publics, rather than speak of a single demos with an overt and a latent set of 
members” (106). Bennett positions Darwin, Dewey, and Latour alongside and against 
Rancière, linking Darwin and Latour through their allegories of worms. For Darwin, 
worms fertilize the soil and bury human objects for archaeologists to discover. Latour’s 
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famous case from Pandora’s Hope, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, demonstrates how 
worms were responsible to moving trees in the Amazon.  
In another related example, Dewey’s Art as Experience helps explain a 
nonmodern notion performative entanglement because our bodies are host to foreign 
actors (drugs, bacteria), and yet objects outside of us (friends, family, nation-states) feel 
quite intimate. Bennett’s claim is not that objects need to be granted equal rights as 
humans. Nor is her argument Harman’s polypsychipist speculation that all actors—
animate and inanimate—might possess intentionality. Rather, it is that what we conceive 
of as a political public is composed by the presence and activity of nonhuman actors who 
must be considered not in their reduced descriptions in the calculative technoscientific 
order, but through their very real, emergent, and actual points of intersection with the 
sphere of culture. This transportation with minimal translation and reduction is what 
constitutes a “politics” for nonhumans in Bennett’s Rancièrian extension. The revelation 
or appearance of objects in this fashion will inevitably disrupt the common ways in which 
we are used to relating to the objects that surround us in the world. 
Bennett makes a novel attempt to reorganize these two thinkers—Latour and 
Rancière —into a hybrid that can get at a presupposition of political equality and 
ontological equality. She suggests, “Compared to Dewey and Latour, Rancière is less 
concerned with how a public emerges than with the means by which its (apparent) 
coherence can be interrupted” (104). In my own reading of Rancière and Latour, I believe 
that this division is fairly accurate. Rancière’s politics exists in action, and Latour’s exists 
to the extent that it seeks—I would hope—to inform political action. Bennett argues that 
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Rancière’s model does actually contain sends for a vital materialist theory in two ways. 
The first, she writes, “Consider, for example, the way it imagines the being of the demos: 
not as a formed thing or fixed entity, but as an unruly activity or indeterminate wave of 
energy. The demos is, we read, ‘neither the sum of the population nor the disfavored 
element within,’ but an ‘excess’ irreducible to the particular bodies involved; Rancière 
implicitly raises this question: Is the power to disrupt really limited to human speakers?” 
(106). As I read her conclusion, Rancière’s politics is in fact an emergent property that 
exceeds the sum total of discrete actors and hierarchies that any given police order 
sustains. The second occurs  
when Rancière chooses to define what counts as political by what effect is 
generated: a political act not only disrupts, it disrupts in such a way as to 
change radically what people can “see”: it repartitions the sensible; it 
overthrows the regime of the perceptible. Here again the political gate is 
opened enough for nonhumans (dead rats, bottle caps, gadgets. tire. 
electricity, berries, metal) to slip through, for they also have the power to 
startle and provoke a gestalt shift in perception: what was trash becomes 
things, what was an instrument becomes a participant. What was foodstuff 
becomes agent, what was adamantine becomes intensity. (106-107) 
Bennett refers not only to ecosystem or life-threatening objects themselves such as when 
a meteor in Lars Vans Trier’s film Melancholia (2011) is speeding toward the earth. 
After all, nature itself is not separate from culture. As is the case with the worms in the 
Amazon, any actor can “sometimes catalyze a public” from Rosa Parks to hyperobjects or 
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Terri Schiavo (107). She offers a series of propositions that follow from these two 
extension: “If human culture is inextricably enmeshed with vibrant, nonhuman agencies,” 
and “if human intentionality can be agentic only if accompanied by a vast entourage of 
nonhumans,” then, Bennett concludes, “the appropriate unit of analysis for democratic 
theory is neither the individual human nor an exclusively human collective but the 
(ontologically heterogeneous) ‘public’ coalescing around a problem” (108). 
 Consequently, Bennett suggests via Latour that it is our ethical and political 
obligation to “to see how to devise more effective (experimental) tactics for enhancing or 
weakening that public” (107). From the previous framework, Bennett requires us to 
revise Rancière’s focus on the human. She argues “to imagine politics as a realm of 
human activity alone may also be a kind of prejudice: a prejudice against a (nonhuman) 
multitude misrecognized as context, constraint, or tool” (108). Bennett urges political 
theorists “to transform the divide between speaking subjects and mute objects into a set 
of differential tendencies and variable capacities” (108). Given that no human lives above 
and beyond material relations, and that all social identities will necessarily share 
consequences for distribution and access to resources, Bennett argues,  
there is no way to call attention to the partition without invoking some 
relationship to the material world; “I speak, I’m invisible” only occurs in 
the context of economics, ideologies, access to resources, ways that bodies 
are positioned and distributed, that enjoy surveillance invisibility, and so 
on. We need not only to invent or reinvoke concepts like conatus, actant, 
assemblage, small agency, operator, disruption, and the like but also to 
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devise new procedures, technologies, and regimes of perception that 
enable us to consult nonhumans more closely, or to listen and respond 
more carefully to their outbreaks, objections, testimonies, and propositions. 
(108) 
Latourian Political Morality: When Means Become Ends 
Bennett’s claim that the self-organization of matter can function as a political 
attractor to create an emergent public is well taken and, in my opinion, correct. At the 
same time, her “extension” of Rancière is not really an extension. It is more what Burke 
calls “casuistic stretching”: repurposing an existing set of terminology into a different 
context. No matter how she might want to extend him, there is not avoiding the fact that 
Rancière’s politics is presupposed on a human model of self-recognition and humanist 
solidarity. Again, my perspective is that his project should be complementary or 
supplementary with an ecological politics. With respect to Bennett’s arguments, the 
interesting argument for me is less whether we can retrofit Rancière for a world of 
nonhuman actors, and more how we can use his pairing of action, politics, and aesthetics 
as a form of indecorous speech to better situate the political project of delivery in 
emergent publics. 
While Bennett has offered several arguments for why we might want to recast 
Rancièreian indecorous speech as a materializable event, I want to increasingly turn to 
the how this goal might be achieved. In the end, Latour—like Rancière—is interested in 
the production of aesthetic effects and conceptual instruments for disrupting police orders 
of, respectively, ecologies and human communities. Simply stated, how might indecorous 
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speech from humans on behalf of objects take form? It is far easier to make these 
suggestions in the abstract than it is to realize them in a set of specific technê or an 
awareness of the affectivity of post-technê. The crucial question for rhetorical theorists is 
the kairotic discovery of the aesthetic means that might enable audiences to recognize 
these aleatory eruptions or to become more aware of our material and ecological 
imbrication with nonhumans. Following from Bennett’s point of view, I believe that we 
could reclassify indecorous speech and delivery as action born not out of a 
presupposition of political equality, but action borne out of what I will call a 
presupposition of ontological equality guided by a Latourian pragmatism and morality. 
This proposal would retain specific features of Rancière’s aesthetics and political action, 
but it cannot retain the political equality component for the reasons that I have suggested 
above. By contrast, I will suggest that Latour via Dewey not only authorizes a view of 
politics as an emergent public of humans and nonhumans, but also productively 
reframes—in part—an ethical-aesthetic project of political action bourn of the 
presupposition of ontological equality. 
In Politics of Nature, Latour productively distinguishes politics from 
morality/ethics while Bennett seems to be collapsing politics and ethics into a carefully 
qualified variant of the thesis “objects are political actors.” However, Latour ultimately 
urges us to resist the argument that all objects are political actors or, more accurately, to 
see this as a claim that we do not need to make. As he notes in “Turning Politics 
Around,” if anti-realist constructivism resulted in the claim that “everything is political” 
because all language is necessarily contingent, then we must be equally as cautious of the 
	   304 
implication that all objects are political—an inversion of the modernist Constitution. 
Thinking back to Cheah’s quotation above, the point of the nonhuman is actually to call 
into question normative assumptions about political action. For Latour, objects participate 
in the shaping of Deweyian publics, but politics remains a human profession with a very 
nuanced relationship to ecological police orders. Morality has a special relationship to 
aesthetics that I will suggest offers a highly productive way to re-think Rancière vis-à-vis 
Latour. 
One of Latour’s highly original contributions lies in how he actually wants to 
retain Deweyian publics while carefully reserving a space for ethical and moral conduct 
through which aesthetics and rhetoric can play a key role. In turn, as I will suggest below, 
aesthetics comes to play a key role in the ethical project of Latour’s pragmatism. In 
Politics of Nature, Latour re-defines the polis as the human-nonhuman collective—our 
oikos and dwelling space. In so doing, he identifies four skills or professions (science, 
politics, economics, morality) that are necessary for the collective to “carry out the search 
for the common world” (162). These do not correspond to any precise profession and it is 
definitely possible for any one actor to occupy more than one profession. The professions 
are more like functions that a variety of different social actors will occupy within 
different assemblages. Scientists should create “instruments” and “laboratories” in order 
to detect and make visible objects’ complex unfolding; politicians are those who accept 
that action within the collective is necessarily hierarchical and that some actors—human 
and nonhuman—will be invariable excluded by any given political settlement 
manufactured in order to weaken or strengthen certain social-material arrangements; 
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economics “reflexively represents the collective to itself” in that economists are 
especially skilled at reducing both human and nonhuman actors to equations that describe 
their various inter- and intra-active capacities (150); and, morality, a term that I want to 
unpack in greater detail. 
If politicians draw on scientists’s representations and economists’s calculability of 
what has been made visible in order to legislate action, then moralists possess “scruples 
that make it necessary to go looking for invisible entities and appellants” (162). In 
Politics of Nature, Latour turns to Immanuel Kant as a point of contrast through which to 
clarify what he means by the profession of morality. Kant’s categorical imperative 
consisted of the obligation “not to treat human beings simply as means but always also as 
ends” (qtd. in Latour 155). Latour claims that a nonmodern world requires a categorical 
imperative where nonhumans as well as humans are treated as ends as well. In an earlier 
essay, “Morality and Technology: The End of the Means,” Latour offers a more detailed 
rationale for this choice. Latour poses a question that science can uncover, economics can 
calculate, and politicians need to act on: “Must we dispose of the waste from the nuclear 
industry in deep or surface silos?” (30). In Latour’s reading, Kant’s answer would be to 
turn to our own mental a priori faculty for judgments with the human means/ends 
restriction. In a sense, Kant wants morality to proceed from a divestment of practical and 
material confines that would likely involve one’s self-interest. Technologies and all 
objects in the world, thus, necessarily become means to ends. 
We might concede that Latour may be overstating Kant’s rejection of the 
material. However, his overstatement is in the service of making a larger point about 
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morality. Latour points toward a need to reclassify technology from a passive 
intermediary to an active enfolding (ontological hypokrisis). He writes: 
What is folded in technical action? Time, space and the type of actants. 
The hammer that I find on my workbench is not contemporary to my 
action today: it keeps folded heterogenous temporalities, one of which has 
the antiquity of the planet, because of the mineral from which it has been 
molded, while another has that of the age of the oak which provided the 
handle, while still another has the age of the 10 years since it came out of 
the German factory which produced it for the market. When I grab the 
handle, I insert my gesture in a “garland of time” as Michel Serres (1995) 
has put it, which allows me to insert myself in a variety of temporalities or 
time differentials, which account for (or rather imply) the relative solidity 
which is often associated with technical action. (249) 
Latour’s reading of agency accords well with that of the anthropologist Ambros 
Malafouris who suggests that humans are not merely defined by symbolic logic and the 
invention of the negative, but by our unique ability to attribute ourselves as the origin of 
an action. Simply put, in keeping with Latour’s desire to see politics as something that 
emerges from our agentive relationships with nonhuman actors, “It is impossible here to 
proceed as if the hammer ‘fulfilled a function’, for it overflows the strict limits of this 
container on all sides” (250). We view things as intermediates when they are 
instrumentalized and as mediators when they “overflow” their containers. Thus, Latour 
concludes that technologies never fully emerge as “means.” In his reading, Kant 
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necessarily converts objects to means them to in his recourse to a priori reason.  
Every technological initiation pays for the multiplication of mediators in 
the creation of intermediaries. The growth of the oak from the Ardennes 
was directed to quite other ends than the production of my hammer, even 
if it had been planted with this end vaguely in mind. Of the oak, the tool 
has kept but a minute part of its properties of solidity, of warmth, of the 
alignment of the lines of lignite. Where was the oak going by itself and for 
itself? In what world did it prolong its existence? Technology is not 
interested in such a question, compelled as it is to dislodge all the entities 
through which it passes in order to engender possible worlds and allow 
new dispositions. A very different anxiety runs through morality: how 
many mediators do the other forms of existence maintain in their wake? 
Do we not run the risk of treating the oak as a simple means for the 
hammer? (255) 
Simply stated, the moralist is thus the one who helps to maintain objects—things—as 
intermediaries.  
Aesthetics and Morality 
Given the pairing of aesthetics and morality, some may certainly have wondered 
what role rhetoric has in the human-nonhuman collective. Latour is critical of rhetoric in 
Pandora’s Hope given the Socrates and Callicles exclusion of the demos, and yet more 
sympathetic in “Democracy of Objects.” My own position is that rhetoric is not a 
profession in Latour’s expanded sense. It remains both an architectonic discourse and a 
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post-technê, and it is more accurate to say that all professions will invariably rely on 
enthymemes, rhetorical and materiality affectivity, and systems of inferential reasoning 
that are unique to their strengths and contributions to the collective of humans and 
nonhumans. Morality offers a key to how rhetoric might fit in as a skill or profession. 
Obviously, even politicians—both in Latour’s sense and in our commonsense notion of 
elected public officials, scientists, economists, and moralists will rely on persuasion and 
have to work within social and material conditions in order to induce cooperation. Yet, 
where closure in politics must occur, Latour writes that the moralist “offers a right of 
appeal to excluded parties” (Politics of Nature 162). Thus, I believe it is better to say that 
we are engaged in the project of analyzing rhetorical strategies that are specific to the 
professions, with morality occupying a central point of concern. Following from Latour’s 
arguments, we need better aesthetic tools to recognize the phone (the white noise) of 
objects (or of marginalized human groups within assemblages who are affected by those 
objects) before they commit indecorous acts that are harmful to the various good and bad 
mixtures of emergent publics that we try to articulate—the hyperobject of global 
warming and the Anthropocene being perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing our 
time.96 Yet, the catch is that we cannot reduce objects to means (mediators) in our 
identification of them should we wish to engage in the profession of morality. 
Latour offers additional insights into what specific technê might be involved in 
the representation of objects as things. Far from only being concerned with scientific and 
empirical description, few commentators have noted where Latour connects the moral 
function of the speech of objects with specific artistic practices.97 In “Why Has Critique 
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Run Out of Steam?” Latour specifically considers the types of aesthetic forms that allow 
objects to become Things. Latour turns (ever) again to Heidegger for the latter’s 
differentiation between an object—calculated and scientifically enframed—and a thing—
a gathering. The object is produced under the modernist Constitution and the thing is the 
reality of the object in the nonmodern (rhetorical realist) constitution. In Heidegger’s 
example of the jug, Latour radically alters Heidegger’s distinction between pre-modern 
and modern to differentiate between how an object is described and a thing. For 
Heidegger, the handmade jug is a thing while a can of coke—industrially fabricated—
cannot be a thing. Latour suggests “While the latter is abandoned to the empty mastery of 
science and technology, only the former, cradled in the respectful idiom of art, 
craftsmanship, and poetry, could deploy and gather its rich set of connections” (233). 
Heidegger’s bizarre hostility to modern technology aside, Latour is more interested in 
this general aesthetic phenomenon whereby objects become things. Latour proposes 
reversing the direction, talking about the objects of science as if they were things 
fabricated not by human hands alone—technê—but (in)directly fabricated by a variety of 
uneven post-technês. Ethical and moral awareness occurs at the point when the object 
becomes a thing, and when we see “a unique window into the number of things that have 
to participate in the gathering of an object” (234). This conversation directly relates back 
to Christina Haas and Richard Lanham’s desire to reduce transparency of technology that 
I cited in previous chapters. Humanists like their technologies to be visible, calculable, 
and able to be manipulated. 
Latour provides several models for artistic practices that present objects as things, 
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including Damien Ortega’s Cosmic Things where Ortega deconstructs Volkswagen Bug 
to its constituent individually manufactured parts. Ortega then hangs these parts by a 
string, dangling in the installation space, collapsing the space of art—which deals with 
things—and industrialization—which likes to present us with seamless technological 
objects. By challenging this dichotomy, Ortega emphasizes all of the individual 
contributions of all the parts that must contribute to a gathering of a thing. Latour makes 
this point about morality and aesthetics again in his analysis of the artist Manuel 
Franquelo’s The Language of Things (Latour, “The Language of Things”). Franquelo’s 
work involves photographs on printed chine colle. After applying this printing technique, 
Fanquelo created digital versions by scanning the photographs. He finally creates a 
unique texture by allowing Hugh Stoneman and Carmen Coral to etch the layered images 
in copper plates. In his brief comments that accompany the collection, Latour notes that 
each portrait seems almost haphazard or Dada-like. The objects that Fanquelo 
photographed were objects of everyday life like old-fashioned rotary telephones. In his 
arrangements, the objects appeared as if they had not been intentionally posed and 
arranged by the author, allowing the thing to “do the talking” (para. 5). Latour argues, 
“They have become necessary because, whatever the odd reasons that have brought them 
together in the studio, they are offering something else than their shape, a substance so 
rare in art that the viewer does not know what to call it: texture might be a word” (para. 
2). To put the matter very simply, Latour is tracing an aesthetic strategy that makes the 
Thing and not the Object appear. He writes, “Shape is the obvious; texture is the 
invisible. A shape is either sharp or fuzzy, crisp or blurred, revealed or hidden. Not a 
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texture” (para. 2). Further, he concludes 
Shape is a word for focus and out of focus, but none for texture and out of 
texture. Shape is vertical, texture, so to speak, is internal. A whole new 
pictorial and material vocabulary is at work here to translate the language 
of shape into that of texture. For instance the seven larger prints are 
stained by the explicit marks used to reframe the seven smaller ones. How 
could you better show that shape is not the goal but that another node of 
expression is at work here—to demonstrate the ways things reach at us? 
As if shape was only a slice, a vertical cut, in the lateral, transversal 
deployment of things. What Einstein might have called “the mollusk of 
reference . . . Showing not a shape with edges but rather the deployment of 
matters being transformed. Yes, for sure, another way to make things 
speak. (para. 4) 
 In consideration of the path from object to Thing, which I am suggesting is one 
form of indecorous speech appropriate to undertake on behalf of nonhuman actors, we 
must remember that Latour is not asking us to represent the reality of things-in-
themselves (the noumena). The last two sections of the large quoted block of text clearly 
indicate that 1. Latour does not intend scientists alone to be the final court of appeal for 
politics, and 2. empirical accounts must be supplemented by general aesthetic strategies 
that help audiences see objects as Things that gather and shape emergent publics. One 
way to begin to think of political action and dissensus through the ontological equality of 
nonhumans may simply lie in aesthetic strategies that call our attention to the complex 
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material properties and aspects of objects that our conventional hermeneutic methods or 
commonsense ways of perceiving objects prohibit. Such presentations would confirm the 
nonhuman turn’s anti-humanist aims of communicating to the human our ecological 
situatedness and the invisible constellation of actors that sustain the symbolic and the 
cultural.  
OOO and Metaphor 
 If Rancière wants action borne out of a presupposition of political equality, 
Latour’s presupposition of ontological equality will seek to present objects in a way that 
traces the emergent and self-organizing capacities of the material actors and ecologies 
through which Rancierian politics necessarily occur. I firmly agree with Bennett’s 
reading on this point. Latour, in my opinion, seems to be gesturing toward a renewal of 
an aesthetic formalism which I will simply call “nonmodern indecorous speech” designed 
to metaphorically simulate the complex character and existence of objects or nonhuman 
actors—a claim I will unpack in this final section. Thus, indecorous speech would 
necessarily involve adding these sorts of textures that convert objects into things, 
enabling objects to maintained as “things”—ontologically equivalent actors. 
Of all those who have been interested in the nonhuman, the OOO wing of the 
speculative realist movement has expressed a great degree of interest in aesthetics. In 
Heideggerian fashion, OOO suggests that we must maintain not just human Dasein but 
the Dasein all beings in their withdrawnness. Thus, the sublime tends to be the rhetorical 
figure that makes the most sense in this context. Much like in the earlier writings of 
Heidegger, poetic formalism and rhetorical figures have made an unsurprising rise to 
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prominence within the speculative realist ranks as is evidenced by Morton’s recourse to 
the sublime in “Sublime Objects.” For example, many OOO theorists employ the 
rhetorical figure Anthimeria in which a part of speech such as a noun is used as a verb to 
create an uncanny metaphoric juxtaposition. If our syntactic habit is to declare that an 
active subject acts on a passive object in such phrases as “a man walks into a bar,” the 
speculative realists often employ syntactical reversals such as Harman’s claim that the 
“the object styles.” The philosopher Levi Bryant as well writes, “the mug blues” to 
describe the virtual proper being of his coffee cup as it forms relations of force over time 
with various human and nonhuman actors within its phase space. In this figuration of 
Anthimeria, the idea is not that verbing the noun captures the reality of the object, but that 
it metaphorically defamiliarizes a common syntactical way that we have of attributing 
agency to humans alone.  
Intriguingly, even Bennett’s confident declaration of the agency of nonhumans 
nevertheless gestures toward figural strategies that convince the human of the human’s 
lack of access to the object’s reality. She writes, “Maybe it’s worth running the risks 
associated with anthropomorphizing (superstition, the divinization of nature, 
romanticism) because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism: a chord is struck 
between person and thing, and I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman 
‘environment’ ” (17).98 Another popular stylistic trope among these commentators has 
been systrophe, or, as Harman calls it, “ontography”: the semi-random listing of parts or 
qualities that make up an object through description without naming the whole object or 
allowing an overall essence or linear narrative to dominate the interpretation. We can see 
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clear shades of systrophe in Matthew Fuller’s dada-ist media ecology and throughout 
Latour’s writing. Latour’s continual efforts to list random combinations of nonhuman 
actors within any social phenomenon has been dubbed a “Latourian Litany” by Bogost 
(“Latourian Litanies” para. 2). Indeed, Michel Serres’ The Five Senses also mobilizes the 
trope of listing. 
Metaphor in particular has taken on renewed importance for object-oriented 
thinking. As aesthetic strategies, metaphors pretend no essential correspondence between 
the objects that are compared. There is no suggestion in Shakespeare metaphorical claim 
that “desire is death” the two objects employed the comparison share literal or essential 
equivalence. Rather, the metaphorical comparison between desire and death preserves 
each element’s conceptual irreducibility while nevertheless prompting a comparison and 
translation of their concrete appearances or other visible qualities. As one of Burke’s four 
master tropes, metaphor, or “perspective,” “brings out the thisness of a that, or the 
thatness of a this . . . tells us about one character as considered from the point of view of 
another character” (Grammar of Motives 503-04). Burke also argues that metaphor is 
crucial to any discussion on an object’s reality: “It is customary to think that objective 
reality is dissolved by such relativity of terms as we get through the shifting of 
perspectives. . . . But on the contrary, it is by the approach through a variety of 
perspectives that we establish a character’s reality” (504). Such a view is not unlike 
Karen Barad’s Heisenbergian agential realism where the observer and the observed co-
create reality, although Burke, as I argued in Chapter 2, is less interested in the 
nonhuman’s role in such cases. Sounding very much like Alfred North Whitehead, Burke 
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writes, “If we are in doubt as to what an object is, for instance, we deliberately try to 
consider it is an many different terms as its nature permits: lifting, smelling, tasting, 
tapping, holding in different lights, subject to different pressures, dividing, matching, 
contrasting, etc.” (504). Metaphor enables the Latourian relationship between shape and 
texture, and between object and thing. No object loses its “withdrawn” reality in the 
comparison. Both objects are maintained as unique and distinct entities. Metaphor 
simulates the ontological space of translation by which entities reduce one another’s 
reality. 
The OOO theorists consequently shift metaphor from a mere formalism to a 
representative anecdote for the object’s concealment as a thing. In Guerilla Metaphysics, 
Harman directly challenges Aristotle’s claim that metaphor was an unteachable gift that 
belonged to humans alone, arguing that all relations between objects take place not just 
like metaphors, but as metaphors. In an April, 2012 Atlantic Monthly article, Ian Bogost 
echoes Harman: “Being withdraws from access. There is always something left in reserve, 
in a thing. The best we can do as humans is to respect the hidden mystery of the 
experience of things, and speculate metaphorically about how an object like a computer 
or a pound cake encounters the world” (16). Later in Alien Phenomenology, Bogost gives 
a more detailed description of metaphor worth quoting at length,  
When one object caricatures another, the first grasps the second in the 
abstract, enough for the one to make some sense of the other given its own 
internal properties. A caricature is a rendering that captures some aspects 
of something else at the cost of other aspects. It is not the objects’ 
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perceptions that we characterize metaphoristically, but the perception 
itself, which recedes just as any other object does. In so doing, we release 
the relation from a reduction between other objects, flattening it down 
onto the same ontological plane as other actors. (82) 
OOO is not just interested in any and all forms of metaphor. Rather, OOO is 
interested in specific kinds of figurations that work against representation, the will-to-
truth, or logical clarity and toward affective obscurity. Elsewhere in “Sublime Objects,” 
Morton writes, “What metaphor does, then, is not unlike any other trope, which the old 
manuals call obscurum per obscures, describe something obscure by making it seem even 
more obscure. Percy Shelly was very fond of this trope—his images endarken rather than 
enlighten” (15). All of these various references to metaphor and writing about figural 
defamiliarization are informed directly by Harman’s previous writings on metaphor. 
According to Harman’s discussion of Ortega Y Gasset’s theory of metaphor in Guerilla 
Metaphysics, the metaphor “a cypress is like a juniper” is too close to the actual manner 
in which humans group trees together. He writes, “it fails as a metaphor precisely because 
the names can be fused together—of our common genus-species taxonomy of trees” 
(106). By contrast, Ortega Y Gassett’s claim “the cypress is a flame,” however, 
“succeeds only because they cannot be fused together.” Metaphor, “presents the inner 
execution of the things in simulated form. Poets cannot really crossbreed trees with 
flames: perhaps only wizards could do this, and their race has vanished from the earth.” 
(107).  
When we read Harman’s and other object-oriented philosophers’ passages both 
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about metaphor and elsewhere, we find not the quasi-empirical recounting of the 
assemblages within which objects and actors move, but the aesthetic formalism of the 
sort that Heidegger was famous for. A typical early Heideggerian description of reality is 
as follows: “When we analyze [color] in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it 
is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus 
shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon 
it to turn into a destruction. . . . The earth appears openly-cleared as itself only when it is 
perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable” (qtd. in Braver 25). 
Harman would add to Heidegger that all entities encounter each other this way, but 
Harman’s understanding of the function of metaphor is identical to the outcome of the 
early Heidegger’s formalism. The problem with preserving objects or any actor in their 
essential unknowability is that this declaration of the ontological uncertainty is generally 
where the OOO thinkers stop in our consideration of objects. In Heidegger’s point of 
view, our attempts to represent and enframe destroy that which we try to understand, “the 
way the Kantian a priori cogito attempts to perceive how a noumenon eradicates its 
noumenality” (Braver 59). Thus, we can find an anthimeria-like strategy within 
Heidegger, as Lee Braver argues, “who forges new terminology drawn from careful, 
open-minded descriptions of the things themselves in order to prevent ideas derived from 
other phenomena from contaminating the thing being studied. The purest way to respect 
beings’ uniqueness is to import no external terminology at all which, taken to its logical 
conclusion, restricts one to tautologous statements such as ‘the world worlds,’ ‘speech 
speaks,’ or ‘propriation propriates’ ” (59). 
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Figures of the Post-Technê: Material Metaphors as Nonmodern Indecorous Speech 
In an ironic move given his status as a “modern,” we can easily employ Burke’s 
rhetorical theory to read the aesthetic effects that OOO is after in their turn to metaphors 
of the uncanny and the sublime. In Permanence and Change, Burke defines the 
metaphoric operation of “perspective by incongruity” or “planned incongruity”:  
The gargoyles of the Middle Ages were typical instances of planned 
incongruity. The make of the gargoyles who put man’s-head on bird-body 
was offering combinations which were completely rational as judged by 
his logic of essences. In violating one order of classification, he was 
stressing another. . . . Were we to summarize the totality of its effects, 
advocating as an exhortation what has already spontaneously occurred, we 
might say that planned incongruity should be deliberately cultivated for 
the purpose of experimentally wrenching apart all those molecular 
combinations of adjective and noun, substantive and verb, which still 
remain with us. It should subject language to the same ‘cracking’ process 
that chemists now use in their refining of oil. (112, 119)  
Intriguingly, Burke believed that perspective by incongruity was a strategy that can be 
applied to all disciplines, utilized by both the scientist (“if science would be truly 
atheistic or impious to the last degree, it should try systematically to eradicate every last 
linkage that remains with us merely as the result of piety or innate propriety, and not 
because of its rationally established justification”) and the poet (“where the accepted 
linkages have been of an imposing sort, one should establish perspective by looking 
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through the reverse end of his glass, converting mastodons into microbes, or human 
beings into vermin upon the face of the earth”) alike (120). In fact, Burke even 
anticipates the aesthetic project of the sublime that Morton, Heidegger, and Latour are 
gesturing toward. Burke writes, “Or let us ever deliberately deprive ourselves of available 
knowledge in the search for knowledge. Attempting to understand motives and purposes 
by avoiding as much as possible the clues handed you ready-made in the texture of 
language itself. In this you will have deliberately discarded available data in the interests 
of a fresh point of view, the heuristic or perspective value of planned incongruity” (120). 
Thus, while OOO’s metaphorical descriptions of how objects conceal as a way to 
re-think delivery as ontological hypokrisis are certainly valuable, I believe that there are 
modifications to metaphors that are more conducive to the way in which objects can 
become things in an act of indecorous speech. Specifically, planned incongruity cannot 
just work at the level of symbolic action. It must actually foreground the material actors 
involved in communication. We must engage all mediums and modes of communication 
to the “cracking” process that Burke identifies for language. In Writing Machines, 
Katherine Hayles offers a way to conceive of the layering of objects through a specific 
production strategy that could be mobilized for augmented reality. In a technotext, a term 
by which “text” could just as easily mean “object” 
the physical attributes constituting any artifact are potentially infinite; in a 
digital computer, for example, they include the polymers used to fabricate 
the case, the rare earth elements used to make the phosphors in the CRT 
screen, the palladium used to the power cord prongs, and so forth.  From 
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this infinite array a technotext will select a few to foreground and work 
into its thematic concerns. (33)  
For Hayles, all texts—both print and digital—are technotexts by varying degrees or 
intensities of self-reflexivity about their materiality. While certainly related to Latour or 
Bennett’s areas of concern, the technotext in particular takes a familiar object such as W. 
H. Mallock’s Victorian novel A Human Document, which we would conventionally 
understand through its symbolic representations, ignoring the book binding, the paper 
texture, the visual elements of typography that we moderns try to conceal through a 
homogenous parenthetical indexing system and black font and white paper—and, as Tom 
Phillips does in The Humament, create an uncanny palimpsest that foregrounds the 
materiality of the medium and visual materiality of production.  
Examples of technotexts abound. Hangjun Lee and Chulki Hong’s video, The 
Cracked Share, foregrounds the invisible layer of actants that participate in our 
enjoyment of the symbolic or representational means of a film by representing the visual 
“noise” of the space in between all of the still frames that we never see when we watch an 
analogue movie. An outgrowth of the technotext is what Hayles calls a “material 
metaphor” (32). By this term, she means, when the materiality of the text is integral to its 
project of connecting world with word. It is a work when “medium and work were 
entwined in a complex relation that functioned as a multilayered metaphor for the relation 
of the world’s materiality to the space of simulation” (32). In a material metaphor, no 
utterance or form is ever instantiated by the human mind alone. For Hayles, all 
communication acts are formed within objects within objects within objects all the way 
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down a la Arthur Schopenhauer’s turtles. A material metaphor thus tarries with the 
sublime (allowing the object to become a thing) while nevertheless calling attention to 
the material instantiation of delivery. 
However, Hayles is primarily interested in the human-computer or human-text 
relationship; furthermore, if objects are discrete and real, they already have forms and 
humans are merely able to makes allies with certain qualities of certain objects from 
within specific assemblages. How can we simulate the process of withdrawal that 
ultimately marks the speculative realist’s employment of metaphor? If we were to pursue 
material metaphors as a form of what Bogost calls “carpentry” in Alien Phenomenology, 
we would need to think of them through all objects and through dimensions of experience 
that did not just relate to humans. Carpentry is Bogost’s term for the mode of 
composition that acknowledges the materiality of any act of communication. In Alien 
Phenomenology, Bogost suggests a form of aesthetic experience in which invisible 
operations and relations are made visible against human interpretive and relational 
autonomy. Bogost describes the Tableau Machine, “a non-human social actor” designed 
by Mario Romero, Zachary Pousman, and Michael Mateas. It is a “smart” home that is 
aware of its inhabitants locations and activities. Yet, Bogost describes how “the house 
does not merely record and respond, but interprets the state of the environment in the 
experience of abstract art” (114). Bogost notes, “Its creators surmise that the home can 
perceive, but they add an additional presumption: a home’s perception is unfathomable 
by its human occupants. Instead of understanding it, the best we can do is trace the edges 
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of its dark noise, producing a caricature of its experience in a form we can recognize” 
(137). 
Thus, Bogost recommends employing computer algorithms with randomized 
scripts in the process of participating in the carpentry that simulates relationality and 
withdrawal. Let us see how this might play out in the work of two additional digital 
artists who have been specifically interested in the algorithmic materiality of new media 
objects. Working through a Nintendo Entertainment System emulator, Ben Frye’s 
Deconstructulator allows a game such as Super Mario Bros to be played while the 
computer’s processing of the binary code is visualized alongside the screen in real time. 
Whatever activities the player makes within the system cause the revelation of 
corresponding changes through the otherwise invisible relations of material affect that the 
player does not directly encounter but that nevertheless intimately construct the 
assemblages of the game. 
 At the same time, we can compare Frye’s revelation of the hidden materiality of 
operation of the code to the artist Jodi’s revelations in her older installment Crtl-Space. 
The difference between the two can help us to establish where a break in the portioning 
of the sensible emerges, giving rise to an object politics. Like Frye, Jodi’s technotext 
takes on a critique of hermeneutics that would often restrict its gaze to the contents of the 
screen. While Frye allows the game operator to keep moving, alerting him or her to 
hidden relations that change in space with each step—as does Tableau House—Jodie 
invokes a technê of “noncorrespondance” (Galloway, Essays). In video game lingo, 
noncorrespondance occurs when a player pushes the button for “jump” and the character 
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will not jump. In the simulated sense of a material metaphor, the object has become a 
thing. On entering the website installation of Crtl-Space, the system’s code reveals itself 
through the mediation of visualization while directly simulating a system crash, but the 
user is no longer able to test the effects of his or her own influence within the system. In 
this way, Jodi’s system has taken on its own impenetrable materiality where Frye, by 
contrast, allows players to work and test relations within it. Here, a potential continuum 
of difference is paved for a reconsideration of how nonhuman actants or various material 
layers are represented vis-à-vis technology that could be used to generate topoi for any 
sort of compositional medium. Procedural rhetorics, thus, are instrumentalized in the 
service of bearing witness to new material idioms to borrow Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 
phrase. 
This continuum of differences can also serve to create new compositional forms 
that combine algorithm-driven planned incongruity with the object-oriented goal of 
simulating the decentering the human agent. I recently came across a game called Plague, 
Inc. (2012) designed for the iPhone. Plague, Inc. is what is known among gaming 
scholars as a “pandemic simulator.” The player takes on the role of a virus with the goal 
of increasing the virus’s conative or entelechial drive in order to extinguish the human 
race. In a pandemic simulator, there are no human agents like doctors, FEMA officials, or 
health practitioners that the player can summon to intervene. In contrast to Sid Meier’s 
strategy game simulation in Civilization, Plague, Inc refuses to allow the player to access 
or relate to any human agents in an agentive capacity. Where Meier wants to show how 
human instrumental actions like military interventions and creating colonies can create 
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emergent and unpredictable affects, Plague, Inc. offers no anthropomorphic narrative 
about who the player is or why the virus might want to wreak havoc on human 
civilizations. Unlike the popular Resident Evil series where the Umbrella Corporation’s 
genetic manipulation inadvertently creates a zombie apocalpyse, Plague, Inc. offers no 
common tropes or mythologies of rogue scientists or insidious multinational 
pharmaceutical companies who have created this virus for profit or world domination. 
The gamespace is entirely composed of the virus as the only agentive actor. 
The game designers also reinforced the absence of the human agent in its visual 
presentation. The graphic elements—“skins”—allow the game to be rendered in a 
sensible and perceptible manner. Yet, Plague, Inc. deliberately employs a minimalist 
style to the effect that there is no visual avatar for either the player or the disease. The 
game designers write,  
The entire game takes place on a rudimentary Mercator map of the globe, 
where you select your country of origin and watch the days tick by. Tiny 
boats stream from seaports to their docking places in other countries, and 
tiny airplanes emerge in wave upon wave, shooting across continents. The 
player mostly watches, accumulating points at certain milestones in the 
progression of the infection, and cashing in those points through menu 
screens that allow the player to mutate the pathogen at will, exercising 
some control over the symptoms and vectors of infection” (para. 3).  
With the absence of any narrative, the player can only progress in the game by making 
the virus a major affective agent within the various different actors and networks around 
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the globe. The entire focus of the game is on the virus’s expansion and success at a very 
concrete and empirical level. Although they cannot present the virus “in itself,” the 
designers have strived to maintain it as an active mediator rather than a passive 
intermediary. Humans and other actors have become the intermediaries. 
As a result of these design decisions, the figuration of human agency—not the 
player’s agency—has been recast from individual or local to global and epic scales. 
Visually, the game employs what Burke calls planned incongruity: an uncanny inversion 
of the current graphics-heavy commercial approaches to game design designed to please 
and supplement human sensory experience. The designers argue, “[the graphic design] 
also perfectly fits the pathological perspective it asks gamers to adopt. To a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail, and to a pathogen, everything looks like a Petri dish. This 
clever and dizzying experiment in proportion undermines our typical approach to 
ourselves and to the globe, and it does so in a way that seems uniquely suited to the 
mobile gaming format” (para. 3). As morbid as the outcome might be for humans, the 
designers are successfully performing what Bogost calls for in terms of imagining what 
the world might appear as to a pound cake or a virus. Procedural rhetoric has been 
mobilized in the serve of arguing that “the puzzles that structure strategy games may 
appear innocuous and intellectual, but in fact they are characterized by a total lack of 
perspective. They work by inciting people to engage in endless rounds of asocial, 
problem-solving logic that exists apart from any kind of human connection” (para. 3). In 
combination with the idea of a material metaphor or Bogostian carpentry, I believe that it 
might be possible to suggest a form of object-oriented simulation gaming. Viruses may 
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create a greater sense of fear and pathos in the collective mythology of human 
civilizations. However, we could just as easily create ecologically-themed games 
featuring Alaimo’s mercury, Bennett’s Omega-3 fatty acids, pirate radio, pound cakes, or 
virtually any of the other examples that I have mentioned in this dissertation to feature. 
Materialist Pedagogy 
Algorithms need not only be related to the revelation of computer systems, but to 
materiality more broadly speaking as we can find in Jodi Shipka’s book, Toward a 
Composition Made Whole. In theorizing to digital literacies, Shipka argues that 
compositionists restrict what counts as technology to computers and digital production. If, 
however, technology is not merely an instrument, and all literacies are technological and 
the point of composing is not just to have students learn rigid genre rules, but to inculcate 
critical thinking and rhetorical awareness, then Shipka asks us to explore the 
compositional potential of all things—digital and physical. Composing is about 
negotiating material forms and human nonhuman assemblages and looking at how each 
offers unique possibilities and constraints in terms of trying to communicate an idea to a 
different audience. In a very real sense, Shipka illustrates why I have preferred the term 
“materiality” (e.g., material realism) at many places in this dissertation in comparison to 
“technology.” Her claim is that students should compose as a way of being in the world 
and engaging with human and nonhuman forms than just writing with the mastery of 
academic genres in mind. We could readily infer a form of indecorous speech as a 
pedagogical outlet for rhetoric and writing teachers with the explicit goal of revealing the 
	   327 
Thing-ness of the various actors involved in delivery as an ethical and, perhaps, political 
mode of dwelling and practicing rhetoric in a world of nonhuman actors.  
Material metaphors and Shipka’s points of review relate to what Jenny Rice has 
recently called a “publics approach to place” (14). She writes, “Rather than seeing place 
merely as a composition (which of course it is), and rather than seeing place in terms of 
its ecological character (which, of course, it has), I prefer to examine the habits and 
practices of publics who can and do affect that location” (14). Rice wants to investigate 
the process by which “publics are imagined by those who compose them, but these 
imaginations are always materializable in publics that popular, change, and undergo the 
effects of material places. It is in publics, not places, that rhetoricians can make the 
strongest intervention into imperiled places” (14). In addition to Rice, nonmodern 
rhetorical realism and political aesthetics offer a crucial materialist correlative to those 
involved in the rhetorical methodology of institutional critique (Sullivan; Porter; Blythe; 
Grabill; Miles). In Blythe’s case, agency within institutions (both technological and 
ecological) means “Students (and we) should recognize how organizations operate, 
critique that operation, find points where the working of an organization may be altered 
(points that are often discursive, as explained later), and recognize their role (perhaps 
even their complicity at times) in maintaining organizations” (168). Thus, it is the 
mundane and the material that allow not only for a better understanding of better or 
worse “a given local institution as a series of interrelated systems” (174) demonstrates 
how “changes in one system brings changes in others” (174). Although Stoneman only 
ties indecorum to speech, the idea of spatial contestation—the materialization of 
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rhetoric—has been extensively written on by rhetorical scholars in ways that have clear 
ties to indecorum. Nedra Reynolds’ work on cultural geography attempts to understand 
the spaces of daily-lived existence as sites of cultural production as a form of emergent 
publics.  
Christian Weisser’s well-known scholarship on forms of public writing argues 
that it not liberal consensus but contestation that is necessary for vibrant democratic 
public sphere. Technological and material literacies are becoming a crucial part of 
learning to write for multimodal publics. As Weisser suggests in the context of technical 
writing, “Many of our students will go on to careers in which they will use or perhaps 
create apps for portable devices, and we are obligated to prepare them for those careers” 
(“Mobile Apps”). Yet, given my dissertation’s focus on nonmodern ontologies, I 
necessarily interpret Weisser’s claim in a different sense. I think we are not obligated to 
prepare students to seamlessly enter the work space to manipulate objects and to 
perpetuate the calculative devices of the neoliberal order. Rather, as teachers of writing 
and rhetoric, I argues that we are obligated to encourage our students to view 
technologies as Things that participate in the composition—in Latour’s sense—of social 
reality.  
Conclusion 
This awareness of the specific technê and post-technê constitutes an extremely 
crucial form of indecorous appropriate speech proper to a world of ontological hypokrisis. 
Can we actually act borne out of a presupposition of political equality on behalf of 
objects? We cannot, as Rancière’s solidarity model demonstrates. However, I have 
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argued that imposing this requirement—either we have humanist solidarity or there is no 
politics—fundamentally mistakes the task of rhetoric in a world of nonhuman actors. The 
task that we must engage in is what Latour calls the moralist’s relationship to the 
profession of politics: negotiating hierarchies and police orders of subjects and objects 
while lobbying for aesthetic means of the re-inclusion of excluded humans, actants, 
assemblages, and Things. Thus, for me, while aesthetic acts and indecorous speech on 
behalf of objects is one interesting route to employ, rhetoric in the era of the 
Anthropocene definitely needs to attend to forms of politics specific to environmental 
activism: actions borne up in presuppositions of ontological equality and ecological 
awareness. In the context of Marshall McLuhan’s observation that it is the artist who 
diagnoses where our naturalization functions with the technological (or social) actors that 
are at play, aesthetics, decorum, and objects can play a role in allowing things to gather 
(deliver) human communication acts. These elements of Dewey and Rancière’s thinking 
are vital for the realization of politics in a nonmodern cosmos. 
The process of maintaining objects as things takes on the Rancièrian character not 
of politics, but of morality. The relationship between politics in Rancière’s sense and 
Latour’s aesthetic pragmatism can be seen in that Latour’s goal for morality is not to 
create new partitions of the sensible or to affirm a police order. The moralist will leave 
the creation of partitions of the sensible to the politicians for the sake of hierarchical 
action, while constantly devising aesthetic means to disrupt the ordinary ways in which 
modernity tempts us to relate to objects. This aesthetic act is specific to the profession of 
morality and how rhetoric functions within this particular assemblage. In no way, shape, 
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or form would it serve to replace a Rancièran form of politics as an adequate political 
resource for symbolic action and human community formation. However, as I hope that 
this dissertation has argued, symbolic action is something that will always be an emergent 
product of the world of motion and the ways in which language and communication 
materialize within various assemblages. 
Delivery as ontological hypokrisis serves to highlight the need to more concretely 
analyze the complex range of material actors involved in instrumental acts of persuasion. 
At the same time, actor-network theory, hardware and software studies, and assemblage 
theory simultaneously function as an ecological resource to undermine modernity’s 
presuppositions of the human’s rational, social, and cognitive autonomy apart from our 
entanglement with nonhuman actors in technology and nature. Technologies—
technotexts—will take on emergent products and establish conditions for our rhetorical 
agency that both reflect and yet will be exceeded by an instrumentalist conception of 
delivery. Will these neo-formalisms automatically form an ethical response in every use? 
Absolutely not. As I noted via Carolyn Miller’s rhetorica utens and rhetorica docens in 
Chapter 5, there is no way to avoid Cicero’s weapons in the hands of madmen debate 
when we turn from unveiling the hidden premises in enthymemes to the hidden 
algorithms in computational devices. In Persons and Things, Barbara Johnson notes that 
capitalists have become especially skilled at anthropomorphism to sell products to 
consumers. The toilet scrubber brush speaks to us to create a feeling of pathos to help us 
forget that we are purchasing a passive instrumental object and perpetuating the cycle of 
consumer capitalism itself. Simply put, anthropomorphism—formalism—is never 
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sufficient in itself to make objects into things. Anthropomorphism in the capitalist 
assemblage is not the same as anthropomorphism in the Jane Bennett-Vibrant 
Materialism assemblage or the Steve Holmes-dissertation assemblage. Delivery is what 
helps identify the specific materialization of any act of formalism or communication, and 
its emergent affects. 
These conclusions, for me, are what the canon of delivery means in a world of 
nonhuman actors. Fundamentally, as I have argued in this dissertation, the canon of 
delivery in new media must at once encompass instrumental decisions like creating 
algorithms for persuasive purposes, and at the same time look to account for non-
instrumental nodes of material attractors as they condition the space for susceptibility to 
symbolic representation. Such a conception of delivery for me has the power to really 
produce some interesting forms of research, especially if rhetorical theorists can bring 
themselves to move beyond representation and to trace the concrete networks of actors 
that give rise to persuasion. For example, Burke also defines rhetoric as “identification.” 
Identification is the a priori common ground the rhetor would use when seeking to 
induce cooperative social action in others, that is, to persuade. Identification is President 
Obama on the campaign trail sitting at the bar drinking Budweiser with a group of 
ordinary Americans saying, “I’m just a ommon Joe, like you.” For Burke, identification 
is both a precondition and an outcome of persuasion. Yet, thinking about persuasion as a 
complex activity of delivery through assemblages, we could radically extend and 
complicate the idea of identification though the network theorist Duncan Watts. In his 
book Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, Watts switches from identification to 
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susceptibility. Our susceptibility to social and—I would add—material affect and 
influence are due more to the systematic conditions of the networks in which we live than 
with any compelling logical or enthymematic argument from a rhetor. If a person’s 
internal threshold for decision-making is 80%, with a social network of ten people that 
she looks to for guidance in decision-making, then eight of the ten people she knows 
must hold an idea for her to be most likely to change her mind. In a 2012 Presidential 
election where statistician Nate Silver accurately predicted the elections’ outcome by 
rendering almost negligible any individual symbolic act by a politician, Watts’ thinking 
has relevance for nonsymbolic assessments of affect and delivery. Thus, we could study 
similar processes like this through the material circulation of activist newsgames, 
determining, to offer an illustrative and hypothetical example, how many friend “likes” 
on a Facebook posting of a progressive game like September 12 actually might relate to a 
conservative user’s desire to repost it. We could draw on digital humanities and social 
media data visualization programs like Gelphi to map and trace the networks of affective 
susceptibility. As I noted in Chapter 4, where modern circulation theorists look at 
rhetorical velocity, nonmodern rhetorical theorists examine rhetorical viscosity. 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle declares, “Homer often, by making use of metaphor, 
speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is due to creating actuality in 
all such cases that his popularity is due . . . for he gives movement and life to all, and 
actuality is movement (1412a 304).1 Homer’s descriptions such as “the shameless stone” 
or “the eager spear-point” confirmed that a world of superhuman forces—the gods—
could activate inanimate objects to aid ancient heroes in their quests. Over 2000 years 
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after Homer, many of the nonmodern theorists that I have discussed seem to be interested 
in renewing a similar project but from a nonmetaphorical perspective. Seen from the 
standpoint of nonhuman agency, Latour suggests that each discipline can be defined “as a 
complex mechanism for giving worlds the capacity to write or to speak, as a general way 
of making mute entities literate” (Politics 66, emphasis original). Not unlike Homer, the 
discipline of rhetoric currently faces the need to revise its own troubled relationship to 
materiality, ecology, and delivery by determining which entities we wish to recognize 
and to animate as agents within the various assemblages that we write in. Therefore, it is 
my firm belief that even if conversations about nonhuman agency turn out to be just 
another passing intellectual paradigm or a mere Homeric metaphor, I do firmly believe 
that the nonhuman turn offers digital and visual rhetoric, and especially delivery 
scholarship, a long overdue invitation to examine how and in what ways material forces 
like algorithms are allowed to matter within rhetoric’s past and present disciplinary 
trajectories. 
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1 It is only in the rhetoric of science subfield that one really encounters continual conversations between 
rhetoric and realism. The prominent rhetoric of science scholar Alan G. Gross acknowledged that a 
rhetorical scholar must at the very least hold to Arthur Fine’s conception of “common sense reality,” that is, 
many rhetorical scholars are perfectly willing to be the Dr. Samuel Johnson who will kick a rock to refute 
George Berkeley’s idealism. However, the work of rhetoric is generally taken as the need to interpret 
human signs about objects rather than to interpret the nature of the objects themselves. Despite occasional 
flare-ups in the “culture wars” across the humanities and episodes such as Dilip Gaonkar’s polemical—yet 
necessary in many ways—attack on Big Rhetoric’s relativist implications, rhetorical realists are a small 
minority within larger fields of rhetoric, composition, and communication studies. The dominant paradigm 
remains anti-realism wherein linguistic mediation is an a priori given. 
 
2 Another common variant of anti-realism is the sort of anti-foundationalism located in the thinking of 
Richard Rorty. 
 
3 I want to acknowledge that linguistic constructivism writ large does not necessarily foreclose the idea that 
language cannot have a material dimension. However, given rhetoric’s historic hostility to matter-casuality-
science, rhetorical theorists generally interpret linguistic constructivism’s rhetorical nature as a purely 
symbolic phenomenon. 
 
4 I refer to scholars such as John Trimbur, Licona and Herndl, and Bruce Horner. 
 
5 Cloud’s subsequent attempts in “The Matrix and Critical Theory’s Disappearance of the Real” to 
negotiate historical materialism, realism, and social constructivism lapse into anti-realism. She argues that 
rhetorical realism’s subject matter is properly about two competing versions of the real. One is that of 
experience “in which knowledge of the material base of oppression contra mystification generates critical 
insight and the capacity for action” and a Lacanian Real, “in which the psychic residue of the lack of 
wholeness in the Symbolic and the experience of trauma leave persons/subjects uneasy” (248). Thus, as 
seeing both Lacan and “Marx” as a space of a libidinal materialism, Cloud favors a materialist definition 
inflected with Marx’s human materialism. 
 
6 Cloud is not alone among rhetorical theorists who have invoked Moufee and Laclau’s writing in the 
context of social constructivist or social epistemic accounts of reality. James F. Klumpp and Thomas 
Hollihan affirm for rhetorical activists, critical objectivity is often “an ideological ruse for complicity in 
maintaining the existing social order” (84). A quick database search for articles citing Moufee and 
LaClau’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy—an anti-realist text par excellence—and the word “rhetoric” 
lists over 2000 articles on GoogleScholar’s search feature. Notable theorists include Richard McKerrow’s 
“Critical Rhetoric”; Green; Cloud; Crowley, Toward a Civic Discourse; Celeste Condit, “In Praise of 
Eloquent Diversity”; and, JP Zompetti “Toward a Gramscian Critical Rhetoric.” 
 
7 Under anti-realism, rhetorical materialism thus becomes, Cloud concludes about “advancing a 
political/economic identity to speak in the interest of the working class” (153). The Scylla and the 
Charybdis that Cloud claims to be negotiating are not merely idealism and orthodox Marxism, but a deeper 
conversation related to realism and anti-realism. One could consider Cloud’s rhetorical materialism to be an 
exception; however, as I will describe in the forthcoming chapters, this anti-realist problem with materiality 
conceived of strictly as discourse will plague many ecological (Cooper; Trimbur; Porter) and feminist 
(Davis; Ballif) accounts that attempt to factor in the body or nature to the scene of rhetoric. Lest I be 
accused of stacking the deck, allow me offer a final example from a non-Marxist history of rhetorical 
materiality. Cloud’s view can be located in Bruce Horner’s Terms of Work, a “cultural materialist approach” 
or “social material” approach to rhetoric and composition study. Horner’s Terms of Work for Composition: 
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A Materialist Critique is marked by such a paradigm shift wherein he argues for a “material cultural studies 
approach.” Horner’s argument furthermore realizes the stakes of discussing rhetoric vis-à-vis materiality, 
because it allows us to understand how subjectivities are produced and maintained, how unjust power 
relations are established through material relations of writing communications: 
that materiality may be understood in terms of writing technologies, an attribute of 
writing now being given renewed attention because of the recent shift from the 
technologies of paper and pen to computer software and hardware. Or it might be 
understood more broadly to refer to a host of socioeconomic conditions contributing to 
writing production, such as the availability of certain kinds of schooling . . . yet more 
broadly, the materiality of writing might be understood to refer to networks for the 
distribution of writing. (xvii) 
The revelation of material is offered to challenge a simple model of production and consumption as a linear 
process that conceals the material instantiation of texts: “[this simple model] occludes the full material 
social process of production” (180). Such a view actually does acknowledge an imbrication between 
rhetoric and its material conditions of production and circulation; however, it is not these material entities 
in their own right that is of interest. They have material valence only in so far as they shed light on human 
constructed realities. The limits of Horner’s model is revealed in Wysocki’s comment that, “[for Horner] 
we have agency, that is, in so far as we recognize how we are positioned by and can work with and within 
our particular historically situated and contingent material structures” (4). Furthermore, it presumes that the 
only agency that can occur within a consideration of rhetorical materiality is that which is “fixed and 
static”—a Newtonian-Cartesian view of matter—allowing for discovery of the proper work of thinking, 
thereby preserving an abyss between Culture and Nature (nomos and physis). Horner’s materialism is 
predicated on a neo-Kantian world of mental constructivism and a Newtonian world of static objects 
awaiting human agentive manipulation. 
 
8 “Incipient action” and “attitude” are two areas where Burke referenced the mediating role of the body in 
persuasion. Opinions among Burke scholars differ widely. Deborah Hawhee suggests that Burke anticipates 
the nonmodern view of the body and ecology. Others suggest that Hawhee too easily describes the world of 
motion in the terms of action. 
 
9 Let me offer two extremely recent articulations of anti-realism. In Locating Visual-Material Rhetorics 
(2012), Amy Proben has extended Carole Blair’s rhetorical materialism for use in GPS tracking and visual 
rhetoric, but reconnecting Blair’s—at times—more radical views of materiality back into a Foucaultian 
view of matter as discourse. In Jordynn Jack’s recent (2011) articulation of “neurorhetoric,” it is the 
“discourse” about neurology and not the neurons themselves that is of interest to rhetorical theorists.  
 
10 Sayers further explains Kant’s metaphysical position: “For Kant, it must be emphasized, is a dualist. He 
recognizes the separate and independent existence both of objective things-in-themselves and also of 
subjective appearances, representation, phenomena. . . . For Kant’s philosophy, like Locke’s, also involves 
an unbridgeable division—an absolute gulf-between appearances and things-in-themselves; with things-in-
themselves placed irretrievably beyond the grasp of our knowledge” (22).  
 
11 We encounter a similar move from world to mind in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. As Kant observes,  
in experience, to be sure, perceptions come together only contingently, so that no 
necessity of their connection is or can become evident in the perceptions themselves, 
since apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of empirical intuition, but no 
representation of the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances that it 
juxtaposes in space and time is to be encountered in it. But since experience is a 
cognition of objects through perception, consequently the relation in the existence of the 
manifold is to be represented in it not as it is juxtaposed in time but as itis objectively in 
time, yet since time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of 
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objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, hence 
only through a priori connecting concepts. Now since these always carry necessity along 
with them, experience is thus possible only through a representation of the necessary 
connection of the perceptions. (68) 
 
12 Unlike Locke, Kant does claim that things-in-themselves exist and that we can provide intellection about 
them; however, Bryant claims that Kant sided with the mind: 
. . . [Kant] maintains that we have no access to these objects and therefore no means of 
determining whether, like the objects of our experience, things-in-themselves are 
autonomous, individual unities, or whether the things-in-themselves are, in reality, really 
a thing-in-itself, a primordial unity or One, that is then subsequently formatted or “cut up” 
by our minds. Since the substantiality of substance must issue from somewhere, and since 
we cannot appeal to being itself to ground substance, Kant contends that substance is 
instead an a priori category of mind that is imposed on the chaotic manifold of intuition 
giving it structure or formatting it. (81) 
 
13 By humanism, I simply mean the view of the human as an autonomous subject who is able to consciously 
think and write with absolute intentionality and agency. As Bradford Vivian reminds us, “The rhetorical 
tradition has always valued the ontological status of the speaking subject” (22). 
 
14 Even psychoanalytic or libidinal accounts can still be incorporated into a subject-(de)centered rhetoric. 
The philosopher Paul Ricoeur called Friedrich Nietzsche, Marx, and Sigmund Freud the “three great 
hermeneuts” of suspicion. Each identified forces in operation beneath the conscious subject—will, labor, 
and the unconscious respectively—but none obliged rhetorical theorists to consider nonhuman forces or 
matter in itself. 
 
15 At the outset, it is fair to acknowledge DeLanda’s claim above about the “devil term” status of realism. 
Some, for this reason, prefer to retain the term materialism over realism. Elizabeth Gross, for example, 
claims that realism—even when the question of the nonhuman is raised—is invariably tied to epistemology 
and not ontology. She retains the term “materialism” as have new feminist materialists whereas the “real” is 
what is produced through the dynmatic interplay of human-nonhuman action. Grosz comments, “I am 
much more interested in the dynamic force of the real itself and how the real enables representation and 
what of the real is captured by representation.” (Grosz qtd in Kontturi and Tiainen  247). Yet, I like the 
term realism because of its “metaphysical” resonances, always reminding us of a constant interplay 
between what appears to us and what lies beyond. 
 
 
16 Kevin J. Porter’s theory of consequentialist discourse also shares strong points of congruity with Blair’s 
materialism. 
 
17 While I will explore several examples of this trend throughout my dissertation, I want to offer one recent 
(2010) essay in rhetoric that has attempted such a nonmodern revision that I simply do not have the space 
to go into in detail: Nathan Stormer’s, “Encomium of Helen’s Body.” Stormer invokes Spinoza to develop 
what I am calling a nonmodern rhetorical materialism. If conatus means “an effort, endeavor, striving” or 
“a force, impulse, or tendency simulating human effort,” then Spinoza’s comment in III Proposition 6 of 
the Ethics, “each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” serves as a way 
to dramatically re-oriented our theories of materiality. Stormer contrasts Spinoza to Hobbes’ “survivalism.” 
For Hobbes, instinct will inevitably overcome reason, making for an antagonistic social struggle of all 
against all. In contrast to Hobbes’ dualism of mind and body, two distinct substances where body (Nature) 
overdetermines mind (culture), Spinoza sees not two distinct entities but one and the same thing. Self-
awareness (“I think”), Stormer argues, is both distinct from the body, yet part of the same reality, resulting 
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in what seems like a logical paradox: “to say that the mind is the idea of the body is to say that ‘idea’ is 
awareness, not a facsimile or a representation, of the body. Mind and body are two distinct, interdependent 
expressions of the same reality, but neither is a copy of the other” (221).  
 Matter is not static and fixed, but engaged in an active state of “mattering.” “Mattering” is what 
Stormer calls a generalized “will-to-matter” that is irreducible to the (Nietzschean) will-to-knowledge 
(recognition, identification). The will-to-matter is a species of a larger conative Genus that applies to all 
material entities. Basically, this amounts to the fact that the mechanism of Nature by which the self is 
differentiated and alienated in language is of the same substance but not the same kind of all forms of 
embodiment. The general desire for self-preservation, for conatus is at once, “A will to matter is a desire to 
continue to be embodied in the world. It speaks to the performative impulse for reiteration in that to persist, 
a thing must become itself again and it is never the same for the effort. As the body changes, so does the 
idea of the body” (224). Stormer concludes by drawing a parallel to Judith Butler’s thinking of 
performativity. Butler’s articulation of performativity in Gender Trouble was resoundingly criticized 
because it focused primarily on how the body is produced in discourse, but not how it exists as a material 
force in the world. Stormer stretches performativity from being a quality of the subject to a conative quality 
of all beings in a passage worth quoting at length: 
Materiality is the solvent that dilutes the essential ‘humanity’ of rhetorical action. The 
human quality presumably revealed by rhetorical action is dependent on the very matter 
that is imagined as exterior to whom or to what is doing the acting . . . if will is part of the 
same substance as matter, not external to it, then rhetorical performativity is immanent to 
material interconnection, not a force that enters the world of things as strikes its fancy. 
That the subject and object of rhetoric are sexed masks the not-so-human materiality of 
rhetoric. It anthropomorphizes materiality. Tinkering with Butler’s wording, it is not 
about the human  “materiality of sex,” but the sex of materiality. . . . Here, the importance 
is not that masculine/feminine are constructs, but that an externalization of matter from 
rhetoric is achieved through feminization. By contrast, the responsibility and 
vulnerability of matter to itself is not a human trait, even as being human depends on 
vulnerability to material influence. To be rhetorical, a thing must be materially 
vulnerable; to be materially vulnerable is not uniquely human. (225) 
Such a flat ontological view does not mean replacing the anti-realist rejection of the object’s reality with an 
assumption that all entities have the same qualities. Here, Stormer makes a productive distinction: “that is 
not to say that there is no difference between a film and the communication between RNA molecules and 
proteins. Both perform a will to matter. The question then becomes what is rhetorical about material 
vulnerability without resorting to circular reasoning: to be rhetorical is to be human; to be human is to be 
capable of rhetoric” (226). Finally, he concludes, “A will to matter betrays the inessentially human side of 
rhetoric by exposing the immanence of rhetoric to material vulnerability. To be human, we need rhetoric 
and we cultivate it, but the capacity to act rhetorically is not ours because we are human. It is because we 
are material” (226). Stormer’s “will-to-matter,” and his rhetorical materialism constitutes a death knell for 
Cartesian-Newtonian ontologies by reorganizing rhetorical materialism around both the inscriptive actions 
of human beings and the conative strirrings, strivings, murmurings, and subterranean essences of 
nonhuman actors. The only question that remains is whether rhetorical theorists wish to confess in Latour’s 
sense that we have never been modern or postmodern (e.g., anti-realist). If we were never modern, then the 
subject and object were never split at an ontological level of substantiality. Further, such a nonmodern view 
requites us to theorize rhetoric out of a dialectic of vulnerability to nonhuman actors while searching out 
ethics of care and nonrepresentational rhetorics to bear witness to what modernity would expunge. 
 
18 Blair’s essay, in no small coincidence, was published in Selzer’s Rhetorical Bodies collection. She 
identifies the “the lack of a materialist language about discourse.” With an eye toward developing such as 
heuristic, she poses five questions: “1. What is the significance of the text’s material existence? 2. What are 
the apparatuses and degrees of durability displayed by the text? 3. What are the text’s modes of possibilities 
of reproduction or preservation? 4. What does the text do to (or with, or against) other texts? 5. How does 
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the text act on people?” She then adds several sub-questions, such as a text’s potential for “enabling, 
appropriating, contextualizing, supplementing, correcting, challenging, competing or silencing” (39). Here, 
Blair has moved beyond the view of rhetoric as symbolic (concerned primarily with meaning) and 
immaterial, writing “No text is a text, nor does it having meaning, influence, political stance, or legibility, 
in the absence of material form. Rhetoric is not rhetoric until it is uttered, written, or otherwise manifested 
and given presence. Thus, we might hypothesize as a starting point for theorizing rhetoric that at least one 
of its basic characteristics (if not the most basic) is its materiality” (43). Symbols, she argues, are material 
entities. Rather than, as most rhetorical theorists desire, ask “what a text means,” she says, “if rhetoric’s 
materiality is not a function of its symbolic constructions of meaning, then we must look elsewhere: we 
must ask not just what a text means but, more generally, what it does; and we must not understand what it 
does as strictly adhering to what it was supposed to do” (23). Furthermore, while “everyone seems to know 
that rhetoric is not exclusively about production, and more specifically, that it has consequences that exceed 
goal fulfillment . . . hardly anyone seems willing to address it as anything else” (44). This “anything else” 
would be a view of materialism radically different from anything that rhetorical theorists are used to 
examining. 
 
19 Greene, like Cloud, is concerned with the actual and real conditions under which language circulates. 
“By contrast,” Greene claims, “we need to be more sensitive to how communication and, more specifically, 
the rhetorical subject operate alongside an apparatus of subjectivity associated with changes in capitalism 
that understands that commodity production is not the only site for generating class antagonisms” (38). 
This comment regards how changes in modes of labor create a rhetorical subject, making rhetoric not a 
source of creativity but, at best, a lens of demystifying labor relations. According to Greene, materialist 
rhetorics often try to account for the representational politics of symbolic communication, and in doing so 
he sees two distinct types of materialist rhetorics. The first follows what he calls “the logic of influence 
model,” meaning these materialists “focus on how the interests, often understood as a will to power, of a 
speaker are hidden, distorted or revealed by that speaker’s rhetorical choices” and emphasize “rhetoric’s 
role as a form of persuasion” (38). The second follows the “constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity,” 
where scholars focus “on how the text functions to politically and aesthetically figure the process of 
subjectivity” in order to define “rhetoric as a form of identification” (38). Green’s version of materialist 
rhetoric eschews this binary by offering up a logic of articulation as “a way to map the multidimensional 
effectivity of rhetoric as a technology of deliberation” (39). The advantage of this logic of articulation over 
a logic of representation is 
a materialist rhetoric . . . that . . . replaces a hermeneutics of suspicion with a form of 
cartography that does not reduce the materiality of rhetorical practices to the interests of a 
“ruling class” at the same time as it maintains the irreducible difference between rhetoric 
and other material elements (technologies of power, production and the self in the 
creation of a governing apparatus). A materialist rhetoric built on the logics of 
articulation avoids positioning the historical forces of capitalism, white supremacy and/or 
patriarchy as the deep structure(s) of a governing apparatus but instead maps how they 
are transformed, displaced, deployed and/or challenged by a particular governing 
apparatus. In other words, the “macro-structures of power” exist less as hidden interests 
to be uncovered than as technologies distributed, activated and programmed by rhetorical 
practices for the purpose of policing a population. (39) 
Again, rhetorical materialism is thus reducible entirely to “critique” in the sense of demystifying the 
symbolic statements that sustain the capitalist order by calling attention to actual labor relations. 
Materialism is once again synonymous with criticism, leaving us to limit rhetorical considerations to 
linguistically mediated and human sustained realities. 
 
20 Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Haraway, Merleau-Ponty, Lingis, Deleuze and Guattari, and others have make 
similar arguments. 
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21 Also largely missing in rhetorical theory are the contributions of other such as Elizabeth A. Wilson, 
Grosz, Friedrich Kittler, software and hardware studies, Stacy Alaimo, Kevin Sharpe, Jennifer Andersen et 
al., Andrew Pickering, Tim Ingold, Lambros Malafouris, and, more recently, neurologists such as 
Catherine Malamou, Andy Clark, and Cathy Davidson who have made similar arguments about how 
objects work on subjects. 
 
22 I understand that many would likely raise the claim that Burke grounded language in the body (see Wess, 
“Representative Anecdotes”; Hawhee, Moving Bodies). As Burke notes in the International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, there is “motion without action,” and, further, “action is not reducible to terms of 
motion. For instance, the ‘essence’ or ‘meaning’ of a sentence is not reducible to its sheer physical 
existence as sounds in the air or marks on the page, although material motions of sort are necessary for the 
production, transmission, and reception of the sentence” (159). Agency was the element of the pentad that 
such material motions belonged to as they relate to rhetoric. He also writes, “Presumably the realm of 
nonsymbolic motion was all that prevailed on this earth before our kind of symbol-using organism evolved, 
and will go on sloshing about after we have gone” (160). I also understand that Burke theorized areas such 
as attitude and incipient action as pre-symbolic sources of affect. My claim is not at all that Burke was not 
attuned to issues of embodiment or performativity. I will readily concede that Burke’s division between 
action and motion is actually much more nuanced than an absolute divide between nature and culture that 
many (especially Berlin) attribute to him. Elsewhere, Burke incorporates attitude—a realm where the lines 
between action and motion become porous. It is even possible than an object for Burke can carry an attitude, 
a kind of incipient action, which could be the connection to act/action that would create the link to the 
object or the nonhuman. Furthermore, rhetorical “situations” are a locus of motives that are replete with 
objects. As I will argue through Latour, the case is more that Burke undertheorizes the role played by 
nonhuman actors in constituting even realities that are symbolically and that in terms of how he theorizes 
reality, he, unlike Latour or Bennett, is unwilling to grant science any specialized relationship to reality. 
 
23 Of Burke’s rhetorical realism, Wess suggests that  
language as action structures our lived experience to the real. . . . The real is gauged in 
the act, the prioritizing of this rather than that. The necessity of prioritizing is the 
constraint that rhetoric realism recognizes. Burke’s premise that language is action posits 
the act as the form in which language registers this constraint. As action, language 
inscribes rhetorical sayability rather than either enlightenment certainty or romantic 
authenticity. Charting that inscription is what Burke’s dramatism is all about. 
(Postmodernism 12; Coupe 12, 54; Rueckert) 
 
24 See Cherwitz’s (ed) Rhetoric and Philosophy for a full account of this debate. 
 
25 While I do not have the space to adequately address all of the realism and epistemic rhetoric debates that 
overlap with Burke, I would point the reader toward Daniel Royer’s seldom-cited essay, “New Challenges 
to Epistemic Rhetoric.” Royer not only provides an excellent literature review of the major articles 
involved in these debates, but he recasts the debates’ source of disagreement through the lens of a larger 
Kantian paradigm of anti-realism. 
 
26 In fact, Whitehead is seldom mentioned in rhetorical theory as a whole. One lone exception would be 
“Whitehead's Concept of Concrescence and the Rhetorical Situation” by Gerald D. Baxter and Bart F. 
Kennedy. 
 
27 Greaves is one of the last ones to weigh in on this debate and his settles in favor of human constructed 
reality:  
If rhetoric is integral to human thought, then writing becomes a central element of 
thinking and generating knowledge in all areas of human inquiry (at least in Western, 
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literate cultures). Teachers of writing, then, care as deeply as philosophers and theoretical 
physicists about the relationship between rhetoric and reality. One way to continue the 
discussion but avoid the impasse is to sidestep the philosophical questions about final 
outcomes and explore the kinds of roles that rhetoric plays in the research practices of 
human inquiry. If we can continue to ground this debate within specific scientific settings, 
listening in to the actual conversations among men and women who construct not only 
experiments but theories and models, and reading the documents and reports that position 
the researcher within the dominant discourses of her discipline, we can more accurately 
describe and extrapolate relations between reality and language. (245) 
 
28  Bryan Crable’s arguments in “Distance as Ultimate Motive,” would support Davis’s point of view in that 
“identification,” the outcome of rhetoricity, follows from conditions of “pure persuasion”—persuasion 
without symbolic activity—which is (im)possible to realize except as a nonrepresentational source of affect. 
 
29 In “Unframing Models of Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to Rhetorical Ecologies,” Jenny 
Edbauer makes a similar criticism of Lloyd Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. According to Edbauer, Bitzer’s 
audience/exigence/rhetor model is a “container” model that cannot encompass diverse and enduring 
sources of affect and interaction that proceed from an abstract reading of a rhetorical situation. 
 
30 For Latour, neither epistemic realists nor constructivists are completely right: “Instead of moving on to 
empirical studies of the networks that give meaning to the work of purification [e.g. producing a pure 
subject and a pure nature] it denounces, postmodernism rejects all empirical work as illusory and 
deceptively scientistic” (46). 
 
31 I am grateful to David Blakesley for calling my attention to this aspect of Burke’s thinking in relationship 
to Latour. 
 
32 As Karen Bassi notes via Butler, “theater is precisely the place where the political regulations and 
disciplinary practices that produce an ostensibly coherent gender are effectively placed in view” (10).  
 
33 The philosopher Sarah Kofman argues that Plato accused Heraclitus—like Ion—in the Theatetus of 
concealing the logic workings of his mind in poetry and for not noticing whether or not the people were 
following with each step of his logical unfolding. She writes: 
Plato does not hold Hercalitus’s psychology responsible for this dissimulation, but rather 
attributes it to the very style of his mythical discourse, which is “irresponsible” for the 
truth or non-truth of the content of it carries: irresponsible, because the father of a 
mythical discourse is not present to answer for it, nor to give an account of the words he 
uses . . . it cannot submit to questioning, to dialectical examination, in other words to 
confrontation with the thought of another. (41) 
 
34 I do not have the space to spend on Diogenes of Sinope because he does not specifically theorize 
“delivery” as a specific term in the way the Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintilian do. However, he does in 
fact anticipate Cicero’s notion of the “body in language” centuries earlier. He was famous for excreting in 
pubic as a form of argument as well as employing visual aids to make his point. He often carried about 
lamp during the daytime, claiming to be looking for an honest man. 
 
35 This claim, however, is also difficult to sustain, as it is impossible to actually determine or fix the 
original meaning of Plato’s dialogues (Vitanza, Negation). At times, he employed dramatic modes. At other 
moments, he mobilizes ironic modes, reducing any totalizing statements about his work to the realm of 
mere probability. 
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36 I want to mention in passing that the major texts on rhetoric follow the Greeks and Romans in largely 
ignoring delivery or allowing it the most superficial treatments. As Jacobi describes, Augustine’s On 
Christian Doctrine compliments the importance of delivery but offers no Ciceronian list of specific 
techniques. Boethius seldom references delivery, and Ramus simply kneecaps Quintilian and rhetoric 
without resituating delivery. Ramus’s rejection of delivery is truly a strange phenomenon in rhetorical 
history given his own interest in spatial and visual organizations of knowledge. In the late nineteenth 
century, Thomas Sheridin’s Course Lectures on Elocution argues that rhetors should strive to achieve a 
natural delivery style—to avoid the appearance of artifice—and Gilbert Austin recommended stylistic 
excess. 
 
37 Yancey offer a quick history of delivery in her introductory essay, “Delivering College Composition” to 
her edited collection, Delivering Composition although, with the exception of Jacobi’s essay, there is little 
reference to the rhetorical history of delivery or rhetorical theory in the collection. She links the concern 
with delivery over the spatial concern about the classroom space, “From the 1960s to the 1980s three other 
sites of curricular space appeared—communications programs; computer teaching classrooms; and writing 
centers—each of which brought with it a demand that the physical space for delivery be congruent with the 
activity” (9). Here, delivery is equivalent to the tools and technology of composition. Delivery is a process 
that occurs in part in processes that exist outside of the rhetor. Yancey’s concern is less for students 
delivering or the technologies themselves delivering, and more for how teachers might “deliver” 
composition in an era of multimodal production, concluding “whether or not we need a new paradigm for 
the delivery of college composition or something less radical isn’t clear; what is clear is that an articulation 
of this issue in these historical and epistemological terms helps us see that we are indeed at a critical 
moment in time, one that allows – perhaps even requires – that we take up a closer examination of 
composition and its delivery” (13). 
 
38 One other figure worth mentioning is Peter Ramus. Ramus’s division of invention and delivery was itself 
a Platonic conception of rhetoric and delivery informed by Plato’s geometric cosmological worldview. 
Gutenberg’s printing press helped spatialize our understanding of arrangement and delivery. Ironically, for 
Ramus, this invention only served to confirm in his mind the reduction of rhetoric to stylistic adornment 
and to solidify the work of dialectic and logic. Rhetoric, including delivery, was reduced to a sort of 
figurative art and left to eventually become the lamentable belle lettrism of Hugh Blair and the study of 
poetic and rhetorical figures. These were the beginnings so-called current-traditional rhetoric period that 
focused on arrangement, style, and invention. 
 
39 No mere humanist sentiment, Lanham’s arguments are empirically verifiable. As I will describe in detail 
in Chapter 4, the scientific journal Cognition demonstrated that having students read in non-standard fonts 
actually increased retention: “making material harder to learn can improve long-term learning and retention. 
More cognitive engagement leads to deeper processing, which facilitates encoding and subsequently better 
retrieval” (qtd. in Lang n. pag, “The Benefits of Making it Harder to Learn”). They conclude that we are 
actually wired to learn and retain information better in “disfluent” conditions. I will cover this situation in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
40 Tanner’s work coincides with poststructuralist experiments with the aesthetics of print such as Derrida’s 
Glas, and anticipates performative experiments by rhetorical theorists such as D. Diane Davis’ (2000) 
Breaking Up at Totality where the visuality of font and figurality of language become what Vitanza has 
called (via Lyotard) “parastrategies” to break up logocentrism which would otherwise privilege the 
phenomenological immediacy of speech. 
 
41 Although concerned with invention and not explicitly delivery, Gregory Ulmer’s theory of electracy—
image ontology—even goes so far as to suggest the pervasiveness of visual and networked rhetorics has 
fundamentally altered print and oral modes of reasoning and deliberation so as to require the theorization of 
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a unique electrate mode of reasoning that he calls “conduction.” Unlike the pre-planned topoi of Arisotle, 
linear cause-effect reasoning, or the rehearsed modes of argumentation that characterize the classical 
tradition, conduction refers to a free-floating space of emergence—chora in Plato’s terms. The Ulmerian 
rhetor’s invention process becomes a mode of opening oneself so that all institutions, objects, myths, 
symbols, and other aspects deliver meanings to the rhetor without the intent or with respect to the context 
of meaning of the original author. The rhetor, in an analogy taken from Plato’s chora, becomes a conduit or 
a channel instead for rhetoric of the originating impulse. Few, as we shall see below, go as far as Ulmer in 
making this claim for the canon. 
 
42 Connors also focuses on the formalized rules of paper type, typeface, and argues that an “ethos” is 
presented “for the realm of actio is the realm of ethos must more than logos or pathos” (66). How we 
manufacture the “self” or, to invoke Aristotle’s phrase, “incarnate” the soul into the audience is intimately 
related to material and medial confines. Horner made a similar argument in a later essay, “Reinventing 
Memory and Delivery,” that writing is more than a holistic impression—more than the sum total of 
graphics and fonts—of the ethos of the composer that the viewer constructs. 
 
43 An additional signal that we are in epistemic realism/ anti-realist relativism lies in the “encoder,” 
“decoder” language seen throughout many efforts to rethink delivery. While decoding, productively, can 
refer to having the theorization and practice of rhetoric through different mediums, it nevertheless is only 
articulated within the confines of logic, epistemology, and Platonic invention. If we do not study the 
medium, writes Welch, “the decoders are going to be less sophisticated in dealing with the powerful forms 
of newly powerful delivery systems of electric rhetoric.” She is quite correct at a purely descriptive level as 
is Bolter above in the sense of describing the mediality delivery from the user’s/receiver’s point of view 
(and we will see this pattern repeated in Mark Hansen’s point of view in Chapter 5); however, her language 
of decoding is the language of Enlightenment critique and the modern Constitution. Despite the conflation 
of medium and delivery, delivery remains harnessed to invention—in particular, a social-epistemic and 
critique based invention where delivery is just an analytical (or productive) tool and, in terms of creating 
with technology, an afterthought. It is not too far to claim that this is, in a sense, a remediated Platonism by 
another name that desires to embody and materialize delivery, while disembodying and dematerializing the 
rhetorical practices and the complex ways in which it makes more visible what was already an untenable 
separation between human and nonhuman, nature and culture. As I noted in my analysis of Burke’s 
recalcitrance in Chapter 2, the anti-realist or naïve realist approach representing and meaning is an decoder 
model wherein decoding means determining the ideological content or truth or falsity of representational 
reality. Welch is not looking at delivery to see texts as complex nodal points of circulation and disclosure 
through vast human and nonhuman ecologies. Rather, the occasion of delivery is enough to extend the 
work of epistemic rhetoric by applying constructivist and cognitivist paradigms as usual while failing to 
heed the phenomenological or ontological distinctions inherent in such a project. As Barad will help us to 
realize below, it is not that seeing delivery as a complex performance excludes truth/falsity from 
consideration; rather, it is to recognize that appeals to truth/falsity are always already bound up in complex 
cycles of circulation, and in need of constant rearticulation. 
 
44 In The Laws of Media, we find the “tetrad” as a method of McLuhuan trying to provide a more specific 
organizational analysis—a fourfold composed of enhancement, obsolescence, retrieval, and reversal. 
 
45 Harman’s own claims, however, that Aristotle argued that rhetoric was the art of concealment are simply 
mistaken for a variety of reasons. However, I will readily concede that it would be amazing and incredible 
if Aristotle would actually lend himself to such a reading. 
 
46 For Giorgio Agamben as well, potentialities do not merely refer to acts of human existence 
(Potentialities). 
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47 I write “pseudo-Cicero” here because although it cannot be verified that Cicero wrote the RAH, it is 
heavily suspected that he was the author. 
 
48 However, with respect to Plato and Aristotle, a nonsymbolic account of delivery is nevertheless 
intimately connected to the Q Question that Richard Lanham asks (Chapter 1): how do we know if the good 
man speaking is a good man? Cicero, pseudo-Cicero, and Quintilian largely avoid the moral questions in 
the service of a sophistic position of seeking the available means of persuasion for a given case. Delivery 
seems to be precisely what Plato and Aristotle feared: an “anything goes, no holds barred” persuasion of 
the completion of the rhetor’s aim when Quintilian speaks of the importance of being able “to exhibit an 
emotion that cannot be distinguished from the truth” (X.75). In essence, the Romans rhetoricians tip 
hypokrisis toward acting and performance as the only goal of effective rhetorical delivery, leaving open the 
possibility that the orator who speaks the truth might fail to convince where the rhetor who seeks self-
interested falsehoods may succeed by virtue of skill in delivery. Morality, thus, would have to be supplied 
by the common or by studying virtuous texts. Isocrates, for example, in Antidosis, claims that while he 
cannot promise happiness or virtue for those who study rhetoric, “those who follow the precepts he lays out 
will be helped more speedily toward honesty of character” (58). In an early formulation of Matthew 
Arnold’s “sweetness and light” doctrine, Isocrates claims that if one’s subject matter is praiseworthy, and 
the more one contemplates what is praiseworthy, the more one’s soul is directed down this path. Isocrates 
writers, “Furthermore, the more one studies what constitutes good character for the community and the 
more one works to present a good character in one’s rhetoric activities, the more one habituates oneself to 
being a good character” (23). We will return to this point again in Chapter 6 as it has profound implications 
for who (women, slaves) and what (nonhuman actors) are allowed to be present in the rhetorical situation 
by considering Latour’s re-reading of the Gorgias and Rancière’s understanding of indecorous delivery as a 
form of egalitarian speech. 
 
49 Polypsychism holds that all entities are intentional and conscious actors at some level. 
 
50 This example was intended for illustrative purposes. I will readily concede that Hussurl would not 
include semiotics and signifiers in his account. That is, he would not include the Chinese characters as part 
of the sensory unity of the coffee cup. 
 
51 I want to offer a point of clarification about agency. Latour collapses the distinctions between human 
agents and nonhuman agents in order to propose a new analytical model for social science. However, it is 
impossible to actually attribute “agency” to all actors. I side with Levi Bryant’s understanding of agency as 
he proposes it in his forthcoming book Onto-Cartography. He conceives of agency in terms of differential 
gradients with what he calls a criteria of “a minimal degree of self-directness.” A virus possesses a very 
low degree of self-directness whereas dogs and humans possess greater degrees. Thus, a small stone being 
tumbled through a small stream, he suggests, will have no agency. By contrast, Latour would claim that the 
pebble’s “agency” does not refer to an entity’s capacities for self-directness. Rather, its “agency” obtains in 
relationship to how its position in a given actor-network complex constrains or enables the agency of other 
actors around it. Simply put, Latour, again, does not offer an ontological theory of materiality agency. 
 
52 Michelle Ballif’s Seduction and Diane Davis’s Breaking Up At Totality are examples of work within 
rhetorical theory where Butler’s theorization of feminist materiality is accepted without much modification. 
Nevertheless, I do want to concede that this criticism of Butler’s work as a whole is unwarranted. Bodies 
That Matter does in fact make a shift to discuss the biological body and her more recent work on life 
certain discusses the role of nonhuman actors. 
 
53 Compactants is Latour’s recently employed extension of “actant” to describe computer and technological 
actants (Garber).  
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54 See Miguel de Beistegui’s Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology for a comparison 
between Heidegger and Deleuze. The two figures do in fact overlap in some important ways; however, 
their points of departure would require too much commentary than I have space here. 
 
55 Fuller writes, “What abstract poetry tried to achieve is achieved in a similar fashion, though more 
consistently, by Dadaistic painters, who played off actual real objects by nailing them or gluing them next 
to each other in a painting. Concepts can be played off against each other much more clearly than when 
their meanings have been translated into words. (1) 
 
56 I would take issue with the fact that Cooper does actually deny that nonhuman actors have agency at all. 
However, I am in general agreement with the rest of her conclusions in this article. 
 
57 Indeed, it is the argument of my dissertation that these concerns are not far removed from the pragmatic 
concerns of writing teachers. My argue here echoes that of Jeff Rice in “Networked Assessment” when he 
considers how actor-network theory, a form of assemblage theory, causes us to re-think how we view the 
process of assessment for writing program administration. Rice argues,  
Traditionally, assessment at the programmatic or individual levels depends on the circulation of 
[value-laden] topoi in order to make meaning. These topoi include the circulated points that 
writers write for multiple media, multiple audiences, multiple genres, and over time. A networked 
assessment, on the other hand, takes up Latour’s notion of the trace and its account. By focusing 
on the tracing of a given program’s network, for instance, the role of assessment shifts toward an 
understanding of activity relationships as opposed to generic outcomes. In turn, assessment 
follows a new media logic in order to understand how a given grouping of activities and agents 
reveals a program’s work. (1) 
 
58 I describe the modern Constitution as Latour defines it in We Have Never Been Modern in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
59 The view of code as static is yet another tacitly held claim by many affiliated with composition studies 
and digital rhetoric. In the 1999 special issue of Computers and Composition on the rhetoric of code, 
commentators spent more time arguing for the creative agency of the writer over a monolithic and 
inflexible view of coding than actually considering complex points of rhetorical interconnectivitly between 
computer technology and cultural meaning. To cite one example, Joel Haefner translated Hamlet’s “To be 
or not to be” statement into a Boolean function in the C programming language as a way to argue that code 
does not have the same contemplative reflexive creativity as poetry. Here, we see shades of Helmers and 
Hill’s desire for reflection within visual rhetoric: “The simultaneous dichotomy of Shakespeare demands-to 
consider being and nonbeing-cannot exist in the text of code” (329). Computers are mechanistic. Ian 
Bogost counters, “We think of computers as frustrating, limiting and simplistic not because they execute 
processes, but because they are frequently programmed to execute simplistic processes” (7).  
 
60 Although, as Kathy Davidson has recently (2012) articulated, a rudimentary understanding of HTML5 
would undeniably be helpful given the post-2011 rise in networked-based communication and the digital 
humanities in order to theorize and practice communication. 
 
61 For further evidence of this claim, I would point the reader toward Matthew Fuller’s essay on Microsoft 
Word in Beyond The Blip. To loosely borrow Althusser’s language, Fuller painstakingly details how all of 
the different menu options in the Word interface “hail” and “interpellate” the writer in ways that do end up 
impacting the activity of writing. 
 
62 Along with Bogost, McGonigal, and Anna Anthropy, I agree that video games as a form of new media 
because of the increasing accessibility of “do-it-your” “prosumer” technology. Point-and-click and drag-
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and-drop interfaces such as GameSalad have made videogame production as simple as video-editing in 
Apple’s iMovie.  
 
63 According to Christina Haas, the “myth” that technology is transparent holds that  
[w]riting is not changed in any substantive way by the transparent medium through which it passes. 
In this view, writing is writing is writing, unchanged and unaffected by the mode of production 
and presentation. . . . But believing that technology is transparent does not in fact make it so, and 
does not preclude technology having powerful effects on literacy, effects that we are not prepared 
to examine or understand if we are operating with a belief that technology does not matter. (34) 
 
64 Indeed, while Bogost and media studies scholars enjoyed little citation in the 2008 Computers and 
Composition special issue, Gee was frequently cited. Although Gee is interested in the uniqueness of the 
videogame mediums expressive capacities, his model of analysis in his seminal book, What Video games 
Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy, is that of discourse communities. Just as we learn to 
become linguistic code-switchers as teenagers when shifting in between peer or adult discourse 
communities, gaming literacies, he argues, are analogous. Gee, like delivery theorists, wants to add an 
“always already there” mediality to dominant and privileged literacy classes of print reading and writing. 
“After all,” he states, “we never just read or write; rather, we always read or write something in some way” 
(14). The “rules” of a text require that it be read in some way (15). Richard Lanham’s famous “at/through” 
division in The Electronic Word makes a similar point about the extra-text features of objects, whereby 
homogenous formal elements (uniform typeface) encourage us to look through the text, ignoring the 
material and visual instantiations that we can only see by looking “at” it. In a similar sense, Gee argues that 
since new literacies (visual, digital, gaming) are multiple, learning occurs through the exposure to new 
forms of literacy. Along the same lines, literacy means learning about the semiotic domain of video games 
where the individual can “produce meanings.” A digital literacy theorist thus would analyze commonplace 
phrases from The World of Warcraft such as “LFD” comments that pop up from random players in the 
global chat screen. The phrase means “looking for dungeon” and functions as a request from a player to see 
if any other players want to join for a raid. In the sense of participating within the literacy community of a 
game, a player is unable to join, respond, or form her own group without being literate in the discursive 
norms of the community. Gee concludes that literacies are thus always embedded in discourses and 
activated through “lived, talked, enacted, value-and-belief-laden practices . . . carried out in specific places 
and at specific times” (3).  
 In Gee’s thinking, multimodal literacy in particular is connected to the de-coding of symbols. 
Constance Steinkuehler suggests via Gee, “literacy, within the context of video games, is not defined as a 
‘coding’ or ‘skill-based’ process but rather ‘the ability to make sense out of semiotic systems that include a 
diversity of communicative modes’ ” (Gee qtd. in Steinkuehler 100). Following from this view, Gee 
ultimately concludes that video games are thus “semiotic domains”: “To understand or produce any word, 
symbol, image, or artifact in a given semiotic domain, a person must be able to situate the meaning of that 
word, symbol, image, or artifact within embodied experiences of action, interaction, or dialogue about that 
domain” (24). He breaks semiotic domains into two levels—internal and external—of “design grammars.” 
Design grammars are the symbolic and social contexts that govern the appropriateness of content for a 
given semiotic domain and the internal design grammar. The internal reflects the symbolic content intended 
by the designers and the external refers to the real world gaming and social behaviors—an “affinity 
group”—that establishes these behaviors. Thus, Gee concludes that gaming literacies involve both a 
mastery of symbolic content and norms of the community of players to which one associates with. Despite 
this attention to mediality and the specificity of video games, Gee’s semiotic focus inevitably reduces 
medium to semiotic context. Gee is primarily interested in how the user interacts with the content than with 
the concrete specificity of the technologies that produce these representations and symbols themselves. As 
Friedrich Kittler argues in a confirmation of the necessity of considering technological literacies from 
Bogost’s point of view, “Given that tools are always defined from the point of view of their user, there is 
no need to question the old approach that defines machines from the point of view of humans; and 
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subsequently there is no need to consider the possibility that, conversely, humans are defined by machines” 
(40). 
 
65 Again, to point back to my arguments in Chapter 2, this realization goes far beyond the likely Burkean 
critique that Bennett (or Latour) describes action in the terms of motion. For Latour, this would be an 
artificial separation: action is inseparable from motion in reality and we can realize this inseparability 
without resorting to the terms of causal determinism or mechanistic description that Burke complains of in 
his rejection of positivist scientism. In direct contrast, the refusal to engage with how empirical descriptions 
of the forces of nonhumans condition the scene of action is another way by which Cartesian dualism 
remains at play—a hierarchy that induces cooperation efforts against ecological realism and the inclusion 
of nonhuman actors in the shaping of rhetorical forces in the world. If we were to consider two additional 
Burkean terms, agency (equipment used for action) and act (action itself), Latour would likely claim that 
neither designates a separable element for the rhetorician to extract in her reading of a rhetorical situation; 
rather they co-produce one another to the point where act cannot be discussed apart from agency and scene 
composed by nonhumans.  
 
66 One of the reasons that I am so insistent at the outset of this chapter on arguing more generally for the 
problems that rhetorical theory has with technological materiality is that this fundamental divide between 
symbols and medium is so profound that realizing the claim that delivery theorists desire—that “delivery is 
the medium”— will require considerable revisions against the most entrenched anti-realist, social 
constructivist, subject-centered (or de-centered), and epistemic tenets of rhetoric. In fact, this Cognition 
study will come up again in the next chapter via my exploration of Katherine Hayles term “technotext,” a 
term for compositional practices that foreground the medium of composition as a form of composition. In 
other words, we can take the Cognition experiment as a technê for having students learn about and 
compose with the materiality or mediality of composition as a pragmatic gesture that can raise students’ 
critical awareness of technological mediation (Shipka, Toward a Composition Made Whole). Similarly, I 
would argue that we should take examples such post-cinematic affect and begin to illustrate to our students 
how companies such as Dow Chemical in their award-winning The Human Element advertising campaign 
utilize nonsymbolic forms of persuasion in their high speed video montages that produce a dizzying effect 
that Dominic Pettman dubbed, the “corporate sublime” (5). 
 
67 Examples include Jeff Rice’s edited collection From A to <a> on html and rhetoric, Annette Vee’s 
unpublished doctoral dissertation on the rhetoric of code, Byron Hawk’s edited collection Small Tech, and 
Bay and Rickert’s essay, “The New Media Fourfold.” Eyman’s unpublished dissertation also offers 
promising inroads for this issue. A 1997 Computers and Composition special issue on programming as 
writing also merits citation. 
 
68 I do not have the space to discuss the debate in detail, but I must observe that what games scholars now 
as the “luddology/narratology,” debate turns on a similar argument between scholars who want to focus on 
the representational content and those who want to focus on procedures, software, and technical processes. 
 
69 In addition, Bogost has recently admitted the failure of representations and video games when weighed 
against the unstable circulation of flows. At a recent talk at the Nonhuman Turn in Twenty-First Century 
Studies, Bogost noted that his social media game Cow Clicker, intended as a critical satire, actually 
spawned beyond his authorial control. The game was popular enough to even merit “cow clicktivism,” the 
ironic use of the player’s nonsymbolic enjoyment of the community of the game to send cows to the “third 
world” for clicking on cows. This example once again demonstrates not the procedures are unimportant—
far from it. It is does emphasize that players respond to move than just an alignment of procedure and 
representation. 
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70 Logocentrism was best articulated by Jacques Derrida. In a very general understanding, 
“(phal)logocentrism” (as he frequently corrected us) is the assumption that writing reflects thinking, and 
that thinking itself is an immanent (self-contained) process of a transcendental (divorced from material 
conditions of embodiment) mind. Derrida counters that thinking is bound up with the technical and material 
processes of writing—a dual of presence and absence that has lurked as a dangerous threat to presumptions 
of rationality at least since Phaedrus was caught with a transcript of a speech in the rhetoric. 
 
71 I am unsure of how to differentiate protocol from procedure except at this level the stance vis-a-vis 
representation and coded-rule. Bogost, for whatever reason, does not acknowledge or discuss protocol in 
his literature review on gaming and procedurality in Procedural Rhetoric. 
 
72 See Richard Young’s “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks” for a full discussion of the technê as technical 
knowledge or divine inspiration dichotomy. Hawk also fully explores this issue in A Counter-History of 
Composition. 
 
73 I discussed McCorkle’s work in detail in Chapter 3. 
74 I am grateful to Scot Barnett for this specific suggestion about applying Miller’s work in this context. 
 
75 Assemblage is a term that DeLanda extends from Deleuze’s philosophy with the explicit purpose of 
describing social phenomena. See Alex Reid’s The Two Virtuals for a general introduction to Deleuze’s 
theory in the context of rhetorical theory and composition studies. 
 
76 Although these figures are not widely cited among composition scholars, they are certainly not 
unprecedented. Alex Reid’s The Two Virtuals and Byron Hawks’ A Counter-History of Composition have 
made specific connections between Deleuze and Guattari and new media theory and composition pedagogy. 
 
77 I defined “phase space” in the previous chapter and I define it again below. It is term from complexity 
theory that describes material entities not in terms of their fixed Newtonian points in space but in terms of a 
non-linear space of change over time. 
 
78 Thus, given the lack of authorial or agentive “I,” we should not only study a rhetorical problem such as 
environmental pollution through the appropriate selection of imagery such as the pastoral figuration of a 
pathos-laden Mother Earth that we wound and hurt in order to create sympathy or identification in an 
audience for our cause. Rather, a rhetorical analysis might start within a detailed tracing of the presence of 
pollution with the assemblages of the home and within workplaces. Here, it is important to trace not just 
points of symbolic circulation in relationship to emergent publics and political discourse, but material 
points of circulation as well—the ways in which actors such as chips materialize in different configurations 
of bodies and assemblages. Bennett offers an example of mercury poisoning: 
These movements [of mercury] reveal that lower-class peoples, indigenous peoples, and non-white 
peoples carry a disproportionate toxic load. Tracing the traffic in toxins involves 
scientific/economic/political/ethical analysis of realms and interest groups heretofore imagined 
separately, for example, those of health, medicine occupation safety, disability rights, and 
environmental justice, as well as “traditional” environmentalism devoted to the welfare of wild 
creatures. (80)  
She concludes, “The same material substance, in this case, a particular toxin such as mercury or dioxin, 
may affect the workers who produce it, the neighborhood in which it is produced, the domesticated and 
wild animals that ingest it, and the humans who ingest the animals who have ingested it” (80).  
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79 It should be noted that Bennett’s claim about cultural studies’ lack of attention to materiality is not 
entirely accurate. There are several scholars (Grosz; Wilson; Alaimo) aligned with cultural studies who 
definitely have addressed the materiality of cultural artifacts. 
 
80 The use of the term assemblage became en vogue in the writing of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari. 
DeLanda is heavily influenced by both thinkers, but it is not important for the purposes of this essay to 
spend much space in parsing their similarities and differences. In general, DeLanda is a Deleuzian thinker, 
but he places emphasis on different points within Deleuze’s thinking that other Deleuzians have ignored. 
 
81 Jennifer Whitson’s use of Latour’s actor-network theory—a variation of assemblage theory—in order to 
explain “counter-play”—another variation of “playing the procedure”—best illustrates the need for games 
studies scholars to utilize such an approach to video game studies. “Counter-play” occurs when players 
resist the constraints of the coded procedures. It is not that algorithms are not persuasive; rather, Whitson 
suggests, “it in the very nature of play to find the movement between the rule, and for many players the 
‘fun’ in play is the inherent challenge of attempting to master, defeat, or remake games’ formal structures” 
(1). In order to conceptualize control, Latour’s actor-network theory focuses not only on the representations 
or the game, but the material structures and relations that give rise to the game, from the movement from 
the designer’s studios, the technical documents that describe gameplay, to the production facility, to retail 
stores, and eventually to the player’s home. Whitson suggests that digital rhetoric scholars must study the 
parts and not the “finished” whole (e.g., the finished newsgame), considering both human and nonhuman 
actors as equal participants, such as “developers, producers, programmers, graphic artists, playtesters, PR 
personnel, critics, lobbyists alongside discs and cartridges, consoles, handhelds, game engines, graphic 
software and hardware” (6). The “empirical” presence of nonhuman actors works to constrain and confine 
the limitations of what a game can and cannot perform. In a way similar to my observations about post-
cinematic affect above, actors have multiple goals: publishers want a profitable game while developers may 
seek critical acclaim and graphic awards over playability. Hardcore players demand time-intensive and 
complex games with intricate boss sequences while causal gamers want simple and finite games 
interactions. If needs are not met, then some actors drop out of the network: “Simply put, the more actors 
there are working in some semblance of unison, the strong the game network” (7). Thus, there is no 
underlying structure of games or discernable individual design, but, as Whitson concludes in a direct nod 
toward circulation scholarship, “there are circulating structuring templates that can lead to similarities 
between networks” such as surveillance and monitoring (8). In Chapter 2, I referred these structuring 
templates via Latour’s term “circulating reference” (Pandora’s Hope). In DeLanda’s terms, structuring 
templates mean that video games are bound up within micro-level assemblages (players and designers’ 
self-interested motivations) and macro-level assemblages (company profit) (7). 
 
82 I thank Levi Bryant for calling my attention to this marble-bowl example as a teaching heuristic. 
 
83 I am grateful to Todd May for calling my attention to this aspect of Protevi’s work in his lecture, 
“Humanism and Solidarity.” 
 
84 Alaimo’s claim is not that scientists must function as a new intellectual elite who necessarily serves as an 
intermediary for any social issue. She is not referring to scientists in the sense of those who serve 
multinational science companies, but, in Latour’s sense, science writ large as a knowledge-producing entity. 
Her point is more that the points of interconnection between bodies and man-made harmful chemicals has 
reached a level of sophistication and imbrication within daily life, that scientific evidence is necessary 
simply to offer instruments of detection that can then inform political action. 
 
85 Despite the points of congruence between Alexander Galloway’s thinking and some of nonmodern 
ontologies that I have previous discussed, Galloway has recently (2012) claimed that progressive politics 
and flat ontologies are irreconcilable (“Criticism”). More prominently, the critical media theorist Andrew 
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Feenberg has argued that in Latour’s nonmodern ontology, “the loser’s perspective in any struggle 
disappears from view” similar to how Enron’s corporate malfeasance is placed alongside electricity in 
Bennett’s account of the electrical grid in Chapter 4 as just one more actant among actants. If, Feenberg 
writes, “morality in this new theory is now confined to holding the collective open to new claimants,” so 
that “morality is no longer based on principles but on these operational rules”; the usual elements—
“freedom of choice, understanding, self-reflection”—cannot be universally ascribed to all actants.” Indeed, 
Feenberg is pointing precisely to the need to move from ontology and analytical description to the need to 
establish ethical and politics forms of normativity. 
 
86 Tim Morton’s latest book, Realist Magic, takes Harman’s claim that objects interact in a sensual ether to 
suggest that all forms of causality are aesthetic in nature. 
 
87 Isocrates offers another illustrative example of this trend. Isocrates, for example, claims in Antidosis that 
while he cannot promise happiness or virtue for those who study the great speeches, “those who follow the 
precepts he lays out will be helped more speedily toward honesty of character” (22). In an early 
formulation of Matthew Arnold’s “sweetness and light” doctrine, Isocrates claims that if one’s subject 
matter is praiseworthy, and the more one contemplates what is praiseworthy, the more one’s soul is 
directed down this path. He writes, “Furthermore, the more one studies what constitutes good character for 
the community and the more one works to present a good character in one’s rhetoric activities, the more 
one habituates oneself to being a good character” (23). Undoubtedly, similar assumptions in the present 
moment inform the National Basketball Association’s racial logic behind the dress code policy that bans 
African-American players from wearing “doo” rags and other “urban” paraphernalia. Thinking back to 
Plato and acting, the clothes “make the man” as the body and soul must be in alignment, and African-
Americans are viewed as incapable of “acting” in the same way as an intelligent white philosopher who can 
don blackface and know that he is still a white male at the end of the day.  
 
88 Names include Fantham; Leff; Rosteck and Leff; Smith; and Deem. 
 
89 He lists the following scholars: Farrell; Whitson and Poulakos; Vitanza, Negation; and, Greene. As an 
aside, I agree with this point in the sense that no one specifically referenced the term decorum. I would only 
add that a critique of decorum is presupposed by Victor J. Vitanza’s performative—“non-positive 
affirmative”—aesthetic. Vitanza’s non-linear, affected, and paralogical writing style was so successful in 
disrupting the “police order” that characterizes academic norms of style that the prominent rhetorical 
scholars George A. Kennedy accused “Vitanzan Vitalism” of suffering from a “bizarre form of linguistic 
herpes” (14). The immunological metaphor is appropriate. As Robert Esposito has noted, “community” (the 
polis of those with something in common) is established by symbolic movements of immunity that seek 
that exclude what cannot fit comfortably into norms. Vitanza, noticeably, calls his own project “anti-body 
rhetorics,” in possible tacit recognition of this immunizing function. It is not politics in ’s sense, but neither 
is it a form that can be recuperated within a dominant academic writing style. Indeed, we can even include 
D. Diane Davis’s Breaking Up At Totality that manages to circumvent and interrupt the “decorous” modes 
of academic writing through performative stylistic experiments. 
 
90 For example, Leff directly claims that Cicero’s technical understanding of delivery was explicitly related 
to style (and also delivery) to the extent that it was “canonized along with purity, clarity, and ornamentation” 
(112). 
 
91 Although I do not have the space to pursue them, there are clear overtones here between performance in 
Butler’s Foucaultian sense and decorum’s disciplining of the body. 
 
92 I am grateful to Jared Colton for helping me understand how Rancière’s philosophy functions in 
relationship to community. 
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93 Rancière does address technology in part in The Ignorant Schoolmaster.  
 
94 This claim is not an endorsement of Donna Haraway’s early work on cyborgs. Haraway was widely 
criticized for implying that only cyborgs—human-technology subject positions—could form viable 
positions of resistance in the current technological disorder. Simply put, she undertheorized forms of 
resistance that might be necessary for those disenfranchised by the digital divide. In making this point, I 
simply seek to highlight the fact that the current technological order has increasingly played a role in 
forming subjectivity to the extent that its role must be addressed. 
 
95 Bennett extends Spinoza’s conatus to include inanimate actors. The view shifts from degrees of 
intentionality that, say, a bacteria will possess to lesser degrees than a human, to non-linear forms of 
emergence that inanimate actors can participate in. 
 
96 In a subsequent essay, “Democracy of Objects,” Latour offers a more complimentary role of rhetoric, 
listing its production of “tricks” and “tropes” as essential for composing the common world (xi). Given that 
rhetoric, for Dewey, is something that should be invested in minoririatian representation—action borne out 
of a political presupposition of ontological equality respective to a given formation of the human-
nonhuman collective, rhetoric’s ethical obligation corresponds to the opposite point of emphasis for 
Levinas. It does not merely work on the Other’s (the Object’s) infinite withdrawal, but on Vollzug: what is 
disclosed and what emerges in ontological hypokrisis. Rhetorical scholars will understandably be wary of 
the possibility that Latour has reinscribed rhetoric yet again to style. Yet, my view is that “style” and 
aesthetics could be a reductive role that rhetorical theorists embrace in a world of nonhuman agency. 
Gravity is not rhetorical, but it nevertheless produces emergent ratios of agency through which symbolic 
action occurs. Others may well wonder if rhetoric should not be listed as a profession alongside politics and 
morality. I believe that this role for rhetoric is still crucial as even economists and scientists still employ 
metaphor and figural language to organized raw data in examples such as quantum string theory. 
 
97 This is discussed in his differentiation between matters of “fact” and matters of “concern” in “Why Has 
Critique Run Out of Steam.” Matters of fact are aesthetic expressions that obtain through Latour’s notion of 
the modern Constitution—an ontological division of culture, politics, and human rhetorical creativity on 
one side and nature and scientific representation of an eternally invariably nature on the other. The 
insistence on “fact” as a correlate of realism and representation is impossible as even neoconversatives such 
as Texas Government Rick Parry are “postmodern” enough to invoke “social construction” when it comes 
to rejecting declarations of scientific fact in the case of global warming. Given a communicative and 
epistemological paradigm when third wave feminists, neo-Marxists, and Government Perry are all in basic 
agreement that reality is socially constructed, Latour asks all critique-minded humanists to do some soul-
searching in order to resolve this problem: “what is it that we were after when we were so intent on 
showing the social construction of scientific facts?” (“Why Has Critique” 227). To paraphrase Latour 
loosely, the original problem that critique rose to respond to in idealism and enlightenment was not to say 
that facts cannot be established and to move away from empiricism entirely, but to move us closer to the 
facts through a renewal of empiricism. Latour argues, “The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to 
believe that there was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact except by moving away from them and 
directing one’s attention toward the conditions that made them possible” (231). But already, Latour 
complains that this accepted “too uncritically what matters of fact were” (231). Matters of fact—what the 
mind could logically or could not logically derive from immanent rational processes and what invariable 
truth of nature science could empirically describe—were useful for debunking pre-enlightenment 
mythologies; however, Latour concludes that by the same token, matters of fact “became eaten up by the 
same debunking apparatus” (231). 
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98 Along these lines, we should be wary of anthropomorphism simply because corporate entities are often 
skilled at anthropomorphism in order to personalize their products as Barbara Johnson has noted in Persons 
and Things. At the same time, the rejoinder to Johnson’s arguments is that anthropomorphism with the 
capitalist assemblage differs greatly from anthropomorphism in the activist assemblage. Simply stated, this 
is the old problem with rhetoric: do we use it for good or for evil? 
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